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Abstract
Much public historical mythology asserts that Chief Albert Luthuli, the one-
time leader of Africa's oldest liberation movement, launched an armed struggle on the
very eve he returned to South Africa after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. This
profound irony engenders what is arguably one of the most relevant and controversial
historical debates in South African as some recent scholarship suggests Luthuli did
not countenance the armed movement. Today, Luthuli remains a figure of great
contestation due to his domestic and international prominence and impeccable moral
character. Icons of the liberation struggle, political parties and active politicians
understand their justification for past actions and their contemporary relevance to be
dependent upon a given historical memory of Luthuli. Often that memory is not
compatible with the archival record.
Contrary to a nationalist inspired historical perspective, this investigation
concludes that Luthuli did not support the initiation of violence in December 1961.
Evidence suggests that Luthuli only reluctantly yielded to the formation (not the
initiation) of an armed movement months before the announcement in October 1961
that he would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1961. After the
announcement, Luthuli vociferously argued against the use of violence until April
1962. From April 1962 to his death in 1967, Luthuli only advocated non-violent
methods and did not publicly support or condemn the use of violence.
Congregationalism imbedded within Luthuli the primacy of democracy,
education, multiracialism and egalitarianism, propelling him to the heights of political
leadership prior to 1961. Following 1961 these same seminal emphases rendered
Luthuli obsolete as a political leader within an increasingly radicalised, desperate and
violent environment. The author argues that not only did the government drastically
curtail Luthuli's ability to lead, but so did his colleagues in the underground structures
of the Congresses' liberation movement, rendering him only the titular leader of the
African National Congress until his death. While Luthuli's Christian faith provided
the vigour for his political success, it engendered the inertia for his political
irrelevance following the launch of violence. By not supporting the African National






There appear to be two approaches in ANC history. The dominant and
older tradition of non-violence was part of its initial political
philosophy in 1912, reached its best manifestation in the life and
approach of Lutuli, and continued after his death. The other approach
of armed struggle was a development after 1960 and was continued by
the military wing during the exile of the ANC. Lutuli was among
those who maintained the non-violent approach even when the armed
struggle began. Lutuli expressed his understanding of why some had
chosen the option of violence without adopting the view that the policy
of the ANC had radically changed.
Practical Example
In February 2004, I received a submission from the South African
government's (Ministry of Arts and Culture) consultative historian for the Chief
Albert Luthuli Legacy Project recommending changes to a text soon to be engraved in
granite at the Groutville Congregational Church where Luthuli served as a lay-
preacher and deacon.2 One quotation under the heading "Religious Leader"
(Theology), in a perceived relation to a second quotation under the heading "National
Leader" (politics), raised special concern for the historian. The concerned quotations
by Luthuli read:
My own beliefs as I have already said are to a certain extent motivated
by Christian leanings. Because of my Christian leanings I would
hesitate to be a party to violence...3
I Gerald Pillay, ed., Voices ofLiberation: Albert Luthuli (Pretoria: Human Science Research Council,
1993), 1: 30.
Here, as in some other sources, "Luthuli" is spelled "Lutuli". Luthuli often signed his correspondences
"Lutuli". Other members ofLuthuli's family have always spelled their surname "Luthuli" and found it
peculiar, then and now, that Luthuli omitted the "h". Most secondary sources include an "h". In this
study, I include an "h" in my text. Nevertheless, I do not change the spelling ofLuthuli's name from
"Lutuli" to "Luthuli" ifI am quoting a source that does not include an "h".
2 The quotations inscribed on the text mural were not referenced nor listed in any chronological order.
The quotations were only associated together according to theme (Community, Religious, National and
International Leader).
3 "Excerpts from Chief Albert Luthuli's evidence at the Treason Trial (1956-1961) dealing with his
understanding ofa non-violent liberation struggle".
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, I: 154.
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... in the face of the uncompromising White refusal to abandon a policy
which denies the African and other oppressed South Africans their
rightful heritage - freedom - no one can blame brave just men for
seeking justice by the use ofviolent methods; nor could they be
blamed if they tried to create an organised force in order ultimately to
establish peace and racial harmony.4
The historian recommended:
I would like to suggest that we drop [the first] quotation ... especially
because it is quoted out of context. It does not capture the entire
statement that Luthuli issued in 1964, and also gives an impression that
he was condemning Mandela and others at the end of the Rivonia
Trial. I particularly feel that it will feed into stereotypes that would do
Luthuli [more] harm than good: Can we truly suggest that Luthuli
publicly criticised the "armed struggle? Are we suggesting that
Mandela and Kotane were liars? Furthermore, the rest of the statement
(appears as the last quotation under politics in this document) gives a
different picture altogether. Let us not create confusion. Drop this
quote and retain the last one under politics.5
The historian's recommendation, and subsequent rationale, to retain the
quotation that possibly infers Luthuli's support of violence and to delete the quotation
that indicated Luthuli expressed a reservation to resort to violence to advance the
struggle for freedom inspired this investigation. The recommendation can be
construed to be unsympathetic to many suppositions that are made in this study such
as: 'Luthuli did not support the decision to form or launch Umkhonto we Sizwe
("Spear of the Nation", MK)'; 'an interpretation that Luthuli disagreed with other
4 Following the "Rivonia Trial" (1963-1964) on 12 June 1964, Luthuli issued this statement when the
court sentenced Nelson Mandela, WaIter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathada, Govan Mbeki, Dennis Goldburg,
Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi and Andrew Mlangeni to life imprisonment.
PilIay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 152.
5 The historian accurately perceived a disjuncture. More than "out of context", the above quotations by
Luthuli derive from two very different contexts. The second quotation seemingly inferring support for
a violent method originated from a statement made by Luthuli after the Rivonia Trial. The first
quotation stating support for a non-violent option originated from his testimony at the Treason Trial
four years earlier. Both quotations were taken from Pillay's book that misleadingly included the
"excerpts from ... the treason trial" (lower case) immediately after PilIay's section on Luthuli's Rivonia
Trial statement (153). The structure of Pillay's text is chronological. Therefore, a reader may easily
mistake the two quotations within the same section as contemporaneous. Pillay did not indicate a date
associated with the Treason Trial excerpts nor is a reference for the testimony provided in the
bibliography of primary sources (163-7). Luthuli gave evidence at the Treason Trial in March and
April of 1960.
Correspondence to Brian Xaba of the Department of Arts and Culture (Heritage Division: Legacy
Projects) entitled, "Comments on Reverend Couper's Submissions", 22 February 2004.
It must be noted that, though in writing, the historian commented extemporaneously and thus
informally. Therefore, the comments of concern should not be inappropriately construed as "on the
record", formal or publishable historical queries. Hence, I omit the historian's name.
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African National Congress (ANC) members who decided to engage in violence does
not foster a negative stereotype tarnishing Luthuli's legacy and image for posterity
nor does it encourage a critique ofLuthuli's leadership style as weak, conservative,
accommodating and unresolved'; 'Luthuli's refusal to condemn "brave men for
seeking justice by the use of violent methods'" did not imply Luthuli supported their
methods'; 'questioning or revisiting historical assumptions does not engender
"confusion'" and 'censorship of contrasting realities homogenises South Africa's
liberation history leading to an uninformed and misguided society,.6
In the end, both quotations were engraved and today can be read on a large
text mural adjacent to Luthuli's final resting place. I felt strongly that neither
quotation should be excised, for both quotations raise fundamental questions
regarding a man who belongs in the pantheon of great human rights leaders of the
twentieth century. Furthermore, historians, even nascent ones, ought to question
assumptions, particularly assumptions that deal with issues related to a Nobel Peace
Prize-winner and the process that led to the birth ofa democratic country.? Ernest
Renan reminds us that "Forgetting history, or even getting it wrong, is an essential
factor in the formation of a nation". 8 Archbishop Trevor Huddleston once
commented, "History is never simply a chronicle of the past. It is always a challenge
to contemporary thought for the future".9
Secular or Religious Motivation
In 2004 and 2005, the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the
former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, respectively, gave the Albert Luthuli
Memorial Lecture at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Mbeki waxed eloquent about
6 I stress the word "may", as the historian did not and does not necessarily disagree with any of the
above five suppositions. In fact, I suspect s/he would agree with many or all of them. I utilise the
historian's recommendation, subsequent comments and rhetorical questions simply as a foundational
example upon which to question general assumptions and to formulate the thesis posited in this study.
7 At the February 2005 launching ofa documentary on Chief Albert Luthuli at the National Film and
Video Foundation (NFVF), Dr. Pallo Jordan, Minister of Arts and Culture aptly questioned at the end
of his address, "What are you, as a South African, doing to ensure that Luthuli's legacy lives?"
Though not South African and without writing a hagiography, this study is my humble attempt to
ensure Luthuli's legacy lives.
Pallo Jordan, "Address at the Launch ofthe Chief Albert Luthuli Film, NFVF", Johannesburg,
25 February 2005, 7.
8 Quoted in: "The Legacy ofa Legend: Chief Albert J. M. Luthuli", documentary film, produced by the
National Film and Video Foundation, sponsored by the Department of Arts and Culture, 2005.
9 Luli Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004), 8.
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Luthuli's life and his relevance to South African history. Mbeki's speech was
typically cerebral, disembodied and interspersed with quotations from international
poets (Pablo Neruda and Jonathan Swift), philosophers (John Mill and Amilcar
Cabral) and historians (Michael McNulty, Adam Hochschild and Noel Mostert) that
emphasised lofty 'universal' concepts and ideals. Kaunda's speech proved very
different to his predecessor's. Kaunda's offering was simple, embodied and, one
might say, parochial. In his untitled address, Kaunda quoted no poets, philosophers or
historians. The only quotation Kaunda used derived from Martin Luther King, Jr.
Another difference is worthy of note. Whereas Mbeki only once mentioned Luthuli's
Christian "prescriptions", Kaunda, for half his speech, belaboured the influence of
faith that was unarguably the foundation of Luthuli's politics. 10 Kaunda's emphasis
on the seminal role Christianity had upon Luthuli, intended, perhaps, to challenge the
African National Congress' (ANC) nationalist understanding that Luthuli supported
the 16 December 1961 decision to initiate violence to achieve South Africa's
liberation.!! Kaunda stated:
Given his deep belief in non-violence, it can rightly be assumed that
[Luthuli] clearly understood that in their journey to attain justice,
freedom and nationhood, different tactical options may be preferred by
various wings of the same struggle. It is important however, to stress the
fact that, in spite of this pronouncement, he continued with his method of
non-violence campaign (sic) to his death. 12
10 Such a Christian emphasis reveals Kaunda's bias. Kaunda's father was an ordained minister of the
Church of Scotland. Born in 1924 at Lubwa Mission in northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Christian
theology and education undoubtedly had a profound affect on Kaunda. Such a Christian emphasis also
reveals my own bias, as I am an ecclesiastical and vocational descendant of ordained Congregational
missionaries who served the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and the
indigenous people of what is now 'Kwazulu-Natal'.
11 In chapter three, I define and provide examples ofwhat I understand to be 'nationalist' history
production.
Throughout this study, 'nationalist', with a lower case 'n', refers to an orientation towards national
independence and/or to patriotism.
Throughout this study, 'National Party', with a capital 'N' is synonymous with the Apartheid regime.
In this study, I often corrected those who incorrectly refer to the 'National Party' as the 'Nationalist
Party'. Nevertheless, I did not alter in quotations the term frequently used term 'Nationalist'.
12 Kenneth Kaunda, no title, in Desarath Chetty and Deanne Collins, eds., The Deepest International
Principles ofBrotherhood and Humanity: The Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture, 21 October 2005,
(Durban: Public Affairs and Corporate Communications, University ofKwaZulu-Natal, 2005), 22.
In his October 2007 keynote lecture, Joaquim Chissano, the former President of the Republic of
Mozambique, also implied that Luthuli held no other policy against Apartheid other than "non-violent
struggle". Chissano affirmed that Luthuli had "detractors", presumably within the ANC, who
"condemned his policy ofnon-violent struggle" and in December 1961 deviated from the policy for
which he earned the Nobel Peace Prize.
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-
An example of a common and self-contradictory nationalist articulation of South
African history propagated since Luthuli's death in 1967 came from the Premier of
the Kwazulu-Natal Region, Sibusiso Ndebele, in a July 2007 speech.
Inkosi Luthuli believed in the four pillars of struggle [:] peaceful
resistance, international mobilisation, the political underground and the
armed struggle. 13
Kaunda's speech explicitly referenced God and/or Christianity eight times and non-
violence five times so as to contextualise Luthuli. Violent oppression and violent
resistance were only twice given brief and vague mention during the course of
Kaunda's speech. In contrast, Mbeki's speech selectively referenced poets, historians
and philosophers to contextualise the meaning of Luthuli's life citing political (as
opposed to theological) motivations and violent (as opposed to militant non-violent)
resistance to oppression. Mbeki's speech, entitled "The Tempo Quickens",
encapsulated Luthuli's role in the liberation struggle within South Africa's oppression
and violent response to that oppression. Before only once acknowledging Luthuli's
Christian "prescriptions", Mbeki made eight references to violent oppression and four
references to violent resistance to oppression. In interpreting Luthuli, Mbeki under-
emphasised Luthuli's Christian motivations and elaborated on more philosophical and
utilitarian principles to justify the ANC's move to violence. By de-emphasising
Luthuli's Christian leanings, Mbeki sought to avoid the realisation that his views on
the turn to violence, from 1968 to the present, contradict Luthuli's. Other ANC
nationalists such as Jacob Zuma, Nelson Mandela and Ronnie Kasrils concur with
Mbeki's 1968 sentiments when as a member of the ANC's Youth and Students'
Section he said:
...we are forced to arms to defend ourselves. We cannot wish this on
ourselves; we shall after all suffer most, die most and starve most. We
take up arms not because we have less respect for life, but exactly
Joaquim Chissano, "Keynote Address by H. E. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Former President of the
Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the African Forum at the Albert John Luthuli Memorial
Lecture", Durban, 27 October 2007, (Pretoria: Africa Forum, 2007), 2.
13 Sibusiso Ndebele, "SA: lnkosi Albert Luthuli Debate", Kwazulu-Natal Provincial Government,
19 July 2007, 2.
www.polity.org.zalarticle.php?a id=113159, accessed 04 January 2008.
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because we want to restore life to those that remain after the holocaust,
and the children. 14
Mbeki's speech typified nationalist interpretations of Luthuli that generally
neglect the consequence of Christianity on his political prognostications. IS Kaunda's
interpretation of Luthuli exemplified how adulations emphasise Luthuli's "Christian
dignity", "impeccable moral character" and "[embodiment] of Christian virtues such
as tolerance and forgiveness" in a very generic and superficial manner. 16 Most
characterisations of Luthuli fail to critically link Luthuli's faith to his political views.
ANC nationalists negate Luthuli's faith to politics' benefit while ecclesiastics wallow
in Luthuli's faith at the expense of its political ramifications. An accurate historical
interpretation of Luthuli that includes an investigation of the manifestations and
nuances of his faith tradition and directly links them to his specific political vantage
contributes substantively to understanding the complex and contested political
dynamics within South Africa's history.
Intention to Overthrow or Negotiate
This study also addresses two other approaches to historical production that
are in contention. Thula Simpson's dissertation on the aims and objectives of MK
disagreed with the weIl documented historical assumption that the armed struggle
failed. I? Within the section entitled "Submit or Fight", Simpson's study, like many
others, superficially narrated Luthuli's role in the decision to form MK and his stance
on violence despite the fact that he led the movement upon which his study focused. 18
14 Thabo Mbeki, "Letter to the Editor: Violence and Non-Violence", Sechaba 2, no. 5, May 1968, 12.
IS Aquino de Braganl;a and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., The African Liberation Reader: The National
Liberation Movements (London: Zed, 1982), 2: 33-4.
No author, "Chief Albert John Mvumbi Luthui, Isitwalandwe, 1898-1967", Sechaba 1, no. 8, August
1967, supplemental insert.
16 Anthony Sampson, The Treason Cage: The Opposition on Trial in South Africa (Cape Town:
William Heinemann, 1958), 186.
Leonard Thompson, A History ofSouth Africa, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), 208.
Ben Temkin, Buthelezi: A Biography (Balgowan: JB Publishers, 2003), 102. Buthelezi quoted.
17 Thula Simpson, "'Total Onslaught' Reconsidered: The ANC in the 1980s", (Ph.D. diss., Birkbeck
College, University of London, London, 2007), 2.
18 Simpson mentioned Luthuli's name only three times when narrating how the movement opted for
violence and to describe his position on that decision (49-50).
Saul Dubow's text was also similarly brief on Luthuli's involvement and thought on the decision to opt
for violence. Yet, Dubow acknowledged that the decision conflicted with Luthuli's views expressed in
"The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross".
Saul Dubow, The African National Congress (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2000), 67.
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Furthennore, Simpson referenced almost exclusively Mandela's Long Walk to
Freedom to document Luthuli's position on violence. Chapter three ofthis study
elaborates on the dangers of utilising Mandela as the sole source of Luthuli's
perspective on violence at this time. While not directly useful for an analysis of
Luthuli, Simpson's study eruditely outlined the historiographic contributions that
evaluated the efficacy of violence as a means to liberate South Africa. Simpson's
review of historical literature highlighted many of the contestations around which this
study ofLuthuli revolves.
Simpson prefaced his revisionist argument by explaining that "two schools of
thought have emerged on the reasons for the 'failure' of the anned struggle". 19 The
first school of thought, advocated most clearly by Howard Barrell, but also argued by
Paul Moorcraft, Robert Fine and Dennis Davis, Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba,
Dale McKinley, Vladimir Shubin, Saul Dubow, Martin Legassick, Kevin O'Brian and
Simon Adams, understands that by opting for violent methods ''the ANC placed its
eggs in the wrong revolutionary basket" and therefore it failed to obtain its objectives
because it attacked the Apartheid regime's strongest capability, that is military rather
than political or moral strength.2o Simpson summarised this perspective as follows:
19 Simpson, "'Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 49-50.
20 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 2-3. See endnotes 4 and 5, 20-1. Simpson cited:
Howard Barrell, Conscripts to Their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976-1986
(Ph.D. Politics, University of Oxford, 1993), 70-1, 97, 110, 119, 178-9 and 464 and "The ANC's
Military Tradition", (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1994), 12;
Paul Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa (1945-2010) (London:
Brassey's, 1990),345-6;
Robert Fine and Dennis Davis, Beyond Apartheid: Labour and Liberation in South Africa (London:
Pluto, 1991),251-3;
Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba (Oyama Mabandla), Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the
South African Communist Party in Exile (London: lames Currey, 1992),200-1;
Dale McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography (London: Pluto,
1997),50 and 132;
Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (BellvilIe: Mayibuye, 1999), 51-2;
Dubow, The African National Congress, 75-6;
Martin Legassick, Armed Struggle and Democracy: the Case ofSouth Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 9 and "Armed Struggle in South Africa: Consequences ofa Strategy Debate" in
Henning Melber, ed., Limits to Liberation in South Africa: The Unfinished Business ofDemocratic
Consolidation (Cape Town: HSRC, 2003), 156-9 and 161;
Kevin O'Brien, "A Blunted Spear: The Failure of the African National Congress / South African
Communist Party Revolutionary War Strategy 1961-1990" in Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 2,
Summer 2003,27,34 and 60;
Simon Adams, Comrade Minister: The South African Communist Party and the Transitionfrom
Apartheid to Democracy (Huntington: Nova Science, 2001), 56.
Elaine Reinertsen also argued that MK's goals, strategies and structures proved unrealistic and bound to
fail.
Elaine Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe 1961-1964: The Break with a Long Lasting Tradition ofNon-
Violent Opposition in South Africa", Honours diss., University of Natal, 1985.
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... the movement's narrow focus on rural guerrilla warfare led it to
neglect the task of politically mobilising its popular constituency,
thereby abandoning its most effective means of applying pressure on
the state.21
Sheridan 10hns articulated that this school of thought existed since the early 1970s. In
the late 1970s, R. 10hnston wrote that MK had no presence within the country when
political resistance resumed in the 1970s and that by launching MK, Mandela "opted
for the cathartic satisfaction ofa banzai charge into the cannon[']s mouth".22
The second school of thought Simpson discerned interpreted MK's failure to
be the result ofthe ANC's ideological reluctance to fully wage the armed struggle.
This school of thought observed that...
.. .the ANC remained guided by the conservative traditions that it had
imbibed since its formation in 1912. They believed that as a
consequence, the movement was never truly committed to the policies
of revolutionary violence that it proclaimed.23
In other words, this second school of thought advocated by Stephen Davis, Edward
Feit and Richard Gibson asserted that MK failed because the ANC did not ascribe to
its own revolutionary propaganda and prosecuted the armed struggle in a half-hearted
manner due to the ANC's and Luthuli's conservative legacy.24
Simpson's dissertation challenged both schools of thought by arguing that the
ANC's struggle for liberation through MKwas not a failure. Rather, Simpson
contended the armed movement succeeded because it achieved its primary objective
ofapplying pressure on the Apartheid government to enter into dialogue for a
21 Simpson, "'Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 2.
22 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 4. See endnotes 7 and 8, 21. Simpson cited:
R. Johnson, How Long Will South Aji'ica Survive? (London: Macmillan, 1977),23;
Sheridan Johns, "Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare - A South African Case Study", Journal ofAfrican
Studies 11, no. 2, 1973) in David and Helen Kimble eds., The Journal ofModern African Studies 11,
no. 1,2, 3 and 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1973,279-80.
23 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered: The ANC in the 1980s", 5.
24 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered: The ANC in the 1980s", 5-6. See endnote 11,21.
Simpson cited:
Stephen Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War (New Haven: Yale University,
1987), 75 and 203-4;
Edward Feit, Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960-1964: A Case Study (Evanston: Northwestern
University, 1971),312-3;
Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule
(London: Oxford University, published for the Institute of Race Relations, 1972), 56-7.
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negotiated settlement.25 Simpson disagreed with the first school on two counts. First,
Simpson disputed that the ANC failed and second, that the ANC did not have a
realistic chance of success through low or high intensity guerrilla warfare. While
disagreeing with the second school's conclusion that MK failed, Simpson agreed with
its assertion that the ANC did not ideologically or strategically commit itself to
revolutionary violence.
Simpson's claim that the ANC's low intensity war was a result of a strategic
choice is incorrect as there was no realistic capability for anything else. When opting
for armed methods, Mandela did not 'choose' sabotage.26 As far as violent methods
were concerned, but for a few quickly arrested second hand 'experts', MK could do
nothing other than sabotage. Without knowledge of weaponry, arms and training
within South Africa, the option to pursue low or high intensity guerrilla warfare did
not exist. Even Mandela undertook only a few months of truncated training that did
not prepare him to be a soldier, let alone a Commander-in-Chief. The ANC did not
'choose' to fight from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka; it could do no other as its cadres
could not effectively penetrate the frontline states. The ANC did not 'choose' to
exclusively use small arms; it had no finances for jets, helicopters, tanks and a
standing army. While indebted to Simpson's historiographic analysis, this study
concludes that the ANC failed to achieve its objectives for so many decades because it
deviated from Luthuli's desire and advice that the ANC focus on domestic and
international non-violent mass political action.
Methodology
In keeping with the expectations required of an original work, this study does
not simply regurgitate what is already common biographical knowledge of Luthuli.
The opening chapters focus on relevant biographical contributions from primary and
secondary sources. These chapters use Luthuli's autobiography, already read by most
interested in him, only as a template. These relevant biographical contributions
25 This study suggests that international advocacy organisations (primarily Christian in ethos) lobbying
for economic sanctions, domestic trade unions and the United Democratic Front using non-violent
mass action pressured the Apartheid regime to enter into a negotiated settlement in spite of the
arguably counterproductive efforts of the armed movement.
26 However, one could rightly state that Mandela chose sabotage over 'terrorism', i.e., random acts of
violence against 'innocents'.
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primarily focus on events that pertain to Luthuli's particular Christian faith tradition
and its predisposing affect on his political decisions, especially the decision whether
to sanction the use of violence. While there are other aspects ofLuthuli's life that
prove valuable for interpretation and analysis and thus may interest scholars of
varying disciplines, this study is limited to a biographical focus on times, places,
personalities, institutions and roles that are pertinent to the thesis that Luthuli did not
support the ANC's decision to utilise violence due to his Christian and unique
Congregationalist background, thus rendering Luthuli politically obsolete as the
President-General of the ANC from 1962 until his death in 1967.
The pace of the introduction's chronological narrative is very rapid, conveying
a brief history of Congregationalism. Herein, broad tenets (dissent, autonomy,
democracy, justice and education) of the Congregationalist faith tradition are
highlighted. How those tenets relate to an ecclesiastic position (or lack thereof) on
violence within the Apartheid context is also illuminated. Profiles of prominent
Congregationalists in southern Africa (van der Kemp, Philip, Livingstone and
Mackenzie), two of whom Luthuli specifically acknowledged were worthy of
emulation in his Nobel Peace Prize speech, relate to what degree their actions
demonstrated the imbrication of politics and faith in their lives. Chapter one explores
the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions' (American Board)
mission in Kwazulu, Natal and Groutville. Luthuli's Amakholwa (Believers) ancestry
and the many Christian personalities that indirectly and directly influenced his life are
profiled to highlight his ecclesio-political genealogy. Chapter two also reviews
Luthuli's political 'adolescence' by focusing upon the institutions within which
Luthuli participated. This chapter emphasises major milestones ofLuthuli's political
life such as his election to and dismissal from the Groutville chieftaincy (1935 and
1952), his election as leader ofthe Natal and national ANC (1951 and 1952), the
Defiance Campaign (1953), the Congress of the People (1955), the Treason Trial
(1957) and the formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (1959).
In chapter three, the study retreats from the chronological ecclesiastic and
biographical narratives to delineate the production of an historical account that
understands Luthuli accepted and subsequently supported the turn to violence.
Chapter three examines South African nationalists' interpretation of history that has
asserted since 1967 that Luthuli supported violence, as opposed to more formal
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scholarship that accepts that he did not. Emphasis is laid on the ANC's depiction of
Luthuli, using silences, suggestions and misrepresentations, as the ANC leader who
supported the ignition of violence.
In chapters four and five, the study returns to the biographical and
chronological narrative. The pace of these chapters drastically slows in comparison to
chapters one and two. Chapter four chronicles only 1960 and focuses on events that
led the ANC to consider and opt for violent methods of resistance. This chapter
highlights Sharpeville, the State of Emergency, the burning of Luthuli's pass and the
banning of the ANC (March-April 1960). Chapter five covers 1961 and investigates
Luthuli's stance on the decision to use violence as a means to prosecute the liberation
struggle. Events central to this chapter are the All-In Conference (March 1961) and
strike (May 1961), the Congresses' decision to launch MK (July 1961), the
announcement of Luthuli's being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (October 1961), his
receipt of the Prize (December 1961) and the launch of MK (December 1961).
Finally, chapter six resumes the biographical and chronological narrative at a
rapid pace. Chapter six covers the period 1962 to 1967 and engages Luthuli' s soon to
be aborted published efforts to indefinitely forestall the feared imminent use of
violence (March and April 1962), his dislocation from the reins of ANC power due to
his poor health and bannings (his and the ANC's), his joint appeal with Martin Luther
King, Jr. (December 1962), his statement on the Rivonia Trial sentences (June 1964),
United States Senator Robert Kennedy's visit (June 1966) and the tragic events that
led to Luthuli's death (July 1967). As with chapters one and two, the events focused
upon in chapter six relate directly and indirectly to the stance Luthuli took on the
ANC's use of violence. The entire study's conclusion utilises the insights of John and
Jean Comaroffto provide a concluding analysis explicating the impact of
Congregationalism on Luthuli's theological, philosophical and political views.
At least seven theses contained within this study justify the claim that Luthuli
never supported the use of violence as a means to obtain liberation. One, the actual
historical and archival record show no evidence of this, and in fact, other than two
possible sentences taken out of context, is there any argument to be made that Luthuli
supported the utilisation of violence. Luthuli adhered to a non-violent position long
after 16 December 1961. He refused to support violence though he was respectful
and sympathetic of those who were driven to that extreme. In short, all ofLuthuli's
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texts indicate an unwavering support for non-violent methods. Two, Luthuli's
understanding of Christianity, shaped through his connections with the American
Board and its Congregationalist tradition, led him to understand the struggle to be one
towards 'civilisation' and that the means needed to justify the ends. Three, Luthuli's
links to the white community - through churches, the legal fraternity, the Liberal Party
and the Black Sash, along with international supporters - meant that he could not
condone killing in the name offreedom. Four, Luthuli's isolation during the Treason
Trial and then due to his bannings meant that by the mid-1950s he was no longer
actively shaping the direction of the ANC and it made many decisions to which he
was not party. Five, Luthuli's understanding of the military and police power of the
Apartheid state, the ill-prepared black nationalist 'army' and the moral power of non-
violence within the global setting - particularly the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize
- made him see the armed struggle as suicidal and a poor political strategy. Six, his
death was not likely to be the result of an assassination, and therefore no argument
can be implied that he was killed because of his support of the armed struggle. Seven,
the ANC first claimed that Luthuli supported the armed struggle only immediately
after his death when he could not refute such a position.
The perspectives of Jean and John Comaroffs found in their text OfRevelation
and Revolution are undercurrents in this study's assessment of the impact Christianity,
and more specifically, Congregationalism, on Luthuli's theological, philosophical and
political outlook. The Comaroffs examined "the nature of power and resistance" by
investigating the symbiotic relationship between the Nonconformist evangelists who
were carriers ofthe colonialist's consciousness and the southern Tswana whose
consciousnesses became to a certain degree colonised (1820-1920).27 As a preface to
their investigation, the Comaroffs offered critiques of various schools of historical
thought that also sought to articulate "the long battle for the possession of salient
signs and symbols,,?8 The Comaroffs, as historical anthropologists, were critical of
27 Jean and John Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and
Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991, 1: 6.
The Comaroffs are heavily influenced by Gramsci's (1971) vague and amorphous understanding of
hegemony (or "ideology" in its "highest sense"). Many other historians' relevant work can also be
brought into dialogue with my project: Ginzburg's The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos ofa
Sixteenth-Century Miller (1976), van Onselen's The Seed Is Mine: The Life ofKas Maine, A South
African Sharecropper (1894-1985) (1995), and Genovese's Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves
Made (1976). I limit documenting my influence to the Comaroffs for the most practical reason that
Revelation and Revolution's subject matter relates directly to missiology and southern Africa.
28 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 4.
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the simplistic "missionary imperialist" thesis that argued that colonisers and their
missiological handmaidens (both presented as homogenous caricatures), exclusively
through forceful actions and/or processes of political economy, imposed their
worldviews on the subaltern who lacked agency and hence were simply dominated.
The Comaroffs perceived a more stealthy, but perhaps more potent, moral economy
wherein the materialist paradigms and goods "presupposed the messages and
meanings they proclaimed in the pulpit, and vice versa" to answer: "How is it that [the
missioners], like other colonial functionaries, wrought far-reaching political, social
and economic transformations in the absence of concrete resources of much
consequence?,,29
In their study of the encounter between Nonconformists and southern Tswana
in the nineteenth century, the Comaroffs expressed their grave concerns with
deconstructionalist thought wherein artefacts, archives and texts were perceived as
inherently prejudiced, contrived and/or mutually contradictory and completely
meaningless. While the deconstructualists' scepticism about the existence of truth can
be helpful, the Comaroffs recognised that hegemonies of minorities (evangelists) to
exist over long periods oftime, and more importantly, can be imposed without the use
ofviolence. The Comaroffs sought to exhibit the reciprocity engendered by the
intersection of societies and cultures wherein social meaning does "indeed become
unfixed, resisted and reconstructed" for both partners.30 The transfer of socio-cultural
paradigms was not one-way and thus explains the agency of the subaltern as it
accepts, resists or amalgamates the 'alien' paradigms within its own. Likewise, the
Comaroffs did not recognise the missioners as monolithic and they sought to explain
how they fused indigenous society within their own thinking. Also not dismissed was
the reality that missioners and their political compatriots wielded a disproportionate
quantity of "agentive" and "nonagentive" 'power' thus enabling them to produce and
reproduce the bases of the Tswana's existence; likewise, such a reality is not ignored
when examining the influence of Congregationalism on Luthuli.31
In his study entitled "From Church History to Religious History", Philippe
Denis explored South African religious historiography. Therein, Denis related that
"church history is an isolated discipline, almost completely cut off from the social
29 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 9.
30 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 18.
31 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 22.
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sciences and from secular history in particular" despite the fact that South Africa is
unique in the high degree to which Christianity influenced its culture and history.32
However, Norman Etherington indicated that secular historians are increasingly
interested in religion.33 In writing a biographical study on Luthuli through an
ecclesiastic lens, this study provides an understanding of and conclusions about
Luthuli that differ from political writings on him that will intrigue both secular and
religious historians. In doing so, this study accomplishes what Richard Elphick
requested: "[to write] religion into history". 34
Historical interpretations of Luthuli often cite his Christian credentials in a
very generic and superficial manner. This investigation is more strategic and thus
specific. Interpreters such as Mary Benson and Nadine Gordimer, whose works
acknowledged Christianity'S profound influence on Luthuli's life, contribute to this
study.35 Yet, because they, like most authors, do not comment on the particular brand
of faith (Congregationalism) Luthuli professed and in what manner it directly
influenced his specific political outlook and strategy, further interpretation is herein
needed. One author tersely stated, but did not elaborate upon, a thesis of this study:
The Congregationalist training gave Mr. Luthuli lifelong religious
convictions, a respect for Western civilisation and a sturdy belief in the
inherent equality of all men.36
Paul Rich, in his chapter "Albert Luthuli & the American Board Mission in South
Africa", provided the only substantive and specific ecclesiastic examination of
Luthuli. For example, Rich stated that Luthuli served on a committee appointed to
draw up a constitution for the Bantu Congregational Church and as a consequence...
32 Philippe Denis, "From Church History to Religious History: Strengths and Weaknesses of South
African Religious Historiography", Journal ofTheology for Southern Africa 99, November 1997, 85
and 84, respectively. Denis did not quote, but cited:
Nicholas Southey, "History, Church History and Historical Theology in South Africa", Journal of
Theology for Southern Africa 68, September 1989, 5-16.
33 Norman Etherington, "Recent Trends in the Historiography ofChristianity in Southern Africa", in
Missions and Christianity in South African History, eds. Henry Bredekamp and Robert Ross
(Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 1995),203.
34 Richard Elphick, "Writing Religion into History: The Case of South African Christianity", in
Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 11-26.
35 Mary Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli ofSouth Africa (London: Oxford University, 1963),59-67.
Nadine Gordimer, The Essential Gesture: Writings, Politics and Places, ed. Stephen Clingman
(Johannesburg: Taurus, 1988),31-41. Also found in:
Nadine Gordimer, "ChiefLuthuli", Atlantic Monthly 203, no. 4, April 1959, 34-9.
36 Alden Whitman, The Obituary Book (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), 122.
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Congregationalism provided [Luthuli] with a working model ofa
democratically-run Christian community which could be extended to
provide a programme for South Africa as a whole.37
Willem Saayman, who in his text A Man with a Shadow provided "a
missiological interpretation in context" of Zachariah Matthews (also known as Z. K.
Matthews), demonstrated the methodological example for this study.38 In his
biography of Matthews, Saayman provided two different perspectives to his life:
... a contextual situation or 'placing' of Z. K. Matthews, and a
missiological interpretation of his story.. .I propose the term 'social
mission history' for what I am attempting. To put it in yet a different
way, I hope to discover the missiological dimensions in a contextual
reconstruction of Z. K. Matthews' (hi)story. Such a reconstruction
must take seriously the formative places, influences and people in his
life story, must take fully into account the role of the political
. fh' d 39economIes 0 IS ay ...
Lyn Graybill, who linked theology and rudimentary ecclesiology to currents in
Luthuli's political thought, is perhaps the one author whose project most closely
resembles my own on a practicalleve1.40 Graybill correctly understood that
academics give insufficient attention to the impact of religion on political
development. A biography on Luthuli that highlights his unique spiritual perspectives
reveals much about the political choices Luthuli made. Graybill's study examined
four individuals (Robert Sobukwe, Steve Biko, Albert Luthuli and Desmond Tutu)
and explored how each leader's Christian beliefs shaped the respective liberation
movements they led. Many interpretations of Luthuli provide generic references to
Luthuli's Christian faith. However, the generic label of 'Christian' is insufficient to
interpret Luthuli and his views. Graybill stated:
37 Paul Rich, "Albert Luthuli & the American Board Mission in South Africa", in Missions and
Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 202.
Rich published the above also as a paper for the "Conference on People, Power & Culture: The History
of Christianity in South Africa, 1792-1992" at the University of Western Cape (UWC) Great Hall and
Genadendal Mission Museum, from 12-15 August 1992 by the UWC Institute for Historical Research,
28-9. Found at the St. Joseph's Theological Institute, Hilton, Kwazulu-Natal.
"Congregationalism provided a working model ofa democratically-run community which inspired
Luthuli's beliefin a democratic programme for South Africa".
38 Willem Saayman, A Man with a Shadow: The Life and Times ofProfessor Z. K. Matthews, A
Missiologicallnterpretation in Context (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1996).
39 Saayman, A Man with a Shadow, xvii.
40 Graybill, Religion and Resistance Politics in South Africa (Westport: Praeger, 1995),25-44.
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Christianity, then, was never a static dogma but was continually
reinterpreted in the light of new exigencies. Thus, the Christianity
espoused by Albert Luthuli was quite different from that articulated by
Steve Biko - and led to different strategies.41
No intention is made in this study to aggrandise the role of or serve as an
apology for Christian evangelisation, specifically by the American Board in Natal and
Zululand. Rather, the intention is to provide an accurate understanding of the
influence of Congregational Christianity upon Luthuli to allow for a more accurate
description of events related to and motivations for his stance on violence. Ifthe
elements of the American Board are described affirmatively, it is because Luthuli
described them affectionately. Likewise, if elements of the American Board are
described negatively, it is because Luthuli described them critically. Also, any reader
expecting this study to provide a personal and subjective moral judgement on the
ANC's or Luthuli's stance on violence will be disappointed. While this study
examines and provides conclusions regarding the ethical considerations and the
strategic ramifications of the option to use violence, it will refrain from evaluating
whether Luthuli or Mandela was morally 'right' or 'wrong'.
This study utilises interviews actually held with Luthuli or publications that he
penned, such as columns he wrote for the Golden City Post, to a much greater extent
than recollections gained through interviews forty-five plus years following his death.
For example, excerpts of interviews found in Mary Benson's biographical works,
published by Drum magazine and held with newspaper journalists such as Benjamin
Pogrund, Michael Lloyd and Daniel McGeachie at the time decisions were being
made by Luthuli are utilised extensively. However, that is not say this study does not
cite recollective interviews from academics such as Bernard Magubane and allies of
Luthuli such as Narainsamy Naicker and Rusty Bernstein. For example, many
interviews with liberation icons such as Mandela, Turok, Mbeki, Nair, Ndebele,
Asmal, Zuma and even members of Luthuli's family (Edgar and Hilda Thandeka
Luthuli) found in archives and audio-visual documentaries are cited in this study.
Findings based on interviews, for example between Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbett
and Advocate Andrew Wilson (who represented the Luthuli's family during the
41 GraybilI, Religion and Resistance Politics, 3.
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inquest into his death) are also included. Friends of the family (such as Goolam
Suleman and Donald Sivetye), 'veteran' Congregationalist clergy and missionaries
(such as B. K. Dludla, Duncan Davidson, Howard Christofersen, Howard Trumbull,
and Edward Hawley), children (such as Albertinah and Christian Luthuli) and lesser
known allies of the struggle (such as Tor Sellstr6m, Jean Hill and the painter of the
"Black Christ", Ronald Harrison) were interviewed by me during the research phase
of this study and their perspectives are found herein. Having access to office space
and resources at the Luthuli Museum in Groutville on a weekly basis for four years
provided me with the opportunity to dialogue and interview many speakers and
visitors whose insights lace this study. In general, it can be fairly concluded that
retrospective interviews, whether conducted by me or found in recent audio-visual
documentaries, prove less than helpful. Recollections or conclusions about Luthuli,
for example from Billy Nair and Jacob Zuma and Bernard Magubane, proved to be
inaccurate at best. Congregational clergy interviewed failed to provide much
substantive information regarding Luthuli's activities or thoughts. My interviews
with Luthuli's children revealed that for the most part he protected his family from the
increased risk of arrest and interrogation by not disclosing to them his politically
sensitive thoughts or actions. Therefore with few exceptions, i.e., concerning
Luthuli's health, interviews with family members provided few if any verifiable
revelations.
Perhaps most importantly, this study is not a hagiography. As the title "Bound
by Faith" suggests, Luthuli's non-support of armed struggle is neither celebrated nor
condemned by this study. To 'be bound' conjures both positive and negative
connotations. As it concerns the issue of violence, Luthuli's binding proved to be
both positive and negative. Luthuli's character and ideology, primarily motivated by
his religious faith, expanded his abilities and popularity thus catapulting him to the
heights of public opinion and leadership within a context when a majority conceived
only of using non-violent methods. When that context changed and a majority
perceived violence to be more efficacious, Luthuli's character and ideology, primarily
motivated by his religious faith, restricted his political horizons and severely stunted
his ability to successfully influence and lead the liberation movement.
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Introduction
Absorbing the Christian Ethos of Home,
Congregation and Communityl
Any discussion of Congregational polity must begin with the reminder
that for Congregationalism polity is not a mere matter of organisation
or form. If a church is local or territorial, comprising all the people
who live round the building in which it worships, then the relation of
such people to each other, to the church's officers and to the state, may
simply be a matter of arrangement and form; but such is not the case
with a church whose principle of constitution is specifically religious.
When a church is formed solely of those who love One Lord and
Master, and desire to serve Him, its polity is fundamentally spiritual.
For Congregationalists, matters of order - laws, canons, injunctions,
articles, creeds, advertisements - are powerless to make a church; only
Christian men and women can do that, and they are kings and
. 2pnests ...
--The Report of the British Commission to the Fourth International
Congregational Council, Boston, United States, 1920. The
Commission's task: "To review the history of Congregational Polity, to
appraise its present features and to make a forecast of the
developments yet to come".
Congregationalism
This introduction presents the extent that Christianity and Congregational
missiology, polity and education inspired Chief Albert Luthuli's fundamental guiding
principles.3 In subsequent chapters, this study demonstrates how those principles
engendered within Luthuli an existential theological and strategic angst regarding his
position on armed resistance. Though periodically alluding to the issue of violence so
as to anticipate arguments made in subsequent chapters, this introduction does not
specifically focus upon it. Rather, the following introductory background
substantively links Luthuli to his particular brand of faith: Congregationalism.
1 Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2006), 11.
"All the time, unconsciously, I was busy absorbing the Christian ethos of home, and church
congregation and the social ethos of the community".
2 Albert Peel, Inevitable Congregationalism (London: Independent, 1937), 32.
3 I understand why contestation exists between the use of the terms "Chief' (colonial English) and
"Inkosf' (indigenous Isizulu). I use the term "Chief' because this is the preferred designation his
Groutville community gave and still gives to him. I capitalise 'Chief' when used as a title and do not
capitalise it when used as a common noun.
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Particular personalities had an indirect, semi-direct or direct influence on
Luthuli's religio-political ideology. By providing brief biographies of, for example,
Pixley Isaka ka Seme, this study recognises Luthuli's indirect influences. By
highlighting, for example John Dube, this study identifies Luthuli's semi-direct
influences. Chapters one and six examine in detail previously underestimated direct
influences, such as John Reuling and George Houser, respectively. Together, all three
degrees of influence offer sufficient and comprehensive evidence linking
Congregationalism to Luthuli's life. Because 'associations', however close, be they
events, personas or institutions, in and of themselves, provide an insufficient basis
upon which to discern Luthuli's religious and political vantage, the exploration of
'associations' only compliments chapter four that more closely links Luthuli with
allies opposed to the initiation of violence. Luthuli's theological perspectives on
violence and his willingness to yield to, but unwillingness to support, its use primarily
derive from principles engendered by his Christian and Congregational upbringing
and close associations.
Luthuli stood as the quintessential product of mission education provided by
the American Board. Gordimer testified that Luthuli's American Board background
seeped even into the manner in which he spoke English: "with a distinct American
intonation, acquired along with his education at schools run by American
missionaries".4 No less than his speech, Luthuli's politics were profoundly influenced
by his Congregational ecclesiology transplanted from the United States. The
American Board that reared, educated, mentored, employed and preached to Luthuli
throughout his formative years instilled in him a reverence for the values espoused,
though not always implemented, by the western world.
An understanding of Congregationalism's emphasis on religious, political
and individual liberty reveals a source of Luthuli's lifelong motivation to free South
Africa's Black majority from the yoke of white supremacy. Democracy is the
cornerstone of Congregational polity. Hence, an understanding of
Congregationalism's democratic ethos and its influence on Luthuli explains why he
yielded to a Joint Congresses' majority decision to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK or
'Spear of the Nation'), though he led as President-General the liberation movement
4 Gordimer, The Essential Gesture, 32.
Sampson also commented on how Luthuli's speech inflections revealed "a deep American burr".
Sampson, The Treason Cage, 186.
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and disagreed with the decision. Congregationalism values freedom of conscience,
thought and speech and hence provides an interpretive lens through which to
understand how Luthuli tolerated and even welcomed Communists to participate as
partners in the ANC's struggle for freedom in spite of his own disavowal of
Communism and pressure from his liberal allies to exclude them.
Congregationalism's concern for education created within Luthuli a lifelong yearning
for knowledge, a passion for teaching, a strong will to ensure his own children
succeeded academically and a will to fund educational scholarships through the
Luthuli Foundation. Congregationalism's emphases on local property ownership,
strong work ethic and upward socio-economic mobility, what Luthuli called the
Christian principle of "work and pray", illuminate his negative conception of
traditional tribal leadership that thwarted an emerging African contribution to world
civilisation (Luthuli's emphasis).5 Luthuli considered 'civilisation' to be a desired
composite product of scientific, political, cultural and moral (religious) progress.
Congregationalism planted its foci on justice, human equality and ecumenism within
Luthuli enabling him to be a militant advocate for human rights in cooperation with a
broad umbrella of racial and ideological groups.
After briefly outlining Congregational history, Steve de Gruchy summarised
its key "impulses": a strong commitment against state interference in the church, a
democratic church order that locates property ownership and decision-making in the
hands of the 'gathered congregation' at local level, a commitment to unity and
ecumenism; a valuing of human dignity, justice and freedom as key elements in its
praxis in the world and a desire to share its message abroad.6 Of course, many of
these principles were ignored or contradicted at various times during the
Congregational church's history. For example, ironically the Puritans established in
the 'New World' a theocracy, contrary to their ethos, and thus provided an example of
how throughout human history ideals are sought and imperfectly realised. 7
Nevertheless, 'non-Conformist' values endured as they perpetually resurfaced in some
of its remarkable adherents such as Luthuli.
5 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 185.
6 Steve de Gruchy, G. Philpott and D. Ntseng, "The United Congregational Church of Southem Africa:
An Inventory of its Landholdings" (Pietermaritzburg: Church Land Programme, n.d.), 5.
7 Ian Booth, "Major Epochs in the History of Congregationalism", in Papers Presented at the UCCSA
Congregational Polity and Ecclesiology Consultation, Carmel Christian Conference Centre, George,
21-23 August 2008,3.
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It is no historical coincidence that John Dube, Pixley Isaka ka Seme,
W. B. Rubusana and Luthuli allIed the ANC movement for a democratic South
Africa as its first President-General, founder, first Vice-President and longest serving
President-General, respectively. 8 All four were born and bred within
Congregationalism, arguably the most democratic form of 'mainline' ecclesiastic
polity. Dube, Seme and Luthuli experienced an intensive exposure to the very
imperfectly applied democratic and egalitarian ethos of Congregationalism
domestically in South Africa and abroad in the United States. Luthuli travelled to the
United States in 1948 as a visiting lecturer sponsored in part by the American Board.
Luthuli's wife, Nokukhanya Bhengu, studied at Inanda Seminary, also an American
Board founded institution. Luthuli, having been educated at the Aldinville primary
school in Groutville and having learned and taught at Adams College in Amanzimtoti,
both American Congregationalist institutions, no doubt had a thorough understanding
of American history and its relationship with Congregationalism.
Congregationalism's roots begin in the Hebrew scriptures, the Christian
testament, the early church as related by the Acts of the Apostles, the Roman Catholic
Church, the Reformation, the Church of England and early Congregationalism
established in the British Isles and North America by the early Puritans and the
Mayflower's Pilgrims, respectively. In short, Congregationalism is the end result of
increasing degrees of democratisation during the history of the Christian church.
Congregationalism was born from and grew out of a desire to free the church from
authoritative and hierarchical systems of ecclesiastical polity. Congregationalism
emphasises and holds as supreme the "congregation" in matters related to church
governance.
Dissent
Three origins of Congregationalism emanated from three strands of the
Reformation, each contributing to its foundational ideology.9 The first strand sprung
from the English reformer John Wyclifwho held as Congregationalism's core pillar
8 The American Board reared Dube, Seme and Luthuli while the London Missionary Society reared
Rubusana.
9 Peter de Villiers, "The Formation and Ethos of the United Congregational Church of Southem Africa
1967-1992", (Master of Arts diss., Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, Department ofReligious
Studies, University of Cape Town, 1998), 2.
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"that there is such a thing as private judgment in doctrinal matters". IO Wyclif's motto
related to spiritual dissent. Yet, during the Reformation as well as during Apartheid, a
fine line existed between spiritual and political dissent. Often, as with Luthuli, the
two became synonymous. One book Luthuli prized in his bookshelf, History of
American Congregationalism, attested:
... the Congregational way possessed a power and principle which will
always be asserted and realised in a free society. They [articulate] the
nature of such a society, whether in church or state.]]
To describe the Congregationalist faith fully, two words are emphasised. The first
word, 'Fellowship', qualifies Congregationalism as a voluntary association of
Christians. The second word, 'Free', qualifies Congregationalism as cherished, for it
itemises as its inheritance to the well-being of all "the free state, the free school, the
free society life of our Country". 12 Luthuli exuded Congregationalism's dissenting
ethos when he considered issuing a statement to the judge justifying the burning of his
passbook following being found guilty and before being sentenced:
There comes a time, sir, when a leader must give as practical a
demonstration of his convictions and willingness to live up to the
demands of the cause, as he expects of his people .. .I am not sorry nor
ashamed of what I did. I could not have done less than I did and still
live with my conscience". 13
Congregationalism upholds the right to dissent. One Congregational document
affirmed:
10 de ViIliers, "The Formation and Ethos of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa", 2.
de ViIliers' cited:
P. T. Forsyth, Faith, Freedom and the Future (London: Independent, 1955), 13.
11 Gaius Atkins and Frederick Fagley, History ofAmerican Congregationalism (Boston: The Pilgrim,
1942),389-90.
Oliver Cowles, likely related to the famous missioner Bridgman-Cowles family who ministered the
American Board for an accumulated two hundred and seventy-nine years, gave the book to Luthuli as a
gift in December 1948 inscribing on its cover page, "To my good and generous friend, Albert J.
Luthuli".
12 Atkins and Fagley, History ofAmerican Congregationalism, 390. Atkins and Fagley cited:
Year Book ofthe Congregational Christian Churchesfor 1940.
13 Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go: The Autobiography ofa Great African Leader (Johannesburg:
Coliins, 1962), appendix C, "Luthuli's Undelivered Statement at the Time of His Trial for Burning His
Pass", 247.
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Congregationalism was born in dissent; our fathers in the Faith refused
to accept the authority of the state as expressing the mind of Christ for
them. Congregationalists joined the company of others who in
obedience to the Word of God refused to obey the dictates of men. 14
Congregationalism also holds as a fundamental or classical tenet the objection to the
use of creeds in worship or as tests of membership. This tenet affirms that contexts
change as do theological perspectives. Creeds are not final- but they bear witness to
specific historical contexts. To the same extent that creeds elucidate and explain
concepts, creeds can limit and stifle understanding. Creeds also exclude. Rather than
include in fellowship others with whom one agrees on fundamentals, creeds have the
tendency to bar others on the basis of trivialities and nuances. Regarding creeds, one
book on Congregational polity read:
...we do not grant them definitive authority. For us they are witnesses
to the faith of the Church, formulated for their time, just as we believe
that the faith once delivered has to be interpreted and stated afresh in
the context of each era. IS
Unlike his liberal and Africanist critics on the left and right, respectively, that
vehemently opposed any Communist influence in the ANC, Luthuli refused to
ostracise anyone with differing ideologies so long as they had as their primary goal
the overthrow of white supremacy. Despite strong convictions, Christian and
otherwise, Luthuli refused to have dogmatic views to which allies of, and within, the
ANC must adhere. Luthuli's ecumenical leanings maintained a 'broad church',
uniting in solidarity Indians, Whites, Blacks, Communists, liberals, Christians,
Muslims, modernists and traditionalists with the ANC thus enabling the survival and
future growth of the anti-Apartheid struggle and the creation of the present day
democratic South Africa. 16 In a correspondence to Mary-Louise Hooper during the
14 Joseph Wing, ed., Jesus Is Lord in Church and World: Studies in the Nature ojCongregationalism
(Johannesburg: United Congregational Church of Southern Africa), 1980, 8.
15 D. Ray Briggs, "A Covenant Church: Studies in the Polity of the United Congregational Church of
Southern Africa in Terms of its Covenant" (Gaborone: Pula, 1996),52-3.
16 Race is a human construct that has no genetic difiniteness. Neither is there grammatical definiteness
on how race should be textually communicated. I found that the terms 'White' and 'Black' are
capitalised or not capitalised indiscriminately in original textual quotations. In this study, I capitalise
all proper nouns when identifYing a racial category, e.g. 'a Black'I'Blacks', 'a White'I'Whites and a
'Coloured'I'Coloureds'. Possibly against conventional practice, when a racial category precedes a
noun and thus is also used grammatically as an adjective, I do not capitalise any word for the sake of
consistency, e.g., 'white supremacy' and 'the white press'; 'a black majority' and 'a black man';
'coloured church' and 'coloured races'. However, even if preceding a noun, I capitalise 'Indian',
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Treason Trial, Luthuli affirmed his objection to political 'creeds' that would exclude
others:
I personally would say it would not only be unwise but mean to forgo
the service ofany of our faithful and tried lawyers solely on the
grounds ofleftist leanings of anyone we abandon. We would be
pandering unreasonably to unbridled prejudice; to me only professional
ability and sympathy with the Cause should be our CRITERION
(Luthuli's emphasis).17
Autonomous and Democratic
The second strand ofthe Reformation that contributed to Congregational
thought is found within the Anabaptist movement, the most radical strain of the
Reformation. The Anabaptists upheld the congregation as self-governing or
independent of state or episcopal oversight and hence Congregationalism is often
described as the application ofdemocratic principles in Church government. One
Congregational scholar, A. M. Fairbairn, described one of the determinative elements
of the Congregational church as follows:
It is autonomous and authoritative, possessed of the freedom necessary
to the fulfilment of its mission and the realisation of its ideals,
endowed with all the legislative and administrative powers needed for
the maintenance of order and the attainment of progress. 18
Again, Ian Booth rightly pointed out that often the defenders and propagators of
Congregationalism often did not 'practice what they preached'. For example, though
Oliver Cromwell instituted religious freedom after the English Civil War and the
execution of Charles 1 in 1649, the Congregational Church became in effect the
'Establishment Church' whereby ministers accepted government grants, salary
'European' and' African' as they are adjectives that refer to a country or continents, respectively. I
intend no offence through this uniformity.
17 University ofCape Town (UCT), Manuscripts and Archives Department (MAD), Legal Collections
(LC): Albert John Luthuli Papers (AJLP), BCZA 78/46-47, Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project of
the Center for Research Libraries (CAMP) 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to
Mary-Louise Hooper, 02 July 1956,2.
The Albert John Luthuli Papers can also be found at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in
Pretoria. For consistency's sake, I cite only the University of Cape Town references for the remainder
of this investigation.
18 W. B. Selbie, Congregationalism (London: Methuen & Co., 1927), 13. Selbie cited:
Congregational Union Jubilee Lectures, 51-2.
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subsidies and privileged appointments from the state. 19 After the restoration of
Charles 1I, Congregationalism again went underground and became non-Conformist
and Independent in nature again. Congregational independence required self-
governance; and self-governance accentuated the value placed the principle of
democracy that so imbedded itself within Luthuli. Throughout his writings Luthuli
lamented:
White rule having thus made a vicious circle around us denies
effectively and completely democratic rights we could use to promote
our progress and development.2o
Luthuli also lamented:
The white leadership in the two major parties shirks its task of
progressively educating white public opinion along democratic lines.21
Biblical Concern for Justice
The third and final strand of the Reformation that contributed to
Congregational thought derives from John Calvin and hence enables
Congregationalism to be included within the Reformed or Calvinist tradition. Calvin
emphasised the importance of the Scriptures (as opposed to church tradition) as the
primary, ifnot only, means by which to discern God's will. This emphasis on the
Bible, released from the scholastic Latin and written in the English vernacular,
democratised biblical exegesis and hermeneutics thus empowering the individual to
meditate and interpret. Luthuli ubiquitously based his political views on scriptural
references. As this study demonstrates, Luthuli drafted his most famous statement,
"The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" from a sermon he preached a week earlier at
Adams College. The title of Luthuli's autobiography, Let My People Go, is biblically
sourced. Luthuli routinely quoted the Bible in major political speeches, even to
predominantly Indian audiences, many of whom practiced Islam or Hinduism. In
quoting scripture, Luthuli never aimed to evangelise his listeners. Rather, Luthuli
19 Booth, "Major Epochs in the History of Congregationalism", 4-5.
20 Bailey's African Photo Archives (BAPA), Luthuli File (LF), Golden City Post, "Our Political
Weapon", by Albert Luthuli, 23 August 1959.
21 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "0. P. No Better then Nats.", by Albert Luthuli, 30 August 1959, 15.
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spoke genuinely from what motivated him, Christian scripture, and used it to make
political rather than theological, or eschatological, points. For example, in his
opening address to the 22nd Biennial Conference of the South African Indian Congress
in October 1956, Luthuli preached:
Rather lose all than lose our souls and honour and so save ourselves
the shame of earning the distain of our contemporaries and the
condemnation of posterity but worse suffer eternal damnation for
indeed what will it profit to gain the whole world but to lose his own
soul? This Divine poser should be pondered upon deeply by any of us
who might be tempted by considerations of expediency and false
personal gain or intimidation by fear to flirt with the wicked maid,
Apartheid.22
Closely related to Congregationalism's biblical adherence is its emphasis on justice.
Throughout the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, 'justice' is arguably more prominent
than 'love' as a biblical tenet. In a Gospel text, Jesus quoted Hebrew prophecy
(Isaiah 61: 1-2) to announce his mission: "He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the
prisoners... to release the oppressed ... " (Luke 4:18). Hence, Luthuli's particular
brand of faith historically emphasised a concern for social justice. In 1999, on the
two hundredth anniversary of the Congregational tradition in southern Africa, Thabo
Mbeki acknowledged this unique characteristic of Congregational faith.
[London Missionary Society missioners] provide testimony of the
struggle to establish Christian values in a world in which these values
were in constant danger of being compromised through colonial
plunder and oppression ...Under these adverse conditions, those
members of the London Missionary Society of two centuries ago and
their successors have been regarded as unique, in that they defended
the rights of Africans and established educational institutions in what
was then called the Cape Colony. In this way they contributed to the
ongoing resistance to colonialism... We can expect nothing less from
the church of Theodorus van der Kemp, of John Philip, of Albert
Luthuli than that you, the United Congregational Church [of Southern
Africa], will, as you have done for two hundred years, continue to hold
22 University of South Africa (UNISA), UNISA Library (UL), UNISA Archives (UA), Documentation
Centre for African Studies (DCAS), South African Indian Congress (SAIC), 105,6.1.11, Opening
Address by Albert Luthuli to the 22nd Biennial Congress of the South African Indian Congress
Meeting, "A Spirit the Refuses to Submit to Tyranny", Gandhi Hall, Johannesburg, 19-21 October
1956,4.
Luthuli quoted Matthew 16:26.
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high the star of hope as we struggle to move out of the years of
d . 23espmr.
The American Congregational church also possessed the same pedigree of social
justice concern. Congregationalists arguably led the anti-slavery movement in the
United States as early as 1790 with the founding of the Connecticut Anti-Slavery
Society, the American Anti-Slavery Society and the American Missionary
Association. Abraham Lincoln read a book against slavery written by Leonard
Bacon, the founder of the American Anti-Slave Society, and said that it gave him his
foundational ideas concerning the iniquity of human slavery.24 Luthuli read the
perspectives of well-known American Congregationalist Henry Beecher who wrote:
"The object of Christianity is human welfare; its method is character-building, its
process is evolution; and the secret of its power is God".25 American Missionary
Association, Home Missionary Society and American Board literature and preachers
belaboured the imperative to work to change the social conditions of the masses both
home and abroad. A Congregationalist institution of higher learning, Oberlin, from
where John Dube obtained his education, had been a centre of social interest from the
days of its founding. The American Congregational concern for social justice
migrated to the shores of southern Africa with the advent of the American Board
missioners and was re-inculcated in its indigenous leaders during their sojourns in the
United States.
Education
The three strains of the reformation described above coalesced in England to
birth the Puritan movement after King Henry VIII's secession from the Roman
Catholic Church in 1534. The 'Puritans' were thus named because they desired,
through emphasis on the above three strands, 'purity' in worship, church governance
23 Thabo Mbeki, "On the Occasion of the Bicentenary of the UCCSA", given in Cape Town,
31 March 1999. Found as the preface of:
Steve de Gruchy, ed., Changing Frontiers: The Mission Story ofthe UCCSA (Gaborone: Pula, 1999),
v-vi and viii-ix.
24 Atkins and Fagley, History ofAmerican Congregationalism, 249. Atkins and Fagley cited:
"The Congregational Conscience and Slavery", Proceedings ofthe Fourth International
Congregational Council, Boston, 1920,328-30.
25 Atkins and Fagley, History ofAmerican Congregationalism, 251. Atkins and Fagley cited:
Lyman Abbott, "What Is Christianity?", Arena 3, 1891,46.
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and personal life. Contestation about whether the Church of England could be
refonned from within or from outside the communion existed amongst the Puritans.
Those who became disillusioned with the possibility ofrefonn broke away from the
established church and thus became 'Separatists'. Separatists, such as Robert Browne
and John Owen, advocated for the 'self-governance' oflocal congregations. Many
Puritans immigrated to Holland to escape the persecution of Queen Mary. 26 From
Amsterdam, some Puritans then embarked for the 'New World', North America,
hoping to complete their journey to religious liberty. The Puritans established Boston,
Massachusetts where in 1636 they founded Harvard University and later Yale
University in New Haven, Connecticut to train its ministers. The influence of
Congregationalism on United States' history and Luthuli's admiration of its ideals are
further explored in chapter one. Nevertheless, the emphasis Congregationalism
placed on education deserves brief mention, especially within the American context.
Luthuli mentioned in his autobiography that he did not realise during his
fonnative years the extent to which his mother laboured to ensure his education.27
Martin Luthuli, his uncle, and John Dube, his one time principal, also continued to
foster in Luthuli the educational imperative. History ofAmerican Congregationalism
highlighted the important concern Congregationalism placed on education. From that
text, Luthuli once read the following bold historical declaration:
One must not read back into Seventeenth Century New England the
perfected philosophy of a democratic society, but leaders of the little
[New England] commonwealth knew by sound instinct that "if people
were to follow the dictates ofconscience, that conscience must be
enlightened. If people were to govern themselves in church and state,
opportunity for education must be provided". They laid the foundation
of a public school system which was to continue in later years across
the continent and become, perhaps, the finest single aspect of
American life ... What New England did for education was, therefore,
done by Congregationalism.28
26 The Puritans were later referred to as 'Independents' following their return to England during the
Commonwealth that the 'Lord Protector', Oliver Cromwell, a staunch Puritan, established.
27 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 11.
28 Atkins and Fagley, History ofAmerican Congregationalism, 230.
Atkins and Fagley quote a publication entitled, "Proceedings of the Fourth International
Congregational Council", Boston, 1920.
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In his autobiography, Luthuli expressed great pride in the educational
accomplishments of his Congregational community saying that as far as education is
concerned, Groutville ...
.. .has produced a distinguished little group - a university lecturer, an
eminent scholar, the first African head of a training institution with a
staff of mixed race and the first Zulu woman graduate.29
Ecclesiastic Predecessors
Johannes van der Kemp
Congregational history in southern Africa began in 1799 when four
'missioners' sent from the London Missionary Society (LMS), founded just four years
earlier, disembarked in Cape Town. 3D Two missioners set out to live among the Khoi
San (indigenous southern Africans) in Namaqualand and two to serve the Blacks in
the Eastern Cape. Lack of communication, weak leadership and missioners 'gone
native' created much instability during the early years.3l In spite of those difficulties,
over time, the LMS established missions in what are known now as the Northern
Cape (RSA), Botswana, Zimbabwe and the Witwatersrand (RSA). Due to their
relevancy to Congregationalism's ethos in southern Africa as they relate to Luthuli,
four LMS missioners deserve special mention: Johannes van der Kemp, John Philip,
David Livingstone and John Mackenzie.
Many consider Johannes van der Kemp (1747-1811) to be the first prominent
human rights advocate in southern Africa. On 31 March 1899, van der Kemp arrived
29 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 11. See footnote 1.
30 In conformity with contemporary terminology that seeks to evade pejorative and stereotyped
associations, 1use the terms "missioner" and "missioners" rather than "missionary" and "missionaries",
respectively.
The LMS, like the American Board, was initially multi-denominational and thus ecumenical in nature.
Nevertheless, the LMS was primarily Congregationalist in nature, especially after the Presbyterians and
Anglicans withdrew to found their own mission instrumentalities.
Anthony Sillery wrote: "The basis of the Society was resolutely inter-denominational and declared that
its 'fundamental principle' was not to send Presbyterian, Independency, Episcopacy or any other form
of Church Order or Government. .. " The Society has always remained faithful to the principal of inter-
denominationalism, but in practice most of its support has come from Congregationalists, and it has
long regarded itself, as has been regarded, as Congregationalism's own missionary society.
Anthony Sillery, John Mackenzie ofBechuanaland / 1835-1899: A Study in Humanitarian Imperialism
(Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1971),5. Also:
D. Roy Briggs and Joseph Wing, The Harvest and the Hope: The Story ofCongregationalism in
Southern Africa (Johannesburg: The United Congregational Church of Southern Africa, 1970), 13.
31 Esther Johnson, "Cape Town: The Establishing of Congregationalism in Southern Africa", in
Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 20.
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in Cape Town with three other colleagues, thus inaugurating the genesis of
Congregational influence on the sub-continent. In 1803, van der Kemp founded a
mission station at Bethelsdorp, near present day Uitenhage. 32 The mission benefited
the Khoi San, focusing on what is termed today as 'development' work rather than
'evangelism', per se. van der Kemp at this early stage laid a priority on education,
agriculture, entrepreneurism and self-sufficiency that Luthuli also would encourage
and facilitate as Chief of Groutville.
Gardens were started in the van der Kemp Kloof, and vegetables and
fruit trees were planted. The people were able to feed themselves and
the gardens also served as a source of income. A school and a church
were built. It was here that the first spelling book was produced on
South African soil. It contained.3 ,133 words of one syllable ...Houses
were erected, and a carpentry shop was started to help with building
operations. A blacksmith shop was built to help with repairing the
wheels of the wagons and carts. Leatherwork was begun for repairing
the bridles and harnesses of horses ... Wild flowers served as a source
of income for the people at the mission station. The cultivation and
preparation of aloes for export was another of the skills learned by the
people.33
It must be acknowledged that van der Kemp did not typify the average missioner.
Controversy surrounded van der Kemp as he was seen by many, both friends within
the LMS and foes amongst the colonist, as having 'gone native'. He took as a wife a
young slave girl, thus offending both missiological and racial sensibilities. At
Bethelsdorp, van der Kemp practiced inter-racial worship and taught his indigenous
parishioners how to read and write, neither of which pleased the neighbouring
burghers. Rather than establishing western designed structures, van der Kemp lived
amongst the Khoi San in traditional huts and, by some accounts, even in traditional
attire. van der Kemp constantly argued with local authorities regarding his mission,
making him a most vilified nuisance. van der Kemp thwarted the colonists' desire for
a local source of inexpensive labour though his efforts to expand literacy and
economic self-sufficiency among his adherents.
32 Margaret Constable incorrectly related 1801 as the date for the establishment of the first
Congregational church. After his efforts in "Kaffraria" failed due to instability in the area, van der
Kemp returned to Graaf-Reinet in May 1801. The church that van der Kemp presumably served and
left to colleagues was a Dutch Reformed Church. van der Kemp only arrived in Bethelsdorp on
02 June 1803 founding the first congregational 'mission'.
Margaret Constable, "The Eastern Cape: A Highway for God", in Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 24.
33 Constable, "The Eastern Cape" in Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 24-5.
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van der Kemp served his indigenous constituency as a renegade human rights
activist. Though established a year after van der Kemp' s death in 1812, the first
circuit court, nicknamed the "Black Circuit", was infused with cases brought by his
emboldened parishioners. One historian cited over fifty cases of murder being
brought by the Khoi San against the Boer settlers. 34 Many of the cases brought to
court could not be resolved given that many who filed charges did so retroactively.35
Due to his temperament, van der Kemp likely engaged in hyperbole when accusing
his antagonists while minimising or ignoring the infractions incurred by those whom
he defended. The presence of emotive vitriol on both sides and the prolific number of
court cases (many legitimate, many not) ultimately supported by the mission station
evidenced that van der Kemp offered a safe haven for the Khoi San who suffered
much oppression, exploitation and racism by the colonists. The legal battles forced a
shift in settlers' views; colonists reluctantly realised that the indigenous people would
struggle for their freedom and use the law to protect themselves as equals. 36
John Philip
In his Nobel Peace Prize speech, Luthuli credited John Philip (1775-1851), a
prominent Congregationalist, for "[standing] for social justice in the face of
overwhelming odds".37 Philip arrived in southern Africa in 1819 to investigate
charges that many LMS missioners inappropriately carried out their vocations. As
superintendent for the LMS, Philip served as the primary contact who invited the
American Board to send missioners to South Africa. 38 Philip's link with
Congregationalism rests more solidly with his seventeen years of pastoral service as a
Congregationalist minister in Aberdeen, Scotland prior to his arrival on the sub-
continent. Also, after settling in Cape Town, Philip accepted an invitation to pastoral
341. H. Enklaar, Life and Work ofDr. J T van der Kemp, 1747-18]]: Missionary, Pioneer and
Protagonist ofRacial Equality in Southern Africa (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1988), 188.
35 J. W. Hofmeyr and Gerald Pillay, eds., A History ofChristianity in South Africa (Pretoria: HAUM
Tertiary, 1994), 1: 52.
36 Enklaar, Life and Work ofDr. J T van der Kemp, 188.
37 Kader Asmal, David Chidester and Wilmot James, eds., South Africa's Nobel Laureates: Peace,
Literature and Science (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2004), 25.
38 D. J. Kotze, ed., Letters ofthe American Missionaries (1835-1838) (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck
Society, 1950),8-45.
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ministry provided that the church meeting be the governing authority of the church,
thus in 1820 establishing the first Congregational church in South Africa. 39
Luthuli identified Philip in his Nobel Peace Prize speech as an "illustrious
[man] of God" because Philip's faith led him to advocate for human rights in southern
Africa.4o However, in the early 1800s, most described Philip as a cantankerous fool.
The historian Frank Welsh called Philip "the chief Boer bugbear".41 Luthuli also
rightly mentioned in his Nobel Prize speech that Philip and others' named are "still
anathema to some South Africans".42 One text claimed that "every South African
school boy knows that Philip was notorious for fancying ideas about Black and White
equality".43 Sir Lowry Cole once remarked that "Philip is, it is to be feared, more a
politician than a missionary" (emphasis is Cole's).44 Though his advocacy was
quieted by an argument to compensate slave owners for their lost property, Philip
became a fierce abolitionist.
Born in Scotland, Philip hailed from the same locale as Adam Smith. Philip
and other Congregationalists of European and American stock, thus found themselves
imbued with the "Protestant work ethic" on which this investigation later comments.
Smith argued that slave labour was economically counterproductive since those
enslaved could not possess private property and thus had no reason to work
productively.45 Philip "evoked Smith to legitimise the civilising mission, its struggle
against 'vassalage', and its commitment to the values ofliberal individualism".46
Luthuli's distaste for Communism is much in part due to this ecclesiastic heritage.
Philip's championing of the oppressed quickly made him a very controversial figure
39 Although, Esther Johnson indicates 1822 as the date Philip accepted the pastorate.
Esther Johnson, "Cape Town: The Establishing ofCongregationalism in Southern Africa", in Changing
Frontiers, de Gruchy, 20.
40 Asmal, Chidester and James, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 25.
41 Frank Welsh, South Africa: A Narrative History (New York: Kodansha International, 1999), 109.
42 Asmal, Chidester and James, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 25.
43 Jay Naidoo, Tracking Down Historical Myths (Johannesburg: AD Donker, 1989), 49.
This text explored an interesting debate: the historical 'myth' that Philip was a segregationist. The
debate concludes that he was not by making a historical contextualised differentiation of the words
"segregation and "separation". "Segregation" involves a motive to subjugate while Philip argued for a
policy to 'separate' so as to protect. For Philip, separation was not the ideal, but rather a desperate
tactic to avoid complete dispossession of indigenous land and to preserve some modicum of freedom
and independence.
44 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 37.
45 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations, ed. E. Cannan,
(London: The Modem Library, original addition dated 1776, 1937),365.
46 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, I: 119. Comaroff cited:
John Comaroff, "Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models ofColonial Domination in South
Africa", American Ethnologist 16, 1989,661-85.
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in his day. Through his numerous tours in the region and the regular reports he
received from outlying missioners, Philip kept himself and the metropole abreast of
the circumstances of the Cape peninsula to a much greater extent than even the local
governing authorities did. Philip first ran afoul with white settlers due to his prolific
advocacy for the Khoi San. Through his lobbying efforts to the Colonial Office in
London, Philip participated in the entrenchment Ordinance 50 (1828), legislation that
provided the Khoi San and other 'Coloureds' full legal and civil rights.47 This
ordinance included legislation for equality before the law, regulation of oppressive
work contracts, prohibition of excessive punishment and land ownership.48 As an
arbiter for the Treaty System, introduced in 1836, Philip lobbied for more favourable
colonial policies toward of the Xhosa and Sotho-Tswana. Philip, for right or wrong,
believed his advocacy for the Treaty System would encourage legislation prohibiting
further settler encroachment and dispossession of Blacks' land.
Much to the chagrin of white supremacists, Philip consistently argued that the
races were equal in cerebral capacity. Philip wrote that it was the lack of education
that created a difference in intellectual achievement. Philip's understanding of the
equality of the races led him to pontificate on the need for oppressed races to be
socially equal to Whites as well. Philip, constantly accused of"meddling", retorted to
his critics:
If a minister is guilty of dereliction of his duty in advocating the cause
of the oppressed, or in relieving the necessities of the destitute, I plead
guilty to the charge ...Tcould not see the Mission destroyed, nor the
aborigines trampled in the dust ...without attempting to relieve them by
legal means.49
David Livingstone
Luthuli also admired David Livingstone (1813-1873), a protege of John Philip,
a Congregationalist and a missioner of note. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
speech, Luthuli noted that Livingstone's ideals and legacy inspired his own.
Unfortunately, Livingstone is known more as an explorer searching for the source of
47 Philip was often accused ofa sense of self-importance and prone, like van der Kemp, to statements
ofgrandiosity. Philip contributed to the incorrect perception that he was the sole agent responsible for
the passage of Ordinance 50 rather than an advocate of its concretisation by Order-in-Council.
48 Hofmeyr and PiIlay, A History o/Christianity in South A/rica, 1: 56.
49 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 37.
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the Nile, being "lost" and then found by William Stanley, than as a missioner.
Livingstone was a deeply spiritual man. Martin Dugard noted with dismay that
Livingstone was "too religious" to be an epic adventurer (Dugard' s emphasis).
His spiritual aura was so great that even the Arab slave raiders against
whom he battled so vehemently said he possessed the intangible
known as baraka, uplifting and blessing all coming into contact with
h· 50lm.
A' la van der Kemp, Livingstone proved particularly adept at immersing
himself within the indigenous context, often being accused of 'going native'.
Wherever he went, he worked assiduously to learn the local language, always eating
with and residing amongst the 'native' population. For this reason, Livingstone spoke
scathingly against slavery and used his fame as an explorer to vociferously lobby for
its abolition. As much as the search of the Nile and the propagation of the Gospel, the
elimination of the slave trade seemed to be Livingstone's life passion. For
Livingstone, slavery resulted in the destruction of a people and his ire was so raised
by it that, despite his otherwise diminutive demeanour, Livingstone would often
express public rage on his speaker's circuit. In 1856, Livingstone resigned from the
LMS after spending fifteen years in Africa, perhaps realising that his fame as an
intrepid explorer enabled him to be a far more potent weapon against slavery than that
of a benign missioner.
Livingstone's contribution to human rights in Africa is not well known.
Andrew Ross suggests that Livingstone's stances were not compatible with nineteenth
and twentieth century ecclesiastical history that shied away from casting a shadow on
British imperialism. If one examines the biographies of Livingstone, one will note
that Livingstone's support of the'Hottentot Rebellion' of 1851 and his justification of
Blacks' rights to utilise violence against Boers and English settlers alike are not
mentioned.51 Livingstone's advocacy for human rights led him to be a proponent of
British colonialism (or 'benevolent imperialism'), so as to stamp-out slavery.52
Livingstone resigned from the LMS to focus his efforts as an abolitionist utilising the
50 Martin Dugard, Into Africa: The Epic Adventures ofStanley & Livingstone (New York: Broadway
Books, 2003), 2.
51 Andrew Ross, John Philip (/775-1851): Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa (Aberdeen,
Aberdeen University, 1986), 2, see endnote 1 on 229.
52 In 1834, slavery had been abolished in all British colonies and protectorates.
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three 'Cs': Christianity, Commerce and Colonialism.53 Yet even within ecclesiastic
history texts, Livingstone is not given much merit for his contribution to human rights
advancement. This is due to the fact that then, as well as now, the church frowns
upon clergy who take-up 'secular' vocations, appointments or passions even if those
'secondments' forward the ethos of the church more than actual grassroots ministry. 54
Briggs and Wing, in their history of Congregationalism in southern Africa,
condescendingly suggest that Livingstone and others "did little more than hoist the
Gospel banner" rather than "occupy" and "take possession" of "the country far
beyond", as 'they should have'.55
One is able to observe within southern African Congregationalism a tendency
for lay and ordained leaders to abandon a vocation linked or synonymous with the
church for vocations more secular in nature. Though inspired by their Congregational
brand of Christianity, many leaders found the Church to be too conservative and
lethargic an instrument by which to achieve ambitious goals. Like Dube to education,
ka Seme to law, Livingstone to anthropology and geography and even Luthuli to
politics, John Mackenzie was drawn to the rather unusual and oxymoronic craft of
"humanitarian imperialism".56
John Mackenzie
Undoubtedly, one of the "other illustrious men" who is unnamed in Luthuli's
Nobel acceptance speech is John Mackenzie (1835-1899). Born on 30 August 1835
in Scotland to poor and simple parents, Mackenzie began his studies to become a
missioner in 1855 under the tutelage of a Congregationalist minister in Bedford,
England. Mackenzie soon left the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Apparently, the
most independent ofNonconformist churches far better suited Mackenzie than the
more authoritarian and hierarchical ecclesiology that too resembled the Anglican
episcopacy. Mackenzie soon became convinced that "Congregational Independency
53 Dugard, Into Africa, 67.
54 This study observes this motif in Luthuli's life as he effectively utilised the political realm rather
than the ecclesiastic realm (and forfeited his Christian, Amakholwa, chieftaincy) to forward the struggle
for liberation as a leader of the ANC.
55 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 162.
56 Livingstone supported colonialism in an effort to abolish the slave trade.
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is the fonn of government laid down in the New Testament for the Churches of
Christ".57
In 1873, the LMS appointed Mackenzie to oversee the Moffat Mission at
Kuruman. Like so many Congregational missioners of note, and similar to Luthuli,
the confines of the Church proved too restrictive and the call of the Gospel led beyond
parish leadership to political leadership. While at Kuruman, Mackenzie became a
vociferous advocate ofland rights for indigenous Africans. While disputes between
the Transvaal Republic and the Tswana tribes increased, Mackenzie's bias for those
whom he served led him to argue to the British government that a commission should
be established to prevent unscrupulous Whites from expropriating tribal territories.
Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of the Cape, requested Mackenzie to become
Commissioner for the government. Mackenzie was interested in the position, but not
at the expense of his mission work at Kuruman, for he knew that the LMS would not
pennit him to serve 'two masters'. By the 1880s, two recently constituted Boer
Republics (Stellaland and Goshen) were poised to utilise conflict between them to
expropriate land from the Batswana. Mackenzie's efforts to enlist the British
government's intervention eventually led him to England wherein the London
Convention of 1883-1884 effectively guaranteed protection for the Batswana within
British Bechuanaland. In doing so, Mackenzie earned from the infuriated Boers the
distinction of being labelled a "meddling missionary".58
Returning to South Africa in 1884, Mackenzie accepted for a short time the
position of Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland, thus resigning from the LMS as
did Livingstone to focus on his abolitionist efforts. For six years thereafter,
Mackenzie worked unsuccessfully to extend British protection for the indigenous
people residing in an area from the Orange River to the Zambezi. To Mackenzie's
credit, the Cape Colony incorporated British Bechuanaland in 1895 thus avoiding the
same corporate ownership under Cecil Rhodes that affected Matabeleland in 1889.
Polity, Ethics and Violence
To interpret Luthuli, one must be cognisant of the religious faith that primarily
motivated him. Any historical inquiry that ignores the role of Luthuli's specific faith
57 Sillery, John Mackenzie ofBechuanaland, 4.
58 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 175.
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tradition fails to analyse him adequately, if at all. As mentioned in the preface,
historical commentators have frequently referenced Luthuli's 'strong Christian
character'. A review of biographic material on Luthuli reveals that the superficial
designation 'Christian' is to some so assumed or benign that it is not analysed.
Alpheus Zulu once reminded an audience:
[Luthuli] became famous for his political exploits with the result that
many of his other qualities were almost submerged. Those of us who
were intimately associated with [Luthuli] know well that he would
have desired to be remembered first as a Christian. This point needs to
be emphasised especially in our day when many people doubt the
relevance of the Christian faith in the struggle for building a happy and
free South African society. All his labours were the expression of
Christian faith. 59
For others, the designation 'Christian' is so inconvenient that it is easily ignored or
dismissed as trivial.
While Luthuli allied himself with many Christian leaders of various traditions,
from Roman Catholic to Quaker, Congregationalism proved to be the seminal
influence that guided his decisions. While strategic considerations influenced Luthuli
not to support the ANC's turn to violence, faith-based considerations ultimately
prevented him from accepting and endorsing violent strategies to attain liberation,
hence this study is entitled "Bound by Faith". Lifelong Congregational influences
and many Christian associations wed Luthuli to non-violent methods as likeminded
Christians at the time perceived violence to be antithetical to the Christian faith within
the South African context.
Intentionally, this study does not interrogate the definitions or nuances of
'pacifism' and 'violence'. Within 'pacifism' and 'violence' there is a very wide
spectrum of understandings. Both terms are meaning laden and each requires a
dissertation to unpack. Research has not uncovered any definition, explanation or
qualification for either term by Luthuli. Therefore, it is therefore unwise to
conceptualise them extraneous to the 'standard' definitions that Luthuli would likely
have understood and the meanings that he most likely intended to articulate. Suffice
to say, herein, the terms 'violence' and 'pacifism' are taken from the Oxford
59 UKZN, APC&SA, PC80/1/1/2, Bishop Alpheus Zulu, Inaugural Address of the Albert Luthuli
College, 15 March 1977, 1.
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Dictionary and are used in the most generic manner. Pacifism is: 'The belief that
disputes should be settled by peaceful means and that war and violence are
unjustifiable'. A pacifist is one who subscribes to the above belief. This definition
does not include qualifications or exceptions inherent in the statement that "war and
violence are unjustifiable". Violence is: 'Behaviour involving physical force intended
to hurt, damage or kill'. The operative term here is 'physical force'. This study
interprets that this definition does not restrict itself to physical force against human
beings; the definition allows for the inclusion of structures. Thus, the definition
includes sabotage as sabotage involves a physical force that damages. Later, chapter
six makes the distinction between a pacifist and a non-pacifist who advocates the use
of pacifist strategies.
To support the thesis linking Luthuli's stance on violence to his Christian
faith, the advocacy of non-violence must be specifically linked to Congregationalism
within the South African context. Therefore, an examination of Congregationalism's
stance on violence is here required. Demonstrating the link between
Congregationalism and non-violence is problematic for three reasons.
First, like most mainline denominations, Congregationalism does not hold
pacifism as a religious tenet as do Quakers or other faith communities within the
Anabaptist movement, such as the Mennonites.6o Congregationalism, like
Christianity in general during its history, does not inherently oppose the use of force
in appropriate contexts.61 Within the South African context, a deep contradiction was
held by South African Christians in general and Congregationalists who opposed the
liberation movements' use of violence yet did not necessarily (or, consistently)
denounce the daily institutionalised violence perpetrated by the South African state.62
Contradictions even existed with those who preached non-violence. For example,
Frank Chikane, former Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches,
once confided:
60 American Friends Service Committee, South Africa: Challenge and Hope, rev. ed., Lyle Tatum, ed.
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1987).
John de Gruchy, "Radical Peace-Making: The Challenge of Some Anabaptists", in Theology &
Violence, Villa-Vicencio, 173-85.
61 Douglas Bax, "From Constantine to Calvin: The Doctrine of the Just War", in Theology & Violence,
Villa-Vicencio, 147-71.
62 The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church, 2nd rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: William Eerdmans),
1996.
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With regard to my own non-violent stance, the contradictions began to
appear after I was released on bail during the treason trial of 1985. My
house and my family were attacked with petrol bombs and my name
was discovered to be on a hit list. At the time, I was preaching non-
violence and preparing my case to show how peaceful I was, while the
community organised itself to protect me from those agents of the
apartheid system who were threatening my life. I was confronted with
the reality of armed people who were committed to preserving my life
and the lives of my family. I was obliged to admit that I was only able
to continue preaching non-violence because others were prepared to
use violence to create this space for me. There comes a time when one
cannot preach non-violence without recognising the hypocrisy of
enjoying a security provided by violent means.63
Second, despite the above, within the South African context during the 1960s
when the ANC decided to form MK, South Africans within the mainline
denominations, including Congregationalists, generally assumed only non-violent
methods to be legitimate means by which to oppose Apartheid. In 1961, so pervasive
was the assumption that only non-violent methods were legitimate that churches did
not discuss, debate or even consider the utilisation of violent measures. Seemingly
irreconcilable are the two claims that 'Congregationalism does not advocate pacifism'
and 'Congregationalists assumed exclusively non-violent methods as legitimate'.
Racism in part sources the contradiction between the first claim by Congregationalists
(and South African Christians in general) during the 1960s that violence can be
necessary and moral and the second claim that assumed only non-violent methods
were legitimate in the struggle for South Africa's liberation. Black Christians across
the ecclesiastical spectrum also expressed this hypocrisy concerning the legitimate use
of violence. This contradiction poses a difficult obstacle for the presentation of
deductive or documentary evidence that Congregationalism, by its nature, influenced
Luthuli to refrain from supporting the turn to violence.
Third, Congregationalism is, by the very nature of its polity, decentralised.
Individual members and churches are independent in matters of conscience. Little or
no hierarchy exists whereby official and authoritative rulings are established to which
members and churches must abide. As discussed earlier in this introduction,
63 Frank Chikane, "Where the Debate Ends", in Theology & Violence, VilIa-Vicencio, 303-4.
Chikane also mentioned: "The recent case of Mrs. Coretta King was a classic example. In order to
undertake her mission of peace in South Africa in line with the non-violence tradition of her husband
Martin Luther King, she had to be protected by security police" (303). It must be remembered, King
depended on the use of force by the National Guard and Federal Bureau ofInvestigation to protect
those actively involved in the non-violent civil rights movement.
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Congregationalism is highly democratic and allows for a wide divergence of views.
Doctrines, edicts and encyclicals are not a part of the Congregational tradition. Those
who serve within the instrumentalities of the wider Congregational family may speak
'to' churches but may not speak 'for' them without their collective consent. In other
words, the wider church may prophetically lead and direct, but not dictate to, local
churches. Also, the wider church can with approval represent the views of the local
churches rather than unilaterally decide what those views are.
The lack of 'authoritative' structures and uniform creeds creates dearth of
material documenting 'the' or 'a' Congregational stance towards violence in South
Africa in 1961. However, the 1970 reaction of the union of Congregational churches
(the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa, UCCSA) to a World Council
of Churches' (WCC) resolution pledging to support for movements that may employ
violence to achieve liberation through a special fund under the Programme to Combat
Racism (PCR) assists this study in circumnavigating the above articulated archival
hurdle.
In 1970, the UCCSA's Fourth Assembly statement concerning the WCC's
PCR disclosed a conservative undercurrent concerning the use of violence within the
white, black and coloured churches. Though many of the denomination's leaders
were progressive, outspoken and exhibited prophetic actions, the grassroots of the
church could not countenance even indirect support of any armed liberation
movements. Many texts highlight the saga of the controversial WCC decision to
support liberation movements opposed to Apartheid through the PCR special fund. 64
A detailed chronology of events concerning the WCC's PCR special fund is not
necessary for this study's purposes, though a cursory overview is required.
In 1968, the Assembly of the WCC met in Uppsala where it declared that
"racism is a blatant denial of the Christian faith" and "urged that the World Council of
Churches undertake a crash programme to guide the Council and the member
64 John de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip), 1979), 127-38.
Pauline Webb, ed. A Long Struggle: The Involvement ofthe World Council ofChurches in South
Africa (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1994), 102-15.
Charles Villa-Vicencio, Trapped in Apartheid: A Socio-Theological History ofthe English-Speaking
Churches (Cape Town: David Phi lip, 1988), 109-15.
World Council ofChurches (Programme to Combat Racism), "From Cottesloe to Cape Town,
Challenges for the Church in a Post-Apartheid South Africa", PRC Information 30, 1991,84-6.
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churches in the urgent matter ofracism".65 As a result, in 1969 a WCC sponsored
Consultation on Racism in Notting Hill, London itemised many directives. The final
step concluded: "that all else failing, the Church and churches support resistance
movements, including revolutions, which are aimed at the elimination ofpolitical or
economic tyranny which makes racism possible".66 The same year, the WCC Central
Committee met in Canterbury and established the PCR while confessing that it has
done "too little and too late" in response to many wars of liberation in Africa, the civil
rights movement in the United States and the banning of South Africa's ANC. The
WCC Central Committee committed itselfto implement a "determined attack on
racism".67 In 1970, the PCR established a special fund that would contribute
financially to "organisations that combat racism, rather than welfare organisations that
alleviate the effects of racism ... ", i.e., liberation movements.68
In a chapter from A Long Struggle: The Involvement ofthe World Council of
Churches in South Africa, entitled "Eloquent Action", Baldwin Sjollema detailed the
immediate reactions ofthe South African member churches of the WCC,
Congregationalist included, to the peR. In summary, the South African churches
expressed much righteous indignation. The fact that the WCC did not consult, and
consequently its announcement came as a surprise to its South African member
churches, only exacerbated matters. The South African government seized the
initiative by characterising the PCR as a mechanism by which the Communist
infiltrated WCC would aid and abet "terrorists". The South African Prime Minister,
Vorster ranted against the WCC in parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
accused the intended WCC programme of supporting liberation movements ...
65 World Council of Churches (Programme to Combat Racism), Ans J. van der Bent, ed., "Breaking
Down the Walls: Statements and Actions on Racism 1948-1985", PRC Information, Special Report,
1986,34-5. Statement from the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Uppsala, "Report
on Section IV, Towards Justice and Peace in International Affairs", 1968.
66 Statement from the WCC Sponsored Consultation on Racism, Notting Hill, London, 19-24 May
1969.
World Council of Churches, PRC Information, Special Report, 1986,37.
67 Statement from the Central Committee, Canterbury, "Recommendation Regarding and Ecumenical
Programme to Combat Racism", 1969.
World Council ofChurches (Programme to Combat Racism), PRC Information, Special Report, 1986,
39.
68 Statement from the WCC Executive Committee, Arnoldshain, Germany. "Recommendations by the
International Advisory Committee for the Programme to Combat Racism Regarding Special Fund as
Adopted by WCC Executive Committee", September 1970.
World Council of Churches, PRC Information, Special Report, 1986,41.
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...whose actions consist of crimes of violence like murder, arson,
armed robbery and others which are aimed at all sections of the civilian
population, including women and children.69
Despite its global focus, the negative publicity surrounding the PCR quickly focused
specifically on the South African anti-Apartheid movement. Despite the many,
diverse and exclusively non-violent planks of its plan, antagonistic commentators
reduced the PCR to gun-running. The fallout from the PCR in South Africa lingered
for many years and caused enormous strain between the WCC and its South African
member churches.
In the wake of the announcement to create the PCR, the Secretary of the
UCCSA, Joseph Wing, clearly articulated to the South African government and its
members that any form of violence, be it by the government or the liberation
movements, could not be condoned by the church.70 As the UCCSA concluded its
Fourth Assembly, Wing could articulate the thought ofthe denomination when he
said:
The United Congregational Church of Southern Africa is of the
opinion that the racial situation in South Africa cannot be minimised
and that it calls for responsible Christian action. We are equally
convinced that the forces which produce change are inherent in the
Gospel and that Christians cannot repudiate the "ministry of
reconciliation" to which it has been called and resort to methods which
may result in one form of racialism being replaced by another...We
believe that racial discrimination can only be changed by a change in
outlook leading to racial reconciliation. For this reason, we abhor and
therefore reject violence and terror and pledge ourselves to work, by
means consistent with the Gospel, for racial harmony and goodwill. 71
For a mainline and Reformed denomination, the UCCSA possessed, at the
time ofLuthuli's 1967 death, what could be for the time and context, a progressive
racial viewpoint, having merged white, black and coloured mission churches to form a
new denomination in the midst of Apartheid. Later, the UCCSA may have been
considered 'radical' by some concerning its anti-Apartheid stances, with many of its
ministers being arrested, detained and incarcerated for protesting white supremacist
69 Baldwin Sjollema, "Eloquent Action", in A Long Struggle, Pauline Webb, 15.
70 UHOA, wee, correspondence from Rev. Joseph Wing to Rev. Richard Sales, 25 September 1970.
de Gruchy and van der Water, Spirit Undaunted, 10-3 and 143.
71 UHOA, wee, correspondence from Rev. Joseph Wing to Rev. Richard Sales, 25 September 1970.
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rule.72 However, contained within the diversity of the UCCSA was the conservative
nature of South African Christians who decried racism, yet did scarcely anything
proactive about undermining it.
The Congregationalist response to the WCC's 1970 PCR suggests the type of
response most of Luthuli's South African Christian colleagues would have had to his
alleged countenance of violent tactics in 1961 when the ANC launched MK. The
Congregational response to the ecclesial debate surrounding violence reveals the
views of those whose succour and praise Luthuli received throughout his political
career. Though not pacifist, the wider Christian church in South Africa (then still
primarily governed by liberal Whites who opposed racism theoretically but would
never support violence practically) would have certainly viewed Luthuli's support of
MK as a betrayal of their mutually shared values. The result would have created rifts
in relationships that Luthuli held so dear. By affirming only non-violent methods
after MK's launch, Luthuli did not sacrifice his mutually shared values with and thus
the support of white Christian liberals who he judged on the global scale would be the
strategic key to a bloodless liberation.
Though occurring in 1970, nine years after the ANC launched MK, the events
surrounding the WCC's decision to support liberation movements illuminates many
points simultaneously. Though Congregationalists are not generally pacifists and the
wider church did not dictate a uniform or authoritative position on violence to which
its members and churches adhered, most Congregationalists in 1961 opposed any
form of violent opposition to Apartheid. Most importantly, the surprised reaction of
mainline church denominations to the WCC's support ofliberation movements
connotes that not until 1970 did most Christians substantively question and debate for
the first time the legitimacy ofviolence within the South African context. This
underscores the understanding that mainline churches, Congregationalists being no
exception, assumed that only non-violent methods should be utilised to oppose
Apartheid in 1961. Luthuli's consistent opposition to the use of violence to oppose
Apartheid coincided with mainline denominations' pre-1970 opposition to the use of
72 For example, in 1980 the police arrested and detained Rev. John Thome and three colleagues for
trying to bring demands of students to the attention of authorities. Wing then organised fifty-three
ministers to protest their detention. This action led their arrest and detention.
Jim Bailey, ed., The Beat ofDrum: The Rise ofAfrica, "The Day the Bishops Went to Jail"
(Braamfontein: Raven, 2001), featured in Drum's July 1980 issue, 4-5, 8.
Steve de Gruchy and Desmond van der Water, eds., Spirit Undaunted: The Life and Legacy of
Joseph Wing (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 2005), 71.
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violence. Furthermore, Luthuli's consistent opposition to violence prefigured the
mainline denominations' nuanced and theologically consistent stance best articulated
by Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu in the 1980s that justified violence while
simultaneously advocating strictly non-violent methods of resistance; that is, the
church disavowed pacifism while advocating its strategies. For example, Tutu
conveyed Luthuli's non-violence stance coupled with Luthuli's "No one can
blame..." philosophy when he stated:
We are driven... to invoke a non-violent method which we believe is
likely to produce the desired result. If this option is denied us, what
then is left? If sanctions should fail there is no other way but to fight.
Should the west fail to inspire sanctions it would, in my view, be
justifiable for Blacks to try to overthrow an unjust system violently.
But I must continue to work to bring an end to the present tyranny by
non-violent means. Should this option fail, the low intensity civil
war. ..will escalate in to a full-scale war. When that happens, heaven
help us all. The Armageddon will have come!73
Luthuli's ecclesiastic roots ran much deeper than his political roots that began
rather late in his life. Luthuli possessed stronger ecclesiastic relationships than
political. Brookes, Huddleston, Reuling, Collins, Michael Scott, Lavinia Scott,
Reeves, Hepple, Taylor, Mary-Louise Hooper and Charles and Sheila Hooper, Atkins,
Brueckner and many others identified in this study typified Luthuli's mainstay of
support. In 1970, the Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational
denominations issued clear rejections of violence as a means to bring about political
change and pledged to work for the removal of injustices by peaceful means.
Luthuli's public support for the use of violence would have constituted a personal and
ideological betrayal to all of the above churches that belonged to an ecumenical body
Luthuli at one time served as Vice-President. The opposition of the UCCSA to the
hint of even indirectly supporting violence through the WCC' strongly suggests the
degree to which the wider church and Luthuli's Congregationalist colleagues would
have reacted to his support of violence in 1961.




The Home of My Fathers·
The revolution which Christianity brought into the lives of converts
was profound, as can perhaps be imagined. Conversion meant an
entirely new way of life, a new outlook, a new set of beliefs - the
creation, almost, of a new kind of people. They were still Zulus to the
backbone - that remained unchanged except for a few irrelevant
externals. But they were Christian Zulus, not heathen Zulus, and
conversion affected their lives to the core. -- Albert Luthuli2
Introduction
Most ANC leaders during the 1960s, particularly those arising from the ANC
Youth League, received their education at Christian mission schools (for example,
Duma Nokwe (St. Peter's), Oliver Tambo (Holy Cross and St. Peter's), Wilson Conco
(Mariannhill), Ashby Mda (Mariazell), Robert Sobukwe (Healdtown), Nelson
Mandela (Healdtown) and WaIter Sisulu (All Saints). While these schools provided
the intellectual tools with which they would prosecute the liberation struggle, they did
not usually succeed in instilling a theological ethos that would fonn the basis of their
being. Rarely did their specific faith traditions detennine the basis of who they were
and how they thought. Perhaps only Zechariah Matthews' Methodism approaches the
degree to which a specific faith tradition influenced an ANC leader to the extent that
it did Luthuli. Luthuli's roots in Congregationalism were deep and extensive,
stretching back three generations. Congregationalism defined his home, school,
vocation and spiritual life and his political life did not take precedence over these.
Though those political colleagues who knew and worked with Luthuli grew very
affectionate of him and deeply respected his integrity, a distance between them and he
existed, caused by the profound gravity with which the Christian and Congregational
faith bound him. Some were uncomfortable with his prayers before each meal, others
with the grace he extended to antagonists and others by his unwillingness to achieve
liberation by force, if necessary. Early in his teaching career, Luthuli's Christian
associations fostered a propensity to charitably interpret others thus precluding
1 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 1.
This is also the title of Let My People Go's first chapter.
2 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 4.
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embitterment and disillusionment and enabling his patience for political reform to
outlast that of his many lieutenants.
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
The mission arm of the Congregationalist church, the American Board [of
Commissioners] for Foreign Mission (the Board) was founded in 1810 at Andover
Seminary in Massachusetts.3 In 1812, the Board began its early mission activities in
India.4 For the next twenty years, the Board expanded its reach to Ceylon, Turkey,
Greece, Hawaii and to west and central Africa. The first mission to Africa failed. 5
The failure, caused by the infiltration of traders and colonial powers prejudicing the
indigenous population against the missioners, likely haunted the American Board.
Later, the Board became convinced that it needed to withdraw in southern Africa
when conditions became similarly unviable.6
The Board's presence in southern Africa was catalysed by John Philip, the
Superintendent of mission in southern Africa for the LMS. Philip, a strong advocate
for indigenous human rights and a politically contentious character, ultimately
recommended to the Board in 1833 that it send missioners to the Matabele (inland)
and Amazulu (maritime) fields. 7 In 1835, the Board sent missioners to southern
Africa, specifically to its most south eastern coast known as Natal. Following their
arrival in Cape Town in February, these missioners arrived on the banks of what is
now Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa in 1836.
The Board's arrival in South Africa coincided with the Great Trek and
Dingane's violent encounter with Piet Retief and has remained to this day, through its
descendent mission boards, an integral participant in South Africa's history. Upon
3 Actually, the ABCFM was, like the LMS, ecumenical or interdenominational rather than exclusively
Congregational, composing itselfof Presbyterian, Congregational and Reformed Dutch missioners.
Nevertheless, both organisations became, for all intents and purposes, Congregational.
Note: "of Commissioners" was eventually deleted from the instrumentality's name.
4 Some would argue it began in 1806, during the famous "Haystack Meeting" when five seminarians,
inspired by a terrifYing thunderstorm, pledged themselves to propagate mission work.
S Kwazulu-Natal National Archives (KZNA), Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR), American
Board Mission (AMB), A608, D/l/90/91, no author cited, "Historical Sketch of West Central African
Mission", pamphlet published by the American Board of Commissioner for Foreign Missions, Boston,
1886.
6 Tan Booth, "Natal and Zululand: The Work of the American Board Mission", Changing Frontiers,
de Gruchy, 80-2.
7 Kotze, Letters ofthe American Missionaries, 9-11 and 28-45.
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Philip's referral, six American Board missioners from five states (Daniel Lindley and
Alexander Wilson from North Carolina, Henry Venable from Kentucky, Aldin Grout
from Massachusetts, George Champion from Connecticut and Newton Adams from
New York) and their wives encountered innumerable difficulties that disrupted
progress in both the inland mission to Mzilikazi's Matebele (Mosega) and the
maritime mission to Dingane's Amazulu (Kwazulu and Natal) due to the Voortrekkers
diffusion throughout the land that engendered violent clashes. Grout, Adams and
. Champion and their families were sent to establish the maritime mission in Natal
while Lindley, Venable and Wilson and their families were to establish the inland
mission. The inland mission failed and the missioners consolidated their efforts in
Natal. By May 1836, Adams settled on the Umlazi River (Natal), Champion and
Grout on the Umsunduzi River (Zululand), Lindley at Illovo River (Natal), and
Venable and Wilson on the Umhlatuzi River (Zululand). The American Board was
the first mission entity to arrive in Natal to establish mission stations; it was not the
last. Vukile Khumalo pointed out that from 1850 to 1900, "Natal was one of the most
heavily evangelised regions of the globe".8 Khumalo's claim was not hyperbole.
Norman Etherington asserted the following:
No other quarter of nineteenth century Africa was so thickly invested
with Christian evangelists. The Secretary of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions estimated in 1880 that the
number of missionaries in Natal was proportionally greater to any
other community on the globe two or three times over. By the turn of
the century in Natal alone there were 40,000 communicants and 10,000
adherents to Christianity. Most ofthe converts lived in mission
reserves and they occupied about 175,000 acres ofland.9
Grout and his wife, Hannah Davis, arrived with the other families in Cape
Town on 05 February 1935 and proceeded to Natal via Bethelsdorp, arriving on
21 December 1935. Grout wasted no time and set off for northern Zululand where he
had an audience with King Dingane at Umgungundhlovu on 16 January 1836. Grout
8 Vukile Khumalo, "Head Rings or Top Hats? An Inquiry into the Shifting Meaning of Body
Coverings in Nineteenth Century Kwazulu-Natal", Chicago Art Journal, Spring 2001, 41-2, footnote
15.
~orman Etherington, Preachers, Peasants and Politics in Southern Africa, 1835-1880: African
Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978),
275.
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perceived that he was hosted with "the utmost kindness and attention". 10 With
Champion, they were able to establish a mission station called Ginani ("I am with
you") and a school as Dingane's priority was education. Returning to Bethelsdorp to
bring his wife north, Grout found that she was seriously ill and soon died on 24
February of tuberculosis a few weeks after giving birth to a daughter, Oriana. In
December 1836, Grout retreated to the United States, delivering his daughter and
Wilson's motherless daughter to the care of relatives. While in the United States,
Grout managed to convince Charlotte Bailey from Mount Holyoke to marry him and
returned to Natal in June 1840.
The inland mission was abandoned in 1837 due to Mrs. Wilson's death and the
Dutch settlers' destruction of the structures in their attack on the Matabele. The
inland mission joined forces in August with their maritime compatriots in Natal. 11
During this time the Board was suffering financial difficulties. An 1837 circular from
Boston issued to missioners in the field read:
You will doubtless have heard, before this reaches you, of the
commercial distress which has come upon our country, and upon the
whole mercantile world. It began to be felt here last summer, and has
ever since been growing more severe. Owing to this in part and partly
to the fact that a number of the missions had increased their
expenditures with unexpected rapidity, - though not more rapidly than
the state of the mission seemed to require - ~ the Board last fall was
indebted nearly 39,000 dollars ...Your expenses must therefore be
reduced, at any sacrifice, to the prescribed limits, or greater evils -
affecting the credit and stability of the Board, the sending forth of
missionaries, and your own personal support - will ensue. 12
War had broken out between the Voortrekkers and the Zulu in the wake of Piet
Retiefs ill-fated visit to Dingane where he, his delegation, and followers were killed.
Retiefs political threats, articulated as theological threats, likely soured Dingane's
opinion ofmissioners in his land. In April 1838, the maritime mission was, like the
inland mission, abandoned and destroyed due to both Boer and Zulu conflict when the
Zulu army invaded Port Natal. Lindley began independently serving the Boers in
Pietermaritzburg. Lindley justified this decision to serve the white population with a
10 Aldin Grout, "A Narrative of the Establishment of the American Mission in Natal", The Natal Star,
25 June 1856, 2. Cited by:
Kotze, Letters ofthe American Missionaries, 96-7.
11 Booth, "Natal and Zululand", in Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 8I.
12 Kotze, Letters ofthe American Missionaries, 178 and 182.
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surprising degree of prescience given the evils of the Apartheid regime that began
some one hundred years later. Lindley wrote:
I do sincerely believe that the cheapest, speediest, and easiest way to
convert the heathen here is to convert the white ones first. More, the
Whites must be provided for, or we labour in vain to make Christians
out of the Blacks. These two classes will come so fully and constantly
in contact with each other, that the influence ofthe Whites, if evil, will
be tremendous - will be irresistible, without a miracle to prevent. To
their own vices the aborigines will add those of the white man, and
thus make themselves two-fold more the children of hell than they
were before. 13
By August 1843, the Board decided to abort the mission in southern Africa until
Philip pleaded with them not to close it. The mission work flourished, comparatively
speaking, from this point on. Taking Grout and Adams as examples, a church was
founded by Grout near the Umvoti River where he served for twenty-five years until
his retirement in 1870. In 1846, Adams confirmed the first Zulu convert, Mbulasi
Makanya, to the Christian faith. 14
Lindley, Adams and Grout are pre-eminent examples of the influence the
Board's presence had in southern Africa. Their influence comes not necessarily from
their own contributions, but rather from the indigenous descendants of those nurtured
within the Christian environments that they engendered. Like their American
Congregationalists before them who established Harvard and Yale, American
missioners in South Africa founded educational institutions that produced some of
South Africa's most distinguished leaders. 15 Though, rather than groom distinguished
leaders, missioners intended education to primarily be a means to bring people into
the Christian faith. For example, the object of education of females, such as
Nokukhanya Bhengu at Inanda Seminary, in the nineteenth and twentieth century
was, for right or for wrong, to educate suitable companions for indigenous pastors and
by familial example, to propagate the faith.
13 Correspondence to Boston from Rev. Daniel Lindley in 1839. Cited in:
Edwin Smith, The Life and Times ofDaniel Lindley 1801-1880 (England: Epworth, 1949), 160.
14 The early beginnings were difficult to say the least. Today, as one surveys the gravesites at historic
mission churches, one can see many American missioners and their children laid to rest.
IS Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 76-101.
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The Female Boarding School is vitally connected with the success of
the missionary enterprises. Its object is to educate suitable companions
for the native pastors and teachers, and for other educated Christian
young men; that in every native community there may be at least one
household illustrative of the fruits of Christian culture. The example of
such families will act as leaven to promote the social and moral
regeneration of the people, and will especially tend to the elevation of
the female sex. The basis of a true Christian civilisation must be laid
in the homes as well as the hearts of the people. 16
Lucy Lindley initiated the Inanda Seminary in 1869 and since then it has produced
many of South Africa's black female doctors, teachers and lawyers, including cabinet
and deputy minister positions in the current South African government. 17 The first
principal sent by the Board, Mary Edwards (more affectionately known as '''Mah
Edwards"), arrived in November 1868 after a three monthjoumey and served at the
school for sixty years. 18 Inanda continues to serve as the only school affiliated with
the Congregational church after having survived the ravages of the Apartheid
regime's Bantu Education policy that led to the closing of other mission schools
across the country (Adams College and Tiger Kloof, to name just two). Adams, sent
initially as a medical doctor from the United States and only became ordained in
South Africa by the LMS, inspired the creation of the Amanzimtoti Institute (later
named Adams College) in 1853 that produced for the African continent many of the
most illustrious members of the Black intelligentsia. 19 Thousands of students, dozens
of schools, hundreds of Sunday Schools throughout Kwazulu and Natal fed capable
and bright indigenous talent to these and other prominent institutions.
Congregational mission schools also produced outstanding political leaders, an
enduring contribution that is still observed today. The founder of the ANC in 1912,
Pix1ey Isaka ka Seme, was a product of the Inanda mission and Adams College.
ka Seme's namesake, Pixley, was an American missioner who mentored him. The
ANC elected John Dube, also a product of Inanda mission, as the first President of the
ANC. At the tum ofthe century, Dube founded the Ohlange Institute, an industrial
16 KZNA, PAR, AMB, A608, D/1/90/97, no author cited. "The Female Boarding School in Foreign
Missions", The American Board for Foreign Missions, Boston, 1866, I.
17 Agnes Wood, Shine Where You Are: A History ofInanda Seminary (1869-1969) (Pietermaritzburg:
Lovedale, 1972), 15.
18 Joanne Gamblee, Ahead ofTheir Time: Nineteenth-Century Miami County Women (Wooster: The
Wooster Book Company, 2001),173-214.
19 KZNA, PAR, AMB, A608, D/1/90/l00, Albert LeRoy, "Amanzimtote Seminary", The Higher
Educational Institutions ofthe American Board (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions, Boston, MA, 191-?), 81-4.
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school. Luthuli hailed from Groutville, attended school and taught at Adams College,
toured the United States in 1948 and became the President-General of the ANC.
From the inspiration ofNewton Adams, the first medical missioner, others such as
lames McCord and Alan Taylor enabled McCord Hospital to be the first medical
facility to cater for the medical needs ofthe indigenous people.20 McCord Hospital
also went on to become the first institution in South Africa to train indigenous nurses
(including one ofLuthuli's daughters), many of whom had graduated from Inanda
Seminary. McCord was the primary hospital whereby Luthuli received medical care
during most of his adult life for his failing sight, high blood pressure-hypertension and
strokes.
Aldin Grout and Groutville
Born on 09 September 1803 in Pelham, Massachusetts, Aldin Grout founded
the Groutville (Umvoti) Mission station from where Luthuli hailed. Grout graduated
from Andover Seminary in Boston, the same institution that bore the mission board he
served.21 Andover Seminary inspired Grout to commit himself to pursue ministries
overseas. Andover Seminary was a distinctly Congregationalist - or Independent -
seminary and therefore it imbued its alumni with the polity and ethos of this branch of
faith.22
Following the death of his first wife and return to Africa with his second,
Grout found the missiological environment significantly weakened by the political
environment. The overthrow of Dingane in June 1839 and his death at the hands of
the Amaswazi in March 1840 led to the installation of Mpande who was, for all intents
and purposes, a vassal of the Voortrekkers, as king. A pattern of ambiguous
dependency was first established with the American missioners as on 06 August 1840
20 All three served as medical doctors.
lames McCord, My Patients Were Zulus (London: Frederick Muller, 1946).
21 Grout's colleague, George Champion, also graduated at Andover Seminary. Today, the seminary is
known as Andover-Newton Seminary and is a United Church of Christ affiliated theological school.
22 Kotze, Letters a/the American Missionaries, 12.
Though Presbyterian, Lindley may also have been significantly influenced by Congregationalism.
Lindley attended seminary at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia where he was inspired to serve
overseas by a branch of the Society ofInquiry on the Subject of Missions to the Heathen. This Society
was established at Andover Theological College in 1811 (Kotze, 11).
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Grout took an oath ofloyalty to the Volksraad.23 Passing the ruins of Ginani, Grout
responded to an invitation from Mpande to visit. Initially, Mpande proved as
agreeable as Dingane and gave permission for Grout to establish a mission station
following Voortrekkers approval that was granted on 15 January 1841. Grout
established a mission station at Empangeni and named it "Inkanyesi" - "Star".
Inkanyesi prospered under Grout due in part to the able assistance of indigenous
leadership and his wife. A man named Mfungumfu Dube partnered with Grout,
protected the missioner and interpreted the preached Gospel. Hundreds of students
attended the mission school where Charlotte taught. Grout proved to be quite the
agriculturalist, planting rye, wheat, barley, corn, pumpkins, melons, beans, sugar and
sorghum. Grout became well known in the area as a 'rainmaker', a chief, and even a
rival power against Mpande. Commentators have noted Grout's dismissive attitude to
Mpande's power and imply that it was Grout's arrogance that caused Mpande's
suspicion.24 Grout overestimated Mpande's trust of him and was naiVe to how little
the king would allow his Zulu subjects to be influenced by a missioner. In reality,
Mpande's interest and benevolence extended to Grout only so far as it was the royal
kingdom that prospered. Grout fostered another kingdom, Christendom. This
kingdom was at theological and cultural odds with the Zulu king. Tragically for
Grout, as well as for any Christian mission in Zululand for some time, Mpande's
subjects paid for their dual allegiances with their lives. Grout's followers believed his
tutelage of them to be sanctioned by Mpande. However, as the two rivals became
ever more suspicious and doubtful of each other's intentions, the Zulus in Grout's
mission became trapped - afraid to demonstrate obeisance and afraid to show
disrespect for Mpande. On 25 July 1842, Mpande launched a surprise attack on the
mission 'eating-up' (killing) those close to GroUt.25 Mfungumfu warned Grout to
abandon the mission station and flee. 26 The Grouts barely escaped with their lives.
23 A. E. Cubbin, "Origins ofEmpangeni: Rev. Aldin Grout's Mission Station Inkanyesi on the
Mpangeni River May 1841 -25 July 1842", in Contree 31,1992,26.
24 A. Duminy and W. R. Guest, Natal and Zululand (Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1989),278.
25 Smith, The Life and Times ofDaniel Lindley, 220.
26 Luthuli Museum, (LM), Groutville, Kwadukuza, Interview with Mr. Taylor Dube, by Mrs. A. Gibb
(Curator of the Stanger Museum), at Nkukhwini, Groutville, 11 August 1983.
Mr. Taylor's memory was not as good as Mrs. Gibb stated it was. While telling the history of his
grandfather, Mfungumfu, seems to have confused the abandonment of Ginani due to Dingane that
occurred when Grout was in the United States with the abandoning ofInkanyezi due to Mpande that
occurred after Grout had returned. Also either Gibb or Taylor thought Cetshwayo succeeded Dingane
whereas the order of succession was Shaka, Dingane, Mpande and Cetshwayo.
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Mfungumfu Dube led Grout south across the Tugela River to eventually settle
a station on the north side of the Umvoti River at Nkukhwini in 1842. A small church
with a thatched roof was built with bricks that Grout taught his members to make.
Mfungumfu proved to be a very able preacher. Grout respected his abilities to such
an extent that he left Mfungumfu in-charge of the mission station and crossed the
Umvoti River to establish another church on the south side. Two reasons for the
move were that Nkukhwini's abundant sand was not suited to Grout's green thumb
and the south side of the, then very large, Umvoti River, allowed more time for a get-
away in case of attack by royal impis (military regiments) from the north. By 1847
the church was constituted and by 1849, Grout had built a church nine metres wide
and 16 metres long, with a corner for a study.27 Mfungumfu, considered a local chief,
married and fathered ChiefNodhlela, who was the father of Chief Taylor Dube.
David Rood and his wife, Alzina, served as the minister of the Umvoti mission
church with Grout from 1848 to 1850. Thereafter, Rood served the Ifafa mission
station on the south coast. After Newton Adams' early death in September 1851,
Rood replaced him serving at the Amanzimtoti mission from October 1951.28 Here,
in 1852 he founded a seminary for boys. This Amanzimtoti Institute came in time to
be known as Adams College where Luthuli lived and worked as a teacher from 1921
to 1935.
The inland mission was destroyed by conflict involving Mzilikazi and settlers,
the maritime mission was destroyed by conflict involving Dingane and settlers, and
the Inkanyezi mission was destroyed by Mpande. It is understandable why Christian
missioners wished to establish some sense of stability in the region. Much of the
Board's money and many of the missioners' and Zulus' lives were at stake.
Revisionist histories critical of the missiological union between missioners and the
colonial government often emphasise a common ideology and theology shared
between the unholy union. Their critiques do so without considering the more
practical realities of bankruptcy and death if the region was not stabilised enough to
produce an environment conducive to establish infrastructure and to raise families, let
alone propagate the Christian faith. The American missioners did cooperate with and
benefit from the colonial state. The government benefited from the pacifying and
27 Booth, "Natal and Zululand" Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 82.
28 Arthur Christofersen, Adventuring with God: The Story ofthe American Board Mission in South
Africa (Durban: Lutheran Publishing House, 1967).
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civilising influence of indigenous population by the missioners and the missioners
benefited by the government's grants oflarge tracts ofland and from the political
stability offered by imperial rule. In time, the state's role became more and more
oppressive to the indigenous population and became highly antagonistic to the efforts
ofmissioners.29
After Natal became a British colony in 1843, large tracts of land were granted
to Dutch settlers (Boers) for farming. Perhaps there was a feeling of obligation by the
Crown to also dispense land to the American Board as Grout and other missioners had
settled in Natal and Zululand a year prior to the Boers. The Governor of the Cape,
Sir George Gray, promised grants ofland to the missioners in Natal. In 1856, Law
No. 5, Deed of Grant, was passed thus allowing the Lieutenant Governor to make land
grants to the American Board.30 Twelve self-contained mission stations of five
hundred acres each were allocated at Umvoti (Groutville), Mapumulo, Inanda,
Umsunduze, Itafamasi, Esidumbini, Table Mountain, Amanzimtoti (Adams), Imfume,
Amahlongwa, Ifafa and Mtwalume.31 These mission stations still exist today under
the auspices of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (a union of
Congregational churches formed in 1967).32 Precisely because of its democratic,
egalitarian and 'self-rule' polity, American Board mission stations emphasised as land
policy the establishment of individual tenure for indigenous adherents.33 Robert
Houle explained that the American Board preached...
... a muscular, agrarian faith in which work and education played
equally important roles alongside worship. To promote this ideal, they
developed the 'village plan' under which Amakholwa lived in small
29 The government became more offensive to missioners, converts and the oppressed majority as a
whole due to the enforcement of migrant labour and high taxes under Natal colonial rule as seen in the
1906 Bhambatha Rebellion and poll tax and under Nationalist Party rule as seen in the Sharpeville
protest against Apartheid's pass laws.
KZNA, PAR, AMB, A608, Frederick Bridgman, "A Statement regarding the Obstructive Policy of
Government toward Christian Work Among Natives", n.d.
30 Booth, "Natal and Zululand", Changing Frontiers, de Gruchy, 83.
31 de Gruchy, Philpott and Ntseng, "The United Congregational Church of Southern Africa", 12.
32 The sizes of some glebe (church) lands are now smaller. For example, portions ofland have been
sold by the church in recent years at Inanda, Ifafa and Groutville. The UCCSA has sold some land
because it can not protect it from squatters, to raise funds for local and wider church, to benefit other
ministries, clinics and schools and to assist the government in land reform efforts.
33 Khumalo, "Head Rings or Top Hats?", 35.
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settlements on mission reserves and leased plots of land from the
.. f: d I 34mISSIOn to arm an graze catt e.
The Congregational missiological emphasis on land tenure nurtured Luthuli's
preoccupation and concern with the inadequacy ofland. The enactment of the 1913
Land Act, No. 27, legally confined Africans to high density reserves and deprived
them of the right to purchase land outside of those reserves. Luthuli's autobiography
and speeches are peppered with censorious references to the 1913 Native Land Act.
Luthuli's role as Chief in the latter half ofthe 1930s and throughout the 1940s
enlightened him to the systemic injustice of land rights. Congregationalists' emphasis
on land tenure created in time a class ofeducated commercial agriculturalists and
entrepreneurs who quickly out-grew the small land holding they were allotted.
Luthuli's chieftainship placed him as an arbiter between the state and the Amakholwa
and between the Amakholwa themselves when the restrictive land laws caused much
contestation within the mission reserve. Gordimer simply summarised the context
Luthuli confronted on the mission reserve:
... [T]he Chief found that most of the things that made the people in his
reserve unhappy were things that could not be put right by careful
advice or a chief's wisdom. There was not enough land for the five
thousand people in the reserve to grow their crops of sugar cane and
vegetables and graze their cattle. As the sons of the families grew up,
they could not buy or rent more land, because Africans were not
allowed to own or farm outside the reserves in South Africa.35
Congregationalism's emphasis on land tenure and Luthuli's struggle to resolve the
symptoms of systemic injustice regarding land ownership awakened his political
acumen thus catapulting him to political prominence.
Ntaba LuthuIi
Inscribed by hand in the Luthuli family Bible is a record of the original
progenitor of the clan, Madunjini Luthuli, a polygamist who "gave rise" to many sons,
34 Robert Houle, "The American Mission Revivals and the Birth of Modern Zulu Evangelism", in Zulu
Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present, Benedict Carton, John Laband and Jabulani Sithole, eds.
(Scottsville, University ofKwaZulu-Natal, 2008), 224. See further endnote 7, 235-6.
35 Nadine Gordimer, "The Man Who Burned His Pass", in Heroes o/Our Time (New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1961),88.
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the eldest of which was named Ntaba. 36 After their conversion and baptism by Aldin
Grout, Ntaba and his wife, Titisi Mthethwa, and others such as Ngasha Mzoneli
renounced polygamy and became Amakholwa. Ntaba and Titisi's conversions led to
an American Board church being constituted on 01 May 1847, now called the
Groutville Congregational Church.37 Both Ntaba and Titisi became "zealous
Christians" and began a line of Luthuli 'Kholwa that is strong to this day.38 Ntaba
became the second chief (Inkosi) to be appointed to serve the Umvoti Mission
Reserve's Abasemakholweni (Converts) community - and the first of four Luthulis
who served as Chief. 39 Not mentioned in Albert Luthuli's autobiography is the fact
that Ntaba was the first teacher to serve in one of several schools organised in the
area.40 Nokukhanya, Luthuli's wife, remembered Ntaba spurned polygamy and
abolished drinking throughout the village and was thus a strong influence on her
husband's (himselfa 'tee-totaler') life.41 In Luthuli's autobiography, one reads a
story about Ntaba that provides a perfect glimpse of the political tensions that
permeated the existence of American Board products, what Shula Marks referred to as
an 'ambiguous dependency'.
One of the few anecdotes which I recall about [Ntaba] suggests that on
relations between church and state he was basically sound. Being a
deacon (elder) of the Groutville congregation, he was asked, at a time
of war between the Zulus and the British, to pray for the success of the
Queen's forces. The prayer stuck in Ntaba's throat. "0 God", he
prayed eventually, "protect the victims of whoever is the aggressor in
this war,,!42
Titisi gave birth to four sons, Martin, John, Daniel and Henry.43 Ntaba's cousin,
Ngubane, became the Christian chief after Ntaba. Martin, Ntaba's son and Luthuli's
36 LM, Luthuli Family Bible.
37 Grout retired from the Umvoti ministry in 1870. Only after the turn of the century did the residents
name the community and the church "Groutvi1le".
38 Peter Rule, Marilyn Aitken and Jenny van Dyk, Nokukhanya: Mother ofLight (Braamfontein, The
Grail, 1993),24-5 and 46-7.
39 Sampson, The Treason Cage, 186-7.
40 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 84.
41 Shirley Deane, Black South Africans: A Who's Who (57 Profiles ofNatal's Leading Blacks) (Cape
Town: Oxford University, 1978), 67.
42 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 5.
43 Rule, Aitken and van Dyk, Nokukhanya, 47.
LM, Luthuli Family Bible.
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uncle, became Chief after Ngubane.44 John married a recent Christian convert,
Nozililo Mtonya Gumede, whom Luthuli described as an "assiduous reader of the
Bible". Shortly thereafter, John, a well-trained teacher at the Groutville
Congregational mission, sought to earn more income. John purchased oxen and a
wagon and entered the transport business. Many from Groutville embarked upon
commercial ventures as the only professions available for literate Amakholwa were
teaching and the civil service that provided inadequate income to afford products to
satisfy increasing western tastes. Robert Houle described Groutville as the "most
fully realised pastoral village" saying:
By 1867, its 433 residents owned nearly 50 wagons, many more
ploughs and carts, and hundreds of trained oxen to pull them.
Transport-riding was a particularly popular and lucrative career for
Groutville's kholwa community, allowing them to tend their farms
while using their unique position as Zulu Christians to do business in
both the traditional and Western worlds ofNatal, buying grain from
Zulu neighbours and reselling it to the white community. The
residents of Groutville poured these profits into the markers of their
Christian identity - their 64 Western-style homes (including those
made of brick), Victorian wardrobe, farming implements and small
libraries.45
John departed north with the British South Africa Army forces where he likely served
logistically as well as linguistically. At some time, Mtonya ventured north to join
him. The violence ofthe First Chimurenga Rebellion (Matebele) disrupted
business.46 On a chance encounter in Bulawayo, John met some Seventh Day
Adventist missioners who desired to establish a school for orphaned children.
Sufficiently impressed with John's teaching abilities, the missioners requested him to
44 Edward Callan stated that Ntaba's son, Ngubane, followed Ntaba and preceded Martin as Chief of
the Umvoti Mission. However, Ntaba's sons are known as Martin, John, Daniel and Henry. Therefore,
I conclude that it was Ntaba's cousin, Ngubane, who became Chief before Ntaba's son Martin.
Although, it could be that Daniel or Henry's middle name or Zulu name was 'Ngubane'.
Edward Callan, Albert John Luthuli and the South African Race Conflict (Kalamazoo, Western
Michigan University, 1962), 17.
Khanya Ka Buthelezi incorrectly wrote for Ethekwini On-line that Luthuli succeeded Ngubane.
Buthelezi indicated that Ngubane was Luthuli's uncle.
Khanya Ka Buthelezi, "Chief Albert Luthuli",
www.ethekwini.gov.za/durban/discover-durban/our-durban/history/famous durbanites/politics/luthuli,
accessed 15 March 2008.
45 Houle, "The American Mission Revivals", in Zulu Identities, Carton, Lahand and Sithole, 224.
See further endnote 9, 236.
46 Sampson, The Treason Cage, 187.
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take charge ofthe school at the Solusi mission. But first, John had to reform his
ways. One source on the history of Solusi reported:
Unfortunately, [John] was a heavy drinker. During the rebellion he
passed the idle hours away by drinking more and more heavily, nearly
drinking himself to death. Finally, he sent for Dr. [A. S.] Carmichael,
who treated him, and warned him of the dangers he faced unless he
reformed.47
Thereafter, John remained in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) as an evangelist, interpreter and
teacher in Bulawayo for the Seventh Day Adventists. John proved to be a competent
teacher despite the meagre resources.
What a school it was! No textbooks, no blackboards, no equipment.
[John] told his students, "Your textbook is going to be your Bible.
Your songbook is going to teach you English". They learned to write
by marking in the sand.48
John's leadership of the school was short-lived. The mission grieved when he
unexpectedly died in mid-1898. What is known of John's sudden death is puzzling.
After a grave illness involving a fever and a brief recuperation, the missioner
Anderson...
... later learned that on the morning of the day [John] died, a friend
brought him some ears of corn. Thinking they would taste good,
[John] asked his wife to cook a half dozen ears, which he ate, and with
fatal results.49
John more than likely died of malaria. Heavy rains that year caused an epidemic of
malaria that devastated Bulawayo. The Solusi mission, including most of the
missioners, perished from malaria during the same period. John left his wife
widowed with the eldest son Alfred and their six month old son, Albert John Mvumbi
47 Virgil Robinson, The Solusi Story: Times ofPeace, Times ofPeril (Washington, D.e., Review and
Herald, 1979), 58.
In Robinson's text, Luthuli's father is referred to as 'John Ntaba'.
If John possessed a predisposition to alcohol dependency, it was passed on to Luthuli's sons who also
suffered from it.
48 Robinson, The Solusi Story, 59.
49 Robinson, The Solusi Story, 65.
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Luthuli.50 Some commentaries and biographies ofLuthuli indicate that he preferred
the name 'Mvumbi', or 'Continuous Rain' to his English names.51 However, no
evidence suggests this claim is correct.52
In his autobiography, Luthuli notably begins his genealogy with Ntaba, the
first Christian convert and not with Madunjini who is not mentioned. Luthuli thus
articulated his genealogy through a theological lens, beginning with his grandfather
and the first convert and a Christian chief (Ntaba), his grandmother and Christian
convert (Titisi), his uncle and a Christian chief (Martin), his father and a Christian
interpreter for missioners (John Bunyan Madunjini), his mother and a Christian
convert (Mtonya) and his brother (Alfred), like his father, a teacher. Luthuli indicated
that he deeply honours his Christian progenitors as they were "zealous Christians"
who were "the founders ofthe Luthuli Christian line".53 Luthuli, like many who have
commented upon his life, did not highlight the unique Congregational nature of the
ancestral line. Perhaps he, also similar to many commentators, did not see his
particular faith tradition as fonnative. However, as this study illuminates, Luthuli's
Congregational faith tradition served as the primary current influencing his political
being.
Martin Luthuli
Luthuli's upbringing was as saturated with Christianity as his ancestry. A
cousin and domestic administrator ofMartin's home, Charlotte Goba, was "a woman
50 Albert was the third of three sons born of John and Mtonya. Alfred Nsusana, the first born son, died
in 1941. Alfred, who was partially educated, did his best to succeed his father on behalfof the Seventh
Day Adventists. The second son was Mpangwa who died at birth.
One source indicated Luthuli's birthday was 18 December 1898. Because Luthuli only "calculated"
1898 as the year he was born, he could not have known the day. Also, if John died in mid-1898 when
Luthuli was six months old, then Luthuli could not have been born in December 1898. If the
December date for Luthuli's birth is accurate, he must have been born in December 1897.
Daily News, "Albert Luthuli Honoured", by Charles Phahlane, 15 December 1999.
51 Sunday Times, "How to View Luthuli's Legacy: Luthuli's Too Big for Boxes", by Prof. Raymond
Suttner, 06 July 2008. Found also at:
http:///www.thetimes.co.za/PrintEdition/Insight/Article.aspx?id=796624, accessed 2 I July 2008.
Beatrice Roberts, Albert Luthuli (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 2006), 2.
This text is a brief regurgitation ofLuthuli's autobiography for secondary education consumption.
Both the above texts likely obtained this information from Mary Benson.
Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli ofSouth Africa, 3.
52 Jacob Zuma indicated in a 1999 speech to open the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital that later in his
life, Luthuli's praise name was 'Madlanduna'.
Daily News, "Albert Luthuli Honoured", by Charles Phahlane, 15 December 1999.
53 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 5.
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ofdeep piety [and] very prominent in church affairs" and a formative influence on
Luthuli's life.54 Even nascent feminist concepts articulated later in Luthuli's life
when he affirmed that "Congress offices are open equally to men and women on
merit" can be attributed to the Amakholwa community at Groutville.55 Luthuli,
somewhat quixotically, explained the nature of household chores exhibited that "the
traditional Zulu distinction between male and female work tended to disappear".56 In
his autobiography, Luthuli, perhaps idealistically, conveyed nascent conceptions of
egalitarianism when he mentioned "Groutville has managed to throw up no elite cut
off from the ordinary life of the village".57 In an unsophisticated manner, Luthuli
described Jean and John Comaroffs more studied articulation of a culture's
transmission of "salient signs and symbols" to "produce and reproduce the basis
of... existence".58 Luthuli recalled, "All the time, unconsciously, I was busy
absorbing the Christian ethos of home, and church congregation and the social ethos
of the community".59 One author stated that this Christian ethos "was to govern his
whole life".6o Morning, evening and mealtime prayers were regular rituals for the
family that for Luthuli the passage of time failed to dissipate. In one recent tribute to
Luthuli, Nomzamo Winnie Madikizela-Mandela reminisced about a time when
Luthuli served as the ANC President-General:
I served dinner, but before they would eat Chief Luthuli would say a
prayer. I will not mention which of the other men felt uncomfortable
during this for they too had their beliefs.61
54 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 10.
Charlotte Goba was interviewed by Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbett in their 1993 documentary on
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UCCSA Head Office Archives (UHOA), Brixton, Johannesburg,"Mayibuye Afrika: Chief Albert John
Lutuli, His Story", audio-visual documentary, produced by Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbett, funded
by Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Shell and Durban Arts Association, 1993.
55 University of Witwatersrand (UW), WiIIiam Cullins Library (WCL), records of the Federation of
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58 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 1: 4-5.
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No alcohol was consumed, a strong work ethic was prevalent, discipline was strict
and education was encouraged. Luthuli acknowledged that while a youth in
Groutville his Christianity was culturally, rather than theologically, instilled.
Luthuli grew up in two Congregationalist households, first that of his uncle,
Martin (mid-1800s-1921), the Chief, and later that of his mother. As liaison between
the old Zulu order and the new order dominated by Whites, Martin appears at various
times in historian Jeff Guy's book The View Across the River. 62 Like his nephew after
him, Martin was raised and educated at the American Board Mission at Groutville.
Seme, Dube and Martin all attended school at Adams. As a farmer and wagon maker,
Martin suffered financially during an economic downturn in the 1880s and as a
consequence offered his services to the desperate Usuthu (Zulu royalists) as they
struggled to communicate appeals to the colonial government and the metropole.
Martin served as a translator in English and L<iizulu. At one time he served the
interests of the rather questionable and selfish character, William Grant. Serving as a
secretary and attache of sorts for the Usuthu brought Martin much in contact with
Bishopstowe, the mission station of the Anglican Bishop William Colenso. As a
liaison, Martin was also brought into the powerful circles of Theophilus Shepstone
and the colonial government he served. In the eyes of the Colenso family, this made
Martin somewhat suspect.63 During the 1880s, Martin acted as Dinizulu's secretary,
the first of subsequent Groutville 'Kholwa notables who served in this capacity
(S. Nyongwana and Leonard Ncapayi).64 As later did his nephew, Martin served the
Congregational church by becoming the Chairperson of the Pastors' Conference, a
second, and lower, leadership instrumentality within the Congregational church. At
the turn of the century, Martin, with Saul Msane, John Dube, J. T. Gumede and
others, founded the Natal Native Congress and became its Chairperson for some time.
Like his nephew after him, Martin advocated for "increased representation for
Africans as well as social changes, such as the introduction ofprivate land tenure for
62 JeffGuy, The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism
(Cape Town: David Phi lip, 2001),127-8,140-1,145-6,151, 159-61 and 255.
63 Guy, The View Across the River, 127.
64 Paul la Hausse de Lalouviere, Restless Identities: Signatures ofNationalism, Zulu Ethnicity and
History in the Lives ofPetros Lamula (c. 1881-1948) and Lymon Maling (1889-c. 1936)
(Pietermaritzburg: University ofNatal , 2000), 167.
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Africans".65 In 1906, during the Bhambatha uprising, Martin used his moderating
influence to help contain the extent of the secession of the 'Ethiopian' Zulu
Congregational Church from the American Board.66
As with Dube and Seme, we see in Martin a life of ambiguity. In 1908,
Martin was the first chief to be elected democratically by the Abasekholweni
community at Mvoti (the previous two having been appointed). At GroutviIIe,
concepts of democracy took root in Luthuli. Luthuli recalled that the selection of his
uncle as Chief was an "occasion of a definite popular choice by the community".67 In
the early I9 IOs, Martin, with other mission chiefs, argued for the complete territorial
and racial separation subject to a more equitable distribution ofJand. Like so many
Amakholwa leaders at the turn of the century, Martin's life was one caught in the
crosshairs of tradition and modernity. Two worlds pulling in opposite directions, one
customary and indigenous and the other Christian and modem, vied for Martin's
allegiance.68
Jordan Ngubane mentioned in one of his newspaper articles that Luthuli had
an 'uncle' named "Ngazana Lutuli".69 Luthuli's vocational interests also mirrored
this uncle's biography. The African Yearly Register, compiled by T. D. Skota,
profiled Ngazana who was born in GroutviIIe in 1874 and was a sub-editor and
manager of Ilanga lase Natal. 7o Ngazana attended the local GroutviIIe primary
65 Thomas Karis and Gwendolen Carter, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of
African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964, "Political Profiles" (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977), 4:
63.
66 Bredekamp and Ross, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, 196 and 207. Bredekamp and
Ross cited:
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Century Natal (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986).
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69 Natal Mercury, "African Profile: New Elected Spokesman of Zulu People of Natal", by Jordan
Ngubane, 01 January 1952.
This "uncle", ifNgazana was an 'uncle' in the western sense, had to be the Zulu or middle name of
Daniel or Henry.
70 In an interview with Nokukhanya Luthuli, Tim Couzens and Annica van Gylswyk expressed an
interest in knowing more about Ngazana. Nokukhanya confirmed that Ngazana is of the same line as
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05 June 1978.
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school, was educated at Adams College and graduated in 1897. Like Luthuli,
Ngazana was a school master by profession (1888-1890) and taught at Adams College
(1899-1915), departing only five years prior to Luthuli' s arrival as a student.
Ngazana also had a connection with Dube's Ohlange Institute, serving as its
Secretary. The Yearly Register listed music as Ngazana's hobby and, like Luthuli, he
was a choir master. 71
The biographic 'associations' Luthuli had with an American Board educated
and trained emerging black elite are extensive enough to assert that they constructed
the core of his being. Other early 1960 ANC leaders despite being trained in mission
schools did not possess the broad and multi-generational Amakholwa associations to
the same extent and depth as Luthuli did. The rich similarities between Luthuli and
those of American Board relations explain how faith bound Luthuli throughout his
life. The degree to which Luthuli and his ancestors in faith attributed their identity to
a legacy of partnership with white Christians in part describes why Luthuli was
unable risk a 'race war' (as tenned by Luthuli and Martin Luther King, Jr.) by parting
with the ANC's idealistic, moderate and non-violent tactics. Others in ANC
leadership positions who did not have deep ecclesiastic roots made, as Joe Matthews
termed, the "psychological switch". 72
John Dube
From 1910-1914, Luthuli attended the local Congregational mission school,
Aldinville Primary, in Groutville where "Kholwa elders promoted education nearly as
fervently as communion".73 Upon completion of standard four, Luthuli attended
Ohlange Institute for two terms. John Dube (1871-1946) founded and led as Principal
Ohlange Institute, located in Inanda. Despite the fact that Luthuli's short time at
Ohlange made little impression on him, Luthuli seemed to be an enhanced
simulacrum of Dube. For this reason, a brief narrative of Dube's life provides an
enhanced understanding of Luthuli.
believe Couzens was interested in Herbert Dhlomo and other early twentieth century black African
petit bourgeois intelligentsia.
71 T. D. Mweli Skota, The African Yearly Register: Being an Illustrated National Biographical
Dictionary (Who's Who) ofBlack Folks in Africa (Johannesburg: R. L. Esson and Co., n.d.), 174.
72 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 285.
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In 1870, the American Board ordained three indigenous lay-leaders, thus
ending the ministerial monopoly held by white missioners. The third was James
Dube, a convert of Daniel Lindley and co-founder of the Inanda mission church.
James Dube had a son, John Langalibalele Dube (1871-1946), who in 1912 became
the first President of the ANC.74 Just as Luthuli, a nephew and grandson to chiefs,
hailed from leadership stock, so too did Dube, a son of a prominent chief. The
parallels between Luthuli and Dube continue. Dube attended Adams College where
he came into the good graces of his mentor and sponsor William Wilcox, a missioner
of the American Board. Dube financed a journey to the United States in 1887 with
Wilcox and soon enrolled in the Oberlin Preparatory Academy before becoming a
student at Oberlin College that had as its motto "Learning and Labour".75 This first
visit to the United States lasted until in 1892 when poor health forced him to return to
Natal, not having formally obtained his degree at Oberlin. Upon his return, Dube, like
Luthuli, taught at Adams College. He then travelled to the United States a second
time to presumably raise money for an indigenous trade school he wished to found.
In 1897, Dube took up residence in Brooklyn Heights, New York and was ordained
into the Congregational ministry at the Lewis Avenue Church located in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant area. Dube returned to South Africa and in August 190 I, during the
Anglo-Boer war, founded the Zulu Christian Industrial School (later in 1917 re-named
Ohlange Institute) based on the philosophy of Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee
Institute.76 Also during the war, the colonial government detained Dube because he
expressed the opinion that Blacks should have political control of the country. In
190 I, Dube became minister of the Inanda mission until 1908 when he resigned from
the pastorate following irreconcilable differences with white missioners and settlers.77
74 Actually, James Dube had more than one son. John had a brother named Charles who was an
American-educated teacher and trader.
Dube was elected President in absentia.
75 Oberlin College provided a great deal of information about Dube and his time in the United States.
Oberlin College, "John L. Dube: A Biographical Sketch". Found at:
www.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/Dube/Dube.htm. accessed 27 January 2008.
76 Luthuli once wrote, "In 'keeping the nigger down' the white man finds himself forced to remain in
the ditch too, as Dr. Booker T. Washington so aptly observed".
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1959.
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was most likely sensitive to being labeled an 'Ethiopian' church as it permitted black ministers to lead
congregations unsupervised by a White. Also the Ethiopian slogan "Africa for the Africans" could
easily be confused with a history of advocating for indigenous rights, ifnot power. See further:
70
Never departing from his educational vocation, Dube made three additional trips to
the United States to raise funds for Ohlange thus totalling five journeys there.78 In
1912, the ANC elected Dube as its first President and elected another ordained
Congregationalist, W. B. Rubusana, as one of its first Vice-Presidents. 79
Dube's life seemed a precursor for Luthuli's. The common American Board
heritage, faith, polity, education and travel to the United States ensured that their life
paths would be similar. Hofmeyr and Pillay identified three ofDube's defining
characteristics:
Firstly, he was an educator and much energy went into making the
Ohlange Institute viable. Secondly, he was a political leader and was
among those who protested against the 1913 Native's Land Act. He
accompanied the delegation to London in 1914 to protest to the British
government. Thirdly, he sought peaceful coexistence between black
and white South Africans, taking part in the Smuts Native Conferences
(only for a few years before he left because it had no real power), the
Joint Council Movement in the 1920s and church conferences. In 1926
he was part of the South African delegation to the international
missionary conference at Le Zoute in Belgium.8o
All of the above three traits apply to Luthuli if one simply substitutes names and
dates. Luthuli was an educator, a political leader and a Christian ambassador seeking
racial reconciliation through peaceful means. Even their disappointments with the
conservative nature of the church and the impotence ofpolitical forums run parallel.
For Dube and Luthuli, education and hard work were the tools by which to achieve
liberation. Violence and revolution were not a part of the recipe. While in Brooklyn,
Dube attended Washington's lectures on topics such as "the dignity oflabour" and the
methods "to teach the Negroes to become moral, self-supporting and useful
JeffGuy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University of
Kwazulu-Natal, 2005), 248-51.
Paul Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza: The Making ofa Rebel (South Africa: P. S. Thompson, 2004).
78 1887-92, 1897-1901, 190411905, 1910 and 1926/1927.
79 Sechaba, "Zemk'inkomo Magwalandini: The Life and Times ofW. B. Rubusana (1858-1936)", by
Pallo Jordan, January 1984. Found at:
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/rubusana.html. accessed 04 July 2008.
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citizens".81 Luthuli emulated Dube. The same unique ecclesiastical polity that reared
both ANC presidents fundamentally influenced their political views. Both served
together on the Adams College Advisory Board that provided Africans a forum by
which to affect mission education during the mid-1930s and later in 1940 both served
on the more independent governing council of "Adams College Incorporated". Both
Luthuli and Dube used Christian biblical teachings and a progressive concept of
civilisation as the basis for their arguments. According to Dube, the Bible stated that
ajust government ruled from the consent of the governed. A central theme, the
distinctly Congregational ethic, that fuses ecclesiastical and political polity as a means
to forward the progressive nature of history was articulated by Dube as it was by
Luthuli. Dube reasoned:
That the time has come when we should have some measure of
legislative representation, some way of making our influence felt in the
law-making powers. Our progress in the Gospel life and its
accompanying civilisation demands it...82
From this cursory biography of Dube, one is able to clearly see the parallel threads of
optimism, theology and strategy that Congregationalism wove into Luthuli's life.
Dube was not re-elected as President of the ANC in 1917 as many progressive
and impatient forces within the Congress viewed his leadership to be too
conservative. Dube rejected violence, though this rejection did not cause him to lose
the presidency.83 Undoubtedly, a recurrent conflict within Congress leaders between
the maintenance of conservative and gradualist ethics (commonly referred to as
hamba kahle politics or "go easy" politics) engendered by American Board mission
institutions and their colleagues' attraction to more assertive methods to establish
equal rights in the land of their birth troubled Dube. This motif later troubled his
younger cousin, Pixley Isaka ka Seme, and other Congress Presidents such as Xuma,
Moroka and Luthuli. For the remainder of his career, Dube led the Natal branch of
the ANC (to which Luthuli was elected in 1951). Dube served on the Native
81 William Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Dissertation Services, 1976), 94.
82 Peter Walshe, The Rise ofAfrican Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress,
1912-1952 (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia, 1971),39.
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Representative Council from 1936 until 1945 when he suffered a stroke. Dube died in
1946. After an election, Luthuli replaced him as a member of the NRC.
Pixley Isaka ka Seme
Another figure that helps to shed light on Luthuli's intellectual history is
Pixley Isaka ka Seme (1881-1951). The Mount Hermon School File gives us a solid
basis for establishing ka Seme as an ecclesiastical ancestor to Luthuli.84 Like his
older cousin Dube, ka Seme was born at the Inanda Mission Station. ka Seme studied
for three years at Amanzimtoti Institution (later to be Adams Training School for
Boys) learning, among other things, photography. ka Seme studied the equivalent of
matric at the Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts and continued at Columbia
University (after being denied an opportunity to study at Yale, his first choice). His
American missioner mentor, S. C. Pixley, whose name Isaka adopted as a tribute
during his studies, sponsored him and saw to his upkeep. John Dube and other
benefactors also assisted a great deal along the way. At Colombia University, ka
Seme delivered an award winning speech entitled "The Regeneration of Africa" that
provides a prelude to the central themes we shall explore in this investigation: an
optimistic understanding of history, an infusion of biblically based theology, and a
gradualist's strategy.
Man knows his home now in a sense never known before. Many great
and holy men have evinced a passion for the day you are now
witnessing - their prophetic vision shot through many unborn centuries
to this very hour. 'Men shall run to and fro', said Daniel, 'and
knowledge shall increase upon the earth'. Oh, how true! See the
triumph of genius today! Science has searched out the deep things of
nature, surprised the secrets of the most distant stars ... and has brought
foreign nations to one civilised family. This all-powerful contact says
even to the most backward race, you cannot remain where you are, you
84 As with Luthuli, the historiography of Pixley Isaka ka Seme generically mentions his Christian
heritage without acknowledging or providing further analysis of the unique Congregationalist 'brand'
of Christianity that undoubtedly influenced him. For example, Drum magazine's entry for Seme
documented that he "was born of a Christian family". The entry continued, "at home he was under the
influence of his Christian parents and the guidance of American missionaries ..."
J. R. A. Bailey and Helen Lunn, eds., Profiles ofAfrica (Johannesburg: Drum, 1983), 101.
Credit must be given to Tim Couzens who 'resurrected' the unfinished work ofa deceased colleague
(Richard Rive) who had done much research on Seme.
ANC, "Discovering Seme", by Tim Couzens. Found at:
www.anc.org.zaJancdocslhistory/people/seme.html. 1-27, accessed on 01 April 2006.
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cannot fall back, you must advance! A great century has come upon
us! No race possessing the inherent capacity to survive can resist and
remain unaffected by this influence of contact and intercourse, the
backward with the advanced. This influence constitutes the very
essence of efficient progress and of civilisation.85
Some years later in 1912, subsequent to his return to South Africa, ka Seme organised
a meeting in Bloemfontein of personalities from black communities all over South
Africa to establish the South African Native National Congress, the initial name of the
African National Congress. ka Seme gave the keynote address that proclaimed the
Congress' purpose: "to devise ways and means of forming our national union for the
purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges".86
Couzens described ka Seme's leadership of the ANC from 1930-1.937 as
"conservative, lacklustre and autocratic" thus rendering the Congress to be in a state
of"culpable inertia". 87
Early Education
In 1915, Luthuli attended Edendale College, near Pietermaritzburg. At
Edendale he participated in his first act of civil disobedience. Luthuli and other
students participated in a student strike and "stay-away" to protest what they judged
to be unreasonable manual labour as a form of discipline. The mass action failed and
for it, Luthuli received a public thrashing from his uncle. Luthuli notably
remembered that at Edendale he was first exposed to white, or "European", teachers.
Here Luthuli perhaps first began to develop, although subconsciously, his
understanding of "a new example for the world", a synthesis of African and European
cultures that could contribute to world civilisation.88 While recounting his times at
Edendale, Luthuli disputed the charge that mission schools were producing "Black
Englishmen".89 Luthuli opined that at Edendale "two cultures met, and both Africans
85 Pixley Isaka ka Seme, "The Regeneration of Africa", Journal ofRoyal African Society 5, 1905-1906,
404-8.
86 Walshe, The Rise ofAfrican Nationalism in South Africa, 34.
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and Europeans were affected by the meeting. Both profited, and both survived
enriched".90
At the conclusion of Edendale's two year 'lower' teacher's course, Luthuli
accepted an appointment to teach as principal at a rural school at Blaauwbosch in the
Natal Midlands. While serving at Blaauwbosch, Luthuli resided with a Methodist
evangelist's family (Xaba) and became the protege of the local Methodist minister,
Umfundisi (Reverend) Mtembu. Luthuli attended this local church "because there
was no local Congregational Church".91 Luthuli was confirmed in the Methodist
church as the Methodists and Congregationalists shared ecumenical affinities. Shortly
thereafter, Luthuli became a lay preacher under the mentorship of the old and
benevolent minister. The fact that Luthuli worshipped and became a lay-leader in this
local Methodist mission school has led many sources to incorrectly document that
Luthuli was a Methodist. At Blaauwbosch, Luthuli first encountered Charles Loram,
Natal's first ChiefInspectorate for Native Education and mentor of Z. K. Matthews
(1933-1934 Phelps Stokes Bursary) at Yale University (Sterling Professor of
Education from 1931).92 Luthuli so impressed Loram that he recommended Luthuli
for a bursary to study for the Higher Teachers' Diploma at Adams College.93
Adams College
In 1920, Luthuli continued his education at Adams College on a scholarship.
After two years of study, he remained a worthy investment to his benefactors. When
Loram again offered Luthuli a scholarship to attend Fort Hare University in the
Eastern Cape, Luthuli declined. Demonstrating his sacrificial nature at a young age,
Luthuli opted to earn a salary to provide for his aging mother. For a talented,
conscientious and educated Black, Luthuli could pursue few vocations other than
teaching for which he was in high demand following his graduation (the others being
ministry, law and the civil service). Father Bernard Huss, Principal at St. Francis
90 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 16.
91 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 16.
92 Loram was gradualistic and paternalistic concerning 'native' education and thus exerted a
conservative influence on white South African liberals. Like Dube, Loram was strongly influenced by
the Tuskegee Institute in the United States. Loram was a co-founder of the Institute of Race Relations
and its first chairman in 1929.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge 4: 60.
93 LM, "Memorial Service to Pay Tribute to the Late Chief Albert Luthuli", speech by
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College at Mariannhill in Natal offered Luthuli a post. Luthuli's doctor, friend,
relative and executor, Mordecai Gumede recalled that such a job offer to a Protestant,
let alone an adherent to the Congregational tradition, the ecclesiastical antithesis of
Roman Catholicism, was unusua1.94 A. E. Le Roy, the ordained Principal of Adams
who served from 190 I to 1926 also offered Luthuli a post to serve as a teacher at the
"Normal College". Luthuli accepted. Luthuli's first responsibilities were to teach
music as the College Choirmaster (his favourite) and Isizulu, the latter without
textbooks. As Luthuli gained in experience and competence, School Organisation
was added to his portfolio and eventually he was made Supervisor of Teachers-In-
Training in all satellite schools.
Like its counterpart in Fort Hare from which many of Adams' graduates
proceeded to earn university degrees, a great many prominent members of twentieth
century southern Africa intelligentsia were educated and groomed to be leaders at the
Adams institution. Much has been written about Adams College, as it was a point of
contestation for and reconciliation of African and western theological, social and
scientific values. Much of the literature on Adams is romantic and idealistic or,
conversely, cynical and pejorative. Like Willem Saayman in Christian Mission in
South Africa, I subscribe to a balanced perspective that nonetheless assumes an
"entanglement" between mission and colonisation that was often embodied at mission
institutions such as Adams College and thus does not "reduce complex historical
dynamics ... to the crude calculus of interest and intention, and colonialism itself to a
caricature".95 Romanticised histories, be they concerned with the missiological
project in general or specifically with Adams College, neglect the shortcomings
inherent within the synergy between Christian evangelisation and imperial
colonisation and thus the subtle and/or naked racism included therein. 96 The
Comaroffs' introduction to OfRevelation and Revolution stated that Monica Wilson
(1969b and 1976) and Brooks (1974) portray missioners as "well-intentioned
94 LM, "Memorial Service to Pay Tribute to the Late Chief Albert Luthuli", Gumede, 29 August 1982,
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95 Willhem Saayman, Christian Mission in South Africa: Political and Ecumenical (Pretoria:
University of South Africa, 1991),22,24,34-5.
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churchmen".97 Their critics, such as Charles Villa-Vicencio who contested Wilson
(1976),98 see these apologies as "modem expressions of the same missionising
culture".99 Other earlier histories, often written by the missioners or their
sympathisers themselves, are essentially collective hagiographies. For example, a
daughter of an American missioner wrote in Stories ofthe Early American
Missionaries in South Africa:
We have only to contrast the ignorant, superstitious Zulu women of
those days, full as they were of fear and terror of revengeful spirits,
harshly treated as they were by their husbands and brothers, with the
educated Zulu women of today who know God's Love and Mercy, and
have experienced Christ's power to heal and to save. Think of the
clean, helpful, sensible native women of to-day and the many native
men living honest, worthy lives, and then we realise that Faith and
Real Religion have purchased wonderful results. 100
On the opposite extreme, revisionist histories that emphasised the shortcomings of the
religio-political interface are often highly anachronistic in their application of modem
theological, anthropological and even scientific conceptions and unfairly judge
nineteenth and twentieth century figures. In their review of histories critical of
Christian evangelism, the Comaroffs mentioned Majeke (1952), Ayandele (1966),
Zulu (1972) who "excoriate the missionary as an agent of imperialism". 101 A more
recent evaluation ofthe evangelical project by Greg Cuthbertson was particularly
ruthless. Cuthbertson's theses that missioners in South Africa "both used and
defended violence" and were "natural associates ofthe Colonial government" were
inaccurate in at least two respects. 102 First, Cuthbertson unfairly deemed all southern
African missioners to be homogeneous when in reality even missioners within the
same mission board varied dramatically in their willingness to confront and/or
acquiesce to the political context within which they operated. Furthermore,
97 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 1: 7.
98 For example, Charles Villa-Vicencio considered Monica Wilson's paper "Conquerors or Servants of
God?" to be an apologetic defense of the missioners' project.
Charles Villa-Vicencio, ed., Theology and Violence: The South African Debate, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids:
William Eerdmans, 1988), 18.
99 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 1: 7.
100 Mary Tyler Gray, Stories ofthe Early American Missionaries in South Africa (Johannesburg:
private print, 196-?), 70.
101 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 1: 7.
102 Greg Cuthbertson, "The English-Speaking Churches and Colonialism", in Theology and Violence,
Villa-Vicencio, 15-6.
77
missioners from the British Isles sent by the LMS to the Tswana can not necessarily
be sweepingly compared with North American missioners sent by the American
Board to the Amazulu; the latter were not as patriotically invested in imperial
domination. 103 Second, Cuthbertson utilised an infinitely wide definition of
'violence', that is structural in nature and includes spiritual, economic, cultural and
even technological violence (in the case of agriculture and industry) to almost
demonise missioners. 104 Ironically, it is these aspects of'civilisation' and even
Christianity that Cuthbertson declares as 'violence', that Luthuli, a traditional leader,
boasted were increasingly appreciated by his people thus allowing them to participate
as equals in the global community. Likewise, pejorative critiques of Adams College
often fail to integrate within their analyses the "ambiguities of dependence" within
which not only personalities but also institutions had to operate. 105 For example,
Pawel Stempowski wrote that "Adams College fostered a false belief in the students",
"not giving [them] the means to achieve [their] aims", "failed to put the African race
on equal footing with the [W]hites", "primarily served [its own] interests", and with
government's policy of segregation "played an active role in establishing and
maintaining the hegemonic control of the white population". 106 If Adams College's
role or effect proved to be so malevolent, one questions why the Apartheid regime
considered the school to be establishing and maintaining the opposite. The Apartheid
government appropriated Adams in 1956 after the school's vigorous implementation
of futile measures to save it because the school did not play "an active role" in
103 Nor can the dynamics of interaction between the LMS and the Tswana be seen as equivalent to
those ofthe Scandinavian mission societies and the Amazulu.
104 Cuthbertson, "The English-Speaking Churches and Colonialism", in Theology and Violence,
Villa-Vicencio, 15-6.
105 Marks, The Ambiguities ofDependence, 1-14.
106 Pawel Loius Stempowski, "The Making, Experiencing and Memorialising of Space: The Adams
College Experience", (Bachelor of Arts, Honours diss., Department of History, University ofNatal,
1999),34-5.
Stempowski's assessments of Adams are valid. Nevertheless, the claims needed to be heavily qualified
and counterbalanced, which they were not. For example, Stempowski declared that the likely
innocuous erection ofa fence at Adams "subconsciously prepared women for their domestic ... [and]
... subservient" roles, 45. This assessment ofmissiology in Natal contradicted Luthuli's autobiography
that emphasised the de-genderising ethos of the Umvoti Mission. Stempowski failed to counterbalance
her accusations with evidence that American Board "laboured strenuously to uplift the African woman
whom they felt was living the deepest degradation".
Myra Dinnerstein, "The American Board Mission to the Zulu, 1835-1900", (Columbia University,
Ph.D., Modem History, 1971),96.
Stempowski failed to indicate that virtually all societies, African and western, were highly patriarchal.
Adams College and mission stations in the nineteenth and twentieth century were not unique or
particularly malevolent in their supposed missiological oppression of black women.
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establishing white supremacy.107 This investigation's purpose is not to undertake a
study and evaluation of Adams College's historiography. Also, this investigation of
Luthuli and the Christian missiological influences he most intimately received at
Adams does not justify, apologise for, ameliorate or discredit the school and its aims
and objectives. Suffice it to say, like Luthuli in his autobiography, this study
acknowledges the contradictions between the values (idealistic and benevolent)
articulated by American Board institutions, epitomised by Adams College, and the
always imperfect, and on occasion contradictory, manner in which those ideals were
implemented in practice.
The Amanzimtoti Institute, later named Adams College, became the 'flagship'
school by which the American Board sought to train Congregational pastors and
teachers. The American Board established the school in 1853 and closed it in
1956.108 Adams' educational high standards attracted black students from all over
southern Africa. At the peak of its pedagogical prowess, Adams College consisted of
a high school, a theological school, a practicing school [for teachers' training], an
industrial school, an agricultural school and a music school. According to the
inaugural issue of its students' publication Iso Lomuzi, the school stood for "Sound
Knowledge and Trained Ability, Modem Methods and Upright Character, a Clean
Body and Spiritual Development". 109
The ethos ofany institution primarily derives from the personalities who
collectively compose it. In his autobiography, Luthuli named Z. K. Matthews (Head
of the High School), K. R. Brueckner (Head of the Industrial School), F. de Villiers
(teacher), Edgar Brookes (Principal) and C. W. Atkins (Head of the Teachers'
Training College and Principal) as the foremost influential personalities at Adams. In
his autobiography, Luthuli made clear that these particular Christian personalities
profoundly influenced him spiritually and thus germinated his faith-based political
philosophy.
A quotation by Brueckner that Luthuli held dear even thirty years later
explains in part why throughout his he life seemed to perpetually view others
107 UKZN, APC&SA, AP 370.968 GRA, 9812/5990, publication by George Grant, The Liquidation of
Adams College, (for private circulation, n.d.).
108 Due to the illness of a missionary who headed the school, the school closed from 1856 to 1865.
109 UKZN, Killie Campbell Africana Library (KCAL), Campbell Collections (CC), Iso Lomuzi:
"Amanzimtoti's Students' Magazine" 1, no. 1, September 1931, inside cover.
This publication was in print from September 1931 to November 1956.
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benevolently: "You must give a charitable interpretation to every man's actions until
you can prove that such an interpretation is unsound".11 0 Even when struggling with
one of his son's disappointing "relapses", Luthuli commented to a close friend, "I
must confess, 1am beginning to lose hope: not that 1would scold him if! saw him -
NO".111 This advice agreed with Luthuli's self-confessed character as not "a very
aggressive person, and 1tend when confronted by (for instance) the ill behaviour of
others, to extenuate for them and look for the explanations for their conduct". I 12 As
we shall see in this investigation, Luthuli assumed Loram's positive intentions
concerning his spadework for Bantu Education, refused to be hostile even to those
who physically assaulted him, requested aid from liberals despite objections by
Africanists, accepted assistance from the Communists despite objections by liberals
and continued to his last days to refuse to support violence as a means by which to
attain South African majority's freedom. Luthuli's 'charitable interpretations' gained
him many allies until the liberation movements were banned and all means of
protesting constitutional grievances were declared illegal.
Luthuli credited an Adams teacher, F. J. de Villiers, for sensitising him to the
manner that Apartheid South Africa socialised Whites to hate people of colour.
de Villiers, a (temporary) Afrikaner apostate who the Dutch Reformed Church denied
ordaining due to his liberal views on race, "seemed closer to the Africans on the staff
than did most white teachers ... [and] associated with us more freely and more often
than did his white fellows". I 13 de Villiers for the first time explained to Luthuli that
Afrikaners were "victims of their own past", whose hatred for people of colour was
acculturated into their society rather than inherent. I 14 This interpretation of white
supremacy offered Luthuli a "real protection against hatred and bitterness" and was
perhaps the source of his belief that after a good deal of soul-searching and repentance
white supremacy would dissolve. Much to Luthuli's dismay, de Villiers later became
the Secretary for Bantu Education and complicit in the destruction of Adams
College. I 15
110 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 24.
I1I VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from LuthuIi to
Mary-Louise Hooper, 08 June 1956, 2.
112 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 32.
113 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 25.
114 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 25.
lIS UKZN, APC, AP 370.968 GRA, 9812/5990, The Liquidation ofAdams College, correspondence
from Mr. F. J. de ViIIiers to the Secretary of Adams College, Inc., 12 July 1956,45-7.
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Luthuli's appraisal of Edgar Brookes reveals his instinct to view others
charitably. Luthuli reminisced in his autobiography that Brookes made a deep
impression on him because "he treated his religion with utter sincerity". 116 Luthuli
viewed Brookes as "one of South Africa's greatest champions of public and private
sanity and morality". 117 Luthuli held this view of Brookes in 1961, despite the fact
that in 1935, while Luthuli still taught at Adams College, Brookes "put up an
impassioned defence" for continued control by white missioners against Loram who
suggested a rapid devolvement of authority in to Africans. 118 Right or wrong, Luthuli
likely observed benevolent motivations in both.
C. W. Atkins typified for Luthuli the ethos of Adams that he held to be most
valuable and enduring. About Atkins, Luthuli wrote:
He placed his emphasis on loving God and on service of the society in
which one finds oneself, and he had no hesitation in involving us
deeply in the affairs of the African communities which lay within
reach of Adams. Possibly this was really the combined achievement of
Adams, but Atkins remains in my memory as a symbol of it. 119
These Christian lay men who encountered Luthuli at the Adams College
mission station instilled within Luthuli the conviction that the ...
.. .Christian faith was not a private affair without relevance to society.
It was, rather, a belief which equipped us in a unique way to meet the
challenges of our society ...which had to be applied to the conditions of
our lives ... that inculcated, by example rather than precept, a
specifically Christian mode of going about work in society. 120
When one reviews Luthuli's autobiography and contemplates the notable personalities
that he highlighted as seminal influences, one finds (with the exceptions of
Umfundisi Mtembu at Blaauwbosch and Matthews) that all were white liberal male
lay-Christian educators. In light of the importance of these influences, Luthuli's
116 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 27.
117 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 27.
118 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 193. Rich cited:
AMB (American Board), BC 15.4, v. 47, Edgar Brookes to the Foreign Secretary, ABM, 02 January
and 02 February 1935, encl., "Memorandum on Future Policy and Development, Arnanzimtoti
Institute", 21 January 1935.
The American Board eventually agreed to a compromise solution.
119 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 27.
120 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 27-8.
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hesitancy and inability to advance into the realm of violence that he feared would
quickly descend into a race war becomes understandable. When the question of
violence arose within the Congress movement, Luthuli's cloud of saintly witnesses
would have undoubtedly disapproved of any such measures. These mentors, these
unseen witnesses, strategically paralysed Luthuli when others less influenced by white
liberal Christians perceived the resort to violence to be the only viable option enabling
them to exit the strategic cul-de-sac. Brookes, Atkins, de Villiers and Brueckner,
despite the contradictions inherent within their liberal politics, influenced Luthuli to
be 'bound by faith'. For Luthuli's mentors, this Christian mode could not
countenance the use of violence in the South African context. Luthuli's missiological
mentors, while influencing his relevancy to the ANC in 1952, influenced his
irrelevancy in 1961 as it concerned being the strategic leader of the struggle for South
Africa's liberation.
John ReuIing
Though not mentioned in Luthuli's autobiography Let My People Go, the
Congregationalist John Reuling (1906-1990) mentored and supported Luthuli longer
than any other. 121 One suspects that Luthuli did not mention Reuling in his
autobiography so as to not jeopardise Reuling's ability to obtain travel visas needed
for his regular visits to South Africa's American Board missions. Reuling served the
American Board as the regional Secretary for Africa from 1946 to 1962. Roy Briggs
and Joseph Wing figured Reuling to be the chief motivator who in 1960 advocated the
dissolution of the Board mission in Natal and establishment of an indigenous church
that would enable South African Congregationalists in Kwazulu and Natal to be fully
autonomous and thus self-governing. 122 In light of anti-colonial nationalism during
the post-war period, Reuling and others resolved to streamline and thus make more
efficient the Board's global endeavours. In order to achieve this missiological
'downsizing', the mission board encouraged and equipped missions to become
121 Luthuli intentionally did not mention many notable people in his autobiography. He wrote, "It may
be noticed that names, which might have been expected in a book of this type, do not appear. The
reason for this is not churlishness on my part, or a lack of honour where it is due". Luthuli continued to
apologise by saying that the book is written for an international audience and therefore names of
domestic (South African) importance required sacrificing.
122 Briggs and Wing, The Harvest and the Hope, 282.
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sovereign. In order to enable the mission churches to be truly Congregational,
autonomy was a prerequisite. Relinquishing foreign control of the church led the role
ofmissioners to be "working on the fringes as it were, serving by teaching or as in the
case of church advisors, giving help when requested". 123 In 1962, Reuling became the
General Secretary (Executive) for the Board's institutional successor, the United
Church Board for World Mission (UCBWM), until his retirement in 1971.
Paul Rich judged Reuling to "have a rather romantic view ofthe white
missionary's role in South African society". 124 Reuling had the somewhat naIve
understanding that one American missioner with a 'can do' spirit could promote
revolutionary economic and cultural change. Supporting aggressive social work in
urban areas and subsequently agricultural development in rural areas, Reulingjudged
that the two albatrosses of African development were tradition and custom. 125
Reuling, in the spirit of Loram, was very much a 'liberal', and not without any
vestiges of condescending paternalism.
Reuling's history with southern African mission history is long, beginning in
1927 when he taught at Adams College with his wife Eleanor until 1941. Reuling
served Adams in various capacities: Dean of Men, Head Teacher (Director) of the
[Teachers'] Training College and the Vice-Principal. 126 For nine years (1927-1935),
Luthuli and Reuling collaborated as colleagues at Adams College. Luthuli's
relationship with Reuling continued long after their time together at Adams. Luthuli
and Reuling corresponded regularly until at least 02 September 1964. Reuling's
personal papers document with photos his relationship with Luthuli as early as 1932-
1933 at Adams, Luthuli's visit to the United States in 1948 (West Newton,
Massachusetts) and even his attendance at Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
events in 1961. Reuling always remained very interested in Luthuli and news from
Inanda Seminary's Principal Lavinia Scott to Reuling frequently included a news
bulletin about Luthuli. 127 Reuling used missioners such as Scott as intermediaries
123 UKZN, KCAL, CC, Inanda Seminary Papers (KCM), 52609, correspondence from Reuling to
LuthuIi, 06 January 1962.
124 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 198.
125 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 198.
126 Yale University Library (YU), Divinity Library Special Papers (DLSP), Record Group No. 120,
"Guide to the John and Eleanor Reuling Papers", compiled by Martha Lund Smalley, 2003. Found at:
http://webtext.library.yale.edu/xmI2html/divinity.120.con.html, accessed 30 January 2008.
127 Most correspondences update Reuling about Luthuli's various bannings. Correspondences also
focus on means by which bursaries may be extended to his daughters, Hilda and Albertinah, so as to
support Luthuli but also to avoid politically offending the Apartheid state. Hilda and Albertinah both
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between him and Luthuli. Reuling mentioned to Luthuli that the American Board
expresses its appreciation to Howard Trumbull for serving as a conduit by sending
and receiving telegrams to and from Luthuli. 128 The UCBWM did not wish the state
to perceive that the church involved itself politically. Hence, the UCBWM avoided
direct or frequent communication that could be intercepted between Luthuli and
Reuling.
On 05 January 1962 during one of his many sojourns to South Africa, Reuling
visited Luthuli at his home. Luthuli emphasised the need for the church to take a
prophetic stance on issues related to the "corporate needs in the present situation of
Africans", lest the church be seen to be irrelevant to and abandoned by the young
people. 129 The next day, Reuling wrote from Inanda Seminary a correspondence to
Luthuli (presumably hand-delivered) summarising their discourse. 130 From their
discussion, it is clear that despite having long since opted for party politics rather than
ecclesial structures as a means toward liberating South Africa's majority, Luthuli was,
as late as 1962, still interested and involved in church dynamics, at least 'behind the
scenes'. Reuling and Luthuli's enjoyed substantive discussions; both felt a special
camaraderie as influential church laymen. In requesting Luthuli to "spark a
movement, issue a call" and thus revive the church by strengthening clerical standards
and training, Reuling seemed to have a grandiose conception of Luthuli's evangelical
potential. 131 In what may be the last documented correspondence between the two,
needed and received bursaries from ecclesiastic sources. One can only speculate whether the church
would have continued to make those bursaries available had Luthuli advocated Communism or the turn
to violence.
UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM, 52273, correspondences from Scott to Reuling, 20 February 1953;
KCM 52311, Scott to Reuling, 15 July 1954; KCM 52419, Eleanor Reuling to Scott, 25 February 1958;
KCM unknown, Scott to Reuling, 08 September 1960; KCM unknown, Reuling to Scott,
06 November 1961; KCM 52601, Scott to Reuling, 04 November 1961; KCM unknown, Scott to
Reuling, 23 November 1961.
128 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Reuling to
Luthuli, 02 September 1964.
Howard Trumbull was an American Board missionary with much business experience. Trumbull was
appointed in 1961 to be a financial advisor for the Bantu Congregational Church (BCC). His task was
to mentor a future Treasurer for the BCC and to structure the BCC financially. Following the
formation of the UCCSA in 1967, Trumbull served as the Treasurer of the Natal Regional Council
doing work related to the financial and legal administration of the glebe lands.
129 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM 52609, correspondences from Reuling to Luthuli, 06 January 1962.
130 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM 52609, correspondences from Reuling to Luthuli, 06 January 1962.
131 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM 52609, correspondence from Reuling to Luthuli, 06 January 1962.
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Reuling related to Luthuli how an Adams College alumnus accepted the 1964 "Family
ofMan" award on Luthuli's behalf. 132 Reuling wrote:
I'm personally glad for you that you have received this additional
recognition and am personally grateful for the opportunity of having
known you for so many years. l33
Luthuli and Reuling's lives intertwined in many spheres oflife.
Commonalities brought Luthuli and Reuling together in the classroom, the sanctuary
and the field. In addition to being the Vice-Principal of Adams and Director of the
Teachers' Training College, Reuling also served as the school's "farm manager". 134
Luthuli supplemented his agricultural knowledge derived from his rural background
shepherding mules in Vryheid and performing chores in Groutville by learning more
scientific, modem and commercial methods of horticulture at Adams College. 135
Born in the predominantly rural state ofNebraska, Reuling, like Luthuli, possessed 'a
green thumb'. Though Reuling served as the farm manager and Luthuli's senior, their
relationship would have been reciprocal and egalitarian. Luthuli transferred
information about indigenous methods and plants while Reuling transferred
commercial skills. By becoming Chief, Luthuli returned to the land and founded and
chaired the Zululand Bantu Cane Growers' Association. Bans forced Luthuli to retire
from the campaign trail and to financially subsist on farming. Luthuli enjoyed
spending time in his fields producing crops by the 'sweat of his brow'. Yes, Luthuli
enjoyed being a teacher. Yes, Luthuli felt 'called', in the theological sense, to
political life to advance the welfare of others. No doubt he felt fulfilled by both
vocations. To his dying day, literally, Luthuli remained a farmer. In fact, the inquest
fonn prepared by the Stanger police identified Luthuli as a "farmer".136 Such an
indication of his vocation may be, in part, a means by which the state could denigrate
132 The Protestant Council ofNew York and the Society for the Family of Man jointly sponsored the
awkwardly titled award. The five thousand dollar prize acknowledged "outstanding contributions in
Human Relations".
133 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel I, correspondence to Luthuli from
Reuling, 02 September 1964.
134 Prof. Z. K. Matthews also held the post of Vice-Principal at Adams College under the leadership of
Edgar Brookes who served as Principal from 1934 to 1945. From 1924 until 1932, Matthews headed
the High School.
135 From Rhodesia, in route to Groutville, Luthuli and his family stayed for a brieftime in Vryheid.
136 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel I, Luthuli Inquest Report,
19 September 1967.
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and belittle Luthuli even in death, denying him the more prominent vocations of
'educator' or 'political leader' .
Reuling best typified Luthuli's white, liberal and lay Christian missiological
mentors. Reuling embodied the American Board's considerable ecclesiastic, political
and agricultural influence upon Luthuli. Reuling mentored Luthuli as an educator and
lay-leader at Adams College, travelled to Oslo to be present with him as he accepted
the Nobel Peace Prize and facilitated Luthuli's global political recognition.
Conclusion
Chapter one describes the foundation that linked Luthuli to Christianity and
more specifically, Congregationalism. By studying Luthuli's faith-based influences,
one is able to more accurately interpret his political thinking. For Luthuli, matters
ethereal bore relevance to matters terrestrial. The former predicated the latter.
In his article "Mission, Church and State in Southern Africa", A. Hastings
wrote that" ... southern Africa has presented a locus classicus for the relationship of
church, state and mission - the complex and diverse interaction of politics and
religion within a missionary context". 137 Luthuli's autobiography began with this
thesis as does this study. Since his formative years, a Christian and Congregational
ethos infused his being. His grandfather, Ntaba, and uncle (Martin) were elected
Amakholwa chiefs before him. His father, John, even served the wider church as a
mission educator in Rhodesia where he died. Being raised, educated and churched in
a mission environment that particularly instilled as much of a political as a theological
ethos engendered in Luthuli a respect for egalitarianism, democracy, freedom, dissent,
justice, education, hard work and socio-economic prosperity and an ecumenism that
transcended all races and creeds.
Though those in the Christian faith and within the Congregational tradition
frequently failed to practice what they preach, the ideals espoused were at times
exhibited in some of its followers such as the founder and first President of the ANC.
At Adams College, Luthuli learned from his missioner benefactors a will to fuse mind
(education), body (politics) and spirit (theology) so one may reach one's God-given
potential. By choosing politics to fulfil his unique calling, Luthuli did not
137 A. Hastings, "Mission, Church and State in Southern Africa", Mission Studies 2, no. 1, 1985, 22.
86
compromise the tenets of his faith or thirty year associations, such as with John
Reuling, who affirmed them. Luthuli's ecclesiastic roots ran much deeper than his
political roots. Faith bound Luthuli while politics served its objectives.
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Chapter Two
A Specifically Christian Mode of Going about Political Work!
... the Christian faith was not a private affair without relevance to
society. It was, rather, a belief which equipped us in a unique way to
meet the challenges of our society. It was a belief that had to be
applied to the conditions of our lives; and our many works - they
ranged from Sunday School teaching to road building - became the
meaningful outflow of Christian belief. -- Albert Luthuli2
Introduction
Chapter two's chronological and biographic narrative traces from 1926 to
1959 the engagements with people, organisations and campaigns that shaped
Luthuli's political views. As a young teacher and chief, Luthuli first viewed the white
paternalist government negatively and sought to organise and plan for holistic
development. As a budding leader, Luthuli politically 'burned his fingers' with
indigenous cooperatives, be they vocational, agricultural or political, as he realised the
government manipulated ethnic nostalgia to thwart a progressive developmental path.
Luthuli's American Board associations and overseas trips bolstered his emphasis on
non-violent multiracial solidarity rather than violent African nationalist support.
Luthuli's cooperation with Christian white liberals and the leadership positions they
entrusted to him within multiracial ecclesiastic and civil society organisations
convinced him that, with domestic mass action, international allies were the key to
political liberation. Luthuli's defiant political stances, directly inspired by theological
considerations, captured the attention of the ANC and propelled him to the heights of
political leadership. The Defiance Campaign and the Treason Trial broadened
Luthuli's appeal as many of all races recognised in him a potential Head of State.
Luthuli's courting of moderate whites threatened to tip the scales ofpolitical power
away from the National Party. Three bans quelled Luthuli's appeal and his political
asphyxiation began.
1 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 28.
"Adams taught me what Edendale did not, that I had to do something about being a Christian, and that
something must identify with my neighbor, not disassociate me from him. Adams taught me more. It
inculcated, by example rather than precept, a specifically Christian mode ofgoing about work in a
society, and I had frequent reason to be grateful for this later in life" (Luthuli's emphasis).
2 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 27-8.
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Natal African Teachers' Association and Zulu Language and Cultural Society
In 1928 while at Adams, the members of the Natal African Teachers'
Association (also "Union") elected Luthuli as its Secretary under the presidency of his
friend and Principal of Adams High School, Z. K. Matthews. The Association's
programme centred on the "material" (attempting to enhance the salaries and
conditions of [black] teachers), "educational" (attempting to motivate its members to
keep abreast of the times through continuing education) and "social" (attempting to
encourage educators to participate in sport, music, debates, games and social meetings
"under the spell of a cup of tea or the cloud of the smoke of a pipe") needs of its
constituency.3 In 1933, Luthuli became the Association's President.
In 1930, during his term as Secretary, Luthuli's wrote his earliest writing
found in the archives. Luthuli wrote a letter of sympathy for another American Board
product and Adams graduate, Allison Champion, President-General of the Industrial
[and Commercial] Workers' Union (ICU).4 For his political antagonism, the
government banned Champion from Durban, exiling him from that city for three
years. The correspondence to members ofthe ICU conveyed at an early stage the
degree to which Luthuli' s belief in divine Providence tempered and consoled his
discontent with the South African government. Luthuli wrote:
My President has desired me, on behalf of the Natal Native Teachers'
Union to write and express sympathy with you gentlemen on the
unfortunate step taken by the so[-]called [M]inister of Justice in
banishing Mr. Champion, your General Secretary. Words really fail
one to express adequately the feelings of regret and sorry (sic) that we
have on this matter, and I am sure that in this, I am not only expressing
the feelings of the [P]resident and myself, but of all the teachers who
know Mr. Champion and the organisation that owes so much to his
indefatigable efforts on its behalf. We trust that the God, the Father
Almighty, will keep him safe in his banishment and allow him to
return to his work to carry it out to an even more successful issue than
before, may be much to the disgust (sic) and disappointment of the
so[-]called Minister of Justice and we hope that with God's guidance
you shall be able to get a worthy acting General Secretary who shall
keep up the work, in the meantime, so ably carried on by Mr.
3 Albert Luthuli, "Natal Native Teachers' Union", Natal Teachers' Journal 12, no. 2, January 1933, 96-
7.
4 An American Board missioner adopted Champion's father, hence the surname "Champion".
"Mhlongo" was Champion's father's original surname.
89
Champion ...We trust that God shall take care and provide in His own
way for his family.s
The Association opposed and boycotted Charles Loram's policies that focused
on manual labour. The emphasis Loram placed on the practical and utilitarian
functions of education limited the educational horizons for people of colour.6 Luthuli
recalled in his autobiography that Loram coined the phrase "develop along their own
lines" and concluded that his policies served as an ideological platfonn for the
National Party's Bantu Education that enforced inferior education on all people of
colour.7 Nonetheless, Luthuli depicted Loram as altruistic, writing, "He had, I do not
doubt, the best ofintentions".8 Loram's efforts to inspire the American Board to
"continue its policy of devolving power and responsibility to its African converts if it
wished to 'retain its influence among the Africans, and carry on its leadership in
improving race relations'" may have inspired Luthuli's sympathetic appraisal of
Loram.9 Perhaps remembering that Loram arranged his bursary to Adams, Luthuli's
characterisation of him was strikingly free of bitterness. Despite four years of
"concentration on material matters" by the Association and little, if any, progress in
that regard, Luthuli remained characteristically deferential when he praised the
Department of Education in the October 1932 issue of the Native Teachers' Journal. 10
Disillusioned by a lack of progress in improving teachers' material lot, Luthuli
refocused his efforts by founding in 1935 an auxiliary of the Teachers' Association,
the Zulu Language and Cultural Society. The Zulu king, Mshiyeni ka Dinizulu,
5 UNISA, UL, UA, DCAS, Collection: AlIison W. George Champion (AWGC), Accession number I,
File Number 3.1.15, correspondence to The General Secretary of the I. C. U. yase Natal from the Hon.
General Secretary of the Natal Native Teachers' Union, A. J. Lutuli, 30 September 1930.
The archives do at times produce items of ironic humour. In a correspondence to Yengwa, Champion
wrote, in what must be jest, "In 1930 I was exiled for three years. All this because I accepted the job of
by all means work for the freedom ofAfrika... Am I absolutely entitled to a Nobel Prize? I know now
you have the means to get me one".
UNISA, UL, UA, DCAS, AWGC, I, 19.7. I. I, correspondence to Yengwa from Champion,
03 September 1970.
6 Charles Loram, "A Plea for Handwork in Our Native School (Continued), Native Teachers' Journal,
January 1921,44-7.
7 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 2 I.
8 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 20.
9 Cited by Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 193 and 206.
Rich cited:
YU, DLSP, Charles Loram Papers, G7/5, "The Devolution of Responsibility and Authority on Native
Leaders", (unpublished memo, n.d. 1937?), 5.
10 Albert Luthuli, "Natal Native Teachers' Union", Natal Teachers' Journal 12, no. I, October 1932,
50-I.
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served as one of the Society's patrons and John Dube served as its first President. 11
The fellow Congregationalist, Chair of the American Board's Umkandlu and Adams
College Advisory Board member, Charles Mpanza, served as the Society's
Secretary. 12
Four years before its inception, Luthuli hoped that the Society "would
undertake to secure the standardisation of necessary'Zuluised' words" and "form new
modes of expressing foreign [e.g., scientific] ideas".13 Luthuli also proposed that the
Society initiate mass adult education. 14 Rather than preserve Zulu culture in some
early nineteenth century time capsule, Luthuli reminisced in his autobiography that
the objective of the Society was to "preserve what is valuable in our heritage while
discarding the inappropriate or outmoded". 15
Luthuli's time with the Society was short-lived due to his call to serve as Chief
in Groutville. His withdrawal prevented any significant direct involvement with the
Society's development. As the Society matured, it deviated from Luthuli's original
intentions. Shula Marks conveyed that the Society primarily sought to attain "state
recognition of the scion of the Zulu royal house as Paramount, and added to it a
concern for the preservation of Zulu tradition and custom". 16 The Society, rather than
agitate the government for quality mass education, benignly collected Zulu folklore
and traditions for publication. Such beneficent activities attracted the support of the
government, in particular the ChiefNative Commissioner ofNatal, H. C. Lugg. 17 The
government's largesse compromised the Society, detracting from its autonomy and
caused many teachers to withdraw their membership from the early 1940s until it
eventually collapsed in 1946. 18
Luthuli conveyed in his autobiography his perception that, in addition to the
grant in aid and office space accepted from the Native Affairs Department in
11 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 194-5.
12 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 195, 192, and 197,
respectively.
13 Luthuli, "Natal Native Teachers' Union", Natal Teachers' Journal 12, no. 2, January 1933, 98.
14 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 196 and 207. Rich cited:
KZNA, Zulu Society Papers, NGA PMB, 1/2/2, Motions by Albert Luthuli to the Executive, Zulu
Society (n.d., 1936?).
15 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 23.
16 Shula Marks, "Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic
Consciousness", in The Creation ofTribalism in Southern Africa, ed. Leroy Vail (Berkeley: Currey
University ofCalifomia, 1989),217.
17 Marks, "Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity", in The Creation ofTribalism in Southern Africa, Vail,
225.
18 LM, "Memorial Service to Pay Tribute to the Late Chief Albert Luthuli", Gumede, 5.
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Pietermaritzburg, the Society's involvement in the politics of the Zulu Royal House
fostered its demise. The Society's co-opted relationship with the government led it to
preserve a caricature of Zulu culture and stunted, if not prevented, an otherwise
dynamic society's progressive contribution to the great stream of civilisation. Luthuli
deduced this civilisation to be a synthesis of many cultures, including African. 19 The
Society's ethos proved too conservative, even retrograde. Thus the Zulu Christian
intelligentsia viewed the Society to be a benign pawn of a malevolent government,20
Luthuli's rejection of the government as a cooperative partner through his
participation in the 1946 boycott of the Native Representative Council had its genesis
in the inability of the Association and the Society to initiate any meaningful change.
The lessons learned by Luthuli's experience with the Association and Society
germinated his strategic shift to more assertive tactics against oppression as a leader
ofthe ANC in the 1951 Defiance Campaign. The failures of the Association and the
Society also later led to Luthuli's vociferous objection in 1959 and beyond of
Africans participation in the bantustan framework.
Political and Ecclesiastic Chieftaincy
Luthuli explained in his autobiography that for many years "Groutville's
domestic affairs were not going very well".21 The Groutville community wished to
unseat Luthuli's unpopular predecessor, Josiah Mqwebu. Beginning in 1933, tribal
elders with the support of the resident missioner approached Luthuli to contest
Mqwebu's rule. The Groutville community actively sought Luthuli's candidacy. For
two years, Luthuli repeatedly declined. By December 1935, Luthuli relented.22
Nevertheless, a process of vetting and approval of Luthuli as a candidate by the Board
and the government likely preceded as a prerequisite his election.
The chieftainship of a mission community consisted of three roles: a
traditional leader (Inkosi) accountable to the local community, a civil servant (Judge)
accountable to the government and an un-ordained ecclesiarch (Deacon) accountable
to the wider and local church. Therefore, any candidate for the chieftaincy must first
19 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, '''Back-ta-Tribalism' Is Unrealistic", by Albert Luthuli, 18 October
1959,7.
20 Marks, The Ambiguities ofDependence, 71.
21 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 41.
22 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 42.
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be approved by the wider church and then the state before being elected by the local
community.23 The Code ofNative Law required for juridical purposes that there be a
chief of the Reserve.24 Any candidate who passed through this gauntlet could then be
presented to the community, to be ratified by democratic vote of what may potentially
be the only approved candidate.
Luthuli and Mqwebu squared off in an election conducted by the Native
Commissioner. Luthuli won 68 votes to 43.25 Though the church likely participated
with the state in engineering Luthuli's position as Chief, it can not be considered to
have been in league with the government, but rather submissive and subservient to it.
The American Board's likely 'pre-approval' of Luthuli's election as Chief to the
Groutville community demonstrates that though Luthuli left Adams College, his role
as Chief still placed him within the ambit of the Congregational family and thus
accountable to it.
In January 1936, Luthuli began his duties as Chief. Criminal jurisdiction was
"especially" conferred in Luthuli's appointment on 25 February 1936.26 Luthuli
argued that Groutville's small size, the lack of conflict due to an educated
constituency and his encouragement to settle disputes amicably rather than through
litigation severely limited his earning potential. Luthuli lamented his low salary as he
struggled to properly educate many children. In a correspondence written to the
Native Commissioner on 24 June 1940, Luthuli itemised his income for the year and
23 Josiah Mqwebu's 'election' in the 1920s is a good case in point. The American Board forwarded
recommendations, presumably based on the sentiments of the Groutville community, which the
government evaluated. In 1920, the American Board recommended Laurence Mqwebu who the
government rejected. The government's counter proposals were Philemon Mhlanumpofu Lutuli and
Josiah Mqwebu. The process of electing a chief was often not as democratic as is often asserted.
KZNA, AMB, PAR, A608, A/2/25, Office of the ChiefNative Commissioner (CNC), No. 2691/17,
correspondence from the ChiefNative Commissioner to Rev. J. D. Taylor, 22 October 1920.
KZNA, PAR, AMB, A608, A/2/25, CNC, No. 2691/17, correspondence from the ChiefNative
Commissioner to Rev. J. D. Taylor, 03 November 1920.
KZNA, PAR, AMB, A608, A/2/25, CNC, No. 2691/17, correspondence from the ChiefNative
Commissioner to Rev. J. D. Taylor, 23 November 1920.
24 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA, 78/46-47, Reel #1, "Regulations Made by the Minister of Native
Affairs under the Authority of Sub-Sections (4) and (6) ofSection Twenty of Act No. 38 of 1927, as
amended".
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA, 78/46-47, Reel #1, correspondence from the Secretary for Native
Affairs to Albert Luthuli, 21 September 1950.
25 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 196. See endnote 28,
207. Rich cited:
Native Affairs Department (NAD), I/SGR/4/2/3/1.
Confusingly, Luthuli indicated that he ran against three other candidates.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 42.
26 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA, 78/46-47, Reel #1, Department ofNative Affairs, declaration by the
ChiefNative Commissioner, Province ofNatal, C. N. C. 57/138, 25 February 1936.
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complained that his income of£150 a year as a teacher had plummeted to £45-50 per
year as the Chief.27 Luthuli's autobiography indicated the government therefore gave
him an extra responsibility and, therefore, remuneration as a "liaison officer".28
Though experience with the Teachers' Association and the Zulu Society no
doubt provided Luthuli with some administrative and financial experience, it was not
until he became Chief that he acquired the role of a public leader. Luthuli admitted
that the position of Chief was not particularly glamorous nor did it predispose one to
be a popular leader of a community or a country. In Luthuli's autobiography, one
senses the disdain he initially had for his very reluctantly accepted position. Luthuli
observed in his uncle's tenure as leader of the Amakholwa certain aspects of modern
chieftaincy that repelled him. Luthuli described the chieftaincy as ''taxing'' and
"petty", and likened the position to an "appointed boss-boy".29
Whereas Adams engendered theoretical (theological, philosophical and
pedagogical) epiphanies for Luthuli, the chieftaincy engendered practical ones. Away
from the hermetically sealed comfort of what was very much an artificial community
motivated by an ethereal benevolence and protected from terrestrial hardships, the
chieftaincy allowed Luthuli to see "almost for the first time, the naked poverty of my
people, the daily hurt to human beings".30 Rather than being proud of and confident
in his role as a traditional leader, Luthuli became disillusioned as he observed
"evidences of an inadequate tribal structure breaking up under the pressures of
modem conditions ... ,,31 Luthuli soon perceived Groutville to be a microcosm of the
greater context affecting all South Africans of colour. A lack of access to arable land,
migrant labour, access to credit without land as a security and thus a deficiency of
mechanical agro-chemical technology negatively affected Groutville. A short time
after he became Chief, Luthuli realised that macro-conditions were limiting micro-
possibilities. Pretoria's policies created a shortage of land, money, employment,
educational and health services and thus stunted the people's achievements. In one of
Luthuli's most memorable excerpts, he explained how if the chieftaincy was to
constructively serve the people, it had to move from addressing the petty to the
substantive.
27 LM, correspondence from Luthuli to the Native Commission in Stanger, 24 June 1940.
28 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 43.
29 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 42.
30 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 44.
31 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 44.
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· ..when I became Chief I was confronted as never before by the
destitution of the housewife, the smashing of families because of
economic pressures, and the inability ofthe old way oflife to meet the
contemporary onslaught. The destruction of our families is not the
least of the crimes which white avarice has perpetrated against us. It
continues, it increases, in spite of pleading voices raised against it.32
Structural injustices that stymied communities had to be confronted as no measure of
self-contained efforts would ameliorate the dire circumstances.
Agricultural, Civil Society and Ecumenical Advocacy Organisations
The 1936 Sugar Act limited the production of sugar in order to artificially
raise its price. Quotas were imposed on the amount of sugar cane that could be
processed and sold and these quotas were especially limiting for the independent,
rural, black, cane grower. In response to this legislation, Luthuli, Gideon Mzoneli and
two hundred others revived the Groutville Cane Growers' Association so as to make
collective bargaining and advocacy more efficacious. The work was arduous, with
the founders waking-up at three in the morning to cut the cane themselves during the
harvest.33 Two humble victories, the restoration of the ability for money to be
advanced for production costs and the institution of'globular' (comprehensive) quota
amounting to the sum of individual quotas, led Luthuli to 'unionise' other growers on
a regional scale. Luthuli then became a founding member and Chair of the Zululand
Bantu Cane Growers' Association that made united representations to those who
regulated the market at the expense of black farmers. Luthuli conceded that the
Growers' Association won some small victories. For example, the Growers'
Association achieved humble and still indirect representation to the Central Board via
a 'non-European' Advisory Board in regards to sugar production, processing and
marketing when the also indirect representation provided by the Native Affairs
Department proved futile. Luthuli organised cane growers until 1949.
As with his involvement with the Teachers' Association, Luthuli seemed to
have grown disillusioned with the Growers' Association's lack of achievement. In
32 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 48-9.
33 LM, Myra Sibuyiselwe Sibisi (Mzoneli), "Sharing My Life Story", presented at the Luthuli Museum
on the "International Day for Sharing Life Stories", 15 May 2008, 2.
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whatever minor political dabbling Luthuli became involved, the participation,
obstinacy and outright hostility of the government undermined substantive progress.
Ultimately, the structural nature of the white supremacist society prevailed over the
interests and advocacy efforts of Luthuli and others who sought to ameliorate the
plight of black South Africans.34 The Association also proved to be little match to the
equivalent white commercial growers' associations.
Not all blame rested with the government or competition. Luthuli acceded
that, to his disappointment, Africans proved "apathetic and uncooperative" and thus
difficult to unite.35 Luthuli claimed that due to their desperate state, the all too
successful divide-and-rule tactics frequently employed by the Apartheid government
balkanised the oppressed. This dynamic persisted throughout Luthuli's leadership of
the ANC, particularly with the Africanists, and perhaps led him to seek close ties with
more confident, assertive, established and cooperative white liberals. Nonetheless, as
late as 1951, Luthuli continued to organise and support black cane growers, utilising
his links with the American Board to procure for the cooperative a donated tractor and
ploughs.36 Luthuli continued to be the sole black representative on the Central Board
until 1953.37
Luthuli's participation in local politics transcended his agricultural advocacy
efforts. Luthuli served on the Durban Joint Council ofEuropeans and Africans, a
precursor to the South African Institute ofRace Relations, organisations in which few
if any of Luthuli's more militant colleagues held leadership positions. Cooperating
with 'benevolent', white and primarily Christian members of various civil society
organisations ingrained in Luthuli a conviction that racial integration was possible and
universal suffrage inevitable. As a member of the Joint Council, Luthuli
corresponded with Senator Brookes and other representatives of the 'natives' to
advocate relief from onerous legislation in 1941. In one 08 April 1941
correspondence to Luthuli regarding opposition to the Burnside Amendment of the
Motor Carrier Transportation Amendment Bill, the writer broke the news that "we
had quite a long struggle over that and other parts of the bill, but we were
34 The Oxford University Press engaged in hyperbole when it claims that upon accepting the
chieftaincy Luthuli "saved the community's economy from collapse".
Oxford University Press, "Luthuli, Albert John: Biography". Found at:
www.answers.comltopic/albert-Iutuli. accessed 05 January 2008.
35 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 55 and 58.
36 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 202.
37 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 58 and 56, respectively.
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unsuccessful".38 The Act discriminated against non-Europeans involved in the
transport industry from revocation of their certificates, to a ten fold increase in
deposits for certificates, to restricting taxis to certain areas and times. The same
correspondence to Luthuli stated, "Senator Brookes and I did all we could to protect
non-European bus and taxi owners and had a strenuous struggle".39 Luthuli also
served as a member of the South African Institute of Race Relations board.4o The
Institute provided a forum within which various churches and institutions met to
discuss matters concerning race. The Institute presented findings to the government
that it, more often than not, ignored.
During the early 1940s, Luthuli' s service to the church was not limited to the
Congregational church. In response to the Durban City Corporation's efforts to
convert a rural and agricultural Anglican glebe (church property bequeathed to
various missions by the British colonial government) in Umlazi into a residential
dumping ground for African workers employed in Durban, Luthuli and others
resurrected the Mission Reserve Association. The original objective of the
Association was to lobby for individual rather than communal ownership of land. The
revived Reserve Association dealt specifically with protecting the rights of the faith
community within the Umlazi Mission station. Consultations occurred and Luthuli
glimpsed moments when "half an ear" was given to the African voice.41 In the end,
history rendered the Durban City Corporation's scheme obsolete with the National
Party's win in the 1948 election. Again, within Luthuli's advocacy efforts glimmers
ofoptimism struggled to compete with exhausting, slow and disappointing results.
International Missionary Conference Trip, India
In his autobiography, Luthuli described his trip to Tambaram, near Madras,
India as providing him with "wider sympathies and wider horizons".42 Under the
auspices of the Christian Council of South Africa, of which Luthuli was a delegate
from Natal and subsequently an Executive Member, Luthuli attended the 1938
38 UW, WCL, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), AD843B (Part I), 100.4,
correspondence to LuthuIi from unknown, 08 April 1941.
39 UW, WCL, SAIRR, AD843B (Part I), 100.4, correspondence to Luthuli from unknown, 08 April
1941.
40 C. J. Beyers, ed., Dictionary ofSouth African Biography (Durban: Butterworth & Co., 1981),4: 330.
41 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 61.
42 LuthuIi, Let My People Go, 70.
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International Missionary Conference from 12-29 December to discuss the
missiological role of indigenous churches. John Mott, Chairman of the Conference,
indicated that the central theme of the meeting "would be the uplifting of the younger
churches as a part of the historic universal Christian community".43 Allan Boesak
noted that participants of the gathering discussed questions related to racism and
colonialism.44
After comparing inter-racial relations, mission education and poverty
alleviation in South Africa to those within an ecumenical Christian gathering, Luthuli
departed India as an "incisive critic" of South African Christianity.45 Luthuli
juxtaposed the dynamism ofdebate and the vigour by which the delegates discussed
and manifested Christianity at the Madras conference with the apathy, diffidence to
society and complicity of the Christian church in South Africa and even with those
included in his delegation.
Notwithstanding being fully immersed in his responsibilities as Chief and his
sober evaluation of the South African church following his trip to Madras, Luthuli
still remained very active in the church. In one illuminating article entitled
"Evangelism for Educated Bantu Youth", printed in the publication The South African
Outlook in October 1940, Luthuli warned that if the Church neglected to capture the
passion and potential of the youth, "other agencies inimical to the realisation of the
Kingdom will harness them".46 Luthuli specifically mentioned Communism and
nationalism as competition. Luthuli's evangelistic zeal for youth and the tone and
intensity of his Christocentric beliefs can be read in the same article. Luthuli
preached:
43 International Missionary Council, The World Mission ofthe Church: Findings and
Recommendations ofthe International Missionary Council, Tambaram, Madras, India, 12-29
December 1938 (London: International Missionary Council, 1939), 7.
See also Volumes I-VII (The Authority of the Faith, The Growing Church, Evangelism, The Life ofthe
Church, The Economic Basis of the Church, The Church and the State, Addresses and Other Records),
(London: Oxford University, 1939). J. Merle Davis compiled volume five.
Also compiled by Davis: The Economic and Social Environment ofThe Younger Churches: The Report
ofthe Department ofSocial Economic Research ofthe International Missionary to the Tambaram
Meeting 1938 (Edinburgh House: London, 1939).
44 AlIan Boesak, Black and Reformed: Apartheid, Liberation and the Calvinist Tradition
(Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984), 135.
45 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 69.
46 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCP 5319, 276 LUT, 8832, "Evangelism for Educated Bantu Youth", by
Albert Luthuli, article reprinted from the October 1940 issue of The South African Outlook by
Lovedale Press, 1.
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Evangelism means the unreserved surrender of the individual to God
through faith in Jesus Christ; and the deepening ofthe individual's
faith and the regeneration of Society through saved souls. Our aim in
evangelism should definitely be to confront the individual with Christ
and to challenge him or her to decide for Christ. And we should not be
satisfied until the individual unreservedly surrenders himself. Our
efforts in evangelism mean little if we do not secure through Christ
changed lives; consecrated lives; new men and women living a new
way oflife, as shown by our Lord and Master Jesus Christ when he
said, "I am the Way, the Truth, the Life, no man cometh unto the
Father but by Me".47
Despite the highly individualistic nature of spirituality, one does perceive the
corporate importance of spirituality when Luthuli alluded to "the regeneration of
society", the need for "social study groups", "the service of others", and interracial
exchanges "for the sake of winning the whole of Africa for Christ".48
Natal Missionary Conference
Prior to his involvement with the ANC, Luthuli sharpened his political and
administrative acumen through his election to leadership positions within many
ecclesiastic entities, one of them within the Natal Missionary Conference. The
Conference sponsored ecumenical gatherings once a year. Most of the Conference's
participants were white missioners. The Conference formed policy regarding
education, as missions controlled 95% ofthe schools for Africans and thus acted as
grantees for the schools. The missioners' function necessitated regular meetings with
the Conference's Advisory Board and the Department of Education in
Pietermaritzburg.
At its 1941 gathering in Durban, the Conference elected Luthuli as its
Chairperson.49 To elect a black, local, layperson to preside over a predominantly
white, expatriate and clerical association elicited much criticism. Nonetheless, the
election reinforced Luthuli's perennial optimism in the ultimate viability of multi-
47 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCP 5319, 276 LUT, 8832, "Evangelism for Educated Bantu Youth", by
Albert Luthuli, 2.
48 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCP 5319, 276 LUT, 8832, "Evangelism for Educated Bantu Youth" by
Albert Luthuli, 1-3.
49 Interview with Gunner Helander in Vasten'ts on 12 February 1996. Found in:
Tor Sellstrom, ed., Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices: lnterviewsfrom
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Frontline and Sweden, 2nd ed. (Uppsala:
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002),282.
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racial cooperation. The affirmation confirmed for Luthuli the Church's overall
beneficence and strengthened the bond between him and like-minded white liberal
Christians. As his most recent trip to India shows and his future trip to the United
States confinns, Luthuli's leadership roles conscientised him to the importance of
international solidarity efforts and the key role the Christian activists could play in
mobilising international public opinion in support of resistance to white supremacy.
Native Representative Council
In 1937 the Native Representative Council (NRC) was formed as a means by
which to compensate and thus mollifY the black population from the legislated loss of
their limited franchise in the Cape Province as a result of the passage of the 'Hertzog
Bills' in 1935. The government authorised Luthuli's first candidature for election as a
member of the NRC in 1942.50 Before his second candidacy for the NRC, Luthuli
became a member of the ANC. Sources indicate that Luthuli became a member in
1944; however, Luthuli stated that his "formal inclusion in the ranks of the ANC" did
not happen until 1945 or 1946.51
Luthuli's involvement with the NRC only began as a result of his success in a
by-election held due to John Dube's 1945 stroke and death in 1946. Luthuli defeated
the ANC veteran Selby Msimang by 231,926 votes to 99,118.52 The election win
provided the first substantive aperture through which Luthuli entered national politics.
Commenting on the NRC, Luthuli indicated in his autobiography:
I had no connection with this Council in its early years, save in my
capacity as Chief. However, when the death ofDr. Dube brought
about a by-election, I was voted into his place. I was interested,
though not at all surprised, as I went about among the people before
the election, to notice how deeply disillusioned they were by this time
with the Council ... 53
50 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA, 78/46-47, Reel # 1, correspondence from the MagistratelNative
Commissioner to Luthuli regarding the "Ensuing Nomination and Election of Members of the Native
Representative Council", 19 August 1942.
51 For example, Wikipedia's information on "Albert Lutuli" indicated Luthulijoined the ANC in 1944.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert Lutuli, accessed 16 October 2008.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 90.
52 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 197.
53 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 94.
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At this time, the liberation struggle's mood became more militant, particularly with
the youth. Founded in December 1943 to pursue the intention of increasing the pace
of reform, the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) placed much pressure on the NRC to
permanently adjourn due to the fact that the Smuts and the National Party
governments paid it no heed.54 Luthuli continued:
... 'What is the use', they asked me, 'of your going to the NRC in
Pretoria? They do nothing but talk. Where has this Council got us?'
It was only true. For years now they had talked. Nobody listened. I
was disillusioned myself, and could only reply. There are people
beyond South Africa who sometimes hear what we say. All we can do
is to shout to the world. All I can do is to help shout louder.55
Luthuli served on the NRC for a very short time. As others had long begun to
perceive, Luthuli realised that the NRC's efforts proved futile. In response to the
government's brutal repression of a miners' strike, Luthuli stated his concurrence with
his colleagues' decision to adjourn indefinitely at his very first meeting with the
government serving as a NRC delegate. The Chairman of the Council, Major F.
Rodseth, expressed the government's disappointment in Luthuli, the young novice
representative, "because he was a trusted chief who had always been helped by the
Department".56 The representative group adjourned indefinitely more than once. Its
own members rendered the NRC defunct until the new National Party government
eventually scrapped the body in 1951. Luthuli and others effectively resigned from
the NRC thus refusing to cooperate with the South African government or its
representative frameworks. In a latter day counter defence from those who perceived
his leadership of Kwazulu as collaborationist, Mangosuthu Buthelezi argued:
In my opinion, to say that we have "accepted" apartheid, by serving
our people within the framework of the South African government
policy would be as nonsensical as to say that when great African
leaders like the late Chief Albert Luthuli, Dr. Z. K. Matthews and
others, served their people within the frame work of the United Party
government policy of segregation as members ofthe Native
Representatives Council, that they did so because they "accepted" the
54 South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), The Road to Democracy in South Africa
(1960-1970) (Cape Town: Zebra, 2004),1: 31.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 95.
55 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 94.
56 UW, WCL, Champion, A922, A8, "History in the Making", 23 November 1952.
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segregationists policies of the United Party government. Nothing
could be further from the truth.57
Buthelezi's justification misled his audience. Luthuli resigned and refused to
participate in the body from the outset of his first participation in an NRC meeting. 58
American Board and North American Missionary Conference Trip, United
States
Within the American Board, John Reuling sensed that Africans were neglected
as it concerned opportunities for foreign representatives to travel to the United States
and so provide to the American churches first-hand indigenous perspectives on the
various mission fields. In 1948, a joint venture between the American Board and the
North American Missionary Conference sponsored a speaking tour to the United
States for Luthuli. The profound impact this had on Luthuli's political life is
articulated in his autobiography when he reflected, "It may be that travelling has made
me see South African issues more sharply, and in a different and larger perspective".59
Lavinia Scott, the Principal ofInanda Seminary, and John Reuling of the
American Board recommended Luthuli to represent the Natal mission. Newspaper
articles provided varied reports concerning the purpose ofLuthuli's speaking tour in
the United States. One source indicated the tour's purpose was "to report on the work
of the Mission in South Africa".60 Others stated it was to "explain the issues of
African economic development".61 Edgar Brookes considered Luthuli to be "the most
outstanding church representative available" to make aware the problems of African
development, particularly within rural economies, to the American Board.62 Another
source indicated that the tour focused upon segregation, race problems and 'racial
57 Excerpts taken from speeches ofChiefButhelezi held in the ANC archives in Lusaka.
Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chiefwith a Double Edged Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988), 100,
footnote 4.
Mzala very ably itemised other arguments criticising Buthe1ezi's participation as leader of the Kwazulu
homeland and his use ofLuthuli and Matthew's service on the NRC to validate it, 45-7.
"Mzala" was a pen name, used by the author, Jabulani Nxumalo.
58 Scott Couper, "Chief Albert Luthuli and the Bantustan Question", Journal ofNatal and Zulu History
24 and 25, 2006-7, 240-68.
59 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 74.
60 UW, WCL, Champion, A922, A8, "History in the Making", 23 November 1952, 1.
61 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 198-9.
62 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM, unknown, correspondence from John Reuling to Lavinia Scott,
20 February 1948.
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reconciliation'. Shortly after his arrival in June 1948, Luthuli spoke to the American
Board Prudential Committee at their Annual Meeting. In an address entitled "Africa
Looks to American Christian Friends", Luthuli's sentiments primarily concentrated on
racial issues, an important topic within Congregational circles at the time.63 During
the last week of June, Luthuli was a 'faculty member' delivering lectures at the
Wilbraham Pilgrim Summer Fellowship Conference in Massachusetts. Luthuli
focused on the communion of races in a letter he sent to the Dean of the Conference.
The fellowship at the Conference brought to me most forcefully and
vividly, but most happily, the realism of our oneness in Christ,
irrespective of our race or colour. Here I was, not only a stranger, but
a man of another colour and nation, and yet I felt myself one with the
fellowship. I have never sung with greater joy and understanding the
song: "In Christ there is no East or West, In Him no South or North,
[But] one great fellowship oflove throughout the whole wide earth".
The climax of this feeling of oneness was reached when the whole
fellowship of God was reached when the whole fellowship assembled
at the Lord's Table (sic).64
Two explanations exist for the divergent portfolios. The first is that Luthuli's
stated purpose to deliver lectures on "African rural development", mission
development and evangelisation (particularly as the latter two involve the youth)
would have been more 'palatable' to the South African government upon which he
was dependent for his visa rather than the intended purpose of speaking on race
relations. A second explanation is simply that the American Board focused on
'African development' at summer camps while his time with the North American
Missionary Society concentrated on 'race relations'.
Luthuli arrived and visited New York under the auspices of the American
Board. Luthuli then spent most of his time speaking to youth at various camps during
the summer. To the youth he displayed much of the oratorical prowess for which he
would later become so famous by electrifying mass meetings with his message.
Luthuli spoke at the Smithfield Congregational Christian Church in downtown
63 American Congregational Association Archives (ACAA), Boston, Massachusetts, "A Firm
Foundation", Annual Report of the American Board Commission for Foreign Missions Annual Report,
"Monday Evening, June 21,1948",1948,55.
E-mail correspondence from Margaret Bendroth, Librarian/Executive Director ofthe American
Congregational Association (Boston, Massachusetts) to Scott Couper, 22 June 2006.
64 ACAA, "From ChiefLuthuli", Missionmy Herald, December 1948, 32-3.
This article is a reprinting ofa correspondence written to Rev. Frank Loper, the Dean of the Wilbraham
Pilgrim Fellowship on 29 June 1948.
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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania where he related as well to people one-on-one as he did to
large audiences. Twelve years later, an old acquaintance, Wilson Minton, vividly
recalled a sentiment Luthuli expressed to him at the speaker's table. Luthuli remarked
that he and Minton were "nearer to each other" than many ofLuthuli's own people
could be to Luthuli, although their "skins were ofa different colour".65 This comment
puzzled Minton and he asked Luthuli what he meant. Luthuli responded that it was
because they "both were Christians led by the same Spirit" while those of his people
who were not yet Christians just could not understand his Christian attitude.66 Many
years later, Minton expressed to Luthuli:
In all my fifty years of ministry, I have had no greater compliment than
that, and I cherish it to this day. And this has helped me suffer with
you in these recent years when you have undergone so much for the
sake of our Lord and His kingdom of which we are a part.67
On 08 October 1948, Luthuli received a Junior Chamber of Commerce "Guest Speaker"
award in Columbus, Ohio.68 Here, at least, his speech concentrated on issues related to
development in rural Africa and obliquely addressed racial issues. For example, Luthuli
reminisced about the past and speculated about the future:
Ever since western civilisation made contact with Africa a New Africa has
been coming into birth. Whether or not we shall have a noble, progressive
Africa wherein love, brotherliness, righteousness shall abound, or a
reactionary and sour Africa dominated by hate, anger, revenge and greed, shall
depend a great deal on the policies and attitudes secular agencies, commerce,
industries and governments adopt in regulating their relations with Africa.69
From that point on, Luthuli served the North American Missionary Conference.
Luthuli visited the major cities of Chicago in Illinois, Minneapolis in Minnesota and
Boston in Massachusetts. While in Massachusetts, Luthuli and Matthews stayed at
the West Newton home of John and Eleanor Reuling.
65 LM, Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbett Papers (COPCP), correspondence from Wilson Minton to
Luthuli, 27 October 1960.
66 LM, COPCP, correspondence from Wilson Minton to Luthuli, 27 October 1960.
67 LM, COPCP, correspondence from Wilson Minton to Luthuli, 27 October 1960.
68 LM, The original certificate was found in a trunk belonging to Mrs. Nokukanya Luthuli, at the home
of Mrs. Veli Luthuli (daughter-in-law to Luthuli), Nonthlevu, Groutville, Kwadukuza.
69 LM, Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbett Papers (COPCP).
American Board Mission Archives, 15.4, v. 51, Albert Luthuli, "A New Africa: An Address Given to
the Junior Chamber of Commerce", Columbus, Ohio, 08 October 1948.
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Though it was not on his itinerary, Luthuli requested to visit the South in order
to learn more about the conditions under which African-Americans lived. His stay
was thus extended by three months and it included Washington, D.C. and Atlanta.
While in the South, Luthuli had a relatively impromptu opportunity to speak at
Howard University on behalf of the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Society in honour of
Mohandas Gandhi who an assassin killed earlier in the year. 70 In his speech, Luthuli
stated American 'Negroes' still suffer discrimination and thus revealed that he did not
romanticise race relations in the United States. Luthuli expressed pride that it was in
South Africa (1893-1914), when after being thrown from a first class section of a
passenger train in Pietermaritzburg, Gandhi devoted himself to champion the cause of
the emancipation of his people from discrimination. Luthuli mentioned that he had
"no doubt that his efforts for his people inspired people such as Dr. John Dube and
others to concern themselves with seeking human rights for their people".7I To his
audience, Luthuli affirmed the "dignity of man and the efficacy of non-violence as an
instrument of struggle in seeking freedom for oppressed people".72 In this speech,
Luthuli prophetically articulated the strategies he would employ as the leader of the
ANC. He praised Gandhi's example that taught "material wealth must be made
subordinate to spiritual wealth that respects human personality".73 Luthuli concluded
his remarks at Howard College by pleading that "those so inspired by [Gandhi's]
philosophy become his undaunted disciples".74 Gandhi proved uncompromising in
opposition to the use ofviolence as a means by which to liberate an oppressed people
from colonialism and racism.
A review of Luthuli's sentiments on Gandhi's example illuminates the roots of
Luthuli's torturous hesitancy to compromise on the use of violence. In July 1961,
Luthuli wrestled with two voices: one of Gandhi's espousals of Satyagraha ('force
that comes from truth, love and non-violence) and Mandela's persuasive arguments in
favour of violence. Those who disagreed with the resort to violence were primarily
70 Luthuli, obviously before arrival, incorrectly inferred that he would be speaking at the "Washington
University". There is a "George Washington University" in Washington, D. C. Because Luthuli
congratulated the University "for a century of meritorious service in the interest of[h]igher [e]ducation
among the American Negroes", the event must have been held at Howard University.
71 LM, Albert Luthuli, "[Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial on the Occasion of the Centenary Celebrations of
[Howard University], original handwritten draft provided to me by Christian "Boye" Luthuli, son of
Albert Luthuli. The document was thereafter placed into the stewardship of the Luthuli Museum,
Kwadukuza in November 2005,3-4.
72 LM, Albert Luthuli, "[Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial", 3-4.
73 LM, Albert Luthuli, "[Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial", 6.
74 LM, Albert Luthuli, "[Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial", 7.
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inspired by Gandhi's 1906, 1907 and 1913 Satyagraha campaigns. After the failure
of the May 1961 boycott and the intransigent stance of the National Party
government, Mandela argued to Luthuli and the other adherents of Gandhian tenets
that non-violent tactics had been exhausted. "There came a point in our struggle
when the brute force of the oppressor could no longer be countered through passive
resistance alone".75 As is briefly explored in chapter three, the ANC and Mandela
referenced Gandhi when introducing ethical qualifications to legitimise the use
violence. For example, Mandela wrote:
Gandhi himself never ruled out violence absolutely and unreservedly.
He conceded the necessity of arms in certain situations. He said,
'Where choice is set between cowardice and violence, I would advise
violence.. .I prefer the use of arms in defence of honour rather than
remain the vile witness of dishonour... ' Violence and non-violence
are not mutually exclusive; it is the predominance of the one or the
other that labels a struggle.76
The strong impact the visit to the United States made upon Luthuli is also
confirmed by the testimony of Allison Champion. In an unpublished manuscript
entitled "History in the Making", Champion insinuated that the ecclesiastically
sponsored trips to India and the United States in part radicalised Luthuli, thus making
him more malleable and susceptible to the influence of the more politically ambitious
and impatient Youth League.77 Champion's testimony points to a perspective that
Luthuli's exposure abroad made him optimistic about the possibilities for South
Africa's future in terms of racial integration.
Chief Luthuli was in America for nine months. When he came back he
definitely changed his tone [according] to those who knew him closely.
He had seen the operation oflaws governing Black[s] and White[s] in
75 Nelson Mandela, "Epilogue: Nelson Mandela Looks at Gandhi", in A Man/or All Seasons:
Mohandas Gandhi, ed. Johan Wassermann (Pretoria: Voortrekker Museum, n.d.), 2: 22.
76 Mandela, "Epilogue", in A Man/or All Seasons, Wassermann, 2: 22.
77 UW, WCL, Champion, A922, A8, "History in the Making", 23 November 1952.
Champion was perhaps the only person who can be documented to paint an unfavorable portrayal of
Luthuli. No doubt, Champion's prejudice against Luthuli was a reflection of his own vindictive and
cantankerous nature and a consequence ofLuthuli's dramatic and, for Champion, embarrassing
electoral win for the President ofthe Natal branch of the ANC in November 1951. Champion
portrayed Luthuli as a highly malleable and inexperienced leader. Champion also viewed Luthuli as a
"politician in the Indian pocket". Champion resented the ANC Youth League's radical support of the
1949 resolution defYing the Unjust Laws of the Union and their subsequent ousting ofDr. A. B. Xuma
by Dr. J. S. Moroka and thus saw Luthuli as another pawn in the hands of the Youth League.
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America. He had seen the limitless opportunities granted to the Negroes
in the United States.78
Upon his return to the United States, Luthuli actually confessed a state of melancholy
to the missioner John Taylor stating, "Spiritually, I wish I would still be in the United
States".79 Luthuli continued:
I have never in my life felt so depressed as I am feeling since my
return. The oppressive measures of our present Government are
definitely hastening the day ofextreme and aggressive African
nationalism. Unfortunately, our own African leaders it appears are
being swept off the path of reason to extremism.8o
Luthuli's depression must be recognised within the context that he returned in 1948,
the same year that the National Party government took power in South Africa on a
draconian Apartheid platform. Luthuli's own fears regarding "aggressive African
nationalism" do come to fruition with the breakaway from the ANC of the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC) in November 1958 and Nelson Mandela's launching of
Umkhonto we Sizwe 's initiation ofviolent resistance in December 1961. Luthuli's
reference to "our own African leaders being swept off the path of reason" pertained to
the Youth League and their motivations to the ANC to adopt more radical tactics such
as boycotts, strikes, non-cooperation with government institutions and civil
disobedience (what would become the Programme of Action in 1949). In 1948,
Luthuli had not yet been courted by the Natal Youth League (t 951) or the national
Youth League (t 952) and thus did not yet subscribe to their more aggressive
sentiments and tactics, let alone contemplate being their standard-bearer.
Luthuli's writings document the influence many American missioners and
lecturers and his extended ecclesiastic visit to the United States had on his political
perspective decades into the future. Luthuli's education and overseas visit exposed
him to, what was in the 1930s and 1940s and what is still to some degree, mythical
conceptualisations and idealisations of the founding of the American nation and the
seminal role of the Puritan Congregationalists in that founding. Luthuli extracted
from his American Board education that which emphasised ecclesiastical and political
78 UW, WCL, Champion, A922, A8, "History in the Making", 23 November 1952.
79 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 199, endnote 57.
80 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 200, endnote 57.
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liberty. Luthuli frequently cited American political aphorisms when calling for the
"consent of the govemed".81 He often quoted in his Golden City Post columns
Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address that was inspired by the Declaration of
Independence.
We only want to see justice done and to see established a truly
democratic Republic of South Africa that will provide a true
government of the people, for the people and by the people.82
In one editorial recognising American Independence Day (04 July), Luthuli pressed
home his points regarding liberty for black South Africans.
The Fourth of July provides an occasion for such a call. On this date,
in the year 1776, was born one of the most important documents in the
political history of man - I refer to the American Declaration of
Independence.83
A staunch Puritan, John Adams co-authored the Declaration ofIndependence,
served the United States as the first ambassador to the Netherlands, its first Vice-
President and in 1797 was inaugurated as the second President of the United States.
Adams thus provides one of many historical links between Congregationalism and the
founding of the United States. Luthuli referred to Adams in the same 1961 'Fourth of
July' column.
The Founding Fathers felt themselves to be agents of a special mission,
which John Adams, America's second President, described as a "grand
scheme and design in Providence for the illumination and
emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth" ...there
is no escaping the fact that the American nation is oriented towards a
noble goal, that it is bound to the grandest conception there is of
human progress and freedom by reason of the heritage which it gave
birth... We take hope in the fact that the Divine Ruler of our destinies
has provided for this earth of ours such a nation as the American
nation.84
81 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Democracy and South Africa", by Albert Luthuli, 30 July 1961.
82 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "It's Up to White South Africa", by Albert Luthuli, 30 April 1961.
BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Our Way Is Right- We Must Keep On", by Albert Luthuli, 25 March
1962. BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "What Would Mr. Mac Do in Our Position?", by Albert Luthuli,
21 February 1960.
83 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Declaration oflndependence", by Albert Luthuli, 16 July 1961.
84 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Declaration oflndependence", by Albert Luthuli, 16 July 1961.
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President of the Natal ANC
Luthuli credited the draconian Apartheid regime, inaugurated by the National
Party election victory over Smuts in 1948, for awakening the "mass of Africans to
political awareness" and goading them out of "resigned endurance" and feeble 'cap-
in-hand' hamba kahle participation in governance.8S Many of the early ANC
Presidents were detached from the grassroots, reluctant to lose their privileged
positions by antagonising the government and were more theoretically rather than
practically inclined.86 The 1944 formation ofthe Youth League (ANCYL), led by
Anton Lembede and supported by Nelson Mandela, Joe Matthews (Z. K. Mathews'
son), WaIter Sisulu, Ashby Mda, Masabalala Yengwa (later Natal Secretary under
Luthuli), Wilson Conco (later Natal Chairperson under Luthuli) and Oliver Tambo
(later Secretary-General under Luthuli) awakened the ANC. Initially Africanist and
anti-Communist, the ANCYL gradually accepted political cooperation with other
races and ideologies following the signing of 1949 pact of cooperation (Xuma-Dadoo-
Naicker) with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the 1950 banning ofthe
Communist Party. Luthuli began attending ANC meetings in Durban in 1944 and
soon joined. Shortly thereafter, ANC members in Natal elected Luthuli to the
Executive Committee.87
After hearing ofthe Youth League in Johannesburg, M. T. Moerene urged
Yengwa and other young men to form a local Natal branch. Yengwa argued that the
ANC "had to move from a political philosophy that was completely abstract to
involvement in actual campaigns".88 The President-General of the ANC at that time,
Xuma, deserves much credit for initially spearheading the ANC, particularly
administratively. Yet, despite Xuma's acceptance of the ANCYL's emergence as a
force with which to be reckoned, the ANCYL politically outgrew the conservative
Xuma. Luthuli wrote:
85 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 99.
86 R. W. Johnson, South Africa: The First Man, The Last Nation (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2004),
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It was not long before [the Youth League] found that, while all were
agreed about the work of organising the movement, Dr. Xuma hung
back over the question of what to do with the organisation once it was
there. Congress was urgent, Xuma was cautious.89
The Youth League, often referred to throughout the ANC's history as the 'King
Makers', then retired Xuma and elected lames Moroka, a Wesleyan Kholwa who was
at the time the leader of the All-African Convention (AAC), to be President-General
of the ANC with WaIter Sisulu as the Secretary-General. The ANC called Moroka to
lead because he agreed to be compliant with the ANCYL's new militancy when
Xuma refused. In December 1949, the ANC adopted the Programme of Action (PA),
inspired by Kwame Nkrumah's example in Ghana, and "paved the way for a new era
of organised action".9o The fundamental change of policy and method was an
uncompromising and final refusal to accept 'crumbs' such as segregation, apartheid,
trusteeship or leadership from the 'rich [white] man's table'. The PA urged the
adoption of more aggressive tactics such as mass civil disobedience, boycotts, strike
action and non-cooperation as a radical replacement of what former ANCYL
President A. P. Mda referred to as the "dilly-dallying and half-hearted" measures that
were the standard course ofold guard under Xuma.91 The PA spurred the ANC to
demonstrate against the Group Areas Bill (June 1950), to strike in protest to the
intention to remove Coloureds from the Western Cape's Common Electoral Roll
(May 1951) and to launch the Defiance Campaign (June 1952). It was Champion's
reluctance to involve the Natal ANC in the Defiance Campaign that caused another
electoral coup over a politically obsolete leader by an increasingly impatient Youth
League.92
Following Dube's stroke, Champion succeeded him as President of the Natal
ANC after electorally defeating another conservative leader, Rev. A. Mtimkulu.
89 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 101.
90 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 30.
91 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 30.
92 The word 'coup' is controversial. The term is not used pejoratively. Rather, in this instance, and in
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spirit that Mary Benson used the term in The Struggle ofa Birthright when in the chapter entitled "The
Youth Take Over", she wrote regarding the Moroka's election, "The Youth League's coup had come
off'.
Mary Benson, The Struggle for a Birthright (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), 128.
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a sitting ANC president, Thabo Mbeki.
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110
During the chaos of the meeting that elected him, Luthuli leapt to the stage to
establish order and found himself unexpectedly appointed as acting chair of the
meeting. Under Champion's leadership, Luthuli served on his executive. Dube led
the ANC Natal region almost independently from the national ANC. Those who
elected Champion most likely did so on a mandate to incorporate the ANC in Natal
with the national organisation. This Champion did; however, not well enough.
Champion allowed his region to be completely ignorant ofand thus lag behind
the national ANC's preparation for the 1952 Defiance Campaign that sought to
mobilise the disenfranchised for civil disobedience. Luthuli declined from further
serving on the Natal executive as he felt that Champion's practice ofappointing his
own executive was undemocratic. The Natal Youth League led by Yengwa perceived
in Luthuli a new brand of leadership, more radical and more democratic than
Champion, and nominated him as President of the Natal ANC. H. Selby Msimang
was also a nominee. Luthuli only agreed to run with Msimang's approval. Msimang
bowed out. Luthuli won the election by a modest majority and succeeded Champion
with Msimang as the Secretary on 30 May 1951.93 In a draft article to Ilanga Lase
Natal, Champion sulked:
Chief Luthuli came out openly to help and cooperate with the African
Congress Youth League whose policy is that of non-collaboration as
framed in the Programme of Action decided by the Conference of the
Congress in Bloemfontein in 1949. I could not accept that policy with
the nature of forces at my disposal. I was criticised severely and
Chief Luthuli has led the attack successfully.94
Champion was not the only one displeased with Luthuli's election. A month
later on 14 June 1951, Waiter Kamakobosi Dimibar wrote to the Secretary ofthe
"Groutville Committee", Phinehas Mbambo, to express his dismay and opposition to
Luthuli's election. Dimibar wrote:
After reading the news of Chief [Luthuli' s] appointment as the
President of the National Congress in Natal and at the same time he
being the Chief of our Mission Reserve: I took his appointment as a
93 Natal Mercwy, "New Elected Spokesman of Zulu People ofNatal", by Jordan Ngubane,
01 January 1952 (?).
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 13. Pillay cited:
Drum, February 1952.
94 UW, WCL, Champion, A922, Dal15, draft article submission to Ilanga Lase Natal, n.d.
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wrong step he has undertaken even to contest the leadership of that
organisation (sic). [The] African National Congress is a political
organisation, an organisation that is full of strife, full of communistic
ideas, full of boycotts against our Government...He cannot hold these
two [posts.] [H]e has either to keep one and resign the other... 95
Dimibar then suggested that the Committee force Luthuli to resign as Chief so that
another can be chosen as a replacement.96
Defiance Campaign
As the newly elected President of the ANC in Natal, Luthuli had less than one
month to prepare for the National Conference ofthe ANC scheduled to be held in
Bloemfontein. Luthuli and the Natal Executive Committee were shocked to realise
from preparatory materials that the ANC planned to initiate civil defiance. After
having temporarily served as Chair of the National Conference, Luthuli confessed that
the ANC Natal was unprepared for the Defiance Campaign (otherwise known as the
Campaign for the Repeal of Discriminatory Legislation). The ANC members did not
receive Luthuli's excuses with sympathy and he was even heckled as a "coward".
The ANC in Natal agreed to make preparations for the Campaign, scheduled for the
latter half of 1952, as best they could. Luthuli and his executive planned to enter the
Campaign as soon as possible.
The history of the Defiance Campaign need not be elaborated upon in this
investigation. Many other sources, including Luthuli's autobiography, more than
adequately document the watershed impact the Campaign had on the ANC and the
increasing antagonistic relationship the movements for liberation had with the
National Party govemment.97 Suffice it to say, Luthuli's entry into ANC leadership
as President of the Natal region was a 'baptism by fire'.
95 UNISA, UL, UA, DCAS, AWGC, Accession number 1, 19.7.2.1, Luthuli Memorial Foundation
Correspondence, correspondence from W. Kamakobosi Dimibar to the Secretary of the Groutville
Committee, Phinehas Mbambo, 14 June 1951.
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97 Benson, The Struggle for a Birthright, 140-56.
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The 'warm-up' to the 26 June 1952 launch of the Campaign began from
06 April with numerous mass meetings and demonstrations throughout the country.
Beginning in June, and in three stages gradually increasing in intensity, disciplined
and trained volunteers of the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) led
by Mandela who was the 'National Volunteer-in-Chief' began to systematically
disobey unjust and oppressive discriminatory laws thus inviting arrest, assault and
penalty. The Campaign utilised strategies inspired by Gandhi and required a strict
adherence to non-violence. Defying unjust laws demonstrated to the oppressed
majority as well as to the oppressing minority the potential inability of the
government to enforce and prosecute petty Apartheid restrictions if the masses acted
in concert. Defying unjust laws also served to educate an often oblivious white
electorate of the inhumanity of Apartheid laws and to thus engender moral outrage at
its insensitivity and brutality to its modus operandi. Intended violations of the law,
including the logistics of how, when, who and where were announced to the
authorities. Demonstrators flouted prohibitions against the use of segregated railway
stations, waiting rooms, public toilets, post offices and park benches in addition to the
enforcement ofpass regulations and curfews.
Though Natal had insufficient time to mobilise for defiance as did other
regions such as the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, by September it felt ready and
participated to the extent that it was able. Benson related that Luthuli met with his
executive in a small ANC office located in a busy Indian shopping centre and
committed to cross the Rubicon. Luthuli impressed upon his lieutenants:
Look, we will be calling upon people to make very important
demonstrations and unless we are sure of the road and prepared to
travel along it ourselves, we have no right to call other people along
it.98
Together they pledged:
John Pampallis, Foundations ofthe New South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1991),
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...we solemnly pledge that we shall exert all our moral, physical and
financial effort to attain our objective - the freedom of the oppressed
peoples of South Africa.99
Yengwa described what happened next: "We all said that we were prepared and he
said he too was prepared and he asked us to pray". 100
The government dispersed mass meetings organised by the Indian and African
Congresses. During the Campaign, the police arrested Luthuli for the first time
though he did not break any laws. As a 'Staff Officer', Luthuli' s role required him to
organise not invite arrest. By its climax in October, 2,354 resisters participated in the
Campaign throughout the nation. 10] While the Campaign did not persuade the
government or the press of the legitimacy of its claims, the protests generated a
massive swelling of the ANC's ranks. Between 1951 and 1953, ANC branches
increased around the country from 14 to 87 and its members in good standing from
7,000 to 100,000.]02
In October 1952, sporadic incidents of violence unexpectedly broke out in Port
Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberly and East London. A breakdown in the
Campaign's disciplined volunteers did not necessarily cause the violence. Many
including Luthuli suspected that agents provocateurs perpetrated violence.
Unsurprisingly, the white press and public linked any violence to the Campaign rather
than to oppressive laws or to agents provocateurs. In response to the violence,
Parliament passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act
making the tactics of the Defiance Campaign illegal. Because the government
enforced more curfews in some areas of the country, the Congresses' leaders decided
to terminate the Campaign in January 1953.
Theologically Informed Political Statement
In August 1952, Luthuli received a letter from the Lower Tugela Native
Affairs Commissioner expressing disquiet that he encouraged people to oppose
99 Benson, The Struggle for a Birthright, 145.
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government schemes. This was of concern to the government, for it employed
Luthuli as a chief and authorised him to enforce minor laws within his jurisdiction.
Though Luthuli claimed he "kept well within the regulations which governed chiefs",
the government had a legitimate case against Luthuli who as an adjudicator of the law
simultaneously encouraged people to break some of them. 103 In September 1952,
three weeks after his receipt and response to the first correspondence of concern,
Pretoria summoned Luthuli. 104
In Pretoria, Luthuli the Secretary for Native Affairs, W. W. M. Eiselen, the
Deputy Secretary and the ChiefNative Commissioner for Natal met with Luthuli.
After some preliminary questions, Eiselen confronted Luthuli with the central
grievance that his involvement in the Defiance Campaign contradicted his role as
Chief Luthuli defended himself against the charge by making a subtle distinction that
the encouragement of breaking certain unjust laws was, by its nature, political and not
criminal. Second, Luthuli declared that he did not conflate his responsibilities as
Chief and leader in the Congress. Third, Luthuli argued that the government
recognised Congress to be a legal entity and, as long as it was legal, no conflict of
interest existed. Luthuli reasoned:
It was to allow these wider associations, intended to promote the
common national interests of the people as against purely local
interests, that the government, in making rules governing chiefs, did
not debar them from joining political associations, so long as those
associations had not been declared "by the Minister to be subversive of
or prejudicial to constituted Government". The African National
Congress, its non-violent Passive Resistance Campaign, may be of
nuisance value to the government, but it is not subversive, since it does
not seek to overthrow the form and machinery of the state, but only
urges the inclusion of all sections of the community in a partnership in
the government of the country on the basis of equality. 105
The government must have heard this last qualification with a collective wry smile for
the ANC intended to subvert the government. The creation ofa government on the
103 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 113.
104 PilIay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 16.
105UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, Reel #2, CAMP MF 2914, Press statement "The Road to
Freedom Is Via the Cross", 15 November 1952,4.
Reel 1, CAMP MF 2914, handwritten draft statement "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross",
14 November 1952.
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basis of racial equality would/or the National Party regime require an overthrow of
the fonn and machinery ofthe state. Before he walked out ofEiselen's door, Luthuli
decided not to comply with the government's ultimatum. After his meeting with
Eiselen, Luthuli addressed thousands in Pretoria at the Transvaal's ANC Annual
Conference.
In October 1952, Luthuli received a letter requesting him to reply to the
contradiction still perceived by the Department. Luthuli replied the same: he saw no
contradiction and had no intention of resigning from either the chieftaincy or the
ANC. 106 Mangosuthu Buthelezi correctly perceived that "Luthuli didn't make any
choice; he let the government do what it does".107 From October, Luthuli fathomed
fully what was to come. In November 1952, the government deposed Luthuli.
Horace Rall, the fonner magistrate who served the order deposing Luthuli, indicated
in an interview he neglected his duties (an accusation that Luthuli denied in his
autobiography) and served "two masters in opposition" with one another. 108
Thereafter, on 14 November 1952 Luthuli drafted the personal and biblical statement,
"The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" that the ANC and the Natal Indian Congress
jointly released.
Though political, documentary evidence proves the statement had a
theological, biblical and homiletic genesis. Six days earlier on 09 November 1952,
Luthuli delivered a sennon entitled "Christian Life: A Constant Venture" at Adams
College. 109 A comparison of the two texts reveals that Luthuli drafted his famous
"The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" statement by quoting substantive portions of
his sennon preached a week earlier. The political perspective emanated directly from
the theological perspective. This thesis enables one to understand better the
existential, theological and political dynamics at work during the later half of 1961
when the option for violence was irrevocably made by the ANC. Obedience to what
106 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM, unknown, from Scott to Reuling, date unknown (December 1952), 3.
107 UHOA, Interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Mayibuye Akfrika", 1993.
108 UHOA, Interview with Horace Rail, "Mayibuye Afrika", 1993.
Hall's claim may have legitimacy. One of Seott's regular reports to Reuling stated: "We have heard
that there had been some criticism of Chief Luthuli at Groutville - perhaps for being away too much, or
perhaps just for not favouring certain people. I do not know. But we have heard recently that the
people there say they do not want any other chief and that if they can't have him they will get along
with none".
UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM, unknown, from Scottto Reuling, date unknown (December 1952),3.
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Luthuli considered to be the fundamental tenets of his faith was of primary
importance and not ultimately, the success or failure of any given tactic or strategy.
Luthuli's faith background taught him that success, that is liberation, was inevitable,
that liberation was not in doubt, precisely because God would ensure that 'might is
not right'.
Luthuli's sermon explained to his faith community the position he was about
to take by providing a biblical rationale for the political statement he would soon
issue. Both texts speak the same message, with varied emphases, to different
audiences. To his faith-based audience, Luthuli's sermon served as a theological
apology for opting for secular politics rather than ecclesiastic chieftaincy as a means
by which to serve the people. To his political audience, represented by the ANC and
the Natal Indian Congress, Luthuli grounded his political statement with a theological
foundation using a title and the same concluding sentence: "The Road to Freedom Is
Via the Cross". To his political followers, Luthuli communicated that the basis and
impetus for politics is a calling from God to serve others. To his faith-based
community, Luthuli communicated that through politics, one implements faith. To
his ecclesiastic followers, Luthuli proclaimed that one is a mere extension of the
other; neither of the two can be separated.
In his sermon and, to a lesser extent in his political statement, Luthuli utilised
the hermeneutic lens of typological re-enactment to convey his justification. When
selecting a title for his autobiography, "Let My People Go", Luthuli again would
mesh politics and faith using the hermeneutic lens of typological re-enactment. The
"Road to Freedom" statement proclaimed that in forfeiting the chieftainship, Luthuli
conceived himself to be moving to a larger "adventure" within the spiritual realm
rather than from the spiritual to the secular realm. Despite choosing the political
realm to struggle for the rights of the South African majority, Luthuli was first and
foremost motivated by theological, and more specifically, biblical considerations. 110
Because Luthuli was the Chief of the Abasemakholweni tribe, his chieftaincy was as
theologically premised by the church as it was politically premised by the people of
Groutville and the government.
The fact that the ANC and the Natal Indian Congress jointly issued Luthuli's
statement is not insignificant, for it points to his democratic nature. When questioned
110 Scott Couper, "Luthuli and Kairos", The Nonconformist (Johannesburg: The Congregational, 2007),
32-43.
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by his antagonists in Pretoria, Luthuli stressed that he answered personally, and not on
behalf of the ANC, as he did not have its specific mandate to respond as the
collective. Valuing the importance of the collective, Luthuli did not issue "The Road
to Freedom Is Via the Cross" in his personal capacity, but rather under the auspices of
the wider liberation movement. These small acts point to a general pattern where, in
his capacity as leader, Luthuli did not act unilaterally or against the majority. This
pattern suggests why in large part after 1962, Luthuli eventually remained quiet about
his opposition to the initiation of violence as a means by which to prosecute the
struggle for liberation.
Those who seek to evince Luthuli's support for the turn to violence
ubiquitously quote a portion of the statement "The Road to Freedom Is Via the
Cross". For example, in his statement, Luthuli rhetorically asked:
...who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking
in vain, patiently, moderately at a closed and barred door? What have
been the fruits of my many years of moderation? 111
Those justifying the ANC's turn to violence anachronistically cite Luthuli's
exasperated question to convey the opposite of what he advocated. Though the
statement explicitly advocated non-violence, portions of it are incorrectly interpreted
to justify violence. Though the title ofthe statement proclaimed sacrifice and
suffering as a means to political salvation, portions of it have been manipulated to
justify a different 'road'.
The Groutville community expressed some initial discontent about Luthuli's
deposing by indicating a refusal to elect a new Chief. Though in the end, Luthuli was
disappointed with the community's reluctant resignation. They did nothing about the
injustice. From then on, Luthuli indicated that he remained "as aloof as possible"
from tribal affairs, seeing chiefs as emasculated by their white supremacist
paymasters. 112 Though sympathetic with their vulnerability, Luthuli was again
disillusioned by his own constituency's lack of political activism and perceived more
political promise for political liberation through the advocacy of a more influential
white, Christian and liberal elite.
III VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, Reel #2, CAMP MF 2914, Press statement "The Road to
Freedom Is Via the Cross", 15 November 1952,2.
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President-General of ANC
The ANC suffered a large disappointment towards the conclusion of the
Defiance Campaign when Moroka abdicated his leadership role by attaining separate
legal counsel from his co-accused, apparently on the pretext that the Communist
lawyers on the defence team represented the accused. Moroka also took the witness
stand to mitigate any legal punishment. Luthuli reflected:
The leader of Congress dissociated himself from his fellow-accused, he
appeared unready to go the whole way in defiance, and he asked
Whites to shield him from the conse~uences of white laws, and from
the consequences of his own stand.11
Moroka's defence proved to be a humiliating gesture by the leader of a liberation
movement.
Luthuli provided a dramatic contrast by defying the government's ultimatum
to choose the ANC or his livelihood as a chief and in his dramatic public statement
following his dismissal joined his "people in the new spirit that moves them today, the
spirit that revolts openly and boldly against injustice and expresses itself in a
determined and non-violent manner".114 Such a declaration guaranteed Luthuli the
soon to be vacant position of President-General of the ANC. In December 1952, a
month after his dismissal, ANC members elected Luthuli to a three year term as the
leader of the oldest and largest continental liberation movement. The membership
elected Mandela as Luthuli's deputy. Ironically, the future Pan-Africanist leader
Potlako Leballo formally nominated Luthuli. 115 This nomination from Leballo
underscored the links between the ANCYL, the Programme of Action, the Defiance
Campaign and the perception that Luthuli was a bold and fearless leader who was
ready to sacrifice all for the liberation of the oppressed in South Africa. When Robert
Sobukwe seceded from the ANC to lead the Pan-African Congress in November
1958, Luthuli's influence began to weaken in ANC circles. Mandela's launch of MK
113 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 122.
114 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, Reel II, CAMP MF 2914, Press statement "The Road to
Freedom Is Via the Cross", 15 November 1952,2.
115 Oxford University Press, "Luthuli, Albert John: Biography".
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in December 1961, effectively a second secession from Luthuli's leadership and
strategy, all but completely diluted Luthuli's influence.
Moroka's ousting and Luthuli's election brought to view the ANCYL's
tendency to support a candidate who would implement its programme, use that leader
to the fullest extent possible and when the flexibility of the leader had been exhausted,
politely, procedurally and democratically dispense with that leader. This recurring
motif occurred with Xuma, Moroka and Champion (and to some extent with other
Amakholwa before the advent of the ANCYL, e.g., Dube and Seme).116 This study
underscores the same dynamic continued with Luthuli. The ANC membership elected
Luthuli as the Natal and national President on the shoulders of an impatient ANCYL.
In mid-1961 when those same younger, more militant and increasingly
impatient elements of the ANC opted to use violence, the ANC was an illegal entity
and could not meet, hold elections or conduct an electoral coup to topple Luthuli as
had been done with his predecessors. Instead, a non-orchestrated coup occurred,
conveniently facilitated by two historical realities that were as prominent as the
ANC's radically new strategic tact toward violence: Oliver Tambo's leadership of the
exiled ANC abroad and Luthuli's banning that confined him in Groutville. Just as
Luthuli evaluated Moroka to be "unenthusiastic and cautious" in December 1952, so
in December 1961 the ANC under Mandela evaluated Luthuli to be unenthusiastic
and cautious regarding the use of violence to oppose white supremacy. 117
Wider Church Relations
Despite Luthuli's disappointment in the Church's efficacy as an agent of
political change, he continued to serve as a leader in various church-based institutions
until he was "forced to resign his post[s] as a result of Govemment Policy".118
Luthuli served on the Advisory Board of McCord Hospital Board, the Advisory Board
of Inanda Seminary and the Governing Council of Adams College. 119 Luthuli also
116 One could argue that the same political dynamic still continues today. Many political commentators
claim that the ANCYL's support of Jacob Zuma reversed his political obituary, allowing him to be
elected in December 2007 as the 'populist', militant and left-leaning President of the ANC after
defeating the more intellectual, conservative and neo-liberalleadership ofThabo Mbeki.
117 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 122.
ll8 McCord Hospital Archives (MHA), correspondence from C. D. Orchard, Medical Superintendent of
McCord Zulu Hospital, to Mrs. A. Luthuli, 31 July 1967.
119 MHA, correspondence from C. D. Orchard to Mrs. A. Luthuli, 31 July 1967.
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served as the Chairperson of the South African Board of the Congregationalist Church
of South Africa (Bantu Congregational Church) and Vice-Chair (Executive) to the
Christian Council of South Africa, the predecessor of the South African Council of
Churches. 120
In January 1953 on the heels of his electoral victory, Luthuli attended the
meeting of the Executive Committee of the Christian Council in the Cape and pressed
a reluctant audience to issue a "non-evasive" statement on the Defiance Campaign. 121
In his autobiography, Luthuli expressed the same sentiments he shared with the
Executive Committee of the Christian Council in 1953:
The charge of evasion, where it is made against churches, is not
unfounded. If the Christian concern is with people and not disembodied
principles, its concern must be with the conditions under which its
people live. Christianity must be concerned with the here and
now...Obviously, we do not expect to see the church organising political
movements. But it must be with the people, in their lives. 122
Luthuli prefigured positions on the Christian church's responsibility to
promote social justice taken by fellow American Congregationalist missioner AlIen
Myrick, Acting Secretary for the American Board mission. In 1966, Myrick
advocated for a greater prophetic missiological presence in the conclusion ofhis 1965
report to the United Common Board for World Ministries (UCBWM), the institutional
descendent of the American Board. Myrick advocated the ideals of the Christian
church, how it should be involved, how it should participate in the struggle for justice
and how it should be vulnerable and risk in faithfulness to GOd. 123 Quoting David
Paton, Myrick pleaded at length that the American missioners in South Africa should
Luthuli was elected to the Governing Council at its 1952 Annual General Meeting.
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be on the forefront of racial integration and social justice.124 Myrick articulated these
ideals well, ideals that Luthuli learned at Groutville and Adams. For example, after
suggesting the UCBWM encourage economic boycotts and sanctions against South
African exports, Myrick concluded his report:
I believe that the time is long since past when the Board for World
Ministries or its missionaries in South Africa should hesitate in their
witness through fear for the future of its institutions or the safety of the
Church. God has shown the Church repeatedly through its history that
its strength and its future do not rest in the survival of its institutions or
the safety of its members, but rather in its obedience to its Lord. I
believe that such obedience compels us, missionaries and Board
officers and members, to oppose the tyranny of South Africa with all
the powers which God has given US. 125
Judging by Myrick's 1967 and 1968 reports and a correspondence to his African
Secretary in 1969, the church in South Africa was not implementing the ideal.
As the introduction to this chapter mentions, Rich more than any other author
articulated the relationship between Luthuli and his faith tradition in his piece entitled
"Albert Luthuli & the American Board Mission in South Africa" (The Mission).126
Rich employed Elpick's ecclesiastic history, the Comaroffs' investigative
anthropology and Marks' use of political biography to disclose the extent to which
Luthuli's "development was crucially shaped by missionary links". 127
Despite Luthuli's continued loyalty to the church, Rich correctly posited that
during the 1950s Luthuli became "estranged" from the work of the Mission and was
subsequently "lost" as his efforts to promote human rights received far more influence
in the ANC than it ever could within a hesitant and conservative church. 128 Evidence
reveals that timidity characterised the Mission's communication and solidarity with
Luthuli and its views of South African politics. Yet, the church's timidity and
124 UHOA, UCBWM Field Secretary Correspondences (UFSC), "Report of the Acting Field Secretary,
South African Mission, for the Year 1965, to the United Church Board for World Ministries", from
P. Alien Myrick, 22 January 1966.
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unwillingness to alienate the government was understandable.!29 Communications
between the Mission and the Board at the time indicated that the church experienced
long delays and many frustrations in obtaining entry permits for its missioners. 13o The
Mission felt the impact of Bantu Education legislation as it negatively affected its
many schools. The Mission had to be particularly careful not to antagonise the
government. 13! For example, in 1953 a petition circulated that objected to Luthuli's
first banning. Despite expressing appreciation that there was a petition, Scott
considered it "wise" that two colleagues had not signed it and she made a counter-
proposal, a less risky option, to have the Mission object specifically to Luthuli's
inability to attend worship.!32 By May 1953, Scott had begun to notice that most of
Luthuli's contacts were with people outside the American Board circles, though he
still attended as a member the Umlomo (Executive Committee ofan American Board
indigenous pastors ' conference) meetings. 133 Finally in one correspondence, Scott
questioned Reuling on the wisdom of travelling to Oslo to observe Luthuli receive the
Nobel Peace Prize and suggested that "there might be about as much harm as good
resulting from such a move". 134
The indigenous church leaders and members may have been more prone to
inertia than the expatriate lead Mission. Reuling at one time pointed out that perhaps
the church might be more politically outspoken if the American Board had not diluted
its power to an even more conservative and unimaginative indigenous leadership. 135
Many African Congregationalists proved even more wary ofLuthuli's increasing
involvement in politics than their former white American ecclesial paternalists who
harboured concerns with the ANC's, and hence Luthuli's, links with Communists. 136
Many of Luthuli's contemporaries feared that the government could expropriate
Mission land, close down additional schools and deny government sponsored
bursaries for continuing education as had been the case for Luthuli's own daughter,
129 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 196.
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Albertinah. 137 After commenting on the announcement that Luthuli had won the
Peace Prize in a correspondence to Reuling, Scott chirped:
Of course, there are many in South Africa who are either displeased or
unimpressed, and this latter group also includes some African people
as well as Europeans. 138
Though resolute in his conviction that the church ought to participate in the
fight against injustices in South Africa, Luthuli's possessed moderate expectations of
that happening. Luthuli acknowledged the pressures and tactics the government
utilised to suppress the church in general. Nevertheless, in his biography, Luthuli
expressed disappointment in the lack of prophetic courage possessed by the church.
Church sites in African areas are now held on yearly lease at the
pleasure of the Minister [ofNative Affairs]. The threat is that, if a
sermon or a congregation or a bishop displeases the Department, the
site will cease to be available. Parsons must not talk politics ...This
threat has many Christian ministers and organisations virtually
cowering, as of course the government intends. What is becoming of
our Christian witness? I am extreme on this point. Let us lose church
sites and keep Christian integrity. I disagree with those who want to
"save something from the wreck" because what I see happening is the
wreck of Christian witness... 139
One wonders why Luthuli did not mention in his bibliography the closing of
his beloved Adams College in December 1956 or any measures he or the ANC
undertook to object to it. 140 Luthuli's criticism that the churches did "almost nothing"
in reaction to the government's withdrawal of support for Christian mission
institutions misleads. 141 According to Alan Paton, Adams College "resisted to the
end" and exhausted every procedural possibility to save the school from "the evil
doctrine that has corrupted so many Christians in a Christian country". 142 From
137 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KCM, 52273, correspondence from Scott to Reuling, 20 February 1953.
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Principal George Grant's narration of the closing, one learns that the College
mobilised and "received the blessing and backing of important and responsible
Church organisations in the country and overseas" - financial included. 143 The
Action Committee of the Christian Council of South Africa (CCSA) became involved
by meeting personally with the Minister ofNative Affairs who promptly and
emphatically dashed any hopes of Adams becoming a private school as "virtually NO
NEW Private Schools would be permitted" (The emphasis was that of the Minister of
Native Affairs as reported by the Christian Council of South Africa to Adams
College.).144 Ironically, F. J. de Villiers, from whom Luthuli learned so much during
his days at Adams, wrote the government correspondence refusing permission for
Adams College to become a private school thus dooming it to the clutches of a
grossly inferior Bantu Education. 145 What measures Luthuli, or the ANC that he led,
took to oppose or protest the liquidation of Adams College are unclear. Rich's study
on Luthuli and the American Board deduced that Luthuli's ban "left him relatively
powerless to influence the debates" surrounding the take over of Adams. In addition,
during much of 1955 when the 'storm clouds' gathered over Adams, Luthuli was
hospitalised.
Luthuli recognised the 'ambiguities of dependence' in which the Mission
existed within South Africa. Luthuli's sympathy with the dilemma the
Congregational church faced in part explains how he could be critical of the church
and its lack of prophetic action and yet be loyal to it to his death. Evidence of the
church's difficult position can be seen in correspondences written to the Board from
the Mission after Luthuli's death. For example, Myrick wrote to the Board's Africa
Secretary, Chester Marcus, frankly suggesting that the missioners in South Africa
were not inclined to hear 'pious irrelevancies and sanctimonious trivialities' from
naIve Americans when they concerned interracial modalities. Myrick wrote:
We have mixed feelings about the vote of the General Synod
recommending that the UCBWM appoint a group of investigators to
visit the Africa mission. On the one hand, we like to show people
143 UKZN, APC&SA, AP 370.968 GRA, "The Liquidation of Adams College", 43.
144 UKZN, APC&SA, AP 370.968 GRA, "The Liquidation of Adams College", 44.
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around and give them an idea of what's going on, as we see it. On the
other hand, it will be difficult not to think of these people as another
kind of Special Branch. If they come with the aim of helping us do a
better job, that's wonderful; but if they are convinced before they come
that we've sold out to Apartheid, etc ...they will probably see only
what they want to see and prove their case on the evidence they find.
You can't live by the CORE discipline and stay in South Africa. Ifwe
are to be withdrawn because we do not, that decision can be made in
[New York] right now. 146
Luthuli sensed that the church would not be the vehicle upon which the
majority of South Africans could depend to press for their liberation. First of all, the
church was not inclusive. Prior to the formation of the United Democratic Front
(UDF), the wider church could not work with and alongside Communists, Muslims
and black nationalists within a broad based political movement formed by the
Congresses as Luthuli could and did well. During the '50s and '60s, Whites and
insularity dominated the Christian churches, whether Congregationalist or other,
Father Trevor Huddleston and Archbishop Denis Hurley notwithstanding. 147 Writing
from Alice to the UCBWM in 1967, Myrick confided:
Perhaps the greatest single problem which the Church (including both
the Bantu Congregational Church in Natal and the Witwatersrand
Congregational Church in the Transvaal) faces is conservatism.
Pastors and laymen alike are firmly settled in traditional patterns oflife
and work. This means that the pastor is primarily a mechanic who
keeps the wheels of the church machinery moving and who rarely asks
what the machine is for. The pastor is an organiser, collector of funds,
dispenser of sacraments, preacher and revivalist. The temptation for
him to conform to the stereotypes of the past is almost overwhelming;
and this temptation is enforced by a deep-seated legalism which is
accepted by most ministers and lay people. Add to conservatism and
legalism an omnipresent clericalism, and one has a powerful bulwark
of the status quO. 148
146 UHOA, UFSC, correspondence from Alien Myrick to Chester Marcus, 31 July 1969.
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In the same correspondence, Myrick referred to the upcoming 1967 union of
the London Mission Society (LMS), the Congregational Union of South Africa
(CUSA) and the Bantu Congregational Church (BCC) churches. Myrick described
the LMS as Botswana's state church, CUSA as dominated by a white minority and the
BCC as preoccupied with internal power struggles and provincial and ethnic (Zulu)
concerns only. Myrick's 1967 report to the UCBWM, elaborated on the Natal
churches' weaknesses. Predominantly white CUSA members had not formerly
worked on an equal basis and in partnership with Blacks. Furthermore, CUSA's
administrative and business practices were Eurocentric. This led to Africans being
marginalised from the leadership of the church. Myrick noted that three of the four
officers of the Natal Regional Council were Whites and the one Black who served as
Vice-Chairman had little influence. Furthermore, despite playing "lip-service" to
multi-racialism, the local churches remained segregated. 149 Prior to and during
Luthuli's meteoric rise to the heights of ANC leadership, none ofthe three uniting
churches poised itselfto play a prophetic role in Luthuli's struggle for liberation.
The failure of the Mission to rally to Luthuli's aid did not diminish his loyalty
to it. Yes, Luthuli was critical of the church's history, stances and impotency to deal
with that which diminished the African majority's humanity. But, he was not critical
of Christian, or Congregational, ideals to which the church more than imperfectly
adhered. Luthuli remained steadfast and devoted to those ideals despite the failure of
the church to realise them. Because ofthe church's failure to realise its ideals,
Luthuli responded to his own question, "Why should we use the weapon of politics?
It is because the vote is the key to freedom and peace". 150
First Ban
Soon after taking office, Luthuli acquainted himself with a constituency with
which he was in large part unfamiliar given his rapid rise to the apex of the ANC
leadership. In February 1953, Luthuli visited Alexandra township outside
Johannesburg where the Defiance Campaign was called off, Cape Town where he
149 UHOA, UFSC, "Report of the Acting Field Secretary, South African Mission, for the Year 1967 to
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Treason Trial records. Cited by:
PilJay, Voices ofLiberation, 1; 94.
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attended the Executive of the CCSA and to Port Elizabeth where he met with the
impressively organised Cape branch of the ANC. Luthuli returned home to Natal
briefly to address the 6th Annual Conference of the Natal Indian Congress in Durban
wherein he extolled those who participated in the Non-Violent Passive Resistance
Campaign and encouraged them to "KEEP MARCHING ON TO FREEDOM
WHATEVER THE COST AND SACRIFICE" (Luthuli's emphasis). 151 Luthuli then
travelled to the Free State to visit the ANC's branch to strengthen its weak stature
within the ANC structures.
On 30 May 1953, the government banned Luthuli for one year from attending
any political or public gatherings and prohibited him from entering any major city. 152
The legal basis for the ban fell under the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Criminal
Law Amendment Act. This ban was the first of four (1953, 1954, 1959 and 1964)
that hamstrung Luthuli's efforts to lead the ANC as President-General. Luthuli's ban
confined him to small population centres and to private meetings for the remainder of
1953. Under his first ban, Luthuli risked arrest for attending Sunday worship.
Refusing to ask permission to attend regular worship services that were open to the
'public', Luthuli only attended Holy Communion services on the rather dubious
assumption that as the minister serves Holy Communion only to communicants, those
services could be considered 'private'.
The end of 1953 closed with the ANC national conference from 18-20
December in Queenstown, a smaller city so that Luthuli and other banned Congress
leaders could stealthily attend. The Conference received Luthuli' s Presidential
address delivered by another wherein he revealed the motivation behind his
leadership:
This annual getting-together of ours may be a most un-welcomed event
among those Whites who mistakenly believe that denying us
opportunities for free association and free speech will stop us from
fighting for our rights and so ensure white domination over us. They
forget that the urge and yearning for freedom springs from a sense of
DIVINE DISCONTENT and so, having a divine origin, can never be
permanently humanly gagged and that human effort to artificially gag
it by means of harsh discriminatory laws and by threats must result in
151 UNISA, UL, UA, DCAF, SAlC, 105,7.1.8, Albert Luthuli's opening address "Let Us March
Together in Freedom", presented at the Sixth Annual Provincial Conference, Durban, 21-22 February
1953,5.
152 UHOA, "Mayibuye Afrika", 1993.
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suspicion, strains and tensions among individuals or groups in a nation,
as, unfortunately, is the state of things in our country, the Union of
South Africa (Luthuli's emphasis).153
Call for Non-Violent "Freedom Volunteers"
In March 1954, Luthuli attended the Natal Indian Congress in Durban and a
meeting of the Congresses' Joint Executive [ANC, the South African Indian Congress
(SAIC), the Congress of Democrats (COD) and the South African Coloured People's
Organisation (SACPO)] in Tongaat to organise the planning for the upcoming
Congress of the People. 154 Shortly after his ban expired at the end ofMay, Luthuli
travelled to Uitenhage where he addressed the annual conference of the Cape
Provincial Congress. 155 Immediately thereafter, Luthuli travelled to Johannesburg to
attend a "Resist Apartheid" conference. 156
During most of Luthuli's speaking engagements in the winter of 1954, he
called for the enrolment of 50,000 'Freedom Volunteers' in the spirit of the Defiance
Campaign. In a 05 September speech delivered on his behalf for the first Natal
Congress of the People held in Durban, Luthuli called for "a harmless army of non-
violent voluntary organisers and propagandists whose twin task is to be to interest and
enrol people for the Congress of the People meetings ... ,,157 The call for Freedom
Volunteers harkened back to Gandhi's call for Satyagrahis (those committed to using
non-violent means and soldiers of truth). Luthuli's speech emphasised two themes
this investigation highlights: theological motivations and non-violence.
153 Document 3a: "Presidential Address by Chief A. J. Lutuli" at the ANC Annual Conference of
December 18-20,1953.
Thomas Karis and Gwendolen Carter, eds. From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of
African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964, "Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964" (Stanford: Hoover
Institution, 1977), 3; 115-6.
154 23 March 1954.
"The Legacy ofInkosi Albert Luthuli", 13.
155 26 June 1954.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 127.
156 27 June 1954.
"The Legacy ofInkosi Albert Luthuli", 13.
Luthuli erred when he stated in his autobiography that following his visit to Port Elizabeth, he returned
to Durban to give an opening address in Durban at the Natal Indian Congress (144). IfLuthuli attended
a conference in Johannesburg a day after the conference in Port Elizabeth, then he had to travel directly
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Luthuli addressed this event in March 1954.
157 Albert Luthuli, "Let Us Speak Together of Freedom", Fighting Talk 10, no. 10, October 1954,4-5.
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This situation presents an inescapable challenge to religious leaders in
our country, especially Christian leaders who proclaim a God-inspired
message that all men are created in the image of God and so "Are born
equal", and that divine approbation, now or in the hereafter, will be
determined by the efforts one makes to help his less fortunate brother,
and not on his efforts at self-preservation and self-elevation...1t must,
however, enjoin our people in words, actions and attitudes to respect
the policy of non-violence wisely adopted by our Congresses. Non-
violent resistance in any provocative situation is our best instrument.
Our strongest weapon is to acquaint our people and the world with the
facts of our situation. 158
Second Ban
On 11 July 1954, less than a month and a half after Luthuli had campaigned
without restriction, the government imposed a second ban on him the moment he
stepped off the plane on his way to address a protest of the planned evictions of
Sophiatown. Luthuli's first ban at least allowed him to attend meetings in small
towns around South Africa. The second ban prevented Luthuli from attending public
gatherings and confined him to the Stanger magisterial area in the Lower Tugela
region for two years thereby allowing Luthuli to still operate effectively as the leader
of the ANC as long as private meetings were held there. Before returning home,
Luthuli watched the Sophiatown protest from a private home while his message was
delivered in absentia. 159 Luthuli again sounded his theological refrain:
Contrary to the plan and purpose of God our Creator, who "created all
men equal", and to us too, not to Whites only, He breathed the divine
spirit of human dignity ...Through gatherings like this in all centres, we
mean to mobilise our people to speak with this one voice and say to
white South Africa: WE HAVE NO DESIGNS TO ELBOW OUT OF
SOUTH AFRICA ANYONE, BUT EQUALLY WE HAVE NO
INTENTION WHATSOVER OF ABANDONING OUR DIVINE
RIGHT ACCORDING TO THE HOLY AND PERFECT PLAN OF
OUR CREATOR: APARTHEID CAN NEVER BE SUCH A PLAN
(Luthuli's emphasis).160
158 PilIay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 80.
159 Luthuli watched from 'Mabuza's' home.
UHOA, "Mayibuye Afrika", 1993.
160 Document 5: Message to "Resist Apartheid" Campaign, by Chief A. J. Lutuli, 11 July 1954.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 132-3.
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Luthuli's ban also prohibited his attendance at the annual national ANC conference at
the Bantu Social Centre in Durban from 16-19 December 1954. In his address, again
delivered in absentia, Luthuli expressed his pleasure that the World Council of
Churches (WCC) condemned Apartheid at their gathering in Evanston, Illinois.
Luthuli highlighted 1954 as a year that a good number of churches in the Union and
overseas, especially the Church of England, publicly decried Apartheid.
Clerical opinion is gradually allying itself with the aspirations of the
Africans. Special recognition was being taken of the uncompromising
rejection of the Bantu Education Act by the Roman Catholic Church
and the Authorities of the Diocese of Johannesburg under the
Rt. Rev. Ambrose Reeves. 161
Luthuli continued his address praising "that Great Christian Crusader, John CoIlins,
for his visit" and indicated that he lived the words of the Christian hymn "Let
Courage Rise with Danger". 162 In this speech, Luthuli debated with those Africans
who utilised defeatist arguments to dampen the mood of those fighting for liberation.
He contested conservative theological reasons for not prosecuting the struggle such as
'God in his own time will give us freedom without our exertion' and 'convert the
white man first by being moderate in your demands'. Luthuli responded that God
demands obedience, sacrifice and action.
They forget that God has long been waiting for African Freedom
Volunteers whom He could harness to the noble cause of bringing
freedom to all people in Africa. These false leaders would have the
African accept the shadow for the substance, thus rendering himself
guilty before God of having a perverted sense of values that exalts
expediency above principle and a mere mess of pottage - crumbs of
apartheid - above freedom, our basic God-given heritage. 163
161 Ilanga Lase Natal, "Luthuli 'Addresses' Congress Conference in Durban', 25 December ]954.
162 Document 7a: Presidential Address by Chief A. J. Lutuli at the ANC Annual Conference of
December 16-19, 1954.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 137-8. See also:
Canon L. John Coliins, "Challenge to the Churches", Sechaba 3, no. 1, January 1969, 14-5.
163 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 138.
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Stroke
In early 1955, Luthuli suffered a severe health condition that kept him in a
virtual comatose state. 164 Luthuli recalled his hospitalisation to have been at least two
months. In an interview, Albertinah Luthuli recalled the time her father fell ill.
...he wasn't accurate about putting the fork in the mouth. And then
my mother would say, "Houw! "What is the matter?" Missing the
mouth and then getting it in the mouth again. And over a few days,
and it, and then one morning, it just got worse.
The family phoned Dr. Mordeciah Gumede in Inanda. Gumede came and examined
Luthuli, confirming that he had a stroke.
And so, together, everybody now handled the thing, the issue of how to
get him to McCord Hospital quickly now...Dr. Taylor was the
superintendent of McCord Hospital for a long long time. He was at the
American Board Mission hospital, American Board Mission,
Congregational, of course. And he was a good friend of Baba. And
they were very close, actually. And they phoned Dr. Taylor, and told
him, "This is what we are faced with now". Then he was in a position
to use his influence to expedite things. So all of them worked together,
kn h· . ·bl 165you ow, to get lm III as soon as POSSl e...
At McCord, doctors again determined that Luthuli suffered a stroke, induced by high
blood pressure, and treated him. All was well, until Luthuli's condition deteriorated
again. Albertinah expressed that it was "very very sudden and frightening". She
explained that a specialist surgeon was summoned who diagnosed that Luthuli had a
coronary whilst recovering from the stroke.
In his autobiography, Luthuli drew attention to his illness and subsequent
"relapse", but recovered before the opening of the Congress of the People. 166 Despite
his stroke and two month hospitalisation, Luthuli drafted messages or at least
approved messages written in his name. A Foreign Service dispatch from the Pretoria
Embassy to the United States' State Department quoted messages from Luthuli
written in New Age (19 May) and Bantu World (28 May):
164 Drum, "Prayers for Luthuli", 19 March 1955.
165 Interview with Albertinah Luthuli, 06 January 2006, Luthuli Museum, Groutville, Kwadukuza.
166 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 151.
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Luthuli said that people from all corners of South Africa would
assemble in Johannesburg on June 25 and 26 to attend the great
Congress of the People. "This assembly will take place at a time when
the political situation in South Africa has never been so
critical"...Luthuli's message further stated, "The country is faced with
an impending fascist republic built on apartheid which has been
condemned the world over...This year we shall rededicate ourselves to
the struggle for freedom in that great assembly of the people where we
shall write a charter of freedom". 167
Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter
The Congress of the People took place at Kliptown, Johannesburg in June
1955 and it was at this event that the Congresses adopted the Freedom Charter. 168
The Congress of the People awarded Luthuli the Isitwalandwe (Wearer of Indwe
Feather) in absentia. 169 Trevor Huddleston, who wrote Naughtfor Your Comfort, and
YusufDadoo, head of the Indian National Congress, also received the award. The
selection ofa Black, White and Indian no doubt intended to convey a sense that the
struggle against white supremacy was a struggle best fought by a broad multiracial
alliance. The selection of Doctor Dadoo, who was a Communist, along with Father
Huddleston and ChiefLuthuli, also evinced a broad ideological alliance. Wilson
Conco opened the meeting as Chair and proclaimed that the new award will be made
"to individuals who have distinguished themselves in the struggle of the people of
South Africa". 170 Arthur Letele, the ANC's Treasurer-General, read a message to the
Congress of the People from Luthuli. 17l
167 Luthuli House, Johannesburg, Archives Division, "Foreign Service Dispatch No. 304 from the
Pretoria Embassy (Washington, D. C.) to the United States State Department", 02 June 1955.
The purpose of the dispatch was to paint the Congresses movement as "Communistic". The subject of
the dispatch read: "Communist Activities: 'Congress of the People"'. The dispatch asserted that the
ANC was "Communist-penetrated". The dispatch also acknowledged that the "general membership is
not Communist-inclined". Interestingly, the dispatch indicated that the Conference would be difficult
to hold successfully due to "Government counter-measures and to [the] recently-lowered prestige ofthe
ANC". The dispatch disclosed that the Conference could be banned, but the government would allow
its holding with the expectation that it would fail.
168 At the August 1953 Cape Provincial Congress, Prof. Z. K. Matthews proposed a national convention
by which all of the liberation movements might gather to discern the solutions to the country's
problems and to draft a document called a Freedom Charter that would envision a democratic South
Africa.
169 The Indwe bird is a 'rare' legendary bird whose feathers are only worn by the bravest warriors. The
term is ofXhosa origin.
170 McGrandle, Trevor Huddleston, 90.
171 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 188.
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Again, a historical review ofthe Freedom Charter need not be accomplished in
this investigation as the event is covered adequately in dozens of South African
history books. l72 Though the Freedom Charter was drafted during Luthuli's time as
President-General, though he participated the Congress' planning during the later half
of 1953 and though he advertised its drafting in May, he had little to do with its
compilation. 173 Luthuli did not even see the Freedom Charter in draft form and in fact
was not privy to reading it before ratification by the Congress of the People. 174 One
source stated the case quite bluntly:
After reading the document and realising the ANC, despite its
numerical superiority, had been subordinated to one vote in a five
member multiracial and trade union "Congress Alliance", Lutuli
rejected the Charter but then later accepted it partly to counter the more
radical Africanist wing whom he likened to black Nazis. 175
One can read into Luthuli's autobiography the above characterisation ofLuthuli's
disappointment with the Freedom Charter. In an effort not to appear too fractious,
Luthuli gently lamented the prose of the Charter, calling it "uneven", "vague", at
times unnecessarily pedantic and "open to criticism".176 Like a wise statesman,
Luthuli attributed the poor summation of the people's will to a lack of coordination,
administration and time management rather than to rifts within the Alliance. m If the
172 Dubow, The African National Congress, 45-58.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 56-69.
No author, Selected Writings on The Freedom Charter 1955-1985: A Sechaba Commemorative
Publication (London: African National Congress, 1985).
173 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3, 60. See endnote 190, 94.
174 In the days before the Congress of the People (22 June), only the ANC's Working Committee saw
the draft (including Sisulu, Mandela and Joe Matthews). On the day of the Congress (25 June), only
the ANC's National Executive (including Conco) reviewed the draft.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 60. See endnote 190,94.
175 Oxford University Press, "Luthuli, Albert John: Biography", 4. Found at:
www.answers.com/topic/albert-Iutuli. accessed 05 January 2008.
This reference to Luthuli's views on the Africanists should be read skeptically. Luthuli rarely, if ever,
used such incendiary comparisons or identifications.
176 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 151 and 153.
177 In her commentary to "An Inventory to the Microfilm Collection ofthe Albert J. Luthuli Papers",
Dorothy Woodson of the State University ofNew York at Buffalo stated, "For both political and
personal, the collection, although extensive, is not comprehensive. Notably absent are ...certain
correspondences between Luthuli and his intimate circle ofIieutenants from the African National
Congress ...This material relates to some of the more controversial clauses and recommended
amendments in the Freedom Charter before this document was passed at the 'Congress of the People'
on June 26,1955". The documents do exist. Conversations within the family intimate that the papers
were smuggled out at the request of the ANC, but taken to the United States without permission by the
husband ofone ofLuthuli's daughters and not necessarily returned to the ANC. Woodson continued,
"It is rumoured that the remainder of the Luthuli papers-that is, those documents not included on
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Communists or the trade unionist marginalised Luthuli as the leader of the ANC
during the drafting of the Freedom Charter, it would not be the only time that the
leader of the ANC did not have his hands on the levers of influence when a crucial
decision, such as the decision to launch MK, was made.
In October 1955, the Natal ANC gathered to discuss, decide upon and propose
redactions to the Charter before it was considered for ratification by the ANC's
annual conference in December. Luthuli and his colleagues prepared a careful
resolution from Natal to the national conference expressing, contrary to Ngubane's
published criticism ofthe ANC, "unreserved acceptance ofthe principles reflected in
all the main clauses of the Freedom Charter" and congratulations for its
formulation. 178 Nevertheless, the resolution also expressed concerns that merited the
Charter's reappraisal before the final document should be ratified. Luthuli exhibited a
tendency to solemnly request additional and careful deliberation of an issue when he
harboured grave concerns about a proposal. Luthuli and Natal "strongly urged
microfilm and which are currently in the possession of a private party here in the United States, will be
returned to Africa to a yet un-determined place". Woodson acknowledged that this private party and
the Luthuli Memorial Foundation allowed a portion of the papers to be filmed by the Cooperative
Africana Microfilm Project of the Center for Research Libraries (CAMP). At this time, where the
missing documents are is unknown.
VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, Introduction to "An Inventory to the Microfim Collection of
the Albert J. Luthuli Papers" by Dorothy Woodson, State University ofNew York at Buffalo, 1981, 1-
2.
178 UW, WCL, African National Congress (ANC), AD 2186, Ga93, Albert Luthuli, "A Reply to
Mr. Jordan Ngubane's Attacks on the African National Congress", 05 June 1956, 7.
Although Luthuli signed this document, 1 suspect that it was drafted for him prior to its redaction and
approval. The many caustic phrases and sarcastic style were highly uncharacteristic of Luthuli. For
example, "Mr. Ngubane [should] employ the services ofa more reliable detective agency",
"[Ngubane's] half-baked knowledge ..." border on insulting and this type of invective was rarely, if
ever, used by Luthuli (1 and 9, respectively). Notwithstanding these qualifications regarding style,
archival evidence confirmed the sentiments and rationale expressed in the retort to Ngubane are
Luthuli's.
VCT, MAD, LC, BCZA 78/46-7), Reel # I and continued on Reel #2 (CAMP MF 2914), notes in
English and Isizulu, "Inaccuracies in Ngubane Allegations", "Ngubane Reply", 1956.
My suspicions about a second writer are confirmed in a 08 June 1956 correspondence to Mary-Louise
Hooper. Luthuli confided, "Let me not give myselfall the credit for the reply to Jordan. We did it
with Nokukhanya went to visit him at his home. He is well".
UCT, MAD, LC, BCZA 78/46-7), Reel #1 (CAMP MF 2914), correspondence from Luthuli to
Mary-Louise Hooper, 08 June 1956,3.
Luthuli wrote a cordial and professional correspondence to Ngubane before his reply was published.
Luthuli's correspondence included many of the same phrases used in the published reply. Luthuli's
handwritten response addressed Ngubane's observations regarding the ANC, apprehension about the
Congress becoming Communistic and press criticism of the ANC. Luthuli's correspondence included
a consistent reiteration that his criticisms of the Freedom Charter voiced in the Natal ANC resolution
(of which he "shared fully in the drafting") did not imply that he disagreed with its overall ethos and
wording. Luthuli set the record straight when he stated that "[the Natal resolution] expresses my own
feeling, but the resolution does not indicate a fundamental difference [with the Charter]".
UCT, MAD, LC, BCZA 78/46-7), Reel #1 (CAMP MF 2914), correspondence from Luthuli to
Jordan Ngubane, 20 June 1956, 2.
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'careful scrutiny' and full discussion before final ratification". 179 Luthuli and Natal
criticised the section on equal rights for "national groups", for Luthuli sympathised
with the Africanist perspective (perhaps for different reasons) that racial groups
should not be emphasised. Luthuli felt that a united 'non-racial' rather than a
'multiracial' nation should be envisioned. In possible prescience of post-liberation
Black Economic Empowerment, Natal indicated that courts should simply be
impartial and not necessarily "representative" of all racial groups. Luthuli and Natal
expressed anxious unease with certain portions of the Charter that expressed "good
propaganda but...not appropriate in a factual document". 180 Natal's response to the
Charter further reflected Luthuli's critiques, namely, portions of it were too detailed
for a document ofu,l1iversal appeal. For example, the ANC Natal felt that references
to the length of the work week and various forms of assistance to farmers should be
excised. Finally, in a possible stab at the Communists, Natal, possibly influenced by
Luthuli's strong Protestant work ethic, stated that lazy persons should expect to go
hungry. Luthuli subtly indicated in his autobiography that the presence of outside
influences ("principles not previously a part of Congress policy"), and this study adds,
his disagreement with certain aspects of the Charter, necessitated the ANC's separate
adoption ofthe Charter.!8!
Despite all of these concerns about the Charter within the ANC, the ANC
working committee, Indians, sympathetic Whites in Johannesburg publicised and
promoted the Charter as if its ratification in December 1955 would be a foregone
conclusion. At a 19-20 November NEC meeting at Luthuli's home, Matthews felt
much angst because ANC members signed their names, thus endorsing the Charter
without ANC approval. The members usurped the ANC's role as the leader of the
liberation movement and bestowed it upon a consultative body.
The same dynamic is observed in 1961. Some viewed the ANC's decision to
initiate violence as a foregone conclusion after the Joint Congresses' decision to form
MK,just as some viewed the ANC's ratification of the Charter as a foregone
conclusion after its acceptance at the Congress of the People. In the formation of the
Freedom Charter and MK, preliminary stages of democratic consensus were met and
then prematurely implemented as de facto policy by members of the Congresses
179 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 66.
180 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 66.
181 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 154.
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movement primarily based in Johannesburg and thus circumventing the ANC's
procedures and its President-General, Luthuli.
Due to divisions concerning the Africanists' protests to the Charter, poor
planning, the confiscation of important documents by the police in September, a
controversial letter from Xuma and various accreditation disputes, the 17-18
December 1955 ANC conference in Bloemfontein postponed the decision to ratify the
Freedom Charter until a special meeting scheduled on 31 March - 01 April 1956 in
Orlando. At the December conference, Luthuli, through Matthews, delivered
Luthuli's "Special Presidential Message". Luthuli began by expressing his
appreciation to all for their support of him and his family during his illness.
I would be untrue to the deepest human feelings if I did not, on behalf
of my family and myself, commence my message by expressing our
deepest thanks to the Almighty for bringing about my miraculous
recovery. I would like to closely associate in these thanks to the
Almighty the staff at McCord Hospital who were willing and devoted
instruments in God's hands in bringing about this recovery. 182
During his address, Luthuli included what was from him a frequent Christocentric
mantra "No Cross, No Crown" when encouraging Africans to quickly accept the
"gospel of SERVICE AND SACRIFICE FOR THE GENERAL AND LARGE
GOOD WITHOUT EXPECTING A PERSONAL (AND AT THAT IMMEDIATE)
REWARD" (Luthuli's emphasis). 183 The conference did manage to re-elect Luthuli
to a second three year term as President-General of the ANC with Tambo as the
Secretary.
Still banned, Luthuli sent a "note" expressing his views in lieu of his presence
to the March-April meeting that met to discuss whether to ratify the Carter. Though
the note expressed agreement with the Charter in principle, Luthuli recommended that
the delegates "discuss very carefully such things as, for example, the principle of
nationalisation".184 Complete nationalisation would have been a vision of
Communists and trade unionists whose influence and support in the liberation
182 Document 13a: Albert Luthuli, "Special Presidential Address", ANC Annual Conference of
17-18 December 1955.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 210.
183 Document l3a: Albert Luthuli, "Special Presidential Address", ANC Annual Conference of
17-18 December 1955.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 213.
184 Luthuli, Let My People Go", 154.
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struggle Luthuli welcomed but to whose political ideology he did not subscribe.
Throughout his leadership of the ANC, Luthuli rebuffed those inside and outside the
ANC, such as Ngubane who wished to ostracise Communists. 185 Luthuli refused to
keep Communists at arm's length while simultaneously he remained wary ofany
inappropriate influence they may have exerted to forward their socio-political and
economic aspirations at the expense ofliberation, more specifically, liberation of the
black majority as represented by the ANC. 186 Luthuli felt confident in his ability to
contain the Communists within the movement. Quoting Kitchener in the British war
cabinet, Peter Hjul of the Liberal Party calculated that the Communists had to support
Luthuli "because of his immense popularity with the people". 187 Luthuli's warning to
the delegates at the ANC meeting to "discuss [the Charter] very fully" was compatible
with his democratic style of leadership.
Despite Luthuli's concerns with the Charter, the meeting eventually adopted it
without revision. Ultimately, Luthuli yielded to the decision thus overriding his own
objections. In his testimony directed to the defence at the Treason Trial, Luthuli
intimated, "Unfortunately, there was no adequate discussion of the economic clauses
of the Charter" as the Congress felt it necessary to close ranks against the Africanist
objections. 188 A similar dynamic and pattern ofleadership from Luthuli occurred in
1961 and 1962 when the ANC decided against his objections to form MK and launch
the armed struggle. Though Luthuli strenuously disagreed with a given position, he
yielded to a perceived consensus arrived at by a democratically arrived decision.
Congregationalism' s emphasis on individual land tenure made the 1913
Native Land Act (allocating 8% ofland to Blacks) an especially pernicious piece of
legislation for Luthuli. Though still banned in May 1956, Luthuli addressed through a
representative the Conference on the Group Areas Act convened by the Natal Indian
Congress. In his address to the conference, Luthuli lamented the long litany of
increasingly oppressive land legislation leading up to the Group Areas Act of 1950;
185 Drum, "Congress Has Something Up Its Sleeve!" by Jordan Ngubane, December 1955, 61.
186 Barbara Wahlberg, "Jordan Khush Ngubane: Journalist or Politician" (B. A, Honours diss., Faculty
of Arts, University ofNatal, Durban, November, 2002), 42.
UW, WCL, ANC, AD 2186, Ga93, Albert Luthuli, "A Reply to Mr. Jordan Ngubane's Attacks on the
African National Congress", 05 June 1956,5-11.
Drum, "How Red Is Congress?", by Albert Luthuli, January 1955,27-8.
187 UKZN, APA&SA, no reference provided, correspondence from Peter Hjul to Peter Brown,
19 May 1959, 1.
188 "Statement taken from Chief Albert Luthuli" for the defence in the Treason Trial. Cited by:
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he focused on the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act that promised more land to be
allocated to Africans (allocating 13% ofland to Blacks). Luthuli continued to argue
that the quality of land was pathetically poor, advocating that while the ANC stood
for a policy where South Africa belonged to all who lived in it:
It is most important and urgent that white South Africa, supporting as
it does territorial segregation, should make available to Africans land
sufficient to enable those of them living on the land to make a living
reasonably in accordance with civilised standards of life. 189
This argument reverted back to the purpose of the original Native Reserves and the
role the American Board missioners played in trying to ensure from the colonial
authorities that adequate land be designated for the indigenous population.
In July 1965, Luthuli's two year ban expired. Following his election as
President-General and after each expired ban, the National Party government
provided Luthuli a few months to reform his ways. Luthuli, with a sense of humour,
commented that he always "misbehaved". 190 In October 1956, he addressed the South
African Indian Congress in Johannesburg on the theme "A Spirit that Refuses to
Submit to Tyranny". 191 Luthuli, as he did with all his speeches, expounded on
spiritual concepts as much as he did political, his speeches doubled as homiletic
orations. Sensitive to his Indian audience that was primarily Hindu and Muslim,
Luthuli utilised phrases such as the "blessings and guidance of the Almighty", "Noble
Divine concepts of man", "Providence", "Divine heritage" and "our honour as created
being[s] of God". Luthuli alluded to Christian scriptures when he opined:
Rather lose all than those our souls and honour and so save ourselves
the shame of earning the disdain of our contemporaries and the
condemnation of posterity but worse suffer eternal damnation for
189 UNISA, UL, UA, DCAS, SAIC, 105, 7.6.9.2, Box 9, Paper by Albert Luthuli, "Some Aspects of the
Apartheid Union Land Laws and Policy as Affecting Africans", Conference on the Group Areas Act
Convened by the Natal Indian Congress, Durban, 05-06 May 1956,4-5.
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19-21 October 1956.
Also found at:
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indeed what will profit it to gain the whole world but to lose his own
SOUl?192
In mid-1956, Luthuli also addressed an inter-racial conference whose theme was "The
Struggle Must Go On, Bans or No Bans" and in December visited Swaziland with
Yengwa and Conco. Upon his return on 05 December 1956, the government arrested
Luthuli in Groutville on a charge of High Treason.
Treason Trial
Police arrested Luthuli at his home early on the morning of 05 December 1956
on the charge of "High Treason" under the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act.
After many papers were confiscated from his home, Luthuli was transported to
Durban and thereafter with Yengwa and others to Pretoria by a Dakota military
transport plane. Luthuli and dozens ofothers met at the Old Fort Prison in
Johannesburg. Good company comforted Luthuli a great deal during his first
experience in jail. What was to be known as the 'Treason Trial' brought together the
brightest and best of South Africa's liberation movement. A total of 156 were
arrested and accused, of whom 105 were African, 23 White, 21 Indian and 7
Coloured. Naicker, Nelson Mandela, WaIter Sisulu, Ben Turok, Zachariah and Joe
Matthews, Reggie September, Helen Joseph, Lilian Ngoyi, Ida Mntwana, Duma
Nokwe, Moses Kotane, Joe Slovo, Oliver Tambo and dozens of others stood accused.
Luthuli noted in his autobiography that among the Trialists were two Anglican priests:
Father Gawe and Father lames Calata. The authorities divided the prisoners into two
cells with one priest incarcerated with each group. Calata conducted worship services
on Sundays. Luthuli observed that the occasion was an all expense paid meeting of
the "Joint Executive of the Congresses" "who could at last confer sine die at any level
we liked" and Mandela almost gleefully called it "the largest and longest unbanned
meeting of the Congress Alliance in years". 193 Press accounts and cheering crowds
indicated that the Treason Trial became a new rallying point for the liberation
192 LM, MYP, Opening Address by Albert Luthuli to the 22nd Biennial Congress of the South African
Indian Congress Meeting, "A Spirit that Refuses to Submit to Tyranny", Gandhi Hall, Johannesburg,
19-21 October 1956,1-2,4.
193 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 160.
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography o/Nelson Mandela (London: Abacus,
1995),234.
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movement. After the acrimony with Ngubane and the Africanists, solidarity in the
midst of confrontation by the government must have been something of a relief for
Luthuli. Displaying again a sense of humour, Luthuli indicated in his autobiography
that he must give credit where credit was due:
I doubt whether we could have devised so effective a method ensuring
cohesion in resistance and of enlarging its embrace, as did the
h · h T· I· . 194government w en It set t e na III motIOn.
Despite the accussed's delight at being brought together, none failed to
comprehend the gravity of the situation. High Treason carried the death penalty. The
period covered by the charges was 0 I October 1952 to 13 December 1956. The
Defiance Campaign, Sophiatown removal and the Congress of the People were all
included. All the accused were released on bail for the duration of the trial.
The preparatory examination began on 19 December 1956. The result of this
stage determined if the case would be tried by the Supreme Court. On 21 December,
bail was set for all of the accused. 195 The Treason Trial Defence Fund started by
Bishop Ambrose Reeves, Alan Paton and Alex Hepple covered all the bail costs. The
preparatory examination continued on 09 January 1957 until 11 September 1957
during which time the Alexandria bus boycott occurred and rural unrest raged in
Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland and the Transkei.
During the Treason Trial, Luthuli's leadership style confronted the
government enough to be popular with black nationalists yet remained sufficiently
moderate to encourage crucial public support from Christian organisations that
provided much of the Trialists' financial and moral support. Among the visitors the
Trialists received in jail were Bishop Ambrose Reeves (Trevor Huddleston's
replacement), Rev. Arthur Blaxall and Dominee Du Toit. During the preparatory
trial, Luthuli fell ill and the court allowed him to be absent for a month. Reeves
offered Luthuli a spiritual retreat at St. Benedict's House in Rosettenville so as to
regain his health.
The ecclesiastic links are not immaterial. Reeves generated a great deal of
international sympathy for the liberation movements. Blaxall considered himself a
dear friend ofLuthuli; their relationship dated back to Luthuli's service on the
194 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 165.
195 E1inor Sisilu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002), 129.
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Christian Council and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Blaxall was one of the first
to personally congratulate Luthuli at his home following the announcement of his
winning the Nobel Prize. 196 Du Toit led the delegation to Madras, India in 1938.
When the issue of violence arose in 1961, the weight of all these Christian colleagues
who could not, for right or wrong, countenance violence collectively pressed on
Luthuli's conscience.
Luthuli's ability to establish close relationships solidified his influence in the
Congresses'movement. Those who interacted with Luthuli sensed a deep integrity
and became loyal to him. At the Treason Trial, Luthuli grew very close to Moses
Kotane, one-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party and a Treasurer of the
ANC, who many considered to be his closest political confidant. In a 1973 interview
with Sonya Bunting, Kotane himself indicated how close the two were:
It was during the Treason Trial that Chief and I started working
together. We were very cordial because we stood for national
liberation and our views coincided. He was very broad-minded and
never narrow. I was his confidant. At times he called me to explain
things to him because others had failed to convince him. 197
The archives identify Luthuli as the leader of the liberation movement and
bear testimony to his strength of character, intelligence and charismatic leadership
style. Luthuli 'held the reins' ofthe ANC and the Joint Congresses. During the
Treason Trial, many testified to the fact that those involved in the Struggle
undoubtedly viewed Luthuli to be the leader of the liberation movement. In an
interview in the early 1970s, Turok confirmed that Luthuli possessed the "charisma of
the popular leader". 198 During the Treason Trial, tensions were often high and those
196 Star, "Internationally Recognised: How Luthuli Heard News of the Nobel Prize Award", letter to
the editor by Rev. Arthur Blaxall, 1960.
Publication Unknown, "Innate Strength ofCharacter ofMr. Albert Lutuli", by Rev. Arthur Blaxall,
06 December 1961.
197 University ofthe Western Cape (UWe), Robben Island Mayibuye Archives (RIMA), Brian Bunting
Collection (MCH 07),8.2.2.1, interview with Moses Kotane done in Moscow by Sonja Bunting,
01 October 1973, page 2 of interview questionnaire and page 9 of interview transcript.
While I do not doubt Luthuli and Kotane's closeness, Luthuli's statement about being a Communist, if
ever said at all, must have been said in jest. Given their closeness, it is inconceivable that Kotane
would have ever realistically believed Luthuli would 'convert' to Communism given his many years of
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'religion"'.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 146.
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less secure tended to gravitate and follow those leaders who exhibited a sense of
purpose and optimism. Those in custody formed a committee of about twenty chaired
by Luthuli that organised and led various discussions in prison, lectures and seminars.
Turok explained that within the Congress structure, particularly within the Joint
Executives, "Chief Luthuli took the chair, and was the obvious leader". 199 During the
following years, as the inefficacy of the ANC's militant non-violent tactics against the
violent National Party regime proved apparent, Luthuli's influence waned
considerably and his capacity to lead diminished. After the banning of the ANC and
after the government's intransigent response to the May 1961 strike, one can question
if Luthuli possessed substantive influence on the strategic way forward.
During the adjournment of the Trial in December 1957, charges against sixty-
five of the accused were inexplicably dropped.2oo Among those acquitted were
Tambo and Luthuli. In August 1958, the Treason Trial proper began with ninety-one
of the remaining accused on tria1.201 After an adjournment and reconvening under a
revised indictment in January 1959, only thirty accused remained.202 Yet, throughout
the Trial until 29 March 1961, Luthuli often had to provide testimony and thus was
always indirectly on trial.
Assaulted
After the July 1956 expiry ofLuthuli's second ban, his arrest and release from
prison in December 1956 and his acquittal from the Treason Trial in December 1957,
Luthuli experienced a welcome reprieve from any restrictions on his movement or
company. On 15 April (Africa Day), large demonstrations occurred commemorating
the 1958 Accra Conference ofIndependent African States. On this day, Luthuli
addressed a large crowd in Durban that carried him shoulder high out of the venue.
Luthuli proceeded from Durban to Ladysmith where he addressed another dense
I feel that Bunting, in order to elevate Kotane's influence at the expense ofLuthuli and Matthews,
disingenuously adds that Luthuli and Matthews "assumed their leadership role almost as ofright. .." to
Turok's statement in an interview.
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gathering. Luthuli began to intentionally court white audiences. In April 1958,
Luthuli wrote an open letter to white voters inviting them to better understand the
aims and objectives of the ANC. The Congress of Democrats (COD) organised a
'Whites only' audience in Johannesburg "to enable Europeans to hear Chief Luthuli
speak,,?03 Luthuli entitled his speech "Our Vision Is a Democratic Society".204
Contained within this speech is arguably Luthuli's most prophetic statement:
But I personally believe that here in South Africa, with all our
diversities of colour and race, we will show the world a new pattern for
democracy. I think there is a challenge to us in South Africa to set a
new example to the world. Let us not side-step that task?05
Luthuli ended his speech on an eschatological note:
There is in the Bible a verse which says that all those who are cowards,
all those who grow apathetic because of the difficulties before them
and run away from the struggle - that they shall not be able to reach
that glorious place. It also says that the cowards be together with the
evildoers.206
Over three hundred people present expressed great appreciation for the views and
sentiments Luthuli put forward. 207 No doubt much to the chagrin of the Africanists,
Luthuli also accepted an invitation from the Transvaal Liberal Party to open its
conference and speak to more Whites who needed convincing at its conference.208
An incident infrequently recalled displayed Luthuli's example of non-violent and
interracial reconciliation despite violent provocation occurred in Pretoria at the
St. Alban's Hall on 22 August 1958.209 On this day, Luthuli addressed an interracial
gathering initiated by the predominately Afrikaner Pretoria Political Study Group.
203 UCT, MAD, LC, Thomton Collection (BC 930), ANC (AS), Albert Luthuli, "'Freedom Is the
Apex': Chief A. Luthuli Speaks to White South Africans", SA Congress of Democrats, Johannesburg,
1958, preface.
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Six Afrikaner men invaded and violently disturbed the forum. 2lD Diplomats, press
correspondents from abroad, social study workers from Britain, clergy and professors
and lecturers from two universities attended the event and witnessed the coordinated
melee.211 The hooligans beat and injured many people, including Luthuli. The
hooligans espoused that a "Kaffir" should not address Whites; for such to happen
insulted the Afrikaner people.212 An assailant knocked Luthuli offhis chair and
assaulted him. While Luthuli hid underneath the table, the defendant repeatedly
kicked him as he tried desperately to shield himself.213 Luthuli received numerous
blows to the face and could not eat for three days as a result ofthe injuries to his
jaw.214 The defendants also attacked the Secretary of the study group, Miss M.
Schoon. Schoon became injured as she was thrown from the stage, "turned a
cartwheel in the air and landed on the floor ofthe hall".215 Police finally arrived,
quelled the disturbance and arrested the interlopers. With others, the Chairperson
restrained Hendrik Claassens, the ringleader of the antagonists, and resumed the
meeting, "speaking with a bruise over his forehead and covered with dust".216
Luthuli intended to speak on the theme of racial reconciliation and a peaceful
South Africa. Though just brutally beaten, he delivered his prepared speech and
theme, unaltered. The Cape Times reported:
Speaking fluently from his notes in a school exercise book, Chief
Luthuli said that the Europeans had been sent to Africa by divine
purpose to help educate and civilise Blacks. The African was
however, becoming confused when he found his helpers were taking
advantage of him and exploiting him...The sands oftime are running
out and our amity might change to enmity - I pray God that it
doesn't".217
Also incorrect is an article about Peter Corbett and Charlotte Owen's 1993 documentary "Mayibuye
Afrika". The documentary and subsequent article cited Luthuli's autobiography.
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The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs strongly deplored the actions of
the men.2 18 The Public Attorney instructed that the six men be charged with public
violence and appear in the Pretoria Magistrate's and Regional Court. The men who
assaulted Luthuli were "found guilty and duly sentenced".219 The incident
underscored the degree to which Luthuli desired his life to be a demonstration of how
to resist injustice and of South Africa's bright possibilities. Luthuli's comments after
the incident as reported in the Cape Times also revealed his increasing frustration at
white supremacists for making his non-violent tactics increasingly questioned by
others in the liberation movement. Despite the beating, Luthuli reflected positively on
the violent incident, noting that he saw a glimmer of hope and encouragement
provided by the genuine support and willingness of Whites to listen to his message.
Though the times seemed desperate and even though assaulted, for Luthuli, the non-
violent road did not lead to a cul-de-sac.
Exclusive African Nationalism vs. Inclusive South African Nationalism
The year and half between Luthuli's acquittal and his third ban contained
some of the most tumultuous events in the ANC's history. The most notable event
was the breakaway of the ANC's nationalist camp to fonn the Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC). Disgruntled about a perceived Communist influence, the
prominence of multi-racialism in ANC tactics and the Freedom Charter as evidence of
both, the Africanists withdrew from the Transvaal ANC conference in Orlando and
fonned their own party on 04-06 April 1959.220 The members of the PAC elected
Robert Sobukwe and Potlako Leballo to lead as President and Secretary, respectively.
The Africanists' platfonn harkened back to the ANCYL catalysed 1949 Programme
of Action inspired by Nkrumah's nascent liberation tactics. Ghana's independence in
218 Star, "A Disgrace to South Africa", 30 August 1958.
219 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 209.
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1957 and the rapid succession of African countries obtaining independence from that
time fuelled the Africanists' passions for more radical stances to be taken by the
ANC. The PAC's pan-African ideology, symbolised by its own flag, a star's light
spreading to the rest of the continent from Ghana, enabled the new party to be
attractive to, for example, Ghana's Nkrumah and Tanzania's Nyerere. The
Africanists founded their ideology and tactics on the ANC's 1949 Programme of
Action. The PAC viewed the Freedom Charter to be a betrayal of the cause. Because
PAC members demonstrated, on the whole, impatience and militancy, many
characterised them to be less disciplined, more impassioned and more spontaneous.
More importantly, they wished to carry out the struggle for liberation without Whites,
Coloureds or Indians.
The 'Old Guard' of the ANC, epitomised by Luthuli and Matthews,
subscribed to what is termed 'South African exceptionalism,.221 'South African
exceptionalism' comprehended South Africa to be a unique African country because
it harboured settler, rather than administrative, colonialists. Settlers became grafted,
and thus inseparable, to South Africa. The liberation movement in South Africa could
not follow, or possibly could not even identify with, the rest ofthe African continent
whose colonial overlords would simply retreat to the metropole. The Freedom
Charter's opening words, " ... (t)hat South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black
and white" espoused this exceptionalism. Africanists deemed such a declaration
political heresy.222 Though Luthuli sympathised with certain aspects of the
Africanists' perspective, such as their emphasis on individual rights (non-racialism)
rather than multiracialism, concern over Communist influence and the need for radical
land reform, he could not sacrifice what he felt was of prime importance: racial unity
in the struggle against Apartheid.223
Luthuli as leader of the ANC did not see himself as an individual beacon by
which the destiny of the ANC would follow, he did not understand himself to be the
trailblazer from whose cult of personality the liberation movement would receive
221 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 32l.
222 Moris and Linnegar, Every Step a/the Way, 173.
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directives nor did he conceive of himself as one to marginalise opinions at variance
with his own so as to homogenise policy according to his perspective. Rather, Luthuli
conceived himself to be a linchpin holding the liberation movement together. He held
together modem and traditional, old and young, Black and White, conservative and
liberal, capitalist and Communist, educated and uneducated, atheist and Christian,
Muslim and Jew and rich and poor. Luthuli gauged the unity ofthe movement to be
of paramount importance. He often suppressed his own sentiments on strategic
issues, provided that suppression did not compromise fundamental aspirations of
complete liberation of South Africa's oppressed, so that the centre held. Luthuli
accepted the Freedom Charter despite qualms. He included the Africanist position,
provided it did not divide the movement. When the Africanists could simply no
longer be accommodated due to their highly aggressive and fractious natures,
Luthuli's response was to reluctantly let them go. After Sharpeville, the banning of
the PAC and the ANC in March 1960 forced both movements north into the
continent; they became competitors for independent countries' succour. The more
militant members of the ANC thus adopted aspects of the Africanist position (pan-
Africamsm, Blacks' control of the liberation movement and a willingness to utilise
violence).
The year 1958 ended with the 46th Annual Conference of the ANC held in
Durban from 13-14 December whereat the membership without opposition re-elected
Luthuli President-General for a third term with Oliver Tambo as Deputy President-
General and Nokwe as General-Secretary. In his presidential address, Luthuli did not
refer specifically to the Africanist breakaway but rather alluded to and confirmed the
ANC's policy of mobilising a "democratic majority" rather than a "racial majority" to
govern the country.224 Luthuli's speech emphasised the nature of 'civilisation' that
that he understood to be a synthesis of the best all cultures have to offer. Also, albeit
in a perfunctory manner, Luthuli reminded his audience of the non-violent methods of
struggle. Luthuli's 1958 speech primarily concentrated on his increasing optimism in
fair-minded Whites and their ability to join the struggle thus providing an impetus for
the overthrow of the National Party government. In 1959, Luthuli increasingly
articulated his belief that the white minority would ultimately surrender to
constructive pressure given their default rationality and malleability to moral
224 UCT, MAD, LC, BC 930, AS, Albert Luthuli, Presidential Address to the 46th Annual Conference
of the ANC, 13-14 December 1958, 7.
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persuaSIOn. Four times in his speech Luthuli expressed that "the manner in which
freedom lovers in the white community have come out openly and boldly to champion
the cause of making the Union a tme democracy for all ... " encouraged him.225
Bantustans
In January 1959, Prime Minister Verwoerd announced to parliament his plans
to initiate what were to become 'Bantustans' in the passage of the Promotion of Bantu
Self-Government Act (No. 46).226 This Act greatly reversed the natural and
progressive dying out of the institution of chieftainship that Luthuli welcomed.227
Though the aim of this investigation does not allow an in-depth exploration ofthe
progressive legislative development of the bantustan framework, a cursory and
elementary understanding of its evolution assists in explaining Luthuli's objection to
it based on his philosophical understanding of civilisation and political understanding
of democracy.
The National Party government designed territorial constmcts called
'bantustans' during the latter half of the 1950s, beginning with the 1956 Tomlinson
Commission, to achieve various economic, social and political objectives necessitated
by numerous contradictions arising from Apartheid ideology that was premised on
racial 'separation'. The Tomlinson Commission concluded:
There is no midway between the two poles of ultimate total integration
and ultimate separate development of the two [racial] groups ... [hence]
sustained development of the Bantu Areas on a large scale [was] the
. I . 228germma pomt.
The envisioned apex of a bantustan framework was the perceived, but not actual,
'independence' for black ethnic groups within designated 'homelands' with both the
ethnic groups and homelands being ideological constmcts. Apartheid engineered
white supremacy, that is, white economic, political, social and economic dominance.
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In a report submitted to the Natal People's Conference on 06 September 1959,
Luthuli lamented that the bantustan framework would throw offthe land 60% to 70%
ofthe peasants without providing them with any new sources of employment, re-
allocate land to peasant farmers with no prospect of a peasant making a gross income
of over £120 a year at the very most, render millions of Africans in white areas (towns
and farms) stateless and rightless, fraudulently put forward a so-called partition of
South Africa that nobody wanted and institute a system of tribal rule that made
African chiefs, contrary to tradition, autocrats and virtually nothing more than
instruments of their people's oppression. Luthuli questioned:
In honesty, can it be said that such a bantustan is in our interest? What
is morally wrong in principle cannot be right in practice! So all
Apartheid laws based as they are on the maxim: "Separate and
unequal" in favour of the Whites can never be in the interests of the
non-Whites.229
The 1959 Promotion ofBantu Self-Government Act prepared a legislative
path for the inauguration in Eshowe of Zululand's first Bantu Regional Authority
(Inkanyezi) in October 1959, a significant milestone in the building ofthe bantustan
framework. Immediately preceding this event, Luthuli published in earnest his grave
concerns. Luthuli wrote twenty-seven columns for the Johannesburg based Golden
City Post (the Post) during 1959. Six articles, all written in September and October,
dealt directly with his opposition to the creation ofbantustans. In a 20 September
1959 column, Luthuli quoted Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of the Abatembu in
the Transkei who had already reluctantly accepted the framework as saying, "Half-a-
loaf is better than no bread. Before, we had nothing. Now at least we have
something". Luthuli responded to Dalindyebo with a number of socio-economic
rebuttals posed as rhetorical questions. Luthuli vociferously opposed Chief
Dalindyebo's line of thinking. Luthuli concluded:
Much of our destiny as a people in a scientific age has been placed by
the white government in the hands of chiefs and their councillors. The
progress ofBantustans will not be judged on the afJluence ofa few;
chiefs, traders, civil servants andprofessional people who are hardly
229 LM, Albert Luthuli, "An Examination and Appraisal of the Political Import of the African Woman's
Demonstration in Natal", a report for the Natal People's Conference on 06 September 1959 in Durban
(Bantu Social Centre), drafted 31 August 1959, 4-5.
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12 percent ofthe people. What will matter more is the raising of the
general standard ofliving of the masses of the people to progressively
approach civilised standards ofliving (Luthuli's emphasis).23o
Throughout October 1959, a plethora of articles against the homelands scheme, such
as "Bantustans Plan Is Not for Us", "Another Dead End of Apartheid", '''Back-To-
Tribalism' Is Unrealistic", continued to be published; all of them reiterated Luthuli's
disgust for the framework.231 Luthuli's vitriol, uncharacteristic of his style,
articulated that the plan for separate development was fundamentally flawed and
exhibited the passion in which he opposed participation in the framework. Luthuli
clamoured:
AFRICANS SHOULD CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE
BANTUSTANS PROPOSALS BECAUSE: they purport to meet our
demand for direct participation in the government of the country by
some pseudo plan of self-government which is falsely acclaimed by the
government as conforming to the traditional form of government in
African society... (Luthuli's emphasis).232
Though Luthuli opposed the bantustan framework on economic, social and
political grounds, it is the theological grounds upon which Luthuli objected that can
not be underappreciated. In a correspondence to Lavinia Scott, Luthuli condemned
the government's lauding of tribalism. Luthuli did not shy from expressing that the
practice of tribalism was "unfortunately an embodiment of our traditional culture".
Luthuli acknowledged that traditional African culture had some basically good ethical
and moral concepts. However, Luthuli appraised that tribalism is in its fuller
manifestation to be, "in practice heathen" (Rich's and therefore Luthuli's
emphasis).233 Luthuli continued to write to Scott asking:
How then could those of us who so value the Christian way oflife and
would like to see AFRICANS and AFRICA become true heirs of the
230 BAPA, LP, Albert Luthuli, Golden City Post, "Answer These Posers, Bantustan Supporters",
20 September 1959,6.
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Christian heritage so that with the best in their culture they could be
enabled to make a noble contribution to true Christian civilisation not
resist to the utmost this diversion of the African to a dangerous secular
stream - heathenism? (Rich's and therefore Luthuli's emphasis)234
Courting Whites
Throughout 1958 and halfway into 1959, while parliament passed legislation
such as the euphemistically named Extension of University Education Act, Luthuli
remained openly active as the leader of the ANC. In keeping with the ANC's non-
violent methods, Luthuli pressed for economic boycotts to be implemented.
Demonstrating his militancy, Luthuli utilised vivid imagery to emphasise the impact
of non-violent methods, stating that economic boycotts would "punch them in the
stomach".235 For example, a campaign began in February that boycotted cigarettes
produced by Rembrandt, a company that supported the National Party.
In his autobiography, Luthuli indicated that during 1959 he "primarily" spoke
to white audiences.236 Luthuli confided that he only "managed to fit some profitable
Congress work as well".237 Prior to his banning, Cape Town received Luthuli
rapturously. Luthuli met with the Archbishop of Cape Town, 100st de Blank, former
Chief lustice Albert van de Sandt CentIivres and Senator Leslie Rubin.238 One
correspondent reported:
Luthuli 's recent visit to Cape Town... was an astonishing affair. He
stepped off the Orange Express at Cape Town station to be greeted by
cheering supporters waiting to garland him. His meeting in the Drill
Hall that evening was one of the biggest of its kind ever seen in the
Mother City. The next four days went past in a flurry: Press
conferences, a house party with liberals, clergymen, and prominent
citizens waiting to shake his hand, a private talk with Black Sash
women, an 'inspection' of the demonstration outside Parliament
against the university apartheid bilI.239
234 Rich, "Albert Luthuli", in Missions and Christianity, Bredekamp and Ross, 202. Rich cited:
American Board Mission A/2/13, correspondence from Luthuli to Scott, 06 July 1953.
235 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 292. See endnote 69,367. Karis and Carter cited:
"Report of the National Anti-Pass Council", signed by Duma Nokwe, Secretary General of the ANC,
submitted to the "Mass National Conference" of30 May 1959.
236 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 210.
237 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 210.
238 By 1959, Luthuli had written contact with Senator Rubin for many years.
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP (BCZA 78/46-47), CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to
Leslie Rubin, 24 May 1956, I.
239 Forum, "Ex-Chief Luthuli's Influence on White Opinion", July 1959, 12.
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One can not underestimate the tide of popularity Luthuli rode at this time. Multi-
racial crowds shouted and sang "Somlandela Luthuli!" ("We will follow Luthuli !").
"While Luthuli talked, nobody moved".24o The National Party regime observed that
Luthuli's moderate realism that mobilised Blacks as well as Whites, Coloureds and
Indians could be far more dangerous than Sobukwe's radical black nationalism. A
letter to the editor submitted to the Rand Daily Mail by Jack Lewsen conveyed the
degree to which Luthuli's non-threatening stance threatened the ruling government. 241
In banning ex-Chief Luthuli, there is no doubt that Minister Swart is
endeavouring to halt Luthuli's increasing anti-apartheid influence on
white political opinion in the Union. The level-headed and
unemotional attitudes of ex-Chief Luthuli have made a broad
impression upon Whites of all political affinities, and it is most
significant that the speeches and statements of new adherents of the
'intellectual rebellion' against the Nationalist (sic) Party's bantustan
policies have one feature in common, namely: unmasked contempt for
the ineffectual policies of the official white Opposition Party, coupled
with a faith and hope in the sanity of African opposition to Apartheid.
I know of no African exponent of racial justice and liberalism who is
better equipped than ex-Chief Luthuli in status and intellectual and
moral integrity to counter the appealing influences of rabid African
extremism. By removing the calm lawful political influence of ex-
Chief Luthuli, Minister Swart has done the greatest possible disservice
to white South Africans.242
This immense popularity outside the black community made Luthuli a viable
Head of State and the ANC a realistic ruling party just as thirty years later Mandela's
magnetism and moderate tone with progressive Whites enabled him to take the reins
of power without the need of a civil war.243 At the close of the 1950s in an
atmosphere bedevilled by fear and mistrust, only Luthuli captured the imagination and
harnessed the hope of many Whites and Blacks in South Africa by instilling
confidence and trust. Only Luthuli elicited substantial doses of white sympathy,
240 Drum, "Cape Town Goes Thumbs Up in a Terrific Welcome to Luthuli!", by Kenneth Mackenzie,
June 1959,25.
241 Jack Lewsen was an advocate, a former United Party member of the Johannesburg City Council and
member ofthe Liberal Party.
242 Forum, "Ex-Chief Luthuli's Influence on White Opinion", July 1959, 12-3.
243 Albert Luthuli, "IfI Were Prime Minister", in The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross: South African
Studies (London: Publicity and Information Bureau of the African National Congress, n.d.), 3: 73-82.
Extracted from an exclusive article published in Ebony, Chicago, February 1962.
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affection and even adoration. Luthuli explained why he intentionally sought to speak
to white audiences.
I felt encouraged by the responses of the Europeans whom I was able
to speak to. I think they came with more than curiosity in their minds.
They seemed to have a real sense of purpose, and a real desire to face
and to discuss the issues. Their ignorance was often disturbing - but I
must make this partial extenuation for them: it is more and more a
f'. d' 244government enlorce 19norance.
Where other younger black leaders saw a cul-de-sac in 1961, Luthuli observed
for himself a groundswell building for a free and fully-democratic South Africa, not
only within the black community, but perhaps more importantly for Luthuli, also
within the white liberal community and among Afrikaner intellectuals. Yes, the
National Party regime behaved belligerently and obstinately. But, a resolved liberal
white community could, in Luthuli's view, with a militant non-violent black majority,
constitutionally overwhelm the supporters of Apartheid. Yes, something was needed
to inspire and galvanise sympathetic Whites to choose democracy -like the Nobel
Peace Prize. Sadly, for Luthuli, that pivotal accolade catalysed very little of what he
thought to be possible. Mandela set off the bombs the day after Luthuli returned from
Oslo, creating little hope for any non-violent revolution for over thirty years.
Third Ban
On 25 May 1959, seventeen months since his acquittal, the government served
Luthuli his third banning order. Luthuli made good use of the hiatus before the ban.
Of course, Luthuli' s 'productive' use of his time led to the end ofthe reprieve. The
timing ofLuthuli's banning prevented him from being present at and opening a large
ANC conference in Johannesburg on 31 May. The government did not necessarily
serve the banning order to prevent Luthuli from travelling to ANC branches or
addressing Congresses' conferences. More importantly, the government served the
banning order because Luthuli persuaded Whites, and many of them. Luthuli's
extensive exposure to and his almost celebrity status among like-minded Whites in
South Africa, explains in part why Luthuli could not break with the policy of non-
244 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 209.
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violence as a war would inevitably destroy his aspiration of peaceful co-existence
between the races. Luthuli's colleagues such as Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu and other
prominent Blacks did not have the same mass exposure to Whites as he did. In
keeping with the progressively harsher nature of each succeeding ban, the 1959 ban
prevented Luthuli from attending any meeting anywhere in South Africa and confined
him to the Lower Tugela District for five years. 245 Many groups, especially the
Liberal Party and the COD protested Luthuli's harsh banning restrictions.246 During a
Congregational Members' Meeting, the Musgrave church resolved to issue a
statement that urged the Minister of Justice to reconsider Luthuli's ban. The
statement, published in the press, proclaimed that the government, and not Luthuli,
destroyed "civil rights and liberties of freedom of speech and conscience", the
"bulwarks of our civilisation". Furthermore, the Congregational church stated:
We believe that there is no more ardent or sincere upholder of the
Christian ideals of brotherly love and the dignity of man than Mr.
Luthuli.247
Luthuli spent the ten day interregnum, between his being served the ban on
25 May and 03 June when the geographical portion of it took effect, campaigning.
Luthuli set off for Johannesburg for the last time sometime on or after 28 May,
visiting Tambo, Congress members and, again, his "dear friend" the Bishop of
Johannesburg. On 01 June a protest meeting took place at Gandhi Hall in
Johannesburg to protest the banning of the ANC meeting scheduled the previous day.
Despite his being in the area, Luthuli could not attend the meeting and a
245 Star, "Luthuli Ban Will Not Be Lifted, Says Swart", 02 June 1959.
246 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Ban Protest to be Allowed", 05 June 1959.
Star, "To Protest about Luthuli Ban", 11 June 1959.
Rand Daily Mail, '''Luthuli Ban' Meeting", 17 June 1959.
UW, WCL, Congress of Democrats (COD), AD 2187, H 48, Press Statement issued by P. Beyleveld,
President of the South African Congress of Democrats, n.d.
UW, WCL, COD, AD 2187, H15, correspondence from Ben Turok to Luthuli, 12 June 1959.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/9/29/l, correspondence and attached "Resolution at a Public Meeting called by
the Liberal Party in Stanger on Wednesday, 24 June 1959" from Ebrahim Mahomed, Secretary of the
Liberal Party to C. R. Swart, Minister of Justice, 25 June 1959.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/9/29/1, "Report on Protest Meeting Banning ofChiefLuthuli and Other
Leaders", 25 June 1959.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/4/12/2, submission to The Star (unpublished, n.d.), Golden City Post
(2 submissions, n.d.) and Rand Daily Mail (17 June 1959), "Luthuli Ban Protest Meeting".
247 Publication unknown, "Luthuli Ban Criticised by Church", 08 June 1959.
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representative read his statement entitled "Freedom Costs Dearly". In it, Luthuli
reminded his followers:
The degree to which we ofthis age are prepared to sacrifice for this
freedom is the gauge of our earnestness and sincerity to secure it. It is
also the measure of our fitness for it.248
Luthuli then flew to Durban on 02 June and began his domestic exile the day before
the banning that confined him to GroutviIIe took effect.249
A month into his ban, on Freedom Day, 26 June 1959, Luthuli issued a
message calling for a boycott of potatoes to protest the use of 'slave labour' on South
African farms. 25o Luthuli and the ANC chose the boycott as a means of resisting
white supremacy with non-violent methods. As written in his autobiography's
postscript after August 1960, LuthuIi remained convinced of the moral and tactical
rightness of non-violent methods.
I make it clear that we mean to cling to methods such as this, to non-
violence, and we mean increasingly to use these weapons even against
such tyrants as South Africa's present government. This is not only a
question of morality. As long as our patience can hold out, we shall
not jeopardise the South Africa of tomorrow by precipitating violence
today.251
Lasting three months, the boycott protested pass laws that rendered thousands of men
confined to 'Farm Gaols'.
248 UW, WCL, ANC, AD2186, Ga84, Albert Luthuli, "Freedom Costs Dearly", handwritten draft,
28 May 1959 at the Groutville Mission, Natal.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 213.
249 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 293.
250 Star, "Luthuli Announces Start of Boycott", 26 June 1959.
Natal Witness, Luthuli Launches ANC's Anti-Nat Boycott", 26 June 1959.
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli and Fann Labour Troubled the Nats", 18 June 1959.
LM, Moses Mabhida, Acting President of the Natal ANC, "Statement on the Potato Boycott", reports
submitted to the Natal People's Conference on 06 September 1959, 8.
UKZN, APC&SA, no reference provided, correspondence from Peter Hjul to Peter Brown, 19 May
1959.
251 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 218. See also:
Times, "African's Call for Non-Violence", 26 August 1959, 7.
Ajoint press release from Luthuli (ANC) and Peter Brown (Liberal Party) to the Rand Daily Mail,
signed 20 February 1960 and released 01 March 1960.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/4/ll/3. Found also at LM.
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While banned to Groutville, Luthuli issued public statements following
disturbances in June arising from spontaneous women's demonstrations. Luthuli
denied that the ANC incited the disturbances and proclaimed its constructive role:
We have issued statements strongly advising people against violence.
Violence is not only contrary to our policy, but most inimical to our
liberation struggle.252
Luthuli remained quite active, through correspondence to Helen Joseph and others, by
assisting in the organisation of the commemoration of "the third anniversary of the
mass demonstration at the Union Building of South African women against the
issuing of passes to African women in August 1959".253 In fact, Luthuli brashly
claimed to the press, "Actually, I am more in touch with affairs than ever before,
probably because I have a lot more time for my correspondence".254 Prolific letter
writing facilitated much of Luthuli's work for the ANC.
The terms of his banning allowed Luthuli to receive visitors, as long as only
one visited at a time so as to not constitute a 'gathering'. In September 1959, the
American Ambassador visited Luthuli at his home. The visit of the Progressive
Party's leader, Jan Steytler, buoyed Luthuli's hope for a peaceful transition to a
democratic South Africa for it constituted a sign of a gradual white opposition to
Apartheid.255 The year ended with the December 1959 ANC Conference in Durban at
which Luthuli issued in absentia a presidential message to the movement. Luthuli
advocated that more training be instituted to discipline the rank and file for non-
violent action and warned against "reckless haste and impatience which would be
suicidal and might be playing into the hands of the Govemment".256 It was at this
252 Star, "Luthuli Denies A. N. C. Part in Disturbances", 25 August 1959.
253 UW, WCL, FSAW, AD 1137, Ae4.3, Cbl.5.3, Message by Albert Luthuli, "Women and the
Freedom Struggle", 09 August 1959.
UW, WCL, FSAW, AD 1137, Ae 4.3, correspondence from Helen Joseph to Albert Luthuli, 28 July
1959.
254 Rand Daily Mail, "Banished Chief Still in Touch with A. N. c.", 17 December 1959.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 215.
255 Steytler and others resigned from the United Party over its increasingly conservative stance that
made the Party, as Luthuli often noted, a mere caricature of the National Party.
256 Albert Luthuli, "The Presidential Address", 47th Annual ANC Conference, Durban,
12-13 December 1959. Found in:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 296. See endnote 81, 368.
This was the last annual conference the ANC was to have in South Africa for over thirty years.
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December conference that the ANC decided to coordinate an anti-pass campaign that
would begin on 31 March 1960.
Conclusion
This chapter chronicled Luthuli's life from 1926 until the end of 1959 wherein
Luthuli's ecclesiastic influences and associations instilled within him an appreciation
for western democracy, multiracial cooperation and non-violence that catapulted him
to the Presidency of the ANC. Luthuli's disappointing experiences with the Teachers'
and Cane Growers' associations, the NRC, his chieftaincy and others' participation in
the bantustan framework persuaded him that parochial (be they from Groutville or
Africa) efforts would be insufficient to overthrow white supremacy in South Africa.
Luthuli's experience with Congregationalists in the United States, Christian
missioners in the Natal Missionary Conference, Indians in the Defiance Campaign,
and white liberals during his 1959 trip to Cape Town convinced him that support
would be international, western, liberal and Christian in nature and that in order to
maintain and increase solidarity, the moral high ground must not be ceded by
implementing violence. Luthuli's leadership ensured that the ANC honoured its
inclusive and democratic ethos. For example, the ANC ratified the Freedom Charter
despite Luthuli's strong reservations. For the sake of unity, Luthuli yielded to the
organisation's democratic decision. This event foreshadowed LuthuIi's role in the
July 1961 decision to form MK.
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Chapter Three
I Place It on Record Here l
Controversy over the role that Luthuli played in the formulation of the
decision to set up the ANC's and SACP's armed wing, Umkhonto we
Sizwe ... , in 1961 had been going on for more than five years at the time of
Luthuli's death. -- Jabulani Sithole and Sibongiseni Mkhize2
Introduction
This chapter examines the various means by which Luthuli's position on violence
has been reversed and appropriated to serve the various agendas of nationalist leaders.
Luthuli initially expressed anger at MK's launch and thereafter did not speak in support
of it. Early accounts alleged that Luthuli was unaware of the decision to form or launch
MK. Mandela's 1994 autobiography changed this conception and later accounts (save
Buthelezi) repeat Mandela's 1994 version that Luthuli participated in and supported the
decision to form MK. Most importantly, this chapter discloses that the ANC only
claimed after his death that Luthuli supported the turn to violence. Thereafter, the ANC
selectively highlighted quotations from Luthuli's "The Road to Freedom" and Rivonia
statements to anachronistically suggest that he supported the turn to violence in 1961.
This chapter traces the evolution of myths concerning Luthuli that even extended to the
manner in which he died, for an accidental death signified his benign political existence
and a political assassination signified him as a threatening violent revolutionary.
1 Luthuli followed the advice ofhis lawyers and did not issue a prepared statement following his sentence
for burning his pass in 1960. He expressed doubt about the wisdom of his decision to not issue the
statement. Instead, Luthuli included the statement in his autobiography saying, "I place it on record here
and leave the reader to decide. Whether he applauds or derides, he will know how I feel".
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 242.
2 Jabulani Sithole and Sibongiseni Mkhize, "Truth or Lies? Selective Memories, Imagings and
Representations of Chief Albert John Luthuli in Recent Political Discourses", History and Theory 39,
(December 2000),72, see also footnote 13.
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Myth-Making in Nationalist Narratives
During South Africa's first fifteen years ofliberation and democracy, many of
those who fought to create the new country wrote autobiographies chronicling their and
others' roles in the struggle (Ahmed Kathrada, Nelson Mandela, Tsmail Meer,
Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils).3 Likewise, many wrote biographies to recount the
seminal role the 'founding fathers' played in the formation of 'a new example to the
world' (Anthony Sampson and Mary Benson on Mandela, Elinor Sisulu on Waiter Sisulu,
Benjamin Pogrund on Robert Sobukwe, Steve Clingman on Bram Fischer, Luli
Callinicos on Oliver Tambo, Piers McGrandle on Trevor Huddleston, Colleen Ryan on
Beyers Naud6, Willem Saayman on Z. K. Matthews and Steve Gish and John Allen on
Desmond TutU).4 There is no biography written about Albert Luthuli.5 No author has
3 Ahmed Kathrada, Memoirs (Cape Town: Zebra, 2004).
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom.
Ismail Meer, lsmail Meer: A Fortunate Man (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002).
Nelson Mandela wrote the forward, dated September 2001.
Joseph Slovo, Slovo: An Unfinished Autobiography (Randburg: Ravan, 1995).
Ronnie Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous: From Undercover Struggle to Freedom, rev. ed. (Johannesburg:
Jonathan Ball, 2004).
4 Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1999).
Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1994).
Sisulu, Waiter and Albertina Sisulu.
Nelson Mandela wrote the forward for this book.
Pogrund, Benjamin. How Can a Man Die Better: The Life ofRobert Sobukwe (Johannesburg: Jonathan
Ball, 1997).
Stephen Clingman, Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary (Cape Town: David Philip, 1998).
Callinicos, Oliver Tambo.
McGrandle, Trevor Huddleston.
Colleen Ryan, Beyers Naude: Pilgrimage ofFaith (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990).
Saayman, A Man with a Shadow: The Life and Times ofProfessor ZK Matthews.
Steven Gish, Desmond Tutu: A Biography (Westport: Greenwood, 2004).
John Allen, Rabble Rouser for Peace: An Authorised Biography ofDesmond Tutu (London: Rider Books,
2006).
5 Few historians have interpreted Luthuli's life. Though countless biographies have been written on other
South African liberation icons, incredibly no one has written Luthuli's. In addition to an archival silence, a
historiographical silence exists due to a lack of substantive historical writing on Luthuli. This study
references the following exceptions: Edward Callan's Albert John LlIthllli and the South African Conflict
and Mary Benson's ChiefAlbert LlItuli ofSouth Africa pre-date Luthuli's death and thus provided little
retrospective contextual analysis. Neither author posited substantive arguments regarding Luthuli's stance
on violence, though they both concluded he opposed its use (64-5, 51, respectively). Lyn Graybill's
Religion and Resistance provided excellent analysis and also generically agreed Luthuli was non-violent
but acknowledged he may have recognised the armed struggle elsewhere in Africa (37-8). This
comparative work of the African National Congress (Luthuli), Pan African Congress (Sobukwe), Black
Consciousness Movement (Biko) and United Democratic Front (Tutu) movements did not focus
specifically on Luthuli. Gerald Pillay's first volume of Voices ofLiberation, provided a brief biography
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heeded Nelson Mandela's 1991 call for a "definitive" biography ofAfrica's first Nobel
Peace Prize winner that would "be a useful addition to the sparse material" that existed
then and still is insufficient today.6 Despite the fact that Luthuli led the ANC from 1952
until his death in 1967 and thus directed the freedom movement through many of the
most dramatic chapters of South Africa's struggle for liberation that include the Defiance
Campaign (1952), the Treason Trial (1956-1961) and Sharpeville (1960), no author has
yet substantively chronicled his life story.?
History inspired by nationalism is a genre of literature predominant today that the
public finds accessible, in terms ofpurchase and comprehensibility. Hence, nationalist
inspired histories produce the bulk of the public's understanding of South Africa's past.
Usually, these nationalist histories are biographic in nature or are history texts sponsored
by a government instrumentality.8 Thula Simpson's dissertation provided this study with
examples of 'nationalist' biographic works when he stated:
The memoirs of Rusty Bernstein, Ahmed Kathrada, Nelson Mandela,
Govan Mbeki and loe Slovo all belong to the sub-genre of accounts from
the generation which initiated the ANC's move to armed struggle...They
and some commentary limited to contexualising Luthuli's speeches and statements yet generally affirmed
Luthuli's non-violent stand (150). There have been some short works on Luthuli within other texts; most
borrowed from or summarised Luthuli's autobiography. For example, Nadine Gordimer's "The Man Who
Burned His Pass", in Heroes ofOur Time, 85-94 and Alden Whitman's The Obituary Book, 121-4. These
brief texts lacked historical analysis and can not be considered biographies. Paul Rich's "Albert Luthuli" in
Missions and Christianity, Henry Bredekamp and Robert Ross, eds., is an excellent academic piece, but by
no means a biography and its subject matter is limited to missiology. Beatrice Roberts wrote Albert Luthuli
for secondary school learners by recycling Luthuli's autobiography Let My People Go. This study also
references and analyses contemporary historical writings and interviews included in audio-visual
documentaries featuring Sibusiso Ndebele, Jacob Zuma, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Billy Nair and
Kader Asmal who have been and are, for all intents and purposes, the primary interpreters ofLuthuli's life
in the context of the liberation struggle. These political icons repeatedly relate or imply that Luthuli
supported the turn to violence in audio-visual documentaries such as "The Legacy of a Legend: Chief
Albert J. M. Luthuli", produced by the National Film and Video Foundation and sponsored by the
Department of Arts and Culture, aired on SABC, 2005 and "A Commemorative Tribute to Chief Albert
Luthuli: 'Servant for the People"', produced by Rhubarb Post Productions and sponsored by the Office of
the Premier of Kwazulu-Natal, 27 February 2007.
6 Daily News, "Nelson Mandela Would Like to See Definitive Biography of Chief Luthuli",
14 October 1991.
7 Due to the neglect ofLuthuli, few in South Africa are familiar with him and his role in South Africa's
history. In 2004, SABC3 ran a very unscientific survey of who South Africans thought were the top 100
Great South Africans. Luthuli ranked 41 sI in importance behind Nkosi Johnson, Gary Player, Hansie
Cronje, Johnny Clegg, Leon Schuster and others. Obviously, the term "great" was heavily qualified.
http://www.answers.com/topic/sabc2-s-great-south-africans, accessed 16 October 2008,2.
8 Such as the Ministry of Education and the HSRC's Every Step ofthe Way, Morris and Linnegar.
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all made the argument... Reverence for the wisdom, heroism, self-
sacrifice, reconciliatory spirit and the prophetic vision of this senior
generation became crucial pillars of the new patriotism which the ANC
very consciously sought to cultivate... ,,9
In short, nationalist history, for right or for wrong, inaccurate or accurate, intentionally
puts forward a particular ideological or 'patriotic' view of history.
The predominant asseveration by the current and recently deceased South African
'political elite' is that Luthuli supported the ANC's decision to form MK, thus initiating
the armed struggle as one method of achieving liberation.] 0 This genre of literature
contrasts itself with many more scholarly contributions from Karis and Carter (1977),
Reinertsen (1985), Pillay (1993), Graybill (1995), Sithole and Mkhize (2000) and, most
recently, SADET (vol. 1,2004) that generally conclude Luthuli never came to support the
turn to violence. However, Simpson's text alludes that even the most academically
rigorous texts can be written with a nationalist bias. Commenting on the SADET work,
Simpson stated:
An interesting place in the historiography of the liberation struggle is
occupied by The Road to Democracy in South Africa project which was
inaugurated in 2001 by the then South African President Thabo Mbeki.
Mbeki identified two flaws with the existing state of historical writing on
South Africa. The first was the aforementioned general paucity of the
literature, and the second was the domination of the field by historians
whom he characterised as hostile to the objectives of the liberation
struggle. Mbeki called for "our struggle" to be written by "our historians"
and the project was designed to serve this objective. ll
Kader Asmal, Jacob Zuma, Nelson Mandela, Billy Nair and Sibusiso Ndebele are the
most prominent examples of those who avow that Luthuli decided upon and supported
9 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 8-9.
10 The Communist Party of South Africa initially considered Luthuli to be a part ofthe decision to initiate
armed resistance with other more traditional (non-violent political) methods of struggle. The Party's
understanding changed with Brian Bunting's biography on Kotane. Slovo is a good example of this
lingering line ofthought.
Sithole and Mkhize, "Truth or Lies", 72-3, see footnotes 12, 17, 18 and 21.
Sithole and Mkhize cited: "Chief Albert Luthuli: A Tribute to the Late President General of the African
National Congress", in South African Communists Speak (London: South African Communist Party, 1981),
360.
11 Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 10.
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the decision to initiate the anned struggle. Those who defend Luthuli's support of
violence as a tactic are often motivated by nationalism and its resultant inclination to
mould a cohesive, homogenous and sanitised natal history of a country celebrating its
first fifteen years of liberation and democracy. This position is supported by those who
serve or have served in positions of high political significance and who have a vested
interest in moulding a particular historical memory.
Linked to the understanding that Luthuli supported anned resistance is a mistaken
belief that the Apartheid regime assassinated him. The rationale behind the conviction is
that ifLuthuli fully supported the anned resistance and, in his role as President-General
of the ANC, acted as 'a', ifnot, 'the' Commander-in-Chief, then the Apartheid regime
was sufficiently motivated to orchestrate his death. This study proposes that because
Luthuli's banning, on the one hand, and marginalisation from the ANC due to his non-
support of the armed resistance, on the other hand, rendered him obsolete, the South
African government did not view him as a threat sufficient enough to orchestrate his
death. Contested are claims made without supportive evidence that the state murdered
Luthuli. The characterisation of Luthuli's death as "mysterious" and the insinuation that
his death involved foul-play are substantiated only by suspicions.
Bunting, Slovo and Benson's Claims
Sources such as Benson (1963), Karis and Carter (1977), Buthelezi (1982) written
prior to Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom (1995) alleged that Luthuli did not support the
fonnation of a violent movement that would in time prosecute the struggle against
Apartheid. 12 Some such as Bunting (1975), Benson (1986) and Slovo (1995) assert that
not only did Luthuli oppose the decision, but he was not privy to its making due to his
presumed opposition to it. 13 Sithole and Mkhize's essay "Truth or Lies" surveyed the
12 CaIlan, Albert John Luthuli, 51.
Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli ofSouth Africa, 64-5.
13 Slovo's biography, though dated 1995, was obviously written before his death on 06 January 1995.
Therefore, 1consider him a pre-1995 source. Mandela wrote the forward to Slovo's book on 18 September
1995 (that is, after he wrote his autobiography Long Walk to Freedom). Mandela and the editors ofSlovo's
autobiography respected Slovo's version of events despite the fact that Mandela's autobiography did not
agree with it.
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historiography surrounding Luthuli's knowledge of the decision to form MK and
compared how various political movements utilised and adapted memory to interpret to
their advantage the ambiguities of historical events. 14 Utilising Sithole and Mkhize's
literature survey as a template, this study identifies the historiographic 'turn' whereby
historical writings move from 'Luthuli' s ignorance of and opposition to MK's formation
and launch' to 'Luthuli's awareness and support ofMK's formation and launch'.
Information from Bunting's biography of Moses Kotane (1975) indicated that
Luthuli did not attend the ANC Executive meeting or the Congresses' Joint Executives
meeting that decided to form MK in July 1961.
In fact, the formation of Umkhonto and its initial sabotage activity created
an immediate problem in relation to the banned President-General of the
ANC,Chief Lutuli, who had only that year been awarded the Nobel Prize
for his services to peace. Lutuli was not involved in the discussions which
led to the formation of Umkhonto. For one thing, he was living under
restriction at Groutville and able to keep in touch with the ANC leadership
in the Transvaal only intermittently. For another, during the crucial
months of 1961 when the decision to set up Umkhonto was being
formulated, Lutuli was preoccupied with arrangements in connection with
his visit to Oslo to receive his Nobel award. A third factor was simply the
reluctance of the ANC leadership to engage in a discussion which might
result in a Presidential veto before it was necessary. IS
Bunting continued, indicating that Luthuli strongly suspected the involvement of ANC
members after the media reported the sabotage acts. Luthuli demanded an explanation.
The ANC headquarters delegated prominent ANC leaders, one after the other, to liaise.
No one satisfactorily explained the situation to Luthuli. Finally, Luthuli summoned
Kotane. In defiance of his banning order, Kotane travelled to Groutville to meet Luthuli.
The two huddled in a sugar cane field and clarified matters. According to Bunting,
Luthuli told Kotane that he would not advocate the use of violence to any member of the
Meer's biography of Mandela does not chronicle the July 1961 decision to form MK or Mandela's January
1962 "disconcerting conversation" with Luthuli following the launch ofMK. Meer only related in her
chronology that after the formation ofMK, "The President-General of the ANC, Chief Luthuli, remains
opposed to violence. He is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize a week before the first explosion".
Fatima Meer, Higher Than Hope: 'RoZihlahla We Love You ': Nelson Mandela 's Biography on His 70th
Birthday (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1988),323.
14 Sithole and Mkhize, "Truth or Lies?", 72-3.
15 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 268.
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ANC. Yet, Luthuli confided that he would not forbid or condemn the acts of sabotage for
it was the ultimately the government's fault. Nonetheless, Bunting related that Luthuli
felt the question of sabotage should have been discussed by the ANC through the "usual
channels", and said: "When my son decides to sleep with a girl, he does not ask for my
permission, but just does it. It is only afterwards, when the girl is pregnant and the
parents make a case, that he brings his troubles home".16
All three explanations given by Bunting for Luthuli's ignorance of the decision to
form MK are very problematic. 17 First, as chapter five narrates in detail, the July 1961
meeting in which the ANC and the Congresses Alliance decided to form MK occurred
near Groutville, in Stanger, so Luthuli's restriction in the Lower Tugela region did not
prohibit these clandestine meetings in which many of the ANC's Transvaal based
leadership participated. Second, the announcement that Luthuli won the 1960 Nobel
Peace Prize did not occur until October 1961. For this reason, Luthuli' s preoccupation
with arrangements to travel to Norway did not prohibit his presence at or knowledge of
the July meetings. Third, given the democratic ethos of the ANC and Luthuli, "a
Presidential veto" did not exist. Mandela and others expected opposition from Luthuli
who possessed great influence, but he had no veto power over a democratic decision.
Only by reason and moral authority could Luthuli persuade the ANC and the Congresses
not to form MK. Therefore, concerning Luthuli's participation in the decision to form
MK, Kotane's testimony through Bunting is inaccurate.
Slovo also contended that Luthuli did not know of the decision to form MK.
Slovo wrote in his autobiography:
Indeed, that grand old man of the ANC, Chief Albert Luthuli, whose
presidential leadership had made immeasurable contribution to the radical
struggle of the 1950s, was not a party to the decision, nor was he ever to
endorse it. It was a measure of his greatness that despite his deep
Christian conviction to non-violence, he never forbade or condemned the
16 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 269.
17 How Bunting, whose source is assumed to be Kotane, concluded incorrectly that Luthuli did not know
the ANC discussed the "question of sabotage" is a mystery. In chapter five, I explain that it was not "the
question of sabotage [that] should have been discussed through usual channels", that distressed Luthuli but
rather he felt MK's launch and launch date should have been discussed through usual channels.
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new path, blaming it on the regime's intransigence rather than on those
who created MK. 18
In her biography of Mandela (1986), Benson provided no detail as to how the
ANC and the Congresses decided to form MK. Hence, Benson did not address whether
Luthuli knew of or participated in the decision to form MK. 19 Nevertheless, informed by
Masabalala Yengwa, Benson implied that Luthuli was unaware of the policy decision to
form and the tactical decision to launch MK.20
...Lutuli raised the question which had long troubled him: Umkhonto's
announcement in December 1961 that the policy of non-violence had
ended. Aware of Mandela's role, Lutuli criticised the failure to consult
[him] and the ANC 'grassroots'. He felt they had been compromised.
Although apologetic, Mandela said he thought that, tactically, the action
had been correct. Besides, they had wanted to protect Lutuli and the ANC
from involvement in the drastic change in policy.21
But, as chapter five highlights, Yengwa's unpublished autobiographical manuscript
indicated that as a result of Luthuli's banning order, the ANC called the full National
Executive Committee together in secret at his magisterial district so that he could
attend.22 Hence, Benson's understanding ofLuthuli's ignorance was also not accurate.
In contrast to Bunting, Slovo and Benson's texts, Elinor Sisulu's book Waiter and
Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime reported Luthuli's involvement in and knowledge of the
decision to form MK.23 Yet, in agreement with the above texts, Sisulu's text affirmed
Luthuli's ignorance of and embarrassment by the timing of MK's launch:
18 Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography, 147.
19 Benson, Nelson Mandela, 106.
20 Benson did not cite a source.
21 Benson, Nelson Mandela, 116.
Yengwa's rendition of the meeting, through Benson, differs from Mandela's version presented in his
autobiography in timing and content. First, chapter six conveys that Benson chronologically placed this
meeting and conversation after Mandela's trip to North Africa (prior to his arrest in Howick) rather than
immediately before he departed in January 1962. Second, Mandela's discussion with Luthuli following his
tour of Africa did not focus on the issue of violence but rather the degree to which newly independent
African countries identified and sympathised with the ANC's cooperation with non-Blacks.
22 LM, MYP, Masabalala Yengwa's unpublished autobiographical manuscript, 106.
23 Sisulu, Waiter and Albertina Sisulu, 146.
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At a meeting to review the launch of MK, Chief Albert Luthuli was clearly
embarrassed about the timing [of the launch] and unhappy about the
apparent recklessness that led to the casualties.24
All texts called into question that Luthuli had foreknowledge of the anned struggle's
activation and launch date.
A consensus existed that Luthuli refrained from speaking-out against the very
policy adopted by the same organisation he led as President-General as a consequence of
his banning, the lack of efficacious alternative strategies, his obedience to decisions borne
out ofthe ANC's consensus-seeking polity and his unwillingness to legally jeopardise
colleagues. Luthuli's son (Christian Boyi Luthuli), Ronald Harrison, Z. K. Matthews and
Gerald Pillay also articulated this perspective.
Buthelezi's Claims
A resolute proponent of Luthuli's unwavering support of non-violence is
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party (lFP) and fonner
Chief Minister ofKwazulu. Buthelezi is not the only political figure to utilise Luthuli's
name and prestige to buttress his power and influence; though he perhaps has the longest
and most extensive record of such a practice?5 In 1974, Buthelezi delivered a speech in
honour of Luthuli who was given the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Award
posthumously. In his speech, Buthelezi made it clear that he viewed Luthuli as his
mentor. Buthelezi thus staked a claim to be Luthuli's protege. To justify his own
declared non-violent opposition to Apartheid, Buthelezi asserted that Luthuli's "guiding
light was to achieve his ideals through non-violent methods".26 Buthelezi accepted the
24 Sisulu, WaIter and Albertina Sisulu, 147.
A bomb detonated prematurely, critically wounding Ben Ramotse and killing Petrus Molefe.
25 Buthelezi often utilised Luthuli's memory as a means to empower himself. Buthelezi, in using Luthuli's
name, sought to disempower those with whom he was politically competitive. Despite the above, the
possible opportunistic motivations for using Luthuli do not necessarily invalidate the perspective that
Buthelezi had regarding Luthuli's stance on violence.
26 LM, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "The Awarding ofthe O. A. U. Merit Award Posthumously to the Late
Chief Albert Mvumbi Luthuli: President General of the Banned African National Congress: To be
Presented on Behalfof the O. A. U. by His Majesty King Moshoeshoe Il", Maseru, 10 December 1974,3.
The event celebrated the tenth anniversary of the OAU's founding.
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'South African exceptionalist' paradigm that deemed appropriate, due to South Africa's
unique context, only non-violent strategies for overcoming colonialism and white
supremacy. In contrast to the 'illegal' ANC, Inkatha could legally pursue a "composite
strategy" involving a number of "non-violent methods in the struggle that goes on for
human rights in South Africa".27 Buthelezi conceded that many considered Luthuli's
non-violent methods to be naIve and his approach to work non-violently to be obsolete.28
Buthelezi claimed that methods of violence would only compel Whites into a laager
invoking a backlash that would "only retard the struggle or complicate it" and that
"Chief Luthuli's non-violence" is the "only way in which we can contribute toward the
avoidance of some catastrophe".29
In remarks made in 1976 on the occasion of the Luthuli Memorial Foundational
Meeting in Swaziland, Buthelezi chronicled his ANC credentials and mentioned his
undying devotion to Luthuli.30 Buthelezi acknowledged that different people employed
different means in different contexts and confessed that it could not yet be determined
whether violent or non-violent means would be more effective. Buthelezi questioned
how the late Luthuli would view the violent manner by which some prosecuted the
struggle. Buthelezi boasted that he advocated only non-violent methods just as Luthuli
did before him. Buthelezi emphasised the danger and risk inherent in a military strategy,
warning:
Since our cause is a just one, we do not need to act in such a rash manner
as to play into the hands of those whose fingers are itching to make us
cannon fodder, in order to prolong their pernicious system, and control
over US.31
LM, correspondence from T. E. Ntlhakana, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of
Lesotho, to Nokukhanya Luthuli, 17 December 1974.
27 LM, Buthelezi, "The Awarding ofthe O. A. U. Merit Award, 5.
28 LM, Buthelezi, "The Awarding ofthe O. A. U. Merit Award, 3.
29 LM, Buthelezi, "The Awarding ofthe O. A. U. Merit Award, 9.
30 "Nothing could separate me from Chief Luthuli, during his lifetime. Nothing could separate me from
him and his ideals, not even death".
LM, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Remarks Made on the Occasion of the Luthuli Memorial Foundational
Meeting in Swaziland", 05 June I976, I.
31 LM, Buthelezi, "Remarks Made on the Occasion ofthe Luthuli Memorial Foundational Meeting in
Swaziland", 13.
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In a vitriolic speech at the Groutville school grounds on Sunday, 29 August 1982,
Buthelezi utilised Luthuli's stature as a 'strategic pacifist' to make many subtle, and some
not so subtle, broadsides against the ANC in exile.32 Buthelezi accused the ANC in exile
ofnot being worthy to inherit the leadership of the liberation struggle on behalfof the
South African people due to its deviation from Luthuli's (and the ANC's historic) policy
of non-violence. Buthelezi stated that no matter the dire circumstances "Luthuli found no
reason to abandon the things ofvalue".33 Buthelezi attempted to clarify the confusing
stance advocated then and now by the ANC leadership regarding Luthuli's support of
non-violence tactics by explaining that he "was a great man who stood firm when others
wavered".34 Buthelezi harangued the ANC leadership for breaking away from Luthuli's
non-violent stance and for pursuing an unrealistic and almost suicidal violent strategy.
In the great tradition in which Chief Luthuli was a participant is where we
must take the struggle another stage forward. This is not to leap off the
precipice of reality, and pretend to each other that we could win the
struggle only with the crook of our finger around the trigger of a gun.
Many misguided patriots will die on the gallows, or injail, because they
think they can put our meagre resources against the might of the South
African army and the cunning of the Security Police. We dare not go
hunting for lions and elephants in dark forests bare-handed. We dare not
leap off the precipice of reality. For the sake of everything we hold dear,
we must be realists and pursue achievable goals. Chief Albert Luthuli had
that realism in his politics ... By no stretch of anyone's imagination can we
conclude that ChiefLuthuli's wish was that we cease to seek peaceful
solutions after his death. Nowhere do I find his life as the terminating
point in his thinking for peaceful solutions. He was prepared to suffer all
32 Dr. Albertinah Luthuli (Luthuli's daughter) was very upset at Buthelezi for his use of her father to
forward his own political agenda against the ANC and even accused Buthelezi of abusing his relationship
with the Luthuli family to manipulate her mother (Nokukhanya) into allowing Buthelezi to commandeer
this and other memorial services. In response to this address, Albertinah issued a press statement in
Zimbabwe indicating that "she did not take kindly to Buthelezi's criticism of the ANC leadership".
Sithole and Mkhize, 'Truth or Lies?", 78, footnotes 44, 45 and 46.
Sithole and Mkhize cited: Ilanga, 2-4 September 1982; Star, 16 December 1982; G. Mare and
G. Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha Politics ofLoyal Resistance (Johannesburg:
Ravan, 1988),41; Smith, Buthele=i, 258.
33 LM, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesbve Kgare Ya Tokoloho Ya Setjaba: National
Cultural Liberation Movement", address presented by Buthelezi, Chief Minister ofKwazulu, at the
Groutville Mission school grounds during "a prayer meeting to commemorate the last leader of the banned
African National Congress who was democratically elected before the organisation was banned - Chief
Albert Mvumbi Lutuli President-General of the African National Congress and Nobel Peace Prize-winner",
Sunday, 29 August 1982,6.
34 LM, Buthelezi, "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesbve Kgare Ya Tokoloho Ya Setjaba", 7.
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things and would have chosen death itself rather than abandon his
. 35commItments.
In this speech, Buthelezi implied that the mantle of political leadership passed from
Luthuli to him. Buthelezi asserted that the political baton was the policy of non-violence.
Buthelezi contended the ANC in exile had dropped the baton. In 1982, Buthelezi
maintained that to fight within the borders of South Africa, as did Luthuli, was the more
noble strategy and within South Africa non-violent methods were most effective in
destroying Apartheid. Buthelezi called the ANC in exile "political scavengers" who used
the names of liberation heroes, such as Luthuli, to divide the liberation forces. Just as the
ANC claimed those who advocated non-violence "fann[ed] divisions" within the
liberation forces, so Buthelezi claimed that those who advocated violence caused
division. Like Luthuli, Buthelezi argued that the violent strategy pursued by the ANC
was unrealistic, if not suicidal. Buthelezi railed:
But the question we should address is whether this is the moment for us to
clutch the AK-rifle and abandon the olive branch and the plough-share,
even if we felt for argument's sake that we should now abandon
ChiefLuthuli's non-violent strategy today. I must say categorically that
from a pragmatic point of view, that option as a feasible alternative, is not
yet open to US.36
Buthelezi boasted that he followed in Luthuli's footsteps by building domestic
constituencies such as Inkatha, though neglecting to mention that the government banned
the ANC while sanctioning Inkatha. In his 1982 speech, Buthelezi directly refuted ANC
claims:
There are those of us who would have us believe that by [the time Luthuli
wrote his autobiography], the ANC was already working on a strategy of
violence behind closed doors. I think it is fitting, as we remember
Chief Luthuli[,] to note that his life was spent in opposition to violence.
He as much as anyone else resisted the militancy of those who broke away
eventually to form the PAC. There is in his whole career no hint of a
35 LM, Buthelezi, "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesi=lve Kgare fa Tokoloho fa Setjaba", 12 and 14.
36 LM, Buthelezi, "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesi=lve Kgare fa Tokoloho fa Setjaba", 25.
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switch to violence, and in his whole life no indication that he espoused
violent means toward political ends. 37
Two years later in a 1984 interview, Oscar Dhlomo, Secretary-General of Inkatha
also claimed that the ANC in exile "abdicated control over liberation strategies in South
Africa" when they decided to wage guerrilla warfare outside its borders.38 That same
year, Dhlomo criticised the ANC by saying that though Luthuli approved of Tambo and
other ANC members going into exile, he never had "any intention that the external
mission would eventually develop into a completely autonomous movement that would
be free to decide on any liberatory (sic) strategies". Luthuli intended the external mission
to lobby international support for political and economic (non-violent) methods to fight
Apartheid. Buthelezi chimed that the external mission deviated from the principles of
Luthuli by "opt[ing] for violence".39 Buthelezi also implied that the external mission
intended to isolate the President-General after the award of his Nobel Prize.40 Chapter
six presents evidence that LuthuIi's continued advocacy for non-violence into
April 1962 embarrassed the Congresses' Joint Executives sufficiently to mandate that he
be spoken to and quieted. Ultimately, the government, more so than the Joint
Congresses, muzzled Luthuli. The 1962 Sabotage Act sufficiently stifled his persistent
pleas for non-violent solutions by prohibiting any newspaper from quoting him.
Well into the dawn of the democratic era, Buthelezi hoisted high Luthuli's non-
violent banner, though simultaneously threatening civil war if Inkatha or the Kwazulu
government felt marginalised or if the future South African government's central
government was strengthened at the expense of regional 'federal' government. At a 1991
prayer meeting, ostensibly for "peace and progress in negotiations", Buthelezi itemised
the reasons why he and the Zulu 'nation' he represented should have full representation
37 LM, Buthelezi, "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesbve Kgare Ya Tokoloho Ya Setjaba", 18.
38 Carton, Laband and Sithole, Zulu Identities, 336, see endnote 34 on page 339. Sitole cited:
Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power, 137.
39 Carton, Laband and Sithole, Zulu Identities, 336-7, see endnotes 35 and 36 on page 339. Sithole cited:
Oscar Dhlomo, "Inkatha and the ANC", Leadership South Africa 3, no. 1, 1984,47.
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Interview with Murray", Leadership South Africa 4, no. 4, 1985,26.
40 Carton, Laband and Sithole, Zulu Identities, 337, see endnote 37 on page 339. Sithole cited:
Wessel de Kock, Usuthu! Cry Peace!: Inkatha and the Fightfor a Just South Africa (Cape Town: Open
Hand, 1986),72.
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in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). In the spirit of Luthuli,
Buthelezi boasted:
I have championed the cause of non-violence and the politics of
negotiation for the whole of my political life. Since the 1970s, I have been
calling for a negotiated settlement of South Africa's problems and I have
argued strongly that South Africans were quite capable of ending
apartheid themselves and establishing a fair and just democracy .. .I
rejected the armed struggle as unnecessary and I rejected the punitive
isolation of South Africa because I knew that black opposition to apartheid
here on the ground would in the end succeed. I rejected the notion that
only violence could end apartheid.41
ANC's Claims
Thus far, no documentary archival evidence has been found that indicates Luthuli
ever supported the initiation of violence against the Apartheid regime. Not until after
Luthuli died in July 1967, did an ANC document claim that Luthuli supported the
decision to initiate violence. From April 1962 to his death in July 1967, Luthuli
abstained from voicing his position on the armed movement and advocated non-violent
methods, such as sanctions, to an international audience. Only when death irrevocably
silenced Luthuli did the ANC claim that he supported the liberation movement's armed
struggle.
On 21 July 1967 Albert Luthuli's death was announced to the world. In a tribute
to Luthuli, the ANC, in good propagandist style, waxed eloquent about Luthuli's militant
credentials. In doing so, the ANC quoted Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
speech: "Ours is a continent in revolution against oppression...There can be no peace
until the forces of oppression are overthrown" and in 1967 retroactively interpreted it as
Luthuli's support ofviolence despite the fact the award and his acceptance speech
advocated the opposite for the South African context. The ANC then provided a further
tribute to Luthuli's support of violence with the following notably defensive argument:
41 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister ofKwazulu at a 'Prayer
Rally for Peace and Progress in Negotiations"', Umlazi, 15 December 1991.
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ChiefLuthuli is irrevocably linked with the African National Congress
and the revolutionary movement of the people of South Africa. The
period of his leadership of our organisation saw the change over from
reliance of solely non-violent forms of struggle to a need for a
combination of both legal and illegal clandestine forms of struggle
following the ban on the African National Congress in April 1960. This
new period was emphasised by a decision to prepare for armed
confrontation of the enemy and the setting up of the armed wing of our
revolutionary movement - Umkhonto we Sizwe. The enemies of our
revolutionary struggle who were bent on fanning divisions inside the ranks
of the ANC whilst at the same time making futile attempts to isolate
ChiefLuthuli from the main stream of the revolutionary movement, came
forth with allegations that Chief Luthuli never approved the change-over
from emphasis on non-violent struggle to the present phase. This was
strongly refuted by Chief himself when he made a statement following the
passing of prison sentences on our leaders at the conclusion of the Rivonia
Trial in 1964...There are those amongst us who, whilst claiming to have
been permanently inspired by ChiefLuthuli's qualities ofleadership are,
however, working against the policies of the organisation he led until his
last breath. These are people who from within the ranks of the oppressed
population are counselling against the use of revolutionary violence with
the plea that those who advocate this form of struggle are leading the
people to catastrophic suicide.42
After Luthuli's death, the ANC earnestly attempted to dispel that for which the
world remembered Luthuli: his advocacy of non-violence and his receipt of the Nobel
Peace Prize. In the ANC bulletin Mayibuye, T. Makiwane sought to clarify the record.
It is true that Chief Luthuli was an advocate of non-violence. He was a
champion of a multiracial society in South Africa. But Chief Luthuli
never believed in non-violence at all costs in the struggle.43
Makiwane then, like the ANC tribute to Luthuli after his death, quoted Luthuli's 1964
Rivonia statement as evidence of Luthuli's turn to violence; however, as this chapter later
discloses, the Rivonia statement is not evidence of Luthuli's agreement with violent
tactics. Mayibuye's statement substantiated how after Luthuli's death the ANC created
the impression that Luthuli supported the turn to violence by obscuring his views on
42 University of Fort Hare (UFH), Howard Pim Africana Library (HPAL), ANC Archives (ANe), Oliver
Tambo Papers (A2561), Folder C 39, "July 21", original typed manuscript.
43 T. Makiwane, "Somlandela uLuthuli", Mayibuye 2, No. 29,19 July 1968,4-5.
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violence. What Makiwane stated is true and yet untrue. Luthuli felt violence for the
purposes of self-defence whether individual or corporate could be morally and
strategically justified. Luthuli was not a pacifist. In the context of South Africa's fight
for liberation from white supremacy, Luthuli never advocated or supported the use of
violence.
The Sechaba Statement
The ANC claimed and continues to claim that Luthuli supported the move to
initiate violence. In many documents emanating from the ANC over the years, the same
refrain is heard:
There is a wrong and unfortunate impression that Chief Lutuli was a
pacifist, or some kind of apostle of non-violence. This impression is
incorrect and misleading. The policy of non-violence was formulated and
adopted by the national conferences of the African National Congress
before he was elected President-General of the organisation. The policy
was adopted in 1951 specifically for the conduct of the "National
Campaign for Defiance of Unjust Laws" in 1952. What is correct,
however, is that as a man ofprinciple and as a leader of unquestionable
integrity, Chief Lutuli defended the policy entrusted to him by his
organisation and saw to it that it was implemented. When that policy was
officially and constitutionally changed, he did not falter. 44
In their article "Truth or Lies", Sithole and Mkhize articulated many profound
points regarding the historiography about Luthuli. For example, Sithole and Mkhize
dismissed a simple dichotomy between "truth or lies" concerning the ANC's claim that
Luthuli supported the initiation of violence. Quotations from the ANC reveal the thesis
was correct. In general, the ANC and its members do not categorically, or explicitly,
state that Luthuli supported the use of violence. Rather, in general, the ANC through
subterfuge and silence strongly implies Luthuli supported the initiation of violence. In
doing so, the ANC can be accused of stating (half) truths to convey (not tell) a lie. For
example, as chapter four reveals, because Luthuli would not and did not condemn the use
44 UCT, MAD, LC, lack and Ray Simons Papers (BC1081 / P28), no author cited, "Chief Albert John
Mvumbi Luthuli, Isitwalandwe, 1898-1967", Sechaba 1, no. 8, August 1967, insert supplement.
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ofviolence, the ANC can claim "Luthuli did not falter [to accept the changed policy]".
Luthuli refusal to condemn the changed policy does not justify the assertion that he
consequently agreed with the policy and subsequently supported it. Such an assertion
obfuscates the actual contestation within the ANC and its partners and between Luthuli
and Mandela in 1961 and avoids a critical assessment of the turn to violence.
Sechaba, the official organ of the ANC of South Africa, printed the above
statement within a special supplement dedicated to Luthuli following his death. It was
subsequently published verbatim in an issue of Spotlight on South Africa. 45 It was again
published verbatim in the book Lutuli Speaks: Statements and Addresses by ChiefAlbert
Lutuli ofthe African National Congress and again in a publication entitled The Road to
Freedom Is Via the Cross, published as the third volume of South African Studies. 46 The
same apology can still be found verbatim on the current ANC internet websites.47
By disregarding Luthuli's theological foundation, commentators and historians
risk distorting the 'faith-based' motivations behind his political principles and decisions.
Luthuli did not subscribe to the ANC as his god or hold himself seminally accountable to
the ANC. ANC nationalist interpreters of Luthuli's life erroneously understand Luthuli
to have been political before being spiritual. For Luthuli, the opposite held true. In his
autobiography, Luthuli declared that which took priority in his life when he professed, "I
am in Congress precisely because I am a Christian".48 Furthermore, Luthuli revealed,
"My ambitions are, I think, modest - they scarcely go beyond the desire to serve God and
my neighbour, both at full stretch".49
45 VCT, MAD, LC, BC1081 / P28, no author cited, "In Memory of Chief Albert Luthuli", Spotlight on
South Africa 5, no. 30, special issue, 05 August 1967, 3.
46 VCT, MAD, LC, BCl 081 / P28.1, ANC South African Studies, Lutuli Speaks: Statements and Addresses
by ChiefAlbert Lutuli, President ofthe African National Congress ofSouth Africa, n.d., 6.
Also known as Lutuli Speaks: Portrait ofChiefLutuli.
VCT, MAD, LC, BCl 081 / P28.1, "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross", South African Studies 3, n.d.,
5.
47 ANC, Introduction to "The Lutuli Page", www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/lutuli/. accessed
26 January 2008.
Ethekwini Online, "Chief Albert Luthuli", by Khaya Ka Buthelezi. Found at:
www.ethekwini.gov.za/durban/discover-durban/our durban/history/famous durbanites/politics/luthuli,
accessed 14 March 2008.
48 This quote is attributed to Luthuli in the inside jacket covers of the 1961 Collins and April 1987 Fontana
Paperbacks (thirteenth impression) editions of Let My People Go.
49 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 24.
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As chapter one indicates, Luthuli's 1948 speech at Howard University establishes
that Gandhi substantively influenced Luthuli. Similar to Gandhi, Luthuli achieved the
status of a hallowed icon whose perspective on the use of violence proved inconveniently
problematic to the ANC. A post-1967 re-interpretation of Gandhi exposes the ANC's
failure to acknowledge his philosophical and theological foundations and thus
misinterpreted his thought. In a Sechaba article entitled "From Gandhi to Mandela",
written to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Natal Indian Congress, the ANC
prefaced its historical apology asserting that. ..
.. .It is not necessary for our purposes to examine Gandhi's philosophical
views which derived largely from his religious beliefs. The main field of
Gandhi's activity lay in politics. And it is here that the role of the
Mahatma is to be sought.50
In addition to neglecting the theological motivations, writers of nationalist history
also selectively quoted Gandhi and Luthuli to explain away contradictions between their
non-violent stances and the ANC's support ofviolence. The ANC selected quotations
from Luthuli and Gandhi to justify its position on violence, even if they made the
opposite point. This occurred when Luthuli and Gandhi, on the spur of the moment,
utilised hyperbole to emphasise a point. Commentators quoted the hyperboles and
interpreted them literally, thereby missing the points.
Luthuli admired and emulated Gandhi's utilisation of strict non-violent methods.
Their similar perspectives embarrassed the ANC when it decided to utilise violence. In
defence of itself, the ANC desperately and acrobatically interpreted that Gandhi did not
view violence as an inviolable principle despite the fact that he resorted to "extremely
abstruse reasoning" to advocate non-violence "to the masses in the face of an enemy
determined to rule by force".51 To provide evidence that Gandhi could support the use of
violence, Sechaba selectively quoted a small portion of his 1938 "Declaration on the
Question on the Use of Violence in Defence of Rights" wherein he postulated:
50 "From Gandhi to Mandela: In commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the formation of the Natal
Indian Congress by Mahatma Gandhi", Sechaba 3, no. 5, 05 May 1969, 10-2. Also found in:
de Bragan9a and Wallerstein, The National Liberation Reader, 2: 43-7.
51 de Bragan9a and Wallerstein, The National Liberation Reader, 2: 45.
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Where the choice is set between cowardice and violence I would advise
violence. I praise and extol the serene courage of dying without killing.
Yet, I desire that those who have not this courage should rather cultivate
the art of killing and being killed, than to basely avoid danger. This is
because he who runs away commits mental violence; he has not the
courage of facing death by killing. I would a thousand times prefer
violence than the emasculation of a whole race. I prefer to use arms in
defence of honour rather than remain the vile witness of dishonour.52
Sechaba asserted that even Gandhi, the imperialists' hallowed 'prophet of non-
violence', "concede[d] that violence was preferable to cowardice and dishonour". In
searching for an ethical loophole to justify its own turn to violent methods, the ANC
mistook hyperbole for reality, interpreted it literally and thus missed Gandhi's
fundamental point that was antithetical to its own made in Sechaba. Gandhi statement,
"Where the choice is set between cowardice and violence I would advise violence"
conjured a self-imposed ultimatum whereby one is forced to choose between two, and
only, two choices. Gandhi, in this hypothetical world, chose violence because cowardice
and dishonour would "emasculate a whole race" by committing "mental violence".
Gandhi's argument continued and maintained, and this is the central point missed by
Sechaba's commentator, "I praise and extol the serene courage of dying without killing".
In other words, Gandhi stated that those who die in the struggle without killing are the
ones who are truly and perfectly courageous! Gandhi saw a third option and was not
locked in his hypothetical bilateral world of those who are cowards and those who are
violent. In fact, Gandhi implied that those who resort to killing behave cowardly as
compared to those who fight non-violently when he says, "Yet I desire that those who
have not this courage [to die without killing] should rather cultivate the art of killing and
being killed". For Gandhi, the 'to be praised and extolled' option is to courageously
struggle and to die without killing. By misinterpreting Gandhi's hyperbole, the
Sechaba's commentator concluded that the armed struggle in South Africa does not
contradict Gandhi's views, for he stated that he preferred violence to cowardice.
52 "From Gandhi to Mandela", Sechaba 3, no. 5, 05 May 1969, 10-2. Sechaba cited:
Mahatma Gandhi, "Declaration on Question of the Use ofViolence in Defence ofRights", Guardian,
16 December 1938.
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However, in reality, Gandhi preferred courageous non-violence.53 Most revere Gandhi
and Luthuli as 'freedom fighters' who advocated strategic pacifism to achieve political
objectives. The ANC interpreted Gandhi's view on violence in a similar manner that it
interpreted Luthuli's. The ANC engaged in creative hermeneutics in order to both
honour and contradict Gandhi and Luthuli.
In their contemporary historical analysis of Luthuli, elite political icons have
mistaken Luthuli's seemingly positive general references to the use of violence and
interpreted them in the same manner that Sechaba interpreted Gandhi's reference to
violence. Luthuli's speeches contain hundreds of quotations advocating 'strategic
pacifism' that are strikingly similar to Gandhi's. Likewise, commentaries similar to
Sechaba's by ANC leaders have argued from anecdotal conversations that Luthuli
justified exceptions (loopholes) to his advocacy for 'strategic pacifism' in the South
African context and hence reasoned that he advocated the opposite of that for which he
stood.
The potential danger of inaccurately interpreting hyperbole can be observed in
Luthuli's as well as Gandhi's statements. For example, in 1953, Drum magazine printed
a quote that would make any Africanist, now or then, quiver with discomfort. In
justifying the common cause and need for cooperation between Blacks and Indians,
Luthuli snapped:
Since we welcome the sympathy and support of all races in the rest of the
world, it would be absurd and contradictory to reject Indians in our own
country. I myself would rather see the African people utterly destroyed
than see them turn against the Indians.54
Here, Luthuli, like Gandhi, conjured a bilateral hypothetical situation so as to emphasise
a primary point. For Luthuli, marginalising the Indians within the context of the struggle
53 Jonathan Wallace, "Nonviolence", Ethical Spectacle, June 2001, 1-8. Found at:
www.spectacle.org/0601/nonviolence.html. accessed 26 May 2008.
M. K. Gandhi, "Between Cowardice and Violence", from The Mind ofMahatma Gandhi, 1-3. Found at:
www.mkgandhi.org/nonviolence/phiI8.htm. accessed 26 May 2008.
54 "In His Office, and on Durban's Esplanade, the President of the Congress Gives His Views to DRUM, in
This Important Interview", Drum, May 1953 (International June). Also found in:
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 14.
Jurgen Schadeberg, ed. Nelson Mandela and the Rise ofthe ANC (Parklands: Jonathan Ball, 1990),56-7.
178
would be unthinkable. Luthuli's central point could not be, 'I would rather see the
African people utterly destroyed'. Because many could, and likely did, misinterpret the
above hyperbole, Drum printed a retraction at Luthuli 's request. In the July 1953 edition,
Luthuli changed the above statement to:
Since we welcome the sympathy and support of all races in the rest of the
world, it would be absurd and contradictory to reject Indians in our own
country. I therefore would oppose most strenuously any African who
acted tyrannically and discriminately against other racial groups, including
Indians.55
Gandhi stated he preferred violence to cowardice. Not being a pacifist, Luthuli
also preferred violence to cowardice. Yet, those perspectives, in and of themselves, do
not support a thesis that Gandhi or Luthuli supported violence within the South African
context. Luthuli and Gandhi did not consider those who fought utilising non-violent
means to be cowards. While accepting his Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway for his stance on
utilising non-violent methods, Luthuli reasoned that as a Christian he could not "look on"
while "systematic attempts [were] made" to:
... debase the God-factor in man or set a limit beyond which the human
being in his black form might not strive to serve his Creator to the best of
his ability".56
In other words, potentially, violence is preferable to being a coward for by doing nothing
in the face of oppression, one participates in one's own dishonour because one negates
one's own God-given potential. Luthuli, like Gandhi, spoke of two types of cowards:
one, apathetic and indifferent (loathed by both Gandhi and Luthuli) and the other, those
who have not enough courage to resist oppression non-violently. Luthuli described the
consequences of being indifferent and craven in a 1958 speech (quoted in chapter one):
55 "Interview with Luthuli", Drum, July 1953,45.
56 Albert Luthuli, "Africa and Freedom", lecture delivered in Oslo, Norway on 11 December 1961 upon
receiving the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize.
Asmal, Chidester and James, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 22.
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There is in the Bible a verse which says that all those who are cowards, all
those who grow apathetic because of the difficulties before them and run
away from the struggle - that they shall not be able to reach that glorious
place. It also says that the cowards will be together with all the
evildoers.57
Mandela's Claim
This chapter utilises secondary sources to trace the constructed contemporary
understanding that Luthuli supported the turn to violence. Initially, many harmonious
'independent' sources of information related to Luthuli's stance on the ANC's decision to
form MK seem to exist. Also, on cursory examination, many current, independent and
popular portrayals ofLuthuli's resignation to, ifnot support of, violence seem to exist.
However, upon closer study and reflection, only one primary source indicated that
Luthuli supported MK's formation when the Joint Congresses made the decision. The
source was fonner President Nelson Mandela's autobiography Long Walk to Freedom
that stated Luthuli participated and ultimately supported the decision to create an
organisation that would utilise violence, albeit reluctantly and as a result of much
persuasion. Mandela wrote:
Before leaving [for the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central
and Southern Africa in Addis Ababa in February 1962], I secretly drove to
Groutville to confer with the Chief. Our meeting - at a safe house in town
- was disconcerting. As I have related, the Chief was present at the
creation of MK [Umkhonto we Sizwe], and was as informed as any
member of the National Executive Committee about its development. But
the Chief was not well and his memory was not what it had once been. He
chastised me for not consulting with him about the formation ofMK. I
attempted to remind the Chief of the discussions that we had in Durban
about taking up violence, but he did not recall them. This is in large part
why the story has gained currency that Chief Luthuli was not informed
about the creation ofMK and was deeply opposed to the ANC taking up
violence. Nothing could be farther from the truth.58
57 Albert Luthuli, "Our Vision Is a Democratic Society", speech delivered in 1958 to a meeting organised
by the South African Congress of Democrats in Johannesburg.
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 29.
58 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 287-8.
180
Mandela's text is seminal to current nationalists' historical memory ofLuthuli's
stance on violence for it stands as a pivot between two divergent understandings of
Luthuli's involvement to support the formation and/or launch of MK. After comparing
those texts that predate Mandela's autobiography with those that postdate it, one finds
two different historical memories. Texts written prior to Mandela's account
(Benson/1963, Bunting/1975, Karis and Carter/1977, Benson/1986, Buthelezi/1986 and
Slovo/1995) cast much doubt about Luthuli's awareness of the decisions and/or whether
he supported the decisions to resort to violence. Those texts written following Mandela's
book provide accounts that affirm Luthuli's awareness and support the decisions to form
MK (Meer/2005, Kathradal2004, Sisulu/2005, Callinicos/2004 and Sampson/1999). The
sheer weight of Mandela's saintly popularity and the millions of copies ofhis
autobiography read globally explains how such a relatively recent text superseded the
many previous accounts ofLuthuli's role in the formation of MK. The global brand that
is Mandela ensured his version of events became the orthodox view.
Texts written after Mandela's autobiography cite Long Walk to Freedom
extensively and/or can be cross-referenced with his text so as to identify it as an original
source. Most, if not all, other sources accept, comply with or otherwise cite Mandela's
recollections. For example, while Ismail Meer's biography does not cite Mandela's
autobiography, Mandela wrote the forward. Thus, it is logical to surmise that Meer's
version would corroborate Mandela's.59 And it does. Likewise, Sampson's book on
Mandela, prominently entitled, Mandela: The Authorised Biography would unlikely
deviate from Mandela's autobiography, thus attaining its "authorised" status. And it does
not.
As Kathrada wisely stated in his Memoirs (and cited as a quotation introducing
chapter five), " ... it should be borne in mind that even people involved in the same event
remember the details differently, and amnesia is no friend of accuracy". The problem is
that a vast majority of the post-Long Walk to Freedom biographical and autobiographical
authors funnel (or, cross-reference) their accounts of the ANC's decision to form MK
through Mandela's textual gauntlet. In Mandela one finds an original source, the
nationalists' historiographic 'Adam'. To understand the dynamics at work when an
59 This 'logical' assumption may be a fallacy, as Mandela also wrote the forward to Slovo's autobiography.
181
emerging nation 'creates' its history, secondary sources must be analysed, interpreted and
then compared with primary source evidence. The concluding evaluation of secondary
sources must recognise the profound impact that an icon such as Mandela and his
corresponding recollection of events has on the formation of South African history. Any
accuracy, or more importantly, inaccuracy, in Mandela's account multiplies exponentially
as biographies and autobiographies reference Mandela's version. Reproductively,
Mandela's text may be considered 'asexual'. Any mutation will be exacerbated as the
'gene pool' ofinfonnation is limited. Texts written after Mandela's autobiography that
cite or draw from it extensively need to be considered suspect. The weight of evidence in
favour of Luthuli's cognisance and support of initiation ofMK may be premised only
upon Mandela's account from which most others, subsequently, merely reference.
Therefore, secondary sources derived primarily from a single source when addressing
Luthuli's involvement and possible support of the ANC's decision to incorporate violent
methods in its struggle for liberation must be questioned and their veracity viewed with
SuspIcIOn.
The custodians of Mandela's legacy are also complicit in excising the high degree
of contestation that existed between Mandela and Luthuli on the issue of violence. At
Fort Hare's ANC Archives, an exhibition sponsored by the Nelson Mandela Foundation
highlighted 'a' perceived historic confluence ofLuthuli and Mandela and thus attests to
the homogenisation of nationalist history concerning the events that led to the ANC's
adoption ofviolence.6o
The Foundation's exhibition explored various themes such as "Modernisers",
"Speaking to Power", "International Legitimacy" and "Armed Struggle", to fabricate
Mandela and Luthuli's parallel life paths. For example, the exhibition stated that
"Luthuli and Mandela were both from "powerful traditional families", though this is not
necessarily true for Luthuli. The elected chieftaincy of the Amakholwa in Groutville can
not be described as 'traditional' or 'powerful'. Furthennore, the exhibition stated,
60 UFH, HPAL, ANC, Nelson Mandela Foundation, Exhibition. Viewed on 09 July 2008.
The Nelson Mandela Foundation forwarded to the Luthuli Museum a draft text of this exhibition in 2007.
The Luthuli Museum requested me to provide comment on the exhibition's text. I complied. Thereafter, I
requested, through the Museum, the Nelson Mandela Foundation to allow me to quote the proposal's text.
The Nelson Mandela Foundation declined the request. Fortunately, the proposal's text appeared unaltered
in the exhibition's display at Fort Hare University from which I quote.
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"Luthuli and Mandela continued to embrace the traditional roles into which they were
born but both wrestled with the idea of accepting chieftainship" though Luthuli was
"born" into no such role. In his autobiography, Luthuli identified himself as a
"commoner".61 The exhibition intimated that Luthuli and Mandela (though for Mandela
vicariously through his father) "were stripped of their chieftainships because they refused
to act as puppets for the authorities".
The exhibition's portrayal ofLuthuli's supposed conversion to utilise violence
relates more closely to this focus of this study. One penultimate statement bluntly read as
follows: "Approached by MandeIa, Luthuli agreed to the armed struggle". This statement
is a gross inaccuracy. As this study asserts, Luthuli reluctantly yielded to the Congresses'
democratic decision to form a military organisation in the event the armed conflict
became inevitable. Because Luthuli objected to this decision, he insisted the military
organisation not be directly affiliated with the ANC that he led as President-General. The
exhibition further elaborated on the decision to embark upon the armed struggle. In
doing so, it merely regurgitated Mandela's autobiography. The exhibition posited:
In June 1961 when Nelson Mandela introduced the idea ofthe armed
struggle at an ANC meeting he was concerned that, because Chief Luthuli
was committed to non-violence, he might be reluctant to agree. After
listening to hours of motivation Luthuli finally agreed that armed struggle
was inevitable. Luthuli opened the debate again at a meeting with the
Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the South African Congress
of Trade Unions and the Coloured People's Congress. At the end of the
meeting Mandela was mandated to form a military organisation, separate
from the ANC.
The exhibition also in a hackneyed fashion placed quotations alongside each other
to give the impression that Mandela and Luthuli possessed coterminous philosophies on
the role ofviolence. The exhibition strategically placed Mandela's May 1961 "we will
have to reconsider our tactics" adjacent to a July 1961 quotation whereby Luthuli denied
being a pacifist to obfuscate the contestation between the two leaders regarding the turn
to violence. The exhibition's abbreviated narration of Mandela's autobiography moved
from "after listening to hours of motivation, Luthuli finally agreed the armed struggle
61 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 29.
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was inevitable" to "at the end of meeting, Mandela was mandated to form a military
organisation". Many nuanced misconceptions exist within this version of history. First,
it can be argued that rather than "was mandated to form", the Joint Congresses and the
ANC 'permitted' or 'allowed' without the threat of disciplinary action, the formation of a
military organisation. Second, the relentless argumentation by Mandela over two long
nights sufficiently disillusioned and exhausted Luthuli to concede the inevitability of
violence. It does not follow that Luthuli supported the decision. The old leader yielded
to intense motivations and a compromise decision democratically derived. For Luthuli,
the inevitability of violence derived from Mandela's resolute mind rather than from the
political context.
Immediately following the exhibition's text that read "Mandela was mandated to
form a military organisation", it tactically cited Luthuli's Rivonia Trial statement ("no
one can blame brave ... ") in solidarity with those convicted three years later in 1964.
This chapter elaborates further on the perfunctory manner that nationalist narratives recite
this and other statements by Luthuli to mischaracterise his stance on violence.
Veterans' Claims
ANC veterans consistently imply that Luthuli participated in the initiation of the
armed struggle and served as its leader. In one audio-visual documentary on Luthuli,
various prominent ANC members insinuated that he supported the initiation of violence.
Billy Nair remembered:
He [Luthuli] already knew, before he left for Oslo, to receive the Nobel,
he knew that night, that Umkhonto was going to be launched. Chief is
safe in his home, nine o'clock that night, throughout South Africa there
were bombings taking place. And I was part of that campaign.62
Nair's assertion that Luthuli knew MK's launch date is unfounded. In Durban where Nair
operated, the launch of MK occurred one day earlier than planned, on 15 December rather
62 "The Legacy ofa Legend", documentary film, 2005.
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than 16 December 1961.63 Luthuli arrived on 15 December at his Groutville home. The
first act of sabotage occurred that same evening, unplanned and unauthorised. A target of
opportunity presented itself. Drunken guards left vulnerable a site being cased for the
following evening's scheduled launch.64 MK's official launch did not occur until
16 December 1961.
In the same audio-visual documentary, the current President-General of the ANC,
Jacob Zuma, recalled that Luthuli named the ANC's military wing. Tom Lodge correctly
indicated that Mandela named the new armed movement.65 Zuma told an anecdote about
Luthuli and the rationale behind the origin of the name "Umkhonto we Sizwe".
At the end rof our discussion] when we were saying, "What is this
organisation going to be called?" he [Luthuli] told a little story and said,
"If you are a man and you fight with somebody out there, and this
somebody is stronger than you are, and you retreat to your home, and this
somebody gets into your home, attacking you in front of your wife and the
children, what do you do if you are a man?" [Luthuli] says, "You take up
your spear, and use your spear to fight the man".66
The story, or elements thereof, may be true. The context of the story is unknown.
Luthuli was likely explaining that he was not a pacifist as he had in other instances.
Resisting a home intruder and opposing political and economic oppression are radically
different contexts possibly requiring varying strategies to oppose.67
In his book on South African Nobellaureates, Kader Asmal related:
Clearly, Albert Luthuli favoured non-violent means of struggle against
apartheid. For example, he advocated economic sanctions against the
apartheid regime as a way to advocate a 'relatively peaceful transition'.
Yet he was not a pacifist. He once observed that anyone who thought he
63 Nair's statement that Luthuli "knew" may be Nair's understanding and not necessarily an intentionally
false statement.
64 Natoo Babenia and lain Edwards, Memoirs ofa Saboteur: Reflections on My Political Activity in India
and South Africa, Mayibuye History and Literature Series 58 (Bellville: Mayibuye Books, 1995),59.
65 Tom Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), 90. See endnote 33 where
Lodge cited in a 2004 interview with loe Matthews.
66 "The Legacy ofa Legend", documentary film, 2005.
67 I acknowledge that within any given "context" of offensive violence, differences in scale and/or method
exist. I also acknowledge that, for some, those differences in scale and/or method may not warrant an
alternative defensive approach, especially within a metaphor.
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was a pacifist should try to steal his chickens.68 I believe that he came to
appreciate - under the pressure of events - that some measure of force was
inevitable, but he felt that any use of force should be done through a
military formation that was separate from the political movement of the
ANC. I know that the plans for an armed struggle, under the auspices of a
new military formation, were submitted to Chief Albert Luthuli for his
approval. Just days after Albert Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Prize,
on 16 December, 1961, the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we
Sizwe, engaged in its first use of force to sabotage a government
installation. In the hope of peace, an armed struggle had begun.69
Asmal correctly stated Luthuli "favoured" non-violent means to fight apartheid.
In July 1961, it may have been true that Luthuli perceived violence as inevitable. But in
October 1961 after the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize, Luthuli perceived a
changed context. Options dramatically opened as a result of global publicity and
acclaim. Luthuli yielded to the democratic decision that the formation of an armed
movement would be permitted. Because of his objection to the use of violence, Luthuli
lobbied adamantly that the organisation should be separate from the ANC and thus
himself. No lives should be taken; only sabotage on symbolic targets would constitute
the violence. Preliminary plans may have been presented to Luthuli to form MK.
Evidence suggests that Luthuli did not approve any plans to activate MK. Though Asmal
does not lie about Luthuli's participation, he conveyed the opposite of the truth.
Arguments that Luthuli supported the armed struggle are also found outside the
South African context by veterans of other wars of national liberation. For example, soon
after Luthuli's death, Mohamed Meghraoui, a member of Algeria's National Liberation
Front (FLN), submitted an article that he intended to be re-printed in the ANC's
publication, Sechaba. Meghraoui refuted distorted "Western press" descriptions of
Luthuli "as a pacifist, a Ghandi (sic) of South Africa".7o Throughout the article,
Meghraoui described Luthuli as a "revolutionary", "fighter" and a "militant", though
68 This frequently told narrative about chickens seems to derive from Mandela.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
Sampson, Mandela, 151.
69 Asmal, Chidester and lames, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 9-10.
Curiously, Asmal does not state that LuthuIi granted his approval for the plans for a new military formation
that were submitted to him. Asmal shared the same sentiments in the video documentary "The Legacy of a
Legend".
70 Meghraoui repeatedly misspells Gandhi throughout his article. From this point I will include the correct
spelling.
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Luthuli used these terms without the violent connotations that Meghraoui, Tambo and
others who eulogised him did.71 Using many quotations, some accurate, some not so
accurate, Meghraoui vacuously concluded:
For our part, we are convinced that Luthuli's activities, far from being an
advocate of pacifism or a Gandhi of Africa as certain malicious press says.
He preached constantly stood (sic) for the overthrow of the racist regime
by the use of the most orthodox method of our times, i.e., the armed
struggle.72
"The Road to Freedom" Statement
The African Liberation Reader, edited by de Braganc;a and Wallerstein, included
in their chapter entitled "The Road to Armed Struggle" Luthuli's public response to his
dismissal from the Groutville chieftainship by the National Party govemment.73 The
inclusion of Luthuli' s response in a chapter thus entitled is, at best, highly anachronistic
and, at worst, an implied distortion of historical reality. The editors' introduction ignored
something as obvious as the title ofLuthuli's statement, "The Road to Freedom Is Via the
Cross". For anyone conversant with the Christian faith, the title of the statement
understands that suffering and non-violence are the means to political liberation (or,
theologically, 'salvation'). No amount of theological henneneutics or political
71 UFH, HPAL, ANC, A2561, "July 21".
Tambo wrote: " armed wing of our revolutionary movement...", " the enemies of our revolutionary
struggle...", " the main stream of the revolutionary movement...", " counselling against the advice of
revolutionary violence... ".
72 UFH, HPAL, ANC, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, draft article by Mohammed Meghraoui, Head of the
National Liberation Movements Commission at the External Relations ofthe National Liberation Front
(FLN), 31 August 1967,4.
Even the ANC found Meghraoui's statement that Luthuli stood for the overthrow ofthe racist regime by
violent methods too explicit and perhaps thus did not publish the piece.
The grammatical errors were likely caused by translation from French to English.
Inaccurate: "Meditating over new methods of resistance by Africans, didn't [Luthuli] one day say, 'The
man who will give the Africans weapons will enjoy their unqualified support and loyalty?," More than
likely, Luthuli conveyed a semblance of the above to highlight the dangers of armed conflict and the
demagoguery that often results from it.
Accurate: "Didn't he say that 'peace and revolution make uneasy bed-fellow and that there shall be no
peace until all the forces of reaction have been overthrown"'?
Though this statement can be and is quoted to advocate that Luthuli supported violence, the context of
Luthuli's Nobel speech and his statements after its reception indicate that the statement did not support the
use of violence.
73 de Braganya and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 2: 34.
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contextualisation can claim that for LuthuIi, in this statement, the way of the cross of
Jesus Christ included violence. To imply that anything in Luthuli's statement is a
precursor for his support of violence, as do de Bragan<;a and WalIerstein, is to advocate
the opposite of what Luthuli wrote. "The Road to the Freedom" for LuthuIi was the
cross; precisely the opposite would be "The Road to Freedom Is the Armed Struggle".
Iconic political commentators such as Tambo and Mandela frequently cited
LuthuIi's famous 1952 statement responding to his dismissal as a philosophical prelude
to, or justification for, violence.74 In this statement, Luthuli asked, " ...who will deny that
thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently and moderately and
modestly at a closed and barred door?,,75 Yet, Tambo and Mandela omitted that Luthuli
consistently and unreservedly advocated only non-violent methods to attain liberation
after this 1952 statement. Raymond Suttner provided an example of ANC nationalist
history by stating in a recent article that the 1952 "The Road to Freedom" statement
indicated the fruitlessness of non-violent strategies in 1961. Suttner stated:
Remarks by Luthuli himself set the stage for debate on the broader issue
of a change of strategy. When he made his famous statement that 30 years
[of] knocking against the doors had brought no positive results but more
apartheid laws, he was indicating the fruitlessness of non-violent acts
against an intransigent regime.76
Technically, nothing Suttner stated is incorrect; yet, he wrote with the intention for others
to infer that Luthuli argued for the armed struggle.
Since Luthuli's death, the ANC obfuscated Luthuli's position on violence with
strategic silences. In the July 1972 issue of Sechaba, the ANC, under the heading
"Violence Is the Key", offered no explanation or rationale for the claim of Luthuli's
74 Nelson Mandela, "I Am Prepared to Die" (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern
Africa, 1979),28.
"I Am Prepared to Die" was Mandela' s statement in the dock in Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964 at
the opening of the defence case.
75 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 289.
UFH, HPAL, ANC: A2561, Box 70, Folder C 39, Nelson Mandela, Riyonia Trial (1963-1964) transcripts,
opening statement, 3.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 773.
76 Sunday Times, "How to View Albert Luthuli's Legacy", by Raymond Sutlner, 06 July 2008.
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radical philosophical shift to violence and the ANC used an un-contextualised quotation
to anachronistically have Luthuli agree with then-l 972 thinking.
The whole history of South Africa is punctuated with violence: violence
by the white oppressors against the unarmed and voteless black majority.
In this situation we hear cries for a peaceful approach to our problems
from an increasing number of so-called friends. The latest call by
Roy Wilkins, a director of the V.S. National Association for the
Advancement of Coloured People to the black people in South Africa to
seek peaceful means to solve their problems. A fitting reply to Wilkins
and others of his ilk who preach to us, was given by Chief Albert Luthuli
when he was dismissed as Chieflong ago as 1952: " ... [who will deny
that] thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently,
moderately and modestly at a closed door? What have been the fruits of
my many years ofmoderation? Has there been any reciprocal tolerance or
moderation from the Government or United Party? No! On the
contrary... ,,77
Again, the author of the above quote failed to mention the title of the address from which
the statement came: "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross". For Luthuli, the way of
the cross was non-violent suffering. The statement advocated exactly that which Sechaba
insinuated it refuted.78 Those who cite the "Who will deny ... ?" passage from "The Road
to Freedom" statement neglect to also reference that which follows it:
... I have joined my people in the new spirit that moves them today, the
spirit that revolts openly and boldly against injustice and expresses itself
in a determined and non-violent manner. ..I have embraced the non-violent
passive resistance technique in fighting for freedom because I am
convinced it is the only non-revolutionary, legitimate and human way that
77 "Inside South Africa: Spotlight on Apartheid", Sechaba 6, no. 7, July 1972, 14-5.
Also, this same quote, used frequently as a standard as a call to arms, is presented in Dawn alongside
quotes from the MK Manifesto, Nelson Mandela as the First Commander-in-Chief of MK, the MK military
code and Oliver Tambo as Commander-in-Chief, all of which advocated for the armed struggle.
UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dawn: Journal ofUmkhonto we Si::we: Souvenir Issue, 25'h Anniversmy ofMK
(African National Congress, 1986), i.
78 Scott Couper, "LuthuJi and the Armed Struggle: Nelson Mandela as the Historiographical Father", 14
March 2006, 22.
This unpublished paper was presented to a University ofKwaZulu-Natal Department of History seminar.
This paper can be found at: www.history.ukzn.ac.za/?q=seminar archive&opO=%3D&filterO=Couper
and subsequently at: www.history.ukzn.ac.za/?q=node/636. accessed 25 January 2008.
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could be used by people denied, as we are, effective constitutional means
l', h .. 79to Jurt er our aspIratIOns.
The seminal tome entitled The Road to Democracy in South Africa also misleads its
readers. Despite the fact that this text chronicled events from 1960 to 1970, the second
chapter entitled "The Turn to Armed Struggle" predictably and anachronistically
introduced the chapter with Luthuli's ubiquitous 1952 "Who will deny... ?" quotation.80
The authors failed to reference that Luthuli issued the statement nine years before the turn
to violence and that the statement as a whole does not at all support "the turn to armed
struggle". The use ofLuthuli's 1952 quote as an implied justification for a December
1961 decision that Luthuli opposed is historically disingenuous. To the authors' credit,
they conclude when examining evidence rather than highlighting quotations that "It is
unlikely that Luthuli ever fully reconciled himself with the decision" to form a separate
organisation from the ANC to initiate the turn to armed struggle.81 Luthuli's statement
revealed that for him, the way of the cross entailed non-violent suffering.
Concerning Luthu1i' s motivations, the existential or eschatological ramifications
of the means to liberation superseded liberation itself. Luthuli did not doubt South
Africa's political liberation would occur. The question was: when. Yet, political
liberation meant very little if the liberated lost moral or spiritual integrity in the process.
Within the context of Apartheid South Africa, Luthuli preached an ethic whereby neither
self-defence nor retaliation proved soteriologically effective. In this vein, "The Road to
Freedom" statement advocated redemptive sacrifice. In a piece entitled "African
Nationalism - Some Inhibiting Factors", Fatima Meer explained that redemptive sacrifice
identifies suffering with martyrdom and salvation.82 Meer related that during the 1950s,
the ANC instilled such an ethic of redemptive heroism that it said to its constituency,
"Won't it be good, my mothers and fathers, when the blood of the youth of the African
people is spilling for a good cause".83 Meer felt that such an ethic not only became the
79 Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, I: 48 and 50.
80 SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 53.
81 SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 89.
82 Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life, 92 and 239, endnote 40. Lodge cited:
Fatima Meer, "African Nationalism-Some Inhibiting Factors", in South Africa: Sociological Perspectives,
ed. Heribert Adam (Oxford: Oxford University, 1971), 140-3.
83 Lodge, Mandela, 92 and 239, endnote 40. Lodge cited:
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means to an end, but it "reached a stage when it became the end in itself,.84 Chapter six
comments further on Luthuli's views on the ethics of violence. Suffice to say,
redemptive heroism supplied inspiration and hope, ingredients that some argued MK's
launch diminished; nevertheless, morally and spiritually based hope remained latent
within the ANC allowing it to still claim the moral high ground for decades to come.85
The frequent use of a very few select quotations by Luthuli to imply he supported
the turn to violence can almost be considered an ANC tradition. For example, Alfred
Nzo once recalled the turbulent times after Sharpeville:
After the bannings it became clear that the era of peaceful struggle had
come to a close. As Chief Luthuli put it, "for many years we have been
knockin~ at a closed door, for many years, banging at the door of white
racism". 6
In a similar fashion, the ANC selectively appropriated quotations from Luthuli's "No one
can blame... " statement in response to the Rivonia convictions to justify the turn to
violence.
Rivonia Statement
On 12 June 1964, Luthuli issued a statement when the court sentenced Mandela,
Sisulu and six other leaders to life imprisonment in the "Rivonia Trial". Morocco's
representative read the statement at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council
on the same day. Luthuli said:
The African National Congress never abandoned its method of a militant,
non-violent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in
the people. However, in the face of the uncompromising White[s'] refusal
to abandon a policy which denies the African and other oppressed South
Africans their rightful heritage - freedom - no one can blame brave just
Meer, "African Nationalism", in South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, Adam, 140-3.
84 Lodge, Mandela, 92 and 239, endnote 40. Lodge cited:
Meer, "African Nationalism", in South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, Adam, 140-3.
85 Lodge, Mandela, 92.
86 Interview with Alfred Nzo. Cited in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 70.
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men for seeking justice by the use ofviolent methods; nor could they be
blamed if they tried to create an organised force in order to ultimately
establish peace and racial harmony... They represent the highest in
morality and ethics in the South African political struggle; this morality
and ethics has been sentenced to an imprisonment it may never survive. 87
The above quote is perhaps the second most often cited by the apologists for violence
who retrospectively argue that Luthuli supported the initiation ofviolence. 88 In a Sunday
Times article, Raymond Suttner provided a balanced perspective, but still leaned toward
the ANC nationalist history that understands the Rivonia Trial statement implied support
for violence. Suttner stated:
After the sentencing of the Rivonia trialists, his statement was nowhere
near condemnation of their resort to violence. In fact he explicitly states
that they were not to be blamed for concluding that there was no option to
them, given the repression of the apartheid regime and the need to avoid
spontaneous acts of violence taking on a racial character. "No one can
bl "h'd 89ame... , e Sal •
Suttner then rightly continued to recognise that "Luthuli never took up arms ..." and that
"He did not advocate armed struggle".90 Suttner did not articulate that Luthuli opposed
the turn to violence until requested not to by those within the liberation movement or
until the state gagged him with the Sabotage Act in 1962.
Commentators rarely state categorically that Luthuli supported the initiation of
violence, though they frequently imply that he did. For example, in an address at the
Occasion of the Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture Week, the then Deputy President Jacob
Zuma recollected:
87 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 798-9.
de Braganya and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 2: 40-3.
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 151-2.
The statement was taken from the text entitled, United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994, 282-3 and from
a United Nations publication produced by the Unit on Apartheid, no. 22/69, 10 December 1969,34-5.
88 "Umkhonto we Sizwe - Spear of the Nation", Sechaba 3, no. 4, June 1969, 15.
T. Makiwane, "Somlandela uLuthuli", Mayibuye 2, no. 29,19 July 1968,5.
89 Sunday Times, "How to View Luthuli's Legacy", by Prof. Raymond Suttner, 06 July 2008.
90 Sunday Times, "How to View Luthuli's Legacy", by Prof. Raymond Suttner, 06 July 2008.
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Another highlight of Chief Luthuli' s leadership of the ANC is that it was
during this period that the armed struggle was launched. He clearly
articulated this ANC policy in a statement issued on 12 June 1964, when
Nelson Mandela, WaIter Sisulu and six other leaders were sentenced to
life imprisonment in the Rivonia Trial.. .He said, "The African National
Congress never abandoned its method of a militant, non-violent
struggle ...However, ...no one can blame brave just men for seeking justice
by the use of violent methods ... 91
Zuma, and others who use Luthuli' s 1964 statement to justify a 1961 decision to launch
MK (with no intermediate justification) fail to explain how Luthuli "clearly articulated"
the ANC's violent strategy while simultaneously indicating that the ANC never
abandoned the non-violent struggle. Luthuli clearly articulated his inaccurate
understanding of ANC policy when he said, "The ANC never abandoned its method of a
non-violent struggle". Luthuli's "No one can blame ..." statement was not the ANC's
policy, but his personal sentiments. Those personal sentiments conveyed understanding,
not agreement, about a given course of action. Zuma and other nationalist interpreters of
South African history understand Luthuli publicly supported the turn to violence with the
Rivonia Statement. A closer reading of the tortuously crafted Rivonia statement suggests
quite the opposite.
In the 1964 Rivonia Statement, Luthuli took pains to highlight that the ANC never
abandoned non-violent methods.92 Luthuli emphasised the ANC's adherence to non-
91 Jacob Zuma, "Address by Deputy President Zuma at the Second Matthew Goniwe Annual Lecture on the
Occasion of the Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture Week", University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg,
02 August 2004,2. Found at:
www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2004/zuma0803.htm. accessed 20 March 2008.
92 Luthuli's statement that the "ANC never abandoned its method of militant, non-violent struggle, ..." is
problematic. In his draft biography, Yengwa commented upon the ANC's Lobatse Conference, held in
secret just over the Bechuanaland (now Botswana) border in October 1962. Yengwa records, "Surprisingly
the subject of sabotage was not very controversial and the conference unanimously agreed to embark on the
armed struggle". Yengwa stated, "In [the] 1963 [Rivonia] trials, the Lobatse Conference was used as
evidence of the ANC's support for the armed struggle".
LM, MYP, unpublished typed manuscript, 108. Also see:
Interview with Govan Mbeki.
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, I: 135 and 574.
Was Luthuli's statement that "the ANC never abandoned its non-violent struggle" a continuation, long
overdone, ofSlovo's "necessary fiction" characterisation that made a distinction between the ANC and
MK? Slovo states that "The public posture of MK as an independent body was formally maintained until
the end of 1962 when in a London speech Robert Resha referred to it as the military wing of the ANC".
Slovo, Slovo: An Unfinished Autobiography, 151.
Or, was Luthuli correct?
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violent methods in a statement related to those sentenced to life imprisonment for
violence so as to gingerly make a distinction between the writer who represented the
ANC and those convicted who did not (they represented MK). An argument can be made
that the ANC decided to pursue both non-violent and violent means. Yet, to have "never
abandoned" non-violent means while simultaneously opting to utilise violent means is a
contradiction. Technically, it could be argued that Luthuli held that prior to the ANC's
legal ban in 1960 "the ANC never abandoned its method of militant, non-violent
struggle". Yet, this perspective would render Luthuli disingenuous given that he
considered the ANC an entity in 1961 when he insisted that MK must be separate from
the ANC (Slovo's "necessary fiction,,).93 Luthuli clearly implied that he was not a
pacifist when he lauded those sentenced as representing "the highest in morality and
ethics". For years Luthuli repeatedly warned that "time is running-out", that people are
desperate and impatient.94 Luthuli could not argue convincingly, in July 1961 when the
decision to form MK was made, that violence was not inevitable given the intractable
position of the National Party. Before the Nobel Committee announced that Luthuli won
the Peace Prize, he, with others of similar ilk such as Z. K. Matthews, acceded to those
justifying a resort to violence because they had very persuasive, ifnot convincing
evidence, based on precedent, to validate their claims. Hence, Luthuli declared, " ...no
one can blame brave, just men... " Yet, Luthuli was not one of those "brave, just men"
who resorted to violence in order to seek justice. Luthuli had always characterised an
initiation of violence as "reckless". Bravery is not necessarily intelligent, discerning,
wise or pragmatic. Luthuli intentionally made a subtle but important distinction between
'sympathy' and 'support'. Sympathy or solidarity with Mandela and the others does not
assume support or agreement with their methods. Luthuli also made a subtle but
Bunting stated, "The Lobatse conference took no specific decisions about the use ofviolence, and the
actions of Umkhonto we Sbve were not discussed. One reason for this was the presence at the conference
of a representative ofthe Bechuanaland police...However, the delegates were briefed in private by Kotane
and others at talks held outside the conference hall, and the conference resolutions made it plain that the
delegates were all very aware that violence was an inescapable reality of the political scene, and they
accepted it".
Bunting, Moses Kotane, 273.
93 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 280, see endnote 18,643. CaIlinicos cited:
"Joe Slovo, Dawn, cited in Howard Barrell, MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle (London: Penguin Forum
Series, 1990),24".
94 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "A Fateful Choice in the Election", by Albert Luthuli, 13 August 1961.
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important distinction between the ANC organisation he led as President-General and the
"brave just men" who could not be blamed if their patience became exhausted. In one
interview recorded by Mary Benson, Luthuli articulated the above point:
If the oppressed people here ever came to indulge in violent ways that
would be in reaction against the policy of Government suppressing them.
However, much as you may disagree with them, you cannot blame them.
But the leadership stand by the non-violent method (emphasis is Benson's
and therefore Luthuli's).95
Perhaps most difficult to explain is Luthuli's declaration that Mandela and others
possessed" ... the highest in morals and ethics within the liberation struggle". By lauding
the ethics and morals of Mandela and others, Luthuli confessed that he did not subscribe
to pacifism as an ideology. So, why could Luthuli not advocate and support violence,
despite being the leader of a liberation movement that effectively agreed to form an
organisation that would be prepared to initiate violence? The reasons are as simple as
they are complex. Luthuli's strong "Christian leanings" (his ecclesiastic upbringing and
his theological foundation), the mutually suicidal context for the oppressed and
oppressing people should violence be initiated and the advent of new strategic
opportunities afforded by his reception of the Nobel Peace Prize persuaded him against
supporting the initiation of violence by MK.
Ironically, the greatest distortion of Luthuli's position on violence came not from
an ANC politician, but from a Swedish cleric and the primary advocate of his reception
for the Nobel Peace Prize, Gunner Helander. As a Christian in solidarity with Luthuli
and the anti-Apartheid struggle during the 1960s, Helander espoused a unique stand on
the ANC's turn to violence: "I had no objection to it". Then, in a manner similar to
current ANC politicians, Helander justified his admiration ofLuthuli (whose "line had
been 'violence under no circumstances''') and his countenance of the ANC's turn to
violence by selectively quoting Luthuli anachronistically. In a 1996 interview, Helander
implied Luthuli changed his stance on violence when the ANC did by stating:
95 Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli, 65.
Luthuli likely stated this around October 1961 when she served as his secretary following the Nobel
announcement.
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But later [Luthuli] said, 'I have been knocking on a closed door for year
after year. I could not use violence myself, but I cannot any longer
condemn those who advocate the use ofviolence[,].96
In this quotation ofLuthuli, Helander amalgamated both the 1952 "The Road to the
Freedom Is Via the Cross" statement and the 1964 Rivonia Trial statement (that in their
totality advocate non-violence) to imply incorrectly that Luthuli supported the ANC's
1961 turn to violence.
Retrospective Significance
In South Africa, 'struggle credentials' (such as a prison term at Robben Island or
membership in MK) are very useful components of any aspiring politician's curriculum
vitae. Likewise, the accolades, memorials, foundations and biographies and the re-
naming of streets, municipalities and building structures necessitate a persistent
justification of the armed struggle by prominent retiring liberation icons, thus
encouraging a rationalisation and sanitisation of the highly controversial and contested
positions taken in 1961. Ambition and justification render the historical 'protection' of
the perceived utility of armed struggle by liberation icons necessary. ANC nationalism
affects not only a country's present perception of itself, but also its perception of its past.
Some historians seriously question the efficacy of the armed struggle in South
Africa. They examine the decision taken in July 1961 strategically and without prejudice
in favour of living legends that rightly deserve to be placed in the pantheon of great
twentieth century human rights leaders. Many historians today agree with Luthuli's
warnings about the use of violence. In The State ofAfrica, Martin Meredith provided
ample defensive rationale for Mandela and nationalist historians to 'remember' that
Luthuli as the leader of the ANC supported the turn to violence rather than remember his
consistent opposition to it.
96 SeJlstrom, Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices, 286.
The second portion of Helander's quotation ofLuthuli may derive from Benson or Kotane who attributed
similar words to Luthuli.
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In terms of the objectives that Mandela had set, Umkhonto's sabotage
campaign was a total failure. The impact on the economy was negligible.
Foreign investors, far from being frightened away during the early 1960s,
became more deeply involved. The white electorate reacted in support of
the government not in opposition to it. The government, instead of
changing course, was spurred into taking ever more repressive counter-
measures, obliterating fundamental civil rights on the ground that it was
dealing with a communist-inspired conspiracy to overthrow the state. All
that was proved, ultimately, was that a collection of amateur
revolutionaries were no match for the brute strength of the South African
state. In trying to explain the collapse ofUmkhonto, revolutionary
enthusiasts spoke of 'a heroic failure'. But it was more than a fatal
miscalculation about the power ofthe government and the ways in which
the government was willing to use it. The price for this miscalculation
was huge. With the nationalist movement destroyed, a silence descended
for more than a decade.97
In a study on Luthuli, it is the production of history by politicians, rather than by
historians, that begs critique. Politicians have an extra-historical agenda, and thus a
heightened bias, when remembering and articulating a conceived history.98 In an audio-
visual commemorative tribute shown on 27 February 2007 at the Luthuli Museum in
Groutville, the then Premier of Kwazulu-Natal, Sibusisu Ndebele, ended by urging
"researchers to research".99 Ndebele rightly claimed that it is in remembering that we
will discern that which we wish to "emulate". This praxis enables remembering and
97 Martin Meredith, The State ofAfrica: A History ofFifty Years ofIndependence (Johannesburg: Jonathan
Ball, 2005), 127-8.
98 I do not mean to imply that only professional, or academic, historians are unbiased or neutral in carrying
out their work. On the contrary, they are not unbiased or neutral. But nevertheless, due to some
prerequisite training in the theory and methods of historical inquiry and the cross-examination by others in
their field, it is hoped that there is at least some restraint and thus a minimisation ofbias. The two checks
mentioned do not for the most part curb the excesses of bias and prejudice for politicians.
99 "As we remember forty years after Nkosi Albert Luthuli, we ask the people of South Africa, we ask the
people of Kwazulu-Natal, to do justice to the memory ofNkosi Albert Luthuli. We ask our writers to
write, we ask our researchers to research, we ask our singers to sing, we ask our poets to write poems, and
this is how he will live on and on. Let us use this forty years anniversary ofNkosi Albert Luthuli to record
his wonderful history, this wonderful life that lived amongst us that we are privileged to have him as part of
this province and in remembering we will try to emulate his lessons".
Sibusisu Ndebele in '''Servant of the People"'.
This audiovisual documentary was shown during the launch of what the Kwazulu-Natal government
declared was "The Year of LuthuIi" (2007). The Premier's office intended that events during the year
highlight various characteristics ofLuthuli's leadership. Most ofthese characteristics conveniently,
although not altogether disingenuously, coincide with the ruling party's (ANC) then-current publicly
declared core values.
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telling to be relevant. It can be argued that the intention to emulate makes the accuracy
of any remembering and telling indispensable.
The commemorative film began by informing the audience that Luthuli was born
in Salisbury, Rhodesia (now, Harare, Zimbabwe). As this study's opening chapter points
out, Luthuli was born near or on the Mt. Solusi Mission, in the vicinity of Bulawayo.
Such an error highlights the desperate need for "researchers to research", no matter how
little research may be required. 100 A more subtle and substantive error relates to the
film's vague implication that Luthuli supported the launch of the anned movement.
Ndebele narrated:
We know the walks that used to take place in the sugarcanes outside his
house here in Groutville with Moses Kotane, with Waiter Sisulu, with
Nelson Mandela. All these leaders coming to consult because he could
not move. And it was at this stage that Umkhonto we Sizwe was
formed. ID!
The film also questionably quoted Luthuli threatening, "If the man of the pen cannot give
us our rights, we will turn to the man of the sword".102
If the Premier's rationale for understanding the lessons of Luthuli is to be soberly
reflected upon, then any conclusions reached must be seen as applicable and relevant to a
current context. As Michel Trouillot rightly stated, "Historical relevance does not
proceed directly from the original impact of an event".103 Today, the issue of violence
pervades political discourse in South Africa. For example, in 2007 Ndebele reassured the
country that there was no basis to the accusations that some within the ANC in Kwazulu-
Natal considered areas of the province "no-go" areas for former President Thabo
100 One of the most egregious errors I have encountered is at the Nkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital located in
Durban. At the entrance of the multi-million Rand state ofthe art hospital a commemorative plaque
informs every staff member, patient and visitor that Luthuli was the "first NobeI Peace Prize laureate".
More incredible than the mistake is the failure to amend it so many years after its unveiling during the
hospital's opening.
101 "Servant of the People", February 2007.
102 "Servant of the People", February 2007.
The assistance of many failed to locate this quotation in Luthuli's autobiography. Efforts by the Luthuli
Museum to determine from the Premier's office from where the quote was sourced proved unsuccessful.
103 Michel Trauillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production ofHistory (Boston: Beacon, 1995),20.
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Mbeki. l04 The mention of "no-go" areas ominously reminded South Africans of a
perceived latent Xhosa and Zulu ethnic rivalry and the threat of violence to maintain
power in Kwazulu-Natal. The public recently debated the legitimacy of numerous non-
violent and violent forms of resistance in Khutsong, previously under the jurisdiction of
the Gauteng Province and then controversially transferred to the North West Province. 105
Even the popular Umshini Wami ("Bring Me My Machine Gun") chorus ofthe current
President-General of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, sung by xenophobes attacking foreigners
residing in Alexandra, Johannesburg in May 2008, serves as an example linking the past
struggle for liberation, Luthuli's opposition to violence as a tactic to achieve liberation
and the current and future lessons that ought to be learned from the "wonderful life" lived
by Chief Albert Luthuli. 106
In the accompanying fortieth anniversary commemorative brochure also produced
by the KZN Premier's office, a message from lames Orange amalgamated the
justification for honouring Nelson Mandela with the justifications for honouring the
"Trinity" (that is Luthuli, King and Gandhi) when he wrote:
It was because of this that Chief Luthuli, as secretary-general of the ANC,
got his inspiration to fight a non-violent fight. This non-violent
philosophy made it possible for Gandhi to receive the Nobel Peace Prize
and it would set the foundation for Chief Luthuli, Dr. Kinf and NelsonMandela to have the same honour bestowed upon them. IO
104 Sowetan, "No 'No-Go' Zone for Mbeki", by Canaan Mdletshe and Mary Papayya, 24 April 2007.
http://www.sowetan.co.zaINews/Article.aspx?id=445262. accessed on 30 April 2007.
IOL, "Mbeki's KZN Meeting Was Planned", 23 April 2007.
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set id=&art id=nw20070423215515671 ..., accessed on
30 April 2007.
105 Mail & Guardian Online, "Khutsong: Life Amid Violent Protests", by Reesah Chibba,
30 April 2007.
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=265141 &area=breaking news/breaking... , accessed on
30 April 2007.
IOL, "Khutsong Protest Violence Erupts", 19 April 2007.
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set id=1 &click id=6&art id=nw2007041911190011 ..., accessed on
30 April 2007.
106 Natal Mercury, "Violence Has an Anthem", 21 May 2008.
Natal Mercury, "Singing ofUmshini Wami Is a Cause for Extra Concern", 23 May 2008.
107 "Commemoration of Chief Albert Luthuli, 2007", Launch Edition, Kwazulu-Natal Provincial
Government, Office of the Premier, printed booklet, February 2007, 12.
Rev. lames Orange is the Chair of the M. L. K. March/Africa/AfricanlAmerican Renaissance, USA.
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There are issues, large and small, within the above statement. First, Luthuli was not the
"secretary-general". Luthuli was the "President-General". Second, Gandhi did not
receive the Nobel Peace Prize. 108 Third, and most important, Mandela can not be
historically amalgamated with Gandhi, Luthuli or King concerning non-violence because
since at least June 196 I, Mandela never supported Satyagraha as a means by which to
liberate the oppressed from their oppressors. 109 In a quintessential utilisation of silence,
Orange did not mention Frederik de Klerk, though he received the Prize jointly with
Mandela. Mandela received the Prize, not for his use of non-violent methods to achieve
liberation (as did Luthuli, King and, according to Orange, Gandhi), but rather for his
efforts to engender reconciliation after a violent war initiated by the National Party
regime and eventually responded to in kind for thirty years by the ANC. In fact, the
ANC and Mandela would not capitulate to domestic and foreign pressure to disband MK
even after his release from imprisonment.!! 0 After June 196 I, there is little basis to
equate Mandela's strategies for liberation with those of Gandhi, King or Luthuli.
Luthuli's Death
A desired 'meaning' ascribed to Luthuli's death motivates those who advocate
that its cause is a "mystery". This study draws upon the conclusion that both the ANC,
due to his steadfast adherence to obsolete methods of militant non-violence, and the state,
through numerous bannings due to his refusal to condemn violence and/or sanction the
state's Bantustan policy, rendered Luthuli politically impotent. Luthuli's death provided
an opportunity for his allies to re-insert him into the political arena to their advantage. A
benign death in no way could advance the struggle. Given the degree ofdistrust accorded
to the state, it is almost inconceivable that any 'accident' would not engender accusations
of foul-play. For Luthuli, the President-General of the ANC, politically silenced for so
108 India gained independence on 15 August 1947. In 1948, the year Gandhi most likely would have
received the Peace Prize, no award was given.
109 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 270-I.
110 As late as December 1991, in response to the National Party regime's call for MKto disband, the ANC
responded, "MK will remain in place until its mission is completed".
UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Umkhonto we Si=1ve, 30 Fighting Years, 16 December 1961-
16 December 1991 (Marshalltown: African National Congress, Department ofInformation and Publicity,
1991).
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many years by the state, only a death, where "some sinister thing must have happened"
could have happened. I I I However, no documentary or criminal evidence yet exists
pointing to the possibility that the South African government murdered Luthuli.
Accusations that the state murdered Luthuli are ubiquitous. Luthuli's wife,
Nokukhanya, and son, Edgar, alleged and his children, Thandeka and Albertinah, allege
that he was assassinated. After learning ofLuthuli's death, the ANC also suspected foul-
play. Thabo Mbeki, the media and recent historical documentaries adopted the
speculative theory that a political conspiracy caused Luthuli's death. Sithole and Mkhize
stated that Luthuli suffered "a mysterious death in Groutville on 21 July 1967" and that
"the circumstances ofhis death are shrouded in suspicion". I 12 Another noted historian
conveyed euphemistically that Luthuli's death is a "mystery" despite the fact that a
formal inquest into Luthuli's death concluded otherwise and neither Nokukhanya nor the
family's legal representative contested the findings at the time. ll3 Tor Sellstrom's text on
Sweden's role in the anti-Apartheid movement also stated that Luthuli "died under
mysterious circumstances". I 14 Even the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki,
notably remarked in the 2004 Inaugural Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture that Luthuli
dedicated his life to the achievement of freedom for his people "until his untimely and
mysterious death on 21 July 1967",115 Other government publications fuel the
speculation that the cause ofLuthuli's death remains shrouded in mystery. Zibonele
Ntuli, who wrote for the Government Communication and Information Service in 2004,
was grammatically unclear when reporting, "It is here [Groutville Congregational
Church] that the bones of one of the heroes ofour time lie - Chief Albert Luthuli - whose
mysterious tragic death is still uncertain". I 16 While the bones within the grave confirm
III Bemard Magubane, in "The Legacy of a Legend".
112 Sithole and Mkhize, "Truth or Lies?", 69 and 71.
113 Sunday Times, "How to View Luthuli's Legacy", by Prof Raymond Suttner, 06 July 2008.
113 Sunday Times, "How to View Luthuli's Legacy", by Prof Raymond Suttner, 06 July 2008.
114 Tor Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Formation ofa Popular Opinion
1950-1970, 2nd ed. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003), 1: 178.
Sellstrom implied that the mysterious circumstance was Luthuli's accident with a train.
115 Thabo Mbeki, "The Tempo Quickens", in Prof. Desarath Chetty and Deanne Collins, eds., "The Deepest
International Principles of Brotherhood and Humanity: The Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture,
21 October 2005", (Public Affairs and Corporate Communications, University of KwaZulu-Natal), October
2005), 15.
116 BuaNews Online, "Ten Years of Democracy Celebrates ChiefLuthuli's Ideas", by Zibonele Ntuli,
(Government Communication and Information System, 28 March 2004).
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Luthuli's death is certain, many question the circumstances in which Luthuli died. The
University of KwaZulu-Natal's Neurology Department at the Nelson Mandela School of
Medicine explained in its website its association with Luthuli and in doing so mentioned
in its brief biography of him that he "died in a train accident under mysterious
circumstances".117 In interviews with those who knew Luthuli, suspicion abounds.
Rhona Mzoneli, who lives near the Luthuli home remembered, "We were all shocked to
hear about his death. We are still not too sure how he died. Official reports said he died
from a train accident, nobody knows how it happened". 118 Thabani Mthiyane, a retired
lecturer from the University of Zululand on a visit to Luthuli's grave once questioned,
"Who really knows the spot where Luthuli died in a so-called train accident?,,119 In
recently published newspaper articles sweeping statements were made insinuating that it
is not known how Luthuli died. One article in the Weekend Witness begins, "Albert
Luthuli's death in 1967 is still shrouded in mystery" despite there being no evidence that
the cause of death was ever in doubt. The classification of Luthuli's death as 'a mystery'
is not supported by evidence, old or new, and it contradicts the official finding that a train
accident killed him. The article continued:
It is said that he was killed by a train in the Groutville area where he lived
but many have suspected that this could have been a more sinister plot and
nearly 40 years later the true facts still have not emerged. 120
One of the curious things about conspiracy theories is that the "true facts" will never
emerge.
The writing of history is often determined by biases and prejudices held by
authors and not by documented archival evidence. As this chapter uncovers, a
preponderance of historical commentary remarking on Luthuli's stance and/or
involvement in the 1961 decision to form MK is actually second-hand commentary
http://www.buanews.gov.za/view.php?ID=04032908301010&col1=buanew04, accessed
08 July 2006.
117 University ofKwaZulu-Natal, Medical School Campus, Neurology, home page.
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/department/default.asp?dept=neurologyunm. accessed 08 July 2006.
118 BuaNews Online, "Ten Years ofDemocracy Celebrates ChiefLuthuli's Ideas", 28 March 2004.
119 BuaNews Online, "Ten Years of Democracy Celebrates ChiefLuthuli's Ideas", 28 March 2004.
120 Weekend Witness, 'The Many Mysteries of the Black Christ", by Carol Brown, 23 September 2006, 10.
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originating from Mandela. History originating seemingly from one source, and then
duplicated exponentially, provides the illusion that multifarious sources mutually
reinforce one another. In a certain political context, the error of one "historiographic
ancestor" providing any false fact or conclusion is multiplied. The theory that the state
murdered Luthuli originates only from the family and/or the ANC and not from any eye
witness accounts or documented evidence.
Contained within the Luthuli Papers is the Inquest Report for Albert Luthuli. 121
The inquest contains a sworn statement by Nokukhanya dated 01 August 1967, signed
about one week after her husband's death. 122 The conclusion of her statement read, "In
my own mind and that of my family we are satisfied that he met with his death as a result
of pure accident". Less than ten years later, in a March 1975 article entitled, "My Life
with Chief Luthuli", Nokukhanya stated:
I fear I'm going to die before I'm satisfied .. .! don't want to live very long.
I want to die as I am - nice and strong. The years are running out, and I
badly want to satisfy myself about the Chiefs death. If! don't it will be
the greatest disappointment of my life. When people ask me how the
Chief died, all I can say is that I don't know. When we recovered the
body we found that his ribs were not broken and his body had no injuries.
When a train hits a man his body is badly injured. 123
121 Dorothy Woodson ofthe New York State University, Buffalo wrote in 1981, "The Albert J. Luthuli
papers on microfilm, includes a wide range of materials, in varying formats, from the time of his
appointment as Chief of the Lower Tuge1a (Zululand) District in Natal, South Africa in 1942 to the inquest
papers into his death in 1967. For reasons both political and personal, the collection, although extensive, is
not comprehensive...The present two reel collection ofthe Albert J. Luthuli Papers on microfilm were
obtained by the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the University of Cape Town from the Center for
Research Libraries, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A."
UCT, LC, MAD, BCZA 78/46-7, AJLP, Reel #1.
The inquest records (found in the Luthuli Papers), from which I in chapter six dissect and recompile to
summarise Luthuli's death, number approximately 50 pages. Some transcripts were recorded in Afrikaans
that have been translated.
122 I refer to Albert as "Luthuli" and to his wife as "Nokukhanya". I wish to differentiate the two to avoid
confusion by using only a surname to refer to each. I do not intend to convey any disrespect to Mrs.
Luthuli by using her first name.
123 Trust, "South African Memory: My Life with ChiefLuthuli", March 1975.
Nokukhanya may have made these comments when recollecting the state ofthe body in the casket. She
said in Peter Rule's biographical book that the accident "did not in any way distort his looks".
Rule, Nokukhanya, 146.
I possess a copy of a photograph stored at the Bailey's Archives in Johannesburg ofLuthuli in his casket.
Luthuli's head appeared undamaged, though there appeared to be some bruising to the forehead.
Nokukhanya's understanding that "his body had no injuries" conflicts with statements she made during an
interview included in Rule's book. Nokukhanya stated, "I think he was struck by a long object like the fork
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Many, most notably Luthuli's family, believe that someone intentionally killed
Luthuli. In Peter Rule's biography, Nokukhanya mentioned that "it seems to me that [the
Chief] had some kind of premonition that he was going to die" by malicious
circumstances. 124 Nokukhanya also had her premonitions. On the day before his death,
when she argued with her husband not to investigate the cane workers by himself, she
"feared someone might attack him".125 In her interviews with Rule, Nokukhanya
intimated that the security police caused her to fear for Luthuli's life. She related how
they would pick him up from home and try to pressure him to leave the ANC.
Nokukhanya knew neighbours were spying on her husband, reporting his and others'
arrivals and departures. She feared it would be all too easy to plan an attack.
Nokukhanya stated that people in Natal were being killed in cane fields and then carried
to the train tracks. 126 Ten days before his death, Nokukhanya recollected that a white
man, who upon meeting Luthuli, called him a "Communist". 127 It must be noted that
Nokukhanya only articulated 'suspicions', and not 'evidence' (even circumstantial) of
foul play.
Albertinah Luthuli, Luthuli's eldest daughter and a Member of the National
Parliament, is convinced her father was murdered. 128 In an interview with her held early
2006, Albertinah disputed Mandela's perception that in 1961 Luthuli could not remember
important meetings he chaired and government 'officials" accusations that Luthuli's
used for stoking the fire (intshumentshu) after the railway line was shifted to bring the engine close to him.
This left a small hole in the back ofhis head".
Rule, Nokukhanya, 144.
Note: The train and engine could not have been "shifted" to bring the train closer to a pedestrian walking
along the bridge.
124 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
125 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
126 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
Nokukhanya suggested that the killing ofNkosinathi Yengwa, an ANC member in Maphumulo, by bush
knives as he hid in a cane field was politically motivated. Nokukhanya expressed concern that Groutville
neighbours were spies and knew Luthuli's schedule. She contended that others in Groutville were
murdered and then dragged to the train tracks so that it can be claimed they were hit by a train (142 and
144).
127 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
Such an aspersion had been cast for decades. Presumably, by 1967, such a repetitive accusation might very
well have amused Luthuli, rather than caused him to feel "depressed".
128 Daily News, "Luthuli's Death Was Not an Accident, Says His Daughter", by Martin Challenor,
30 August 1991, 5.
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senility possibly caused his collision with the train at Gledhow. Albertinah confided her
suspicions about the manner of her father's death.
The world was [unintelligible] and they know that he wasn't senile,
exactly. And then also, I don't like it myself because it kind of fits into
this thing what the people who we believe killed him want the world to
believe. Ya. We believe that he, you know, he was killed by the
Apartheid system, by the Apartheid regime, at Gledhow. It wasn't an
accident. And they gave the same reasons, when they say he was senile,
he couldn't hear, he couldn't see. Now, you ask anybody, they will tell
you...He could hear. He could hear. And he could see also. One eye was
not good. The other one was good. He could see. That is why he could
walk on his own all the way, and all that kind of thing. So, you know that
kind of thing is, which, obviously, really isn't [a] true reflection of the
state of Albert, my father, at that ~articular time, at that time. That he was
senile and all that kind of thing. 12
Though he is now deceased, preserved are the suspicions of Edgar Sibusiso Luthuli, one
ofLuthuli's sons:
I don't think my father was struck by the train. He used to cross the
bridge often. When I was home, I would walk with him, and one thing I
noticed was that he was very, very, careful. When a train was coming he
would stand, not even walk, and hold onto the railings tightly. The space
was big enough for the train to pass you on the bridge. My suspicions
were confinned one day in 1983 or 1984, when I was shopping at
Checkers in Stanger. An elderly man, recognising me as Luthuli's son,
came up to me and said he knew how my father had died. If I was
interested I should come to his house and he would tell me. He told me he
had been working somewhere near Gledhow Station for the Railways
when the accident happened. But I decided not to follow it up. It was a
time of severe political repression and I was very suspicious of his
motives. 130
Confusion seems to exist as to whether the family recently requested a fonnal
investigation of the accident. The February 2006 minutes of the Parliamentary
Monitoring Group recorded a reporter's misunderstanding that the Luthuli family had
129 Interview with Dr. Albertinah Luthuli, 04 January 2006, at the Luthuli Museum, Groutville,
Kwadukuza.
130 Rule, Nokukhanya, 144-5.
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requested an investigation. The Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula,
replied denying that the Luthuli family called "for an investigation into the mysterious
death of Chief Albert Luthuli".131
There are 'facts' related to Luthuli's death; they are just considered "not true" by
their detractors. Suspicions, rather than evidence to the contrary, fuel alternative theories.
The narrator of a film documentary on Luthuli produced by Amandla Communications
ominously engendered doubt about Luthuli's official cause of death when his script read,
"Inkosi Luthuli died in circumstances shrouded in controversy in 1967".132 Luthuli
visited Goolam Suleman's home on a daily basis as the two were close friends and the
home doubled as the ANC President's office. Suleman also related suspicions, again,
always originating from the family, about Luthuli's death. In one interview, Suleman
dismissed entirely the inquest into Luthuli's death. 133
There are a lot of questions that are unanswered about Luthuli's death,
about how he died. And I don't think that the family believes that he died
naturally, that he was knocked down by the train. Nobody yet knows how
he died. 134
The claim that "no one yet knows how [Luthuli] died" is repeatedly made despite the fact
that Nokukhanya signed an affidavit indicating that she suspected no foul play and that
legal counsel (Andrew Wilson) present at the inquest offered little cross-examination
(that is, asked no "unanswered" questions), provided no alternative theories, called no
witnesses nor disputed the inquest's findings.
Thandeka Luthuli, another daughter, reminiscent of her mother, maintained that a
train did not strike her father. Rather, another instrument struck him, presumably wielded
by his murderer.
On post mortem when he was examined, there were no multiple injuries
like you would find in a train accident. There was only one large gash of a
wound at the back of his head as well as swelling of the wrist which
131 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Ministry Media Briefing, Justice, Crime Prevention and Security
Cluster, 09 February 2006.
http://www.pmg.org.za/briefings/briefings.php?id=225. accessed 08 July 2006.
132 "The Legacy ofa Legend", 2005.
133 Daily News, "Lutuli Death: Inquiry Opens", 19 September 1967.
134 'The Legacy ofa Legend", 2005.
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indicated that after he was probably hit with a blunt instrument and as he
was getting weak and life was waning out of him he held on to a rail and
he twisted his wrist and so our view and the view of many people is that it
was a game of dirty tricks. 135
Thandeka's interview contradicted both the post mortem, that she cited, and consequently
the District Surgeon/Examiner (van Zyl) and the Stanger Hospital Superintendent's
(Gregersen) sworn testimony. According to the post mortem, extensive injuries were
diagnosed. It is unknown if the X-rays were ever presented as evidence. The medical
attendants reported that a blood transfusion was given and the wounds were sutured.
Bemard Magubane also shared similar conspiratorial sentiments.
He had travelled that route daily. He knew when the trains pass. You
know, he was an intelligent man. How would he just walk on the rails? It
just doesn't make any sense. It doesn't add up. Some sinister thing must
have happened. You know? This was a very critical time. I mean, uh, in
South Africa, in the history of this country. 1967 was really a very critical
time. I mean, and the symbolism of Luthuli was probably just too
important - his presence, was just too important. If you wanted to create
dissension within the movement, how else could you do it? By
eliminating him under circumstances in which you could not point at the
person who was actually responsible for his death. 136
Magubane doubted Luthuli crossed the rail bridge, even with an on-coming train
approaching, though his son Edgar witnessed and testified that he did so on previous
occasions. Indeed Andries Pretorius, the Station Manager at Gledhow, indicated in his
statement that the bridge "had become a common means" by which to cross the river and
that he himself had "been on the bridge when a train had passed over it at the same time
whilst I was walking along".137 Eness Mfeka, the woman who tended Luthuli's shop
affirmed that "he nonnally walked over the rail bridge". 138 The possibility that Luthuli,
whose fields and shop lie on either side of the bridge, crossed the bridge when a train
might pass is not as preposterous as Magubane judged it to be.
135 "The Legacy of a Legend", 2005.
136 "The Legacy of a Legend", 2005.
137 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel #1, Andries Pretorius, Inquest Report,
Exh. M., Sworn statement dated 25 July 1967.
138 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel #1, Eness Mfeka, Inquest Report, Exh. S.,
Sworn statement dated 25 July 1967.
207
Magubane's vague reference to some kind of "dissension" that would be created
within the liberation movement by Luthuli's death is counter-intuitive. In July 1967, the
Sabotage Act silenced Luthuli, at least publicly. 139 If there was any dissention in the
movement previous to Luthuli's death, it likely concerned the issue of violence, though
the ANC deliberated and decided on it in July and Mandela implemented it in
December 1961. Despite the ANC's resort to violence, Luthuli never advocated
violence and continued to consistently argue for militant non-violent resistance.
Luthuli's death would not likely create any dissension in the liberation movement.
Conversely, Luthuli's death enabled the ANC to consolidate and homogenise a
narrative justifying the rationalisation of the ANC's violent policy.
Tambo justified the armed movement and only publicly proclaimed Luthuli's
agreement to it after Luthuli's death in a press statement dated and/or entitled "July 21
[1967]".140 This statement served as a veritable call to arms, very revolutionary in tone
and focused on an appeal to support the armed struggle utilising the occasion of Luthuli's
death as an opportunity to motivate. The statement vigorously defended the ANC's
policy on violence, utilising hyperbole and a plethora of absolutes. The use of the world
'revolutionary' throughout the document differs from Luthuli's paradigmatic use of the
word in his Nobellecture. Tambo's 'revolutionary' refers to and assumes the
implementation ofviolence. Contrary to Luthuli's death causing dissension within ANC
ranks, the statement reveals that dissension already existed within the ANC before
Luthuli's death. For example, Tambo fumed:
The enemies of our revolutionary struggle who were bent on fanning
divisions inside the ranks of the ANC whilst at the same time making
futile attempts to isolate Chief Albert Luthuli from the mainstream of the
revolutionary movement, came forth with allegations that ChiefLuthuli
never approved the change-over from emphasis on non-violent struggle to
the present phase.
139 Natal Mercury, "Luthuli Now Silenced: Vorster Declares Ban", 04 July 1962.
Natal Witness, "Albert Luthuli: Africa's Forgotten Man", by Dennis Royle, 01 May 1964.
Daily News, "May Not Enter Stanger: Stricter Ban on Luthuli", 23 May 1964.
Daily News, "Heavier Ban on ex-ChiefLuthuli", 24 May 1964.
Daily News, "Comment on Re-Imposed Luthuli Ban", 26 May 1964.
Daily News, "Luthuli Order Expires in May 1969", 20 June 1964.
140 UFH, HPAL, ANC, A2561, Box 70, FolderC39, "July 21".
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From 1961 to his death, Luthuli never refuted (as he once refuted Jordan Ngubane) the
so-called "enemies of the revolutionary struggle" who alleged that he did not support the
use of violence. This is the case because Luthuli did not support the violent movement.
Neither did Luthuli condemn violence. Until April 1962, Luthuli remained publicly non-
violent. 141 From April 1962 until his death in July 1967, Luthuli was for the most part
silent on the issue of violence. This study argues that the ANC utilised Luthuli's death to
consolidate the arguments for violence and retroactively included him in its support.
Luthuli's death provided the ANC the allowance to be 'very liberal' with the truth as it
regarded his supposed support of violence. The ANC was always careful never to
explicitly state that Luthuli unequivocally supported violence. Instead, the ANC cited
Luthul i' s 1964 statement responding to the Rivonia Trial sentences (''No one can
blame ... "), commentated that "Once the ANC changed its policy to violence, Luthuli did
not waver" and issued statements to the effect that his leadership of the ANC which has
opted for violence made him a "fearless revolutionary" to directly link him to MK. 142
Luthuli's death, far from engendering division within the ANC, allowed it to homogenise
its position on violence, posthumously bringing him into the ideological and
'revolutionary' fold. In death, the ANC was safe from Luthuli's private (for he would
not contest in public) rebuttal. Likewise, Luthuli consistently opposed any cooperation
with the Apartheid regime through participation in the bantustan structures. Though the
Apartheid government, following Luthuli's death, attempted to convince the public that
he was about to make an announcement endorsing the bantustan system, it is unlikely that
the government realistically believed that such misinformation would cause any
controversy within the ANC ranks on its clear opposition to the government's divide and
rule tactics. 143 Eliminating Luthuli, rather than cause dissension, could serve as "as
inspiration", inevitably creating cohesion and solidarity within the liberation movement
141 BAPA, LP, Golden City Post, "Our Way is Right - We Must Keep On", by Albert Luthuli,
25 March 1962.
BAPA, LP, Golden City Post, "No Change in Heart among the Whites", 29 April 1962.
142 "Chief Albert John Mvumbi Lutuli Isitwalandwe 1898-1967", Sechaba 1, supplement, no. 8, August
1967,2.
143 "The Big Lie Technique: South Africa's Gestapo Chief, General van den Berg, Who Has Tried to
Besmirch the Memory of One of Africa's Greatest Son, Chief Albert J. Lutuli, Is Proved a Liar", Sechaba
1, no. 10, October 1967, 5.
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as it did for the Africa Liberation Centre. 144 The government, in killing Luthuli, would
have created a martyr, and a martyr fosters unity, not division. For example, shortly after
Luthuli's death, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) stated contradictorily:
For Luthuli we claim no vengeance since his life was priceless, the
murderers cannot pay for him with their own lives. It is by blood that we
can redeem his life and the lives of those who die for their
country... Furthernlore, to us all Chief Luthuli is neither dead nor forgotten
he lives today more than ever and his murderers will view with dismay the
immortality of the victorious spirit of his ideas. 145
The Apartheid government had no reason to counter with death Luthuli's very
parsimonious presence. Luthuli's banning effectively rendered him politically impotent.
Luthuli could not meet people in groups. With other banned individuals, Luthuli could
meet only with great risk and subterfuge. The government effectively silenced Luthuli.
Due to the June 1962 prohibition by the Sabotage Act on quoting banned individuals,
Luthuli only issued by stealth a few international statements during the remaining five
years of his life.
Immediately after receiving news of his death, ANC allies suspected the South
African government killed Luthuli. Members of the ANC stoked suspicions by secretly
distributing pamphlets countrywide that alleged Apartheid death squads killed Luthuli. 146
ZAPU stated in August 1967:
The sudden death of Chief Albert Luthuli is a great loss not only to the
people of South Africa but to all of us who come from Southern Africa. It
was during his term ofoffice that an impetus was given to the African
nationalist movements in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique,
144 UFH, HPAL, ANC, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, correspondence from E. F. Mukuka Nkoloso (H. E. P.
R.) ofthe Africa Liberation Centre, Office of the President to All Fellow Freedom Fighters at the Southern
Bureau ofPolitical Affairs, Africa Liberation Centre, 22 July 1967.
145 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, draft speech by the Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU), July 1967.
146 Sithole and Mkhize, "Truth or Lies?", 71.
Sechaba also makes reference to these pamphlets, although, the ANC did not mention that the Apartheid
regime caused Luthuli's death.
"The Big Lie Technique", Sechaba 1, no. 10, October 1967,5-6.
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Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Zambia and Malawi. His murderers will
be dismayed by the immortality of his noble ideas. 147
The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) opined that Luthuli died "under very
dubious circumstances". 148 A bizarrely worded tribute from Jacob Kuhangua, Secretary-
General of South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) cried:
The treacherous act of brutality, the train that knocked him down, "The
NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER" inspired by the hatred and fanaticism
against which he fought so hard, has struck down in the flower, a life full
of determination, a life full of great achievement, a life full of promise for
his country and people and indeed a Son who died for human respect. 149
Students at the Lincoln University in ~he United States characterised Luthuli's death as
"so shrouded in mystery".150 The Mozambique Liberation Front doubted "the
information that he was killed by a train. His death, we believe, was a premeditated
one".151 A representative of Algerian National Liberation Front nonsensically believed
Luthuli "was assassinated, before having fulfilled his mission: the launching of the armed
struggle ofliberation".152 Within the July 1968 issue of Sechaba, N. G. Maroudas
submitted a number of poems commemorating Luthuli's death. One piece cast serious
doubt on the accidental nature of Luthuli's death and with poetic imagery implied the
train was the Apartheid state.
Chief, when that train knocked you
down (Was it really an accident? -
"He had been going blind for some time" -
147 UCT, MAD, LC, BC 1081 / P 28, "In Memory of Chief Albert Luthuli", Spotlight on South Africa 5,
no. 30, 05 August 1967,7.
Also published in Sechaba 1 (supplement), no. 8, August 1967.
148 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, "Mr. Masha's Speech", Tanganyika African National
Union (TANU), handwritten speech, July 1967.
149 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, "Statement by Jacob Kuhangua, the Secretary General
of SWAPO", 24 July 1967.
150 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, correspondence from Sondlo Mhlaba of the African
Students at the Lincoln University to the ANC (Dar es Salaam), 27 July 1967.
ISl UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, correspondence from Uria T. Simango, Vice-President
of the Mozambique Liberation Front, to the ANC (Dar es Salaam), 22 July 1967.
152 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, draft article by Mohammed Meghraoui,
31 August 1967, 3.
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Were you really so blind that you
could not see it coming?
Or so deaf that you could not hear
it coming?
Or so senile that you didn't have
enough sense
To stay out of its way?
Never mind:
However blind or deaf you
might or might not have been then
You are dead now),
When your body was finally broken by
that huge machine,
That juggernaut of a police state,
howling along its one way track,
And your life dripped into the ground,
Could you, in your last agony, still
bear to think
How insolently love had been met with hate:
The hot grinning hate of masterful men
Intent on subduing to their lust and
greed
The tender human spirit
Behind the barbed wire of Law and Order. 153
A year after Luthuli's death, an article entitled "Somlandela uLuthu/i" found in the ANC
bulletin, Mayibuye, also implicated the state in his murder.
lt is also true that Chief Luthuli was killed, murdered by the vile system of
Apartheid and fascism that stalks our country today. 154
Other sources report the theories of conspiracy, yet cast doubt on their validity. The
Dictionary ofSouth African Biography stated:
On 21/7/1967 [Luthuli] received multiple injuries when he was struck
from behind by a train as he was crossing a railway bridge between his
shop and his home; he died the same day in hospital. lt is almost certain
153 Dr. N. G. Maroudas, "In Memoriam: Albert Luthuli". Sechaba 2, no. 7, July 1968, 11.
Maroudas also wrote: "Sorry, dead chief, not even your Chief has won that victory yet: Your honoured
Nobel Prize was not the prize of peace. To win that real prize it may be one has to use real weapons
against real bullets".
154 T. Makiwane, "Somlandela uLuthuli", Mayibuye 2, no. 29,19 July 1968,2.
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that he did not hear the train. This may have been due to defective
hearing, or to the fact that he was walking into a strong wind. Some
people including members of his family, have suspected foul play, but
there is no firm evidence for this whatsoever. 155
Due to Luthuli's banning, the Apartheid government essentially silenced Luthuli,
rendering him politically inactive. Hence, there was little, if any, motive for the
government to murder an old, partially blind and partially deaf man who could not
effectively lead a liberation movement due to the strict terms of his banning. Also,
Luthuli never publicly advocated violence; he certainly never incited it. No motive
existed for an assassination.
Those who conclude that Luthuli's death was a mystery or the result of a political
conspiracy have not formally investigated his murder and/or have not interrogated, and
thus cited, the inquest report in detail. The exceptions to this assertion are Rule's
biography ofNokukhanya and Charlotte Owen and Peter Corbert's audio-visual
documentary on Luthuli. 156 Rule extensively referred to the official inquest report and
even pictured its first page in his book.15? Though Rule referred to the inquest, he
conveyed as findings of the inquest conclusions contrary to its contents. For example,
Rule wrote that the inquest found Luthuli to have been dragged when there was no
testimony to that effect in the inquest. 158 Owen and Corbett carefully studied the inquest
and interviewed advocate Andrew Wilson who represented the Luthuli family; they also
concluded that "it almost certainly was an accident".159
Magubane asserted that it "simply does not make sense" that Luthuli would be on
the railway bridge while a train was passing. 160 However, Rule's biography included
Edgar Sibusiso's attestation that he watched how careful his father positioned himself on
155 Beyers, Dictionary ofSouth African Biography, 4: 331.
The train actually struck Luthuli as he walked toward it and thus faced it head-on.
156 UHOA, "Mayibuye Afrika".
157 Rule, Nokukhanya, 143.
158 Rule, Nokukhanya, 142.
Pretorius and Gregersen's testimony contradicts Rule's assertion that it appeared as ifLuthuli was dragged.
Rule mistook Gregersen's middle names for her surname. Rule also stated that Gregersen "suspects a
fracture at the base of the skul1 and broken ribs" when Gregersen indicated that the fracture of the skul1 was
"visible", hence there was no "suspicion".
159 Sunday Tribune Maga=ine, "The Chiefs Voice Is Heard Again", by Ingrid Shevlin, 18 July 1993,3.
160 "The Legacy of a Legend".
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the bridge when a train passed: "When a train was coming he would stand, not even walk,
and hold onto the railings tightly".161 A contemporary newspaper article entitled, "24
Inches Away from Death" included a photograph of a man (Mataba) standing on the
same footplate upon which Luthuli walked adjacent to a passing train to verify the
. f h 162precanousness 0 suc an event.
Finally, historians ought to report not only understandable suspicions and a
possibly suspect inquest report, but also, as is done in this study, investigate medical
history to determine the likelihood that a mild stroke may have been sufficient to
momentarily disorient, unbalance and generally discombobulate Luthuli enough to cause
him not to evade the 10 to 10 and 12 inch overlap of the passing train and the footplate on
which he was standing. On the day before Luthuli's death, Nokukhanya argued she
should go to the fields on her husband's behalf because just the previous day he got "so
exhausted" and "looked so tired".163
Conclusion
An archival review revealed that it was not until after Luthuli' s death in 1967 that
the ANC implied, projected or articulated that he supported the switch from non-violent
to violent resistance. The ANC selectively quoted Luthuli's statements, for example
from the "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" (1952), to imply that Luthuli supported
the initiation of MK when his statement advocated the opposite. The ANC consistently
misused Luthuli's statement in support of Mandela and the others sentenced in the
Rivonia Trial (1964) to indicate he supported the armed movement when the very
carefully crafted text indicated that he and the ANC had not departed from non-violent
methods. Luthuli's death enabled the ANC to anachronistically morph, incorporate, graft
and homogenise perspectives, especially those ofLuthuli, into the ANC's justification for
the turn to violence. Mandela's autobiography enabled post-1994 myths of Luthuli's
support of the decision to form and launch MK to contradict inaccurate pre-1994 myths
that the ANC marginalised him from the decision to form MK and the actual reality that
161 Rule, Nokukhanya, 144-5.
162 Sunday Tribune, "Only 24 Inches from Death...", 30 July 1967.
163 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
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Luthuli reluctantly yielded to the decision to fonn MKbut objected to the MK's launch.
The quintessential myth is that of a martyred revolutionary rather than the tragic accident
of a lonely, old and partially blind and deaf man. The fonner proved more efficacious
when justifying the ANC's use ofan anned liberation movement.
Karis and Carter accurately reflected the doubts existing about Luthuli's stance on
violence. Tn the section entitled "The Turn to Violence Since May 31, 1961 ", Karis and
Carter commented poignantly on the question upon which this study is focused: "Just
how Lutuli's mind worked during these days is uncertain".164 The following two
chapters chronicling the events of 1960 and 1961 focus upon Luthuli and the ANC's turn
to violence and more definitively illuminate "how Lutuli's mind worked during these
days".
164 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 649.
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Chapter Four
Building Alliances with Sympathetic Whitest
Need you fear or mistrust people whose greatest desire is to absorb more
and more education and Western civilisation? -- Albert Luthuli2
Introduction
In this chapter, Luthuli's biography continues from 1959 where chapter two
concluded by chronicling the momentous events of 1960: Sharpeville, the State of
Emergency, Luthuli's burning of his pass and the banning of the ANC. This chapter
preludes the ANC's 1961 decision to form and launch MK. While in custody for much of
the year, Luthuli's physical separation from his black colleagues and increasingly close
association with many liberal, white and Christian supporters, such as an American Board
doctor, liberal politicians, an American Quaker, a Swedish Lutheran and Anglican
clerics, led others to perceive that he pandered to white interests rather than to an
increasingly militant black constituency. The rapid ascendancy of the PAC's political
profile and its harsh criticism of Luthuli and the ANC led his lieutenants to seriously
question the predominance and viability of ANC's multiracial and non-violent strategies.
This chapter reveals that the reins of influence within the ANC began to transfer
from Luthuli to Sisulu, Nokwe and Mandela in 1960 following the SharpeviIIe massacre.
Furthermore, following the government's ban of the ANC and the arrest of most its
members, the ANC and the SACP, for all intents and purposes, fused. The fusion of the
two organisations further marginaIised Luthuli from the ANC's already drastically
circumscribed decision making process. This chapter highlights that had Luthuli known
discussions considering violence were taking place between his closest political
associates, he would have opposed them on two grounds. First, Luthuli opposed the use
of violence on personal grounds based on his Christian convictions. Second, Luthuli
opposed the use of violence on practical grounds based on strategic considerations. Both
1 "NaturaIly any sympathetic White wants to participate in freeing his countrymen from their present
bondage, and to deprive him of this is to make him feel that his stake in the country is questioned".
BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "A Message for Black S. A.", by Albert Luthuli, 27 March 1960.
2 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "A Message to White S. A.", by Albert Luthuli, 20 March 1960.
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considerations were observed in Luthuli's reliance on white allies who shared his
Christian convictions and who were for him the generators of domestic and international
advocacy efforts that would eventually and inevitably cause the non-violent overthrow of
the Apartheid regime. The events of 1960 engendered a dislocation between a still
hopeful and popular Luthuli from the increasingly provoked and pessimistic militants.
Sharpeville
The Treason Trial proceeded during 1959 with only thirty defendants.
Paradoxically, though the number of accused decreased during the course of the Treason
Trial, its scope became wider. For example, the Trial moved from an intention to prove
the accused (Mandela, Conco, Resha and others) intended to act violently against the
state to an intention to prove that violence was the ANC's and its allied organisations'
collective policy. As the leader of the ANC, Luthuli found himself essentially on trial
again though he had been discharged at the end of the preparatory examination. The
government adjusted Luthuli's banning so that he could provide evidence at the Trial.
The court also called other previously released leaders of the ANC, such as Yengwa and
Z. K. Matthews, to testify.
The Treason Trial contained many other paradoxes. Mandela and the other
accused could, by being found to adhere to a policy of violence, be guilty of High
Treason though the ANC's policy explicitly advocated and implemented only non-violent
methods. Mandela and the other accused could be found guilty, not for their own
personal intent to act violently but rather, for the ANC's intention to act violently.
Mandela and the other accused faced the death penalty while Luthuli, who as the
President-General led the ANC, did not because the court discharged him. During the
Trial, Luthuli enjoyed the support and succour of liberal Whites and continued to
advocate non-violence while some of those who carried out the ANC's non-violent
methods faced the possibility of a violent death. While stewing in prison, these
paradoxes, combined with Sharpeville and the State ofEmergency, could no longer be
tolerated by Mandela and others.
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While a chronicle of Sharpeville and the State of Emergency and their
ramifications is beyond the scope of this investigation, it is important to note that
Sharpeville's tragedy initiated the decline ofLuthuli's ability to lead the liberation
movement.3 The Sharpeville massacre burned into many consciousnesses that non-
violence protest would be met by the Apartheid regime with violent and deadly force.
When non-violent tactics that are intended to avoid violence actually engender violence,
then non-violence loses its philosophical and strategic appeal for the masses and must be
preached and demonstrated fearlessly by the leadership. In a February interview with a
Daily Mail journalist, Luthuli conveyed with prescience the storm on the horizon. In
response to the question: "Can the Africans in South Africa achieve their aims without
violence?" Luthuli responded, "I hope so. 1hope so". Luthuli continued flippantly:
1do not care so much for the Europeans. They have asked for it. But I do
not want my own people to commit national suicide. No, 1do not want
my people to commit suicide. But will they wait? Will they wait?4
On 18 March 1960, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), under the leadership of
Robert Sobukwe, announced the launch ofan anti-pass campaign ten days before an
ANC planned anti-pass campaign.5 The PAC then invited the ANC to join its campaign.
The ANC, through Duma Nokwe, understandably declined, not wishing to abandon
30ther texts have covered Sharpeville in detail.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 329-44.
African National Congress, African National Congress, South Africa: A Short History (London: Publicity
and Information Bureau of the African National Congress, n.d.), 16-20.
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 276-300.
Mary Benson, The African Patriots: The StOlY ofthe African National Congress ofSouth Africa (London:
Faber and Faber, 1963),267-72.
4 Daily Mail, "I Go to See the ChiefMacmillan Couldn't Visit", by 'Farlie', 10 February 1960.
Daily News, "Luthuli Asks - Can't NATS. Start Talking to Us?", 11 February 1960.
Interestingly, and likely somewhat surprising to some nationalist historians, is that Luthuli disclosed that
the attainment ofuniversal national suffrage is "only a long-term aim". Luthuli continued to say that the
independence recently gained in the Congo disturbed him. "Their getting their independence so soon (sic);
it disturbs me; it is not right".
5 The PAC idealistically wished to obtain freedom and independence by 1963.
The ANC has always written in very hostile terms about the PAC's campaign, even blaming the PAC for
not "taking every opportunity to avoid giving the trigger-happy South African police a chance for
provocation". The ANC accused the PAC of disrupting "completely the highly organised anti-pass
campaign of the national organisation which the government really feared - the African National
Congress".
ANC, African National Congress, South Africa: A Short History, 18.
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months of planning for its own incremental campaign on behalf of one that was far more
hastily concocted by the PAC. The PAC campaign called for strict non-violence from
volunteers who would submit themselves for arrest to protest against the particularly
hated pass laws.
The Treason Trial prosecution concluded its case on 10 March 1960. The defence
called Conco as its first witness on 14 March. On 21 March, Luthuli took the stand as the
second witness. Due to Luthuli's high blood pressure, the court agreed to only be in
session during the mornings. While court opened, Sobukwe and a number of others led
PAC volunteers to the Orlando police station to submitting themselves for arrest. They
were. In Evaton, Langa and Sharpeville the same occurred. In Evaton, roof-top passes
by jets broke-up the protest. In Langa, three people were killed and twenty-seven were
injured in a baton charge.6 The death of sixty-nine and the wounding of one hundred and
eighty six in Sharpeville sent shockwaves throughout South Africa and the world. While
those who participated in the PAC campaign were shot in the back by white policeman
that morning, many South Africans sipped their coffee or tea, newspaper in hand and read
a relatively submissive appeal in Luthuli's column.
We cannot manage without the Whites in South Africa. We have accepted
your civilisation and we like it, and we are absorbing it as fast as we can -
despite the effort of your Government to cut us off from it.7
Sisulu's biography indicates that on the eve of Sharpeville, Sisulu, Mandela,
Slovo and Nokwe decided to launch a country-wide strike. Then the four consulted
Luthuli on their decision. Luthuli consented. 8 On 24 March, Luthuli declared 28 March
to be a National Day of Prayer that would include mourning, protest and a stay-at-home.
On 26 March, in an effort to extinguish the volatile situation, the government suspended
the pass laws. This suspension was a tactical decision and not a change of policy. On
6 ANC, Afrika Ke Nako: 90 Years ofStruggle, A History ofthe African National Congress 1912-2002
(Marshalltown: ANC), 2002, 16.
7 Golden City Post, "A Message to White S. A.", by A1bert Luthuli, 20 March 1960.
Excerpts from the above article were republished the next morning.
Times, "Leader's Pledge to Whites: 'Nothing to Fear"', 21 March 1960,9.
Natal Mercury, "Whites Need Not Fear Africans - Luthuli", 19 March 1960.
8 Sisulu, Waiter and Albertina Sisulu, 140.
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27 March, in an effort to ride the wave ofprotest prematurely catalysed by the PAC,
Luthuli publicly burned his pass in an effort to capture for the ANC the country wide
feelings of outrage and launch its anti-pass campaign four days early.9 Mandela, Sisulu
and Nokwe also burnt theirs.
Sobukwe associated a perceived ANC timidity with its liberal alliances and with
what was thought to be Luthuli's riding on the PAC's coattails. From prison Sobukwe
issued a scathing attack against the ANC and its leader following Luthuli's call for a
National Day of Prayer. 10 Sobukwe used euphemisms such as "bosses", "oppressor
class" and "white press" for Luthuli's liberal allies.
If evidence ofANC rank opportunism was still required, their call for a
day of mourning on 28 March instead of their previously announced
coffin-carrying, placard-bearing pass demonstration of 31 March, provides
that evidence. The ANC opposed our campaign. It called it sensational,
ill-defined and ill planned. We showed them and their bosses that we
could plan and run the campaign on our own without the advice and
sections of the oppressor class. The ANC is now trying to bask in the
sunshine ofPAC's successes. Luthuli now has the courage which he has
lacked for over twelve years to bum his reference book after passes had
been suspended. Supported and boosted by the white press, he has been
making one foolish statement after another, pretending that he has a
following in the country... Our advice and warning to the ANC and its
liberal friends is: Hands off our campaign. We do not need your
interference. Go on with your coffin-carrying and other childish pastimes
but leave the African people to fight their struggle without you. Tell your
bosses you cannot sell the African people because you do not control
them.!!
The PAC used Luthuli and the ANC's political partnerships with liberals against them
and the more impatient ofLuthuli's lieutenants therefore felt upstaged and inadequate
next to the PAC.
9 Times, "'Terrible Trouble If Pass Laws Are Restored: Move to Ban African Groups to be Discussed
Today", 28 March 1960, 10.
The action of burning the pass may have been a game of one-upmanship as the PAC only left their passes
at home. MandeJa's autobiography incorrectly stated Luthuli burned his pass on 26 March.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 281.
10 Possibly the only other person other than Champion to have publicly criticised Luthuli was
Robert Sobukwe.
11 Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better, 141.
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State of Emergency
The National Day of Prayer was the biggest strike in the country's history. On
28 March, the National Party government proposed the Unlawful Organisations Bill; this
proposal forecast the imminent banning of the ANC. 12 Though, in general, Luthuli did
not approve of sending members of the ANC in to exile, Luthuli decided with others to
mandate Tambo to escape from the country and represent the ANC internationally.13 On
29 March, the National Executive Committee agreed to move the ANC underground
should the ANC be banned. Events continued at a rapid pace. 14 On 30 March, the
government made mass arrests authorised by the State of Emergency declared that day
while Philip Kgosana, a very young PAC regional secretary, led over 30,000 people to
Caledon Square. The government promised Kgosana that ifhe dismissed the crowd, he
would have an audience with the Minister of Justice. Kgosana dismissed the crowd
peacefully. When Kgosana and his delegation returned to meet the Minister, they were
denied the audience. 15 That day, the government arrested Luthuli, Mandela, Nokwe,
Resha and many others in the early morning hours. 16 Luthuli was absent from court on
31 March when the Trial reconvened. During his incarceration, a warder assaulted
Luthuli while ascending stairs at the Pretoria Prison causing his colleagues to seethe with
anger.
12 Times, "First Reading for Bill to Give Govemment More Power", 29 March 1960.
13 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 221, footnote 6.
14 Times, "Renewed African Rioting on Day of Mourning: Churches Burnt in Townships", 29 March 1960,
12.
15 Joseph Lelyveld provided a moving account of Kgosana's leadership in his Pulitzer Prize winnng book.
For a brief moment of time that could potentially have turned the course of South African history, Kgosana,
a twenty three year old student, held more power in South Africa than Luthuli, Mandela and Sobukwe
combined.
Jospeh Lelyveid, Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White (New York: Times Books, 1985),
315-29.
16 The initial arrests proved to be illegal. For this reason, as a formality, the police released the accused for
a few seconds and re-arrested them.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom 284-5.
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Luthuli's Pass Burning and Second Incarceration
During the State of Emergency, Sobukwe and Luthuli's ANC lieutenants
observed Luthuli's close relationships with those who inspired his allegiance to non-
violent methods: white Christian liberals. These relationships incensed the Africanists
and diminished the confidence his more militant lieutenants had in him. In his
autobiography, Luthuli stressed that when the court called him to give testimony he was
domiciled in the home of"white Pretoria friends": the family of Tony Brink, the
Chairman of the Liberal Party in Pretoria. 17 Luthuli proudly asserted that the Brink
family home distinguished itself "by a complete absence of any hint of colour bar". 18 In
Brink's brother John's bedroom, Luthuli burnt his pass on 27 March in solidarity against
the massacre at Sharpeville and with the now upstaged ANC anti-pass campaign that had
been planned for 31 March. 19 Tony Brink acted as Luthuli's driver for many days, taking
him around many townships to initiate and lead pass burning protests. On 30 March, the
police arrested Luthuli under the 1960 State ofEmergency at the Brink's home. As the
police led Luthuli away, the Brink family matriarch rushed after Luthuli worried that he
had forgotten his slippers and very concerned that in his prison he "might catch a chill".20
In his autobiography, Luthuli showered the reader with a litany of benevolent,
white, liberal and Christian friends and admirers who blessed him with much solidarity,
hospitality, love and support. In doing so, Luthuli conveyed that the struggle against the
government was multiracial by nature and Christian in character. Luthuli underscored
that Whites also suffered and sacrificed to achieve a democratic South Africa. In doing
so, Luthuli mentioned by name the Whites who the police also arrested: Colin Lang, a
prominent member ofthe Liberal Party; Mark Nye, an ordained minister who provided
17 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 221.
18 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222.
19 In a 1993 documentary on Luthuli, Tony Brink amusingly told the story of how the press photographed
and published Luthuli burning his pass above an enamel wash basin for which the Special Branch searched.
Brink's brother, John, placed his son's soiled nappies in the basin. Their contents prominently displayed,
caused much aversion.
UHOA, "Mayibuye Afrika".
In a ceremony on 21 March 1994, Mandela placed the ashes in a Wilgespruit chapel niche.
LM, COCP, correspondence from Tony Brink to Peter Corbett and Charlotte Owen, 14 February 1994.
20 UHOA, "Mayibuye Afrika".
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hospitality to the Treason Trial accused; and Hannah Stanton, warden of Tumelong
Anglican mission at the Lady Selborne township.
Luthuli makes special mention of those Whites who expressed care and concern:
Michael Parkington, a defence attorney who "greatly comforted" Luthuli with his
solicitude during those stressful days; M. de Villiers, a doctor who attended to Luthuli's
health with "diligent care" and a "humane manner" and "greatly eased the tension of
those days"; Junod, a chaplain to who visited Luthuli and those sentenced to death at the
Pretoria Central Prison; and Reynecke, a retired Dutch Reformed Church minister who
visited Luthuli twice. The acquaintances were not superficial. For example, Luthuli had
known Reynecke since his days on the Christian Council of South Africa.
During the time of his incarceration following the State of Emergency and the
burning of his pass and his giving of testimony in court, Luthuli again suffered from his
poor medical condition.21 His poor health rightfully enabled him to receive "every
consideration and indulgence" from the court. 22 Nonetheless, the court proceedings tired
Luthuli, both physically and emotionally. Luthuli described his initial incarceration as
"normal".23 Yet, the State of Emergency, Luthuli declining health and efforts by the
authorities to seal him off from the other detainees left him isolated. In his cell, Luthuli's
illness kept him confined to bed for most of the day. 24 In time, Luthuli was removed to
the Pretoria Central Prison's hospital where he remained throughout his detention?5
In contrast to his first detention during the preparatory examination described by
Turok in chapter two, Luthuli provided a more pastoral rather than political role for the
other detainees during his second detention. In addition to spending time with the other
detainees during their time for exercise for five weeks from the end of June 1960, Luthuli
made it a point to be with them on Sundays when he conducted worship services "with a
high level of seriousness".26 After playing the ecclesiastical role, Luthuli was separated
21 For example, when remanded on charges of incitement while burning his pass, Luthuli was given
permission to remain seated due to the fact that he was a "very sick man".
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli on Remand", 28 July 1960.
22 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 223.
23 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 223.
24 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 223.
25 Times, "Former ChiefLuthuli in Hospital", 23 July 1960,4.
Times cited "the African newspaper", The World.
26 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 224.
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again from his colleagues and became monastic as he made a sanctuary of his cell.
Luthuli contemplated:
Frail man that I am, I pray humbly that I may never forget the opportunity
God gave me to rededicate myself, to consider the problems of our
resistance to bondage, and above all to be quiet in His Presence. My
whitewashed cell became my chapel, my place ofretreat.27
During this separation from Luthuli's colleagues, the policy rift from non-violent
to violent strategies first emerged. Mandela related in his autobiography how his and
others' conditions at the Newlands police station and Pretoria Local Prison were
primitive, brutal and uncivilised.28 It would seem only natural that Luthuli's preferential
treatment would spawn very different perspectives on the way forward. Various sources,
though perhaps differing about the individuals included within the various cliques,
confirmed that the preliminary decision to embark upon armed strategies did not include
Luthuli. Crucial to Luthuli's exclusion was the separation in prison from his colleagues.
Unlike Luthuli's incarceration during the Treason Trial whereby his strong personality,
optimism and strong resolve urged all others to gravitate to him as the leader, Luthuli's
more comfortable lodging, first before arrest in suburban Pretoria, and second after arrest
in a hospital ward, distanced Luthuli from his colleagues' fomenting. From various
sources, a pattern emerged. Sisulu remembered in an interview how and when the
decision to turn to violence occurred. While in detention between March and August
1960, the same circumscribed collective that included Mandela, Sisulu, Nokwe and Slovo
held an all night meeting to plan and propose to Luthuli a response to Sharpeville. These
discussions eventually led to their resolution that an armed struggle was the appropriate
way forward.
27 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 224.
28 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 283-9.
"We were taken into a tiny cell with a single drainage hole in the floor which could be flushed only from
the outside. We were given no blankets, no food, no mats and no toilet paper. The hole regularly became
blocked and the stench in the room was insufferable (283) .. .I do not think that words can do justice to a
description ofthe foulness and filthiness ofthis bedding. The blankets were encrusted with dried blood and
vomit, ridden with lice, vermin and cockroaches and reeked with a stench that actually competed with the
stink of the drain" (284).
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What we were planning for instance, in jail, is the question of mobilising
the entire country. But side by side a smaIl group was working on this
question ofarmed struggle. One meeting took place in jail - quite a big
meeting - to discuss the situation.29
While Luthuli prayed and meditated, Mandela and others planned and decided. The
"magic circle" of plotters was kept smaIl.3o
ANC Banned
In a statement issued on 01 April by an entity caIling itself the "Emergency
Committee of the ANC", the ANC stiII pledged to continue to prosecute the struggle on
behalf of the oppressed majority using the "path of non-violent struggle" should the
government ban it.3! On 08 April the government announced the banning of the PAC and
ANC by the authority of the Unlawful Organisations Act. South African Communist
Party (SACP) sources offered a narrative of subsequent dynamics paraIlel to ANC
sources. The organisational structure of the ANC was drastically minimised after its
banning, thus diminishing Luthuli's ability to lead; Luthuli considered Nokwe and
Mandela "among the foremost leaders of the ANC".32
In speaking about the mass arrests foIlowing the SharpeviIle massacre and the
declaration of the State of Emergency, Turok recaIled:
Then came the second round of arrests and in that round Rusty [Bernstein]
and others were picked-up. They'd been very negligent in my view.
They'd been told to be very careful and they'd just sat back and allowed
the police to pick them up in their beds. Some of our comrades were
really quite reckless, I think, at the time and considering the needs of the
movement. As a result the movement was totally decapitated. Just about
the whole C[onsultative] C[ommittee] was picked-up except for the blokes
in our house and the National Executive of the ANC likewise...The blokes
29 Interview with Sisulu. Cited in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 70- I.
30 SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 72.
31 Emergency Committee of the African National Congress, "Statement by the Emergency Committee of
the African National Congress", 01 April 1960. Found in:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 572-4.
32 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 223.
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left behind were Yusuf[Dadoo], Moses [Kotane], Michael [Harmel] and
myself, who became as I suddenly discovered to fantastic amazement the
Secretariat ofthe CC and de facto leadership of the Alliance at the same
time .. .I then was co-opted formally on the Secretariat and the three of us
became the Secretariat of the Party CC and with Yusuf abroad we virtually
ran the ANC as well, and the Alliance.33
Turok explained that the State of Emergency and the subsequent mass arrests
drastically curtailed the ANC's 'chain of command'. Restrictive legislation decimated
the ANC hierarchy to such an extent that the chain became only one or two links. Since
the State of Emergency in 1960, and more so after his return from Oslo just prior to the
first acts of sabotage, circumstances omitted Luthuli' s placement in the short chain of
command. The ANC issued statements, leaflets and policy documents, but apparently
without Luthuli's knowledge or approval. Turok recalled:
... documents [and] leaflets which were issued at the time, this was done
mainly by Mick [Harmel] and myself, Mick mainly ...They were issued by
the underground and I might just say in parenthesis that my own view is
that towards the end of the Emergency the ANC and the movement as a
whole [were] operating far more efficiently than we'd ever done before
and this lesson th[at] should have been learned by the movement, that is
that a tight structure, well integrated, pushing things from underground is
far more efficient than a loose, amorphous mass movement under
conditions of oppression?4
The ANC's banning and the resultant constriction of its personnel and democratic
processes negatively influenced Luthuli's participation in ANC decisions more than his
own did. The truncation of participatory and consensus methods of decision making
removed the ideological and administrative foundation upon which Luthuli always led.
As a chief within a highly democratic Christian community, Luthuli practiced one style
ofleadership: 'democratic consensus'. During his young life, Luthuli watched his uncle,
Martin Luthuli, perform his chiefly functions democratically. Luthuli treasured the
highly democratic ecclesiastic polity of Congregationalism practiced in the faith
33 UWC, RIMA, MCH 07, 8.4.5, tape 1, interview with Turok, 9-10.
34 UWC, RIMA, MCH 07, 8.4.5, interview with Turok, tape 1, 13.
In general, Turok's 1973 recollections cited here are reiterated accurately in his autobiography.
Turok, Nothing But the Truth.
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community in which he worshiped. Luthuli could not adapt to the 'command and
control' leadership required for the context. During his entire Presidency, Luthuli
recognised unilateral decision making to be antithetical to the ANC's ethos. For almost
twenty years, Luthuli led the struggle for democracy by example. Then, the 1960 State of
Emergency forced the ANC to be covert, streamlined, efficient and less democratic.
Luthuli's style of leadership, given the new repressive dispensation, became extinct.
ANC members who also belonged to the SACP proved to be more adaptable to
changing circumstances. Banned in 1950, the SACP had more experience in operating
stealthily and, one might cynically add, with fewer qualms about operating less
democratically. Turok's testimony alluded to this possibility. To the question, "The
ANC wasn't functioning? At all?" Turok responded tersely:
We were the ANC. Moses was the ANC. It comes down to that, we all
participated, there was no distinction, the Alliance was complete. It was
one.35
Slovo and Sisulu remembered only Johannesburg based ANC members who "'put
forward a concrete, consistent line' on armed struggle".
During this period the top working collective of the ANC was situated in
Johannesburg and consisted ofKotane, Marks, Mandela, Sisulu, Nokwe
and a few others. It was this body, together with the Central Committee of
the Party, which took the plunge into the new phase of revolutionary
violence.36
Whether it was ANC or the SACP that first decided upon and planned the turn to
violence is not relevant to this investigation.3? What is claimed in this investigation is
35 UWC, RIMA, MCH 07, 8.4.5, interview with Turok, tape 1, 17.
36 Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography, 148.
Interview with Waiter Sisulu. Found in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 86.
37 Magubane, Sithole and others do provide an excellent analysis ofthe parallel events between the SACP
and the ANC as regards the turn to violence. The authors rightfully acknowledge the deeply incestuous
nature ofthe two organisations. The authors adeptly conclude that "the South African Communist party
took a formal decision to embark on the armed struggle well before the ANC did so". The timing of the
two organisations' informal decisions to embark on violence is more difficult to discern. Nonetheless, it is
more probable that the SACP also decided informally before the ANC decided informally.
SADET, The Road to Democracy, 1: 80-90.
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that Luthuli was not an active member of the liberation struggle's leadership after
Sharpeville and the subsequent banning of the ANC and the events surrounding the
decisions are important to this thesis.
After a recess due to the State of Emergency, the Treason Trial resumed on
19 Apri1.38 Due to Sharpeville and the draconian measures taken by the state to stifle
opposition, Nokwe is said to have commented bitterly to Helen Joseph, "This trial is out
of date".39 Despite the fact that much of the Trial focused on the ANC and its non-
violent strategy, Sisulu recalled that the planning for a violent struggle began long before
the court's verdict.4o The context of the next phase of the struggle had been inaugurated
with the state's violent suppression of non-violent tactics. Luthuli's non-violent
strategies had come to be considered "relics of a past era" before the Trial concluded.41
Luthuli did not see the trial or his non-violent strategies as 'relics of a past era'. Whereas
Sisulu, Mandela and others believed the struggle's tactics to be conditional upon the
antagonists' tactics, Luthuli believed the tactics of liberation to be conditional upon the
solidarity, support, sympathy and action of existing and potential enlightened and
progressive allies in the struggle. For Sisulu and Mandela and others, violence against
the violent antagonist became the only option.42 For Luthuli, violence would only further
enrage the antagonist and justify its violence as the state's brutality could be portrayed in
the court ofpublic opinion as self-defence. Luthuli feared that worse than this, violence
initiated by the liberation movement would neutralise, ifnot reverse, the support given to
the liberation movement from domestic and international white, liberal and Christian
allies. Luthuli felt that the key to an ultimate democratic victory depended upon the
38 Karis and Carter stated, "[on 30 March] the three man special criminal court adjourned and did not meet
again until late in April".
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 345.
Elinor Sisulu indicated the trial resumed 19 April.
Sisuslu, Waiter & Albertina, 141.
Mandela indicated the trial resumed on 26 April.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 291.
39 Sisuslu, Waiter & Albertina, 141.
40 SADET, The Road to Democracy, 1: 86.
41 Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 141.
Sisulu cited:
Helen Joseph, JjThis Be Treason (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963),21.
Hilda Bernstein, The World That Was Ours: The Story ofthe Rivonia Trial (London: SA Writers, 1989),
20.
42 ANC, African National Congress, South Africa: A BriefHistory, 19.
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recruitment of allies by moral authority. Whereas Mandela, Sisulu and others saw
Sharpeville as justification to initiate violence, Luthuli viewed Sharpeville as a
tremendous opportunity to boost international and domestic solidarity with the liberation
movement and to enhance the moral authority of the ANC. To the same degree that the
Apartheid regime became an international pariah, the ANC could become a saint.43 It
must be remembered that Luthuli won the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize, though he received it
in December 1961. The non-violent manner of protest following the violent repression
by the Apartheid state at Sharpeville catapulted Luthuli (and the ANC) to the Nobel
Peace Prize short-list. As early as November 1960, the press reported Luthuli's
candidacy for the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize.44 Luthuli's nomination for the Nobel Peace
Prize loomed behind his consistent argumentation against violence. Luthuli was well
aware that in India's fight forliberation from British rule, non-violent tactics prior to and
following most violent repressive acts earned the Indian independence movement its
greatest international public relations victories. These victories ultimately forced the
British to grant Indian independence in 1947.
Treason Trial Testimony
Evidence suggests that in South Africa the non-violent strategies worked.
Sharpeville devastated the Johannesburg Stock Exchange like no act of sabotage ever did.
On 22 March the United States State Department condemned Pretoria's heavy-handed
tactics for the first time. In a 01 April resolution, the United Nations Security Council
called on South Africa to change its policies.45 International opprobrium and economic
isolation became a realistic and near possibility if the state continued to resort to violence
and the liberation movement remained non-violent. Economics, international
43 In the wake ofSharpeviIle, even Die Burger confessed that "South Africa has become the polecat of the
world".
44 Star, "Nobel Prize: More Support for Luthuli", 02 November 1960.
45 The vote was 9 to 0 with Great Britain and France abstaining. The United Nations called upon South
Africa "to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality".
Benson, Nelson Mandela, 85.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 336.
Karis and Carter cited:
Vemon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1963),299-300.
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condemnation and domestic non-violent mass action would bring down the Apartheid
regime, not a guerrilla movement that could not even enter the country or penetrate the
frontline states. In their Treason Trial testimony that followed the Sharpeville massacre,
Luthuli and Z. K. Matthews conveyed optimism that "pressure" would topple white
supremacy.46 Z. K. Matthews testified:
Our optimism was based upon the fact that this is not the only government
that has been relentless in the history ofpolitical struggle... 47
Z. K. Mathews continued that others had been determined not to capitulate to attempts
made by their oppressed subjects, "and they have subsequently done SO".48 As this study
earlier asserts, Z. K. Matthews cited the example of India and posited that "governments
usually act as a result ofpressure".49 Luthuli held the same opinion in court. When
asked by Prosecutor Trengove:
Mr. Luthuli, I also want to put it to you that you never expected that the
white oppressor would ever accept your demands and concede to your
demands?50
46 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 345.
LuthuJi's excerpts from Luthuli's testimony, sourced from Karis and Carter can also be found in an ANC
website:
ANC, "Albert Luthuli - Various Items", www.anc.org.zaJancdocs/history/lutuli/lutuli8.html. 6-12, accessed
04 April 2008.
Sharpeville "interrupted" Luthuli's Treason Trial testimony. I surmise that Luthuli's testimony regarding
the use of violence occurred after Sharpeville. Mandela stated that Luthuli's testimony lasted "several days
and he was cross-examined for nearly three weeks". Conco as the lead witness began on 14 March. If
Conco testified for a week, then Luthuli could have only testified for a day or two previous to Sharpeville,
this leaving the bulk of his testimony and cross-examination for "three weeks" after Sharpeville. Luthuli
was arrested for burning his pass on 30 March and was unavailable for court on 31 March. Following the
State of Emergency, the court went into recess. Mandela says that Luthuli "returned to testify a month
later", presumably on 19 April. Therefore, Luthuli's comments on non-violence before Sharpeville
remained consistent with those made after Sharpeville.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 277-8.
47 Benson, The African Patriots, 283.
48 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 618 and 626. Karis and Carter cited:
Treason Trial Record, 17,953-58.
Benson, The African Patriots, 283.
49 Benson, The African Patriots, 283.
50 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 592 and 626. Karis and Carter cited:
Treason Trial Record, 13,758-9.
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Luthuli responded:
My lords, I wouldn't be in Congress ifI didn't expect that white South
Africa would someday reconsider. That is my honest belief, and one has
grounds for it. I think I have already indicated them, but I firmly believe
that white South Africa will one day reconsider. When, my lords, I cannot
say.51
As chapter three discusses, central to the ANC nationalist history assertion that
Luthuli supported the initiation of violence is the claim that Luthuli was not a pacifist.
During Luthuli's testimony in the Treason Trial, Luthuli affirmed this claim. In response
to the lordship's direct question, "Are you a pacifist?" Luthuli responded equally directly,
"No, I'm not". The exchange continued, "Then perhaps you might explain the position,
the difference between the non-violence campaign and your not being a pacifist." Luthuli
retorted, "My lords, I merely talk as one feels - I'm not conversant with [the] theory of
pacifism, but I am not a pacifist".52 Also in court testimony during the Treason Trial,
Luthuli answered questions related to the ANC's then policy of 'tactical pacifism'.
Court:
Luthuli:
As far as you personally are concerned, would you be party
to violent struggle to achieve your aims?
In the circumstances that obtain in the country (sic) - I
must say this first - I may have indicated that there might
be differences of point of view among different members,
but as far as the [C]ongress is concerned, in the
circumstances that obtain definitely we are for non-
violence (sic). When it comes to a personal level, as to
whether at any time one would, I would say that if
conditions are as they are, I would never be a party to the
51 Benson, The African Patriots, 283.
52 PilIay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 157. Pillay excerpted from:
Chief Albert Luthuli's evidence at the Treason Trial (August 1958 - March 1961) dealing with his
understanding of a non-violent liberation struggle.
Was Luthuli evasive in his rationale for his beliefs or was he genuine by intimating his lack of academic or
ethical inquiry into 'pacifism' as it relates to a field ofstudy or school of thought and non-violence as it
relates to the Christian scriptures and Christian ethics? It is highly unlikely that Luthuli would have
neglected to investigate the matter given his ecclesiastical upbringing in mission churches and schools, his
trip to Madras, India in 1938 (on the eve of World War II), his tour of the United States in 1948 (between













use ofviolence because I think it would be almost national
suicide, in the circumstances as they are.
And quite apart from that point of view, what would you
say with regard to your own beliefs?
My own beliefs as I have already said are to a certain extent
motivated by Christian leanings. Because of my Christian
leanings I would hesitate to be a party to violence, my
lords. But, of course, I must say in that connection that I
am not suggesting that the Christian religion says this and
that I am not a theologian, but my own leanings would be
in that direction.
Have you at any level of the [ANC] heard a suggestion that
the policy [of non-violence] should be changed?
My lords, I've never heard any such suggestion, nor a
whisper to that effect.53
As far as you personally are concerned, what would be
your attitude if such a suggestion were made?
I would oppose it.
Why?
Well, I would oppose it on two grounds really: firstly, from
a personal angle, but also because it's not - or it would not
be - in the interest of the liberation movement, it would not
be a practical thing...
... Why is it that from time to time, if that is the accepted
policy, one finds at meetings reference to your non-violent
policy; why should it be necessary to do that?
Well, it is very necessary that we should do so, firstly
because in so far as we are concerned we are embarking on
something which people may not be fully acquainted with,
so that our task is to educate our own members and the
African people. Then, of course, the other reason is that we
so believe in it that we feel that we should take no chance
of anybody not knowing and being tempted to deviate ... 54
53 Luthuli may be contradicting himselfhere as earlier he stated, ' ... there may be differences of point of
view [regarding violent struggle] among different members ... ' (see above).
54 Pillay, Voices o/Liberation, 1: 152 and 163.
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This statement and others to the same effect uphold the ANC's view that Luthuli was not
a pacifist.55 In his testimony, Luthuli made a distinction between pacifism and non-
violent strategy. He reasoned that pacifists refused to use violence in the case of self-
defence whereas adherents to non-violence did not necessarily prohibit violent self-
defence in the event of a violent attack.56
The court found Luthuli guilty of burning his pass and the government lifted the
State of Emergency at the end ofAugust. The authorities released Mandela and the
others; they went home for the first time since their arrest five months prior.57 In
September, Luthuli received a 'lesser' sentence of a £100 fine and six months in jail
suspended for three years on the condition that he was not convicted of a similar charge
during that period. The sentence likely took into consideration Luthuli's "serious heart
ailment", "limited life expectancy" and prior detention since March 1960.58
Enriching Friendships
The "white ladies" from the Black Sash revealed that they had paid Luthuli's
fine. 59 Luthuli's "Black Sash friends" then took him to the Anglican St. Benedict's
Retreat House in Johannesburg.60 The Black Sash supported non-violent direct action.
Luthuli's sympathy with and sensitivity to this particular constituency is relevant when
querying his motivations for not supporting the ANC's move to violence. In a discussion
paper to the Transvaal Black Sash, Joyce Harris articulated what she understood to be the
core values of Black Sash. She made her position in the context of a debate beginning
within the Black Sash that acts of protest by the oppressed majority, even if technically
unlawful, should not be characterised as "lawlessness". Harris disagreed with this
Pillay identified "the records of the Treason Trial" as his source for these excerpts.
Indeed, that which Luthuli feared in his Treason Trial testimony would happen: leaders would be "tempted
to deviate" shortly thereafter or unbeknownst him, already were "tempted to deviate".
55 The Star once incorrectly identified Luthuli as a pacifist.
Star, "Albert Luthuli - Martyr or Tool of Communism?", 22 July 1972.
56 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 277.
57 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 299.
58 Times, "£100 Fine on Luthuli: Burning ofa Pass Book", 01 September 1960, 9.
59 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 225.
60 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 225.
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qualification and held "lawlessness" to be unconditional. She asserted the purpose of the
Black Sash was to:
...promote justice and the principles of parliamentary democracy and to
seek constitutional recognition and protection by law of human rights and
liberties for all ... If there is ever to be some sort of reasonable way of life
for everyone in our country, I believe it is absolutely imperative that the
values for which the Black Sash has always stood should somehow remain
intact. They won't if we compromise them.61
Furthermore, Harris perceived that the "liberation struggle", as it was termed, implied
"the struggle to overthrow the government by violent means". Harris stated the Black
Sash was not, nor should it be, a part of the "liberation struggle". Harris affinned the role
ofBlack Sash's role as follows:
... that of trying to be a mediator, a peacemaker, an upholder ofjustice, a
guardian of the principles for which we have always stood in a society
which is fast becoming brutalised. In the "liberation struggle" we would
soon be lost.62
During this time, Luthuli's reputation within some sectors of the liberation
movement deteriorated further. Luthuli's autobiography noted that on the advice of his
lawyers and due to concern for his health, he reluctantly did not issue a prepared
statement to the court after having been found guilty of burning his pass wherein he
concluded:
It is my firm belief that it is the duty of all right-thinking people, black and
white, who have the true interest of our country at heart, to strive for [the
abolition of the pass] without flinching. 63
61 UCT, MAD, LC, Jo Macrobert Papers (BC 1165, C2), Joyce Harris, "The Black Sash: Discussion
Paper", n.d., 1-2.
62 UCT, MAD, LC, BC 1165, C2, Joyce Harris, "The Black Sash: Discussion Paper", n.d., 2.
63 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 246. Also found at:
ANC, "Albert Luthuli - Various Items", www.anc.org.zaJancdocslhistory/lutuli/lutuli8.html,
accessed 04 April 2008, 13-4.
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By not issuing the statement, Luthuli impressed that he was not as resolved against the
government as when he issued his "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" statement
subsequent to his dismissal from the chieftaincy. One surmises that those more militant
perceived as a failure of leadership Luthuli's reluctance to further antagonise the, or his,
situation.
Following the Defiance Campaign, the ANC membership unceremoniously
replaced Moroka with Luthuli for obtaining his own legal council and for relying on his
relationships with Whites who testified to his good character and benevolence.64 These
actions and associations raised the ire of the ANCYL, proved to be an embarrassment to
the ANC and rendered Moroka expendable. After Sharpeville and the State of
Emergency, Luthuli's compromises made him susceptible to suffering Moroka's fate.
During a time of heightened anxiety when the PAC captured the public's imagination at
the ANC's expense, many viewed Luthuli as too close to white liberal Christians.
Shortly after police gunned down unarmed protestors at Sharpeville and while militant
domestic and continental pan-African nationalism increased in popularity, many within
and outside the ANC considering violent methods viewed Luthuli's comments and
company with suspicion. Luthuli's preferential treatment by the authorities during the
Trial due to his ill-health sequestered him from his colleagues and decreased the sense of
solidarity that existed previously between him and his co-accused in 1956.65
Appreciated by Luthuli in his autobiography and reported in the press, was
Canon John Collins, Chairman of Christian Action, who, as a major financial supporter of
the Treason Trial Fund, reimbursed the Black Sash for the payment of his fine.66 By the
end of the Trial, Christian Action raised more than £70,000 for the "best possible legal
defence for the accused and aid for their dependents".67 In 1958, the Treason Trial Fund
then became the Defence and Aid Fund. In his autobiography, Luthuli congratulated the
Defence and Aid Fund, founded by Bishop Ambrose Reeves and administered by
64 As a medical doctor, Moroka treated some white patients. Moroka also sponsored educational bursaries
for some white children.
65 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 223-4.
66 Times, "£1 00 Sent to Pay Fine on Luthuli", 02 September 1960,5.
Luthuli, Let My People Go, 226.
67 L. John Collins, "Defense and Aid Fund", Sechaba 1, no. I, January 1967, 11.
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Mary Benson and Alex Hepple, for work wel! done. A total of more than £500,000 was
collected and distributed "for the provision of legal defence for the accused and aid for
the dependents of a person or persons charged with any political offence under racially
discriminating legislation".68 In her hagiography about Luthuli, Mary Benson indicated
that Luthuli came to regard Bishop Reeves "really as father" after having met him and
having gotten to know him during the Treason Trial.69 Benson indicated that Luthuli
greatly admired Michael Scott, Trevor Huddleston and Canon Collins for their
contribution to the Christian church as well as to the African people. Finally, on his way
home from the Treason Trial to resume his ban in Groutville, Luthuli mentioned that he
was the guest of an American Board medical missioner, Alan Taylor, superintendent at
McCord HospitaCO Luthuli began the epilogue to his autobiography, "If friendships
make a man rich, then I am rich indeed".71
Though the friendships made Luthuli rich, they also may have nudged his
marginalisation from effective leadership within the ANC. Judging from newspaper
accounts and from his autobiography, Luthuli surrounded himself with eminent and
liberal white supporters. The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) had a track-record of
constitutional coups against former President-Generals Xuma and Moroka for their
failures to lead militantly. As mentioned earlier, during the Sharpeville massacre on
21 March 1960 Luthuli was staying as a guest at the home of Tony Brink, Chairperson of
the Liberal Party. Due to his ill health, Luthuli received preferential treatment while in
custody, separated from his other ANC colleagues who endured deplorable conditions.
Following the burning of his pass, Luthuli made public that it was "white ladies" of the
Black Sash who paid his £100 fine. Luthuli elected to not issue a public statement on his
pass burning. It was public knowledge that Luthuli convalesced during the Trial at an
Anglican retreat centre.
Given the history of the ANCYL and the ANC, the increasing prominence of the
PAC and the perceived futility of non-violent demonstration, many perceived Luthuli to
be too compromised by his fair-skinned ecclesiastic liberal supporters and thus obsolete.
68 L. John Coliins, "Defense and Aid Fund", Sechaba 1, no. 1, January 1967, 11.
69 Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli ofSouth Africa, 63.
70 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 226.
71 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 227.
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For example, Mary-Louise Hooper, a wealthy white American Quaker widow,
immigrated to South Africa in 1955, bought a home near Durban and worked for two
years as Luthuli's secretary and personal assistant.72 Hooper even donated an Austin car
to Luthuli.73 She became attached to the Luthuli family, moved into the Mahomed
family's "outhouse" ("for a long period, probably about a year" 74) and befriended many
other ANC leaders.75 In 1957, the government arrested Hooper then imprisoned and
deported her from South Africa.76 Hooper boasted an impressive resume for the ANC.77
The ANC elected her as its first white member in 1959 and appointed her to represent the
ANC at three All-African People's Conferences in Accra (1958), Tunis (1960) and Cairo
(1961).78 Subsequentto her return to the United States in 1958, Hooper served the
American Committee on Africa (ACOA), an organisation founded by pacifists that
emphasised the utilisation of non-violent methods to create social change. Hooper
voluntarily worked full-time as the West Coast Representative ofACOA's Africa
Defence and Aid Fund. Hooper's largesse helped to financially support not only the
72 The ANC elected Secretaries (for example, Yengwa and Selborne Maponya) to administrate Luthuli's
affairs as they related to the Congress activities. Mary-Louise Hooper, Jean Hill and Mary Benson are also
identified as Luthuli's secretaries. Oddly, Yengwa rarely, and Maponya almost never, appear in
documentary archives.
Ebrahim Mahomed and Goolam Suleman served as an accountant and secretary, respectively.
73 LM, "Sharing a Little ofE. V. and Chief's Life Story by Mr. Yunus Mahomed", presented at the Luthuli
Museum, GroutviIle, for "International Day for Sharing Life Stories", 15 May 2008, 2.
74 LM, Ebrahim Vally Mahomed Papers (EVMP), deposition from Yunus Mohamed to the Chairman ofthe
Truth and Reconciliation Committee that his father be "honoured in some way for their lifetime
contribution to the cause offreedom", 20 May 1997,2.
75 LM, "Sharing a Little ofE. V. and Chief's Life Story by Mr. Yunus Mahomed", 2.
76 Hooper subsequently sued the government and won. The government paid her a hefty £1,700 on a
technicality that found her detention unlawful. Hooper donated the amount to a very appreciative ANC.
ANC, "Testimony on Mrs. Marie (sic) Louise Hooper Before the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts ofthe
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, New York, 29 May 1967",4 and 7. Found at:
http://www.anc.org.zalun/hooper05-67.html. accessed 21 March 2008.
In this document her first name was incorrectly recorded as "Marie".
77 ANC, E. S. Reddy, ed., "ChiefLuthuli and the United Nations", 2.
www.anc.org.za/un/reddy/cluthuli.html. accessed 20 March 2008.
Reddy indicated that Hooper met Luthuli while she visited South Africa in 1956 with a tour group.
78 This claim that the ANC elected Hooper as it first white member is dubious. As the ANC allowed only
black members at the time and as membership in the ANC was voluntary (rather than elected), it is likely
that the ANC awarded Hooper with a 'honorary' membership.
Aluka, from Africa Action Archive, "About Mary-Louise Hooper, 1961", by the American Committee on
Africa, 100. Found at:
www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.55551AL.SFF .DOCUMENT.acoa000261, accessed
13 June 2008.
Hooper's election to the ANC in 1959 is also found in two ANC sponsored websites:
ANC, "ChiefLuthuli and the United Nations", 2.
"Testimony on Mrs. Marie (sic) Louise Hooper Before the Ad Hoc Working Group ofExperts", 1.
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ANC but also the Luthuli family for discretionary or emergency purposes. 79 Luthuli
personally invited Hooper to be a member ofLuthuli's staff in Oslo, Norway when he
received the Nobel Peace Prize. Luthuli's relationship with Hooper is another link with
non-violent allies that he would not disappoint.
After the ANC's banning, ANC members such as Mandela and Sisulu began
seriously contemplating violence as a means toward liberation. Independent African
countries had difficulty with the ANC's 'South African exceptionalist' doctrine.
Repudiating it, the PAC filled the solidarity niche, leaving the ANC isolated. This
dynamic is seen when in early 1962 Mandela embarked upon a whirlwind tour of
independent African states, hoping to drum up support for the ANC and in so doing
thwart the PAC's diplomatic monopoly maintained by its anti-ANC propaganda. In
Ethiopia, Mandela also received eight weeks of military training to qualify him as a
Commander-in-Chief.80 During this trip, Mandela felt the ANC's need for pan-African
assistance and that support could not be surrendered to the new PAC upstart. Mandela
returned to Natal and proposed a more Africanist stance within the ANC (although in
London when trying to convince YusufDadoo, he qualified the proposed change as one
of"image" and not "policy,,)81. Luthuli brushed the proposal aside, indicating the ANC
had chartered a given course for many decades. African leaders with pan-African
ideologies that dismiss the 'South African exceptionalist' condition were not going be
allowed to "dictate" ANC policy.82
Tambo also converted to certain aspects of the pan-African ideology; he had to.
The ANC appointed Tambo to establish the ANC in exile, preferably in Africa, and more
preferably in what would become known as the Frontline States bordering South Africa.
Initially Tambo ascribed to the 'South African exceptionalist' paradigm. Those who
subscribed to the 'South African exceptionalist' paradigm figured that a violent conflict
in South Africa would be catastrophic due to the permanency of both combatants and
79 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel # 1, correspondence from Luthuli to Mary-
Louise Hooper, 02 July 1956, 3.
In this correspondence, Luthuli asked Hooper: "1 am wondering, dear friend, if in this regard you could
allow us to use the money you sent to Nok for emergency to be used in putting all my lands under cane[?]".
80 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 362-3.
81 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 361-2.
82 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 370-1.
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would leave decades, if not centuries, of mistrust between them. For this very reason,
Tambo was "very upset" by and "opposed" the decision taken to embark upon violence,
even writing a correspondence to the South African leadership questioning the decision.83
Only when Mandela visited Tambo in Tanzania and convinced him ofthe ANC's
isolation in South Africa due to its illegal status and its increasing marginalisation in
Africa due to the rising popularity of the PAC, did Tambo acquiesce to the use of
violence.84 Tambo converted to an Africanist-Ieaning position because of his exile.
Luthuli, who remained in South Africa, held fast to a 'South African exceptionalist's'
understanding and its consequential non-violent methods for achieving liberation.8s
The Africanists' secession influenced Mandela in another manner. The
Africanists drew their ideology from Anton Lembede who was the precursor to Steve
Biko's Black Consciousness Movement. Lembede maintained, and the PAC resurrected,
the idea that the ANC's multiracial approach confused the masses and "de-fused" their
latent nationalist sentiments. Multi-racial alliances were perhaps appropriate for the
educated and elite Blacks, but the masses who had little if any 'racial-esteem' for
themselves, would never erupt and revolt in the manner that the PAC envisioned if in
their perception their black leadership was dependent upon white and Indian guidance
and trusteeship. Cooperation with other races, constitutional strategies, incremental and
compromising goals and a constant harping on non-violent strategies not only lacked
83 Interview with loe Matthews. Found in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 90.
Callinicos stated the exact opposite: "Tambo was well aware ofthe discussions going on inside South
Africa and was neither disturbed nor surprised by the turn of events".
Callinicos, Dliver Tambo, 281.
84 Callinicos, Dliver Tambo, 283.
Within Callinicos' text lies a silence. Between Callinicos' account ofthe launch of MK and Mandela's
visit to Tambo in Tanzania, Tambo's profound reservations and opposition to the turn to violence was not
mentioned. Callinicos wrote that only Mandela's visit and persuasive argument convinced Tambo to
change his position on an issue as fundamental as violence (284). According to the stewards ofMandela 's
historical legacy, Luthuli also reconciled himselfto the turn to violence when Mandela personally
persuaded him. I assert that such characterisations are simplistic and mask the high degree of contestation
that characterised the decision to embark upon violence.
85 The ANC in the later 1960s grudgingly accepted the South African exceptionalist doctrine: "South
Africa's social and economic structure and the relationships which it generates are perhaps unique...What
makes the structure unique and adds to its complexity is that the exploiting nation is not, as in the classical
imperialist relationships, situated in a geographically distinct mother country, but is settled within the
borders".
African National Congress, Forward to Freedom: Documents on the National Policies ofthe African
National Congress ofSouth Africa, (Morogoro: ANC, n.d.).
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sufficient emotional appeal to stir the masses, but they anesthetised them, lulling them
into a stupor and making them ripe for white supremacists' abuses.
Luthuli's close associations with white Christian liberals did not compromise his
political decisions; they did, however, make it exceedingly difficult to retreat from them.
Black Sash's payment of Luthuli's fine did not later obligate him to refuse to support
violence. Luthuli's stay in the Brinks' home and his friendship with Anglican clerics did
not render him a puppet or sell-out to white liberal interests. Luthuli's physician and
friend, American Board doctor AIan Taylor, did not enforce any quidpro quo covenant
regarding political policy and medical care. Though Hooper donated money and a
vehicle to the Luthuli family, he was not ideologically indebted to her or to the ACOA.
Rather, Luthuli's personal views concerning the use of violence resonated with the views
of his political and spiritual benefactors and his views on the use of violence combined
with his allegiance and respect for those of the same spirit dissuaded him from
'converting' to the use of violence as did Mandala, Tambo, Kotane, Yengwa, Nokwe and
others.
When an opportunity arose to pressure LuthuIi to bow to white liberal Christian
political concerns in return for political solidarity, funds or friendship, Luthuli firmly
declined. For example, a lengthy correspondence dated 02 July 1956 to Luthuli from
Mary-Louise Hooper, showed that Luthuli could remain steadfast to his convictions. 86 In
previous correspondences before the Treason Trial, Hooper suggested to Luthuli that the
ANC consider disposing of its attorneys with left wing or Communist sympathies.
Luthuli perceived that Hooper suggested that funds for defence lawyers could be better
procured if those lawyers were not Communists. Not wishing to jeopardise his
relationship with Hooper or the funds she raised and donated, Luthuli considered the
matter very seriously in his correspondence to her and laboriously explained the non-
viability of changing defence attorneys. Demonstrating his democratic nature, Luthuli
discussed Hooper's proposal confidentially with Yengwa and Letele. All three arrived at
an understanding that LuthuIi articulated to Hooper. First, Luthuli carefully explained
that the ANC National Working Committee and the National Executive Committee
86 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to
Hooper, 02 July 1956,2.
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detennined the selection of attorneys. Luthuli confided that he "could bring [his] opinion
and weight to bear on the consideration of any new attorneys or advocates if a need arose
but the decision would be a majority decision of the Executive or the Working
Committee". Luthuli made it clear that a change must be made for "good reason" and
that he knew of no valid reason to create a crisis in either body. Second, Luthuli
intimated that since the Defiance Campaign, the ANC utilised the services of the best
attorneys, regardless of their political leanings. Luthuli argued that "only professional
ability and sympathy with the cause should be our CRITERION" (Luthuli's emphasis).
Luthuli made a rarely articulated confession when he wrote "I do not like Communists",
but continued to focus on principles, "but it would look strange that we work with [the]
Congress of Democrats that is predominantly - not wholly -leftist and make an issue of
leftism when it comes to a purely professional matter where such consideration should
come least". Third, Luthuli qualified that not all the lawyers were Communist. Many
were non-leftists. Fourth, Luthuli revealed that in South Africa the legal society did not
discriminate against leftist or ex-Communist members of the bar. Fifth and finally,
Luthuli explained to Hooper that it was crucial to hire lawyers sympathetic to the cause
with a sound political background in the struggle. Luthuli clearly stated that he hoped
Hooper did not make attorneys' political views a condition for the donation of funds.
Luthuli closed frankly:
I hope you are not feeling so strongly on this matter as to make it a
condition of your giving us the money you are raising. I would infonn
you as a friend that I would not refer this matter to colleagues in the
Executive until I know what your attitude is after this lengthy explanation.
If you should have strings tied to the donation, I am afraid - but in all
honesty I must tell you - that the ANC would regretfully decline it. God
knows that we appreciate your services very much and we need every
penny of the money you may raise but it must not be under conditions that
humiliate us and do hann to our panel of defence lawyers in order to
qualify for donation from our rightist friends. My policy is that we must
make friends from both the West and the East and take from each what is
good for us so long as we are not called upon to violate the principles on
which we are prosecuting our Freedom Struggle. 87
87 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47 (CAMP MF 2914), reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to
Hooper, 02 July 1956,3.
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On 31 August, the government lifted the State of Emergency. September through
December proved less climactic after the electrifying events of March. In September, the
ANC's National Executive met and resolved to continue the struggle underground. The
government's more repressive laws rendered the ANC's highly democratic constitution
and President-General inoperable. Mandela explained that the ANC as a whole had to be
streamlined.88 Conferences, branch meetings and public gatherings could no longer be
held. The ANC National Executive dissolved subordinate entities such as the Youth
League and the Women's League despite their resistance and even disobedience. 89 The
political context forced the ANC to operate illegally and thus clandestinely. It was
agreed that Mandela would operate full-time underground and activate the M-Plan
(Mandela Plan), formulated in the early 1950s in case the state banned ANC. The
M-Plan depended upon 'cells' often households and 'zones' of cells that would report to
local branches. With this organisational structuring, decisions made by the leadership
could be efficiently directed to the constituency.9o
Z. K. Matthews, the final defence witness, began his testimony in the Treason
Trial in October 1960. On 05 October, white South Africans voted in a referendum to
become a republic. In November, the government declared a State of Emergency in
eastern Pondoland and other areas of the Transkei due to violent unrest. The repressive
measures in Pondoland were the last events that Luthuli commented upon in the epilogue
of his autobiography and hence one can safely conclude that during the beginning of
1961 Luthuli completed the dictation of his autobiography to his amanuenses, Charles
and Sheila Hooper.91 The Hoopers added to an already very long list of white, liberal and
ecclesiastic friends and thus reinforced a prominent Christocentric thesis of this study.
88 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 301.
89 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 75.
90 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 166-9.
91 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 228.
Charles and Sheila Hooper are no relation to Mary-Louise Hooper. Luthuli appreciated their assistance in
the writing of his autobiography in his preface (xxv-xxvi). An Anglican priest, Charles served a parish near
Zeerust and wrote the very moving book BriefAuthority about the Apartheid regime's oppression of
indigenous people. Charles wrote the book in the same spirit as Trevor Huddleston who authored Naught
for Your Comfort following the forced removals from Sophiatown.
Charles Hooper, BriefAuthority (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960).
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Luthuli characterised his relationship with them in much the same manner as he did with
dozens of others:
... out of our first meeting there has grown up a deep and abiding
friendship, born of a common outlook in facing the tragedy threatening
our common homeland, and a common belief in the relevance of the
Christian Faith to our problems and needs, however complex.92
In November 1960, the press began to report nominations for Luthuli to win the
Nobel Peace Prize.93 A former Swedish missioner with the Church of Sweden Mission,
Gunnar Helander, led these advocacy efforts. While serving the Natal Missionary
Conference and the South African Institute of Race Relations, Luthuli began a long
friendship with Helander. Helander admired, cooperated with and supported Luthuli
longer than anyone else (save John Reuling who associated himself with Luthuli from
1927 until at least the mid-1960's). Helander served as a missioner in South Africa from
1938 until 1956. During his time in South Africa, Helander denounced the Apartheid
system in word and deed. In 1956, Helander returned to Sweden on furlough and wrote
against Apartheid in both the Swedish and South African press. In 1957, this provocation
led the South African government to deny Helander a visa to re-enter South Africa. From
1949 until 1959, Helander published on average one anti-Apartheid novel per year, the
first being Zulu Meets the White Man.94 Subsequent to his return Sweden, Helander
introduced the human rights crisis in South Africa to the Swedish public resulting in the
South African government's concern. Helander positively reflected the history, strategy
and goals of the ANC and lobbied students, unions and government for its support.
Through Helander's leadership on the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression,
Sweden contributed the largest amount of funds to the International Defence and Aid
Fund to which Luthuli expressed much gratitude.95 As will be elaborated upon in chapter
92 Luthuli, Let My People Go, xxvi.
93 Star, "Nobel Prize: More Support for Luthuli", 02 November 1960.
94 Gunner Helander, Zulu Moter Vit Man (Stockholm: Sv. Kyrkans Diakonnistyrelses BokfOrlag, 1949).
95 Joseph, JfThis Be Treason, 7-9.
Luthuli wrote the foreword to Joseph's book. Chapter five quotes an excerpt.
African National Congress, "Message to the Reverend Canon L. John Collins, Christian Action, London,
1964" from Luthuli. Found at:
ANC, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/lutuli/msglondon1964.html. accessed on 25 June 2008.
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five, Helander initiated the motivation for Luthuli to be the Nobel Peace Prize winner,
accompanied him to Norway and probed him on his willingness to seek asylum there
after accepting the Prize.
As one of his first acts following his return to Groutville, Luthuli wrote much
correspondence inviting various prominent African leaders to the Interdenominational
African Ministers' Conference to be held 16-17 December 1960 in Orlando. With the
State of Emergency lifted, this conference of the remaining un-banned African activists
gathered to assess the way forward. Luthuli could not attend the Conference due to his
banning despite being a convener. Before the police raided the Conference and
confiscated all its documents, the Conference expressed a need for unity among the
liberation movements and the need for "effective use of non-violent pressures against
apartheid".96 The gathering resolved to sponsor an All-In African Conference scheduled
for March 1961 in Pietermaritzburg. The Interdenominational African Ministers'
Conference and the All-In African Conference proved to be the dying last 'kicks' of the
liberation movement's official non-violent policy. At this time, Luthuli feared the non-
violent movement would expire. In a 13 December 1960 correspondence to Q. Whyte of
the South African Institute of Race Relations and three hundred other prominent Whites
throughout South Africa, advocating that pressure be brought on the government to
legalise the ANC, Luthuli warned:
The great danger is to allow a political vacuum to continue. When a
legitimate national organisation is banned, anything may take its place.
Uncontrolled and undisciplined movements may be formed and terrorism
• 97mayanse.
Callinicos named the same circumscribed collective (Sisulu, Nokwe and
Mandela) who provided crisis leadership and directed the ANC during the 1960 State of
96 Resolutions, Adopted by the Consultative Conference of the African Leaders, and Cables, Sent by the
Conference to the United Nations and to Oliver Tambo, 16-17 December 1960. Found in:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge 3, 626.
97 UW, WCL, SAIRR, AD 2182, Section F, item 8, correspondence from Luthuli to Q. Whyte,
13 December 1960.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/3/7/1, correspondence to Peter Brown from Luthuli, 13 December 1960. Also
found at LM.
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Says: 'End Ban on A. N. C. and P. A. C.''', by Benjamin Pogrund, 09 December
1960.
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Emergency to be among those who following the May 1961 strike evaluated that the
"movement's traditional weapons ofprotest...were no longer appropriate" and who "for
many nights ...discussed and carefully assessed the extent to which conditions for armed
struggle were favourable".98 Elaine Reinertsen summarised the state of the ANC and the
events that led to a quiet 'coup' against Luthuli as follows:
It is more than likely that the ANC, devastated by police repression, the
Treason Trial and the State of Emergency, exhausted by extensive mass
campaigning in the 1950s, and taken off guard by its banning in 1960, was
on the point of collapse. The 'Old Guard' could put up little resistance
when the initiative was seized by the militant wing of the National
Executive. The Continuation Committee was dominated by Youth
leaguers and communists; with Luthuli at Groutville, the way was open for
the implementation of a new revolutionary ideology.99
Conclusion
The Sharpeville massacre was the beginning of the end of Luthuli's influence
within the ANC and the liberation movement. A number of wedges pushed Luthuli away
from his lieutenants. First, on the morning of the Sharpeville massacre, the Golden City
Post published Luthuli's, to many, humiliating appeal to a white constituency wherein
Luthuli confided: 'Blacks cannot manage without the Whites in South Africa'. Second,
the PAC perceived in the ANC and Luthuli a pandering to white "bosses". The PAC
accused the ANC of following the dictates of liberal politicians, clergy and press in the
prosecution of the liberation struggle. The emotive accusation convinced Mandela,
Nokwe, Sisulu and others to compete with the PAC's militancy by increasing the ANC's.
This chapter revealed that Luthuli's white liberal and Christian allies ideologically
insulated him, thus affirming his opposition to violence that risked a likely race war.
While Luthuli was sequestered in a white suburban home, his private cell and the prison's
hospital ward, his lieutenants in much harsher conditions agreed to plan for the use of
violence. Luthuli testified in court that he would oppose violence while at the same time
those under him planned for it. Sharpeville did not radicalise Luthuli, for he received
98 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 283.
99 Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 23.
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immense support and hospitality from many of those he praised in his autobiography:
Taylor, Brink, Reeves, Parkington, de Villiers, Junod and Reynecke. In 1960, Luthuli
worked with the Hoopers on his autobiographical manuscripts, had his fine paid by the
Black Sash and recuperated at an Anglican retreat centre. Luthuli hailed Scott,
Huddleston and Collins for their financial benevolence. Helander lobbied European
legislators for Luthuli to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. No doubt due to her close
association with Luthuli, Mary-Louise Hooper became an honorary ANC member, even
representing it overseas.
Associations alone did not prejudice others' conceptualisation ofLuthu1i as their
leader. Rather, this chapter concludes that following his sentence for burning his pass,
Luthuli's reluctant decision not to issue a statement advocating that all strive to abolish
passes "without flinching" diminished his reputation. Unofficially, Luthuli's political
fate mirrored Xuma and Moroka's when the ANCYL relieved him of the burden of
leadership on the basis that he was not as resolved as he was when he issued "The Road
to Freedom" statement. Luthuli's failure to issue the 1960 statement indicated to others
in the ANC that he was not prepared to advance further and rendered him obsolete.
Benson stated, "With Luthuli's blessing, ... Mandela had been chosen to lead at this
hazardous time". 100
This chapter qualifies the above prejudice by clarifying that perception rather than
reality diminished Luthu1i's reputation. Luthuli's correspondence with Mary-Louise
Hooper regarding the retaining of Communist attorneys conveys that Luthuli's close
relationships with white liberal Christians were not indicative of his subservience to
them. Rather, their similar, though not identical, theological and philosophical
foundations united them. Luthuli did not compromise his convictions to appease his and
the ANC's benefactors. Nonetheless, in politics, perception is everything. Luthuli's
close associations and perceived lack of resolve instigated a silent coup within the ANC
whereby the ANCYL and the Communists decided the ANC's political future. As the
following chapter informs, that future would be determined in the 1961 decisions to form
and launch MK.
100 Benson, Nelson Mandela, 97.
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Chapter 5
The Tempo Quickens l
... it should be borne in mind that even people involved in the same event
remember the details differently, and amnesia is no friend of accuracy.
-- Ahmed Kathrada2
Introduction
This chapter continues where chapter four concluded and narrates the events of
1961 as they relate to Luthuli and the ANC's turn to violence. The May Strike convinced
Mandela that the government made the turn to violence inevitable while the same month
the Christopher Gell a~ard convinced Luthuli that moderate white liberal leaders could
still enable political sanity to prevail. This chapter examines Mandela's own evaluations
of the May strike to conclude that he prematurely abandoned it. Therefore, this study
disputes the ANC's utilisation of the May strike's 'failure' as a pretext to abandon non-
violent methods.
Luthuli and Mandela's views clashed in July 1961. After much protestation on
his part, Luthuli very reluctantly yielded to the Congresses' Joint Executive resolution to
form an armed movement for which Mandela successfully advocated. This chapter
explains that Luthuli did not support or agree to embark upon violence, but rather after
two exhausting nights of argument only yielded to a consensus decision to form MK.
Luthuli's request for further deliberation, his insistence that MK must be separate from
the ANC and his appeal that non-violent political mass action continue to be emphasised
affirm this conclusion. Furthermore, this chapter reinterprets that the cause of Mandela's
disconcerting January 1962 conversation with Luthuli was MK's unauthorised launch and
1 The title of Luthuli's autobiographical postscript is "The Tempo Quickens" (215). Luthuli wrote the
postscript following the 1960 Sharpeville shootings and State of Emergency and before the March 1961
'" All-In Africa Conference". Former President Thabo Mbeki used the same title for the inaugural
Albert Luthuli Memorial Lecture on 20 March 2004 at the University ofKwaZulu-Natal.
2 Kathrada, Memoirs, 142.
Here, Kathrada referred specifically to discrepancies that appear in accounts of MK's role in the struggle.
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its Manifesto's declaration that traditional methods ofresistance has expired and that a
new road is being forged. 3
Though Luthuli yielded to the decision to form MK, soon thereafter the context
dramatically altered, and his position strengthened when the Nobel Committee
announced in October that he had received the Nobel Peace Prize. In his mind, Luthuli's
sentiments against violence now became far more persuasive. This chapter explains that,
for Luthuli, the award removed the strategic cul-de-sac Mandela insisted existed; 'The
Road to Freedom Via the Cross' re-opened. The October announcement and reception of
the Nobel Peace Prize reinvigorated Luthuli's public opposition to the preparation for
violence. This chapter and overall study refutes the ANC's assertion that Mandela
convinced Luthuli of the need for violence or that Luthuli forgot he had been convinced.
Despite the Congresses' decision and Luthuli's participation in it, from October, Luthuli
strove through every public statement to forestall that which he feared: Mandela's
activation ofMK. On 16 December 1961 on the heels ofLuthuli's return from Norway,
Mandela unexpectedly launched MK without the ANC's approval thus ignoring Luthuli's
repeated pleas to allow non-violent methods to be bolstered by publicity gained by the
Nobel Peace Prize. This chapter challenges a homogenised ANC history that ignores the
internal contestation regarding violence within the ANC amongst its two leaders before
and after the July 1961 decision to form MK and concludes that by launching MK,
Mandela usurped Luthuli.
All-In Africa Conference
Prospects for continued non-violent methods dimmed in 1961 following
the United Nations General Secretary Dag Hammarskjold's disappointing visit in
January, Verwoerd's withdrawal of South Africa's application to join the Commonwealth
on 15 March and the balkanisation of the liberation movement prior to the March 25-26
All-African Conference. During this time, the Treason Trial still loomed. On 23 March,
Judge Frans Rumpffinterrupted the defence's fourth week of its final argument led by
3 Though occurring very early in 1962, I intentionally include Mandela's visit to Luthuli at the end of the
1961 chronology as Luthuli' s disconcerting comments were directly related to MK's launch and hence the
two events are imbricated.
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Bram Fischer and adjourned. Because Mandela's ban expired on 25 March, he
anticipated attending and speaking at the All-In-Africa Conference in Pietermaritzburg
during the court recess. Before Mandela departed for Pietermaritzburg, the ANC
National Working Committee (NWC) met secretly, presumably in Gauteng, to discuss
strategy. Luthuli had long since returned to his house arrest in Groutville following his
Treason Trial testimony and being found guilty and released for burning his pass.
Luthuli could not have been present to discuss strategy while waiting for the Treason
Trial verdict just as he was unlikely to have participated in the September 1960 ANC
National Executive Committee (NEe) that agreed to send Mandela underground.
The All-In Africa Conference hosted 1,400 attendees from as many as 145
organisations, most of which, following the government's culling and the participants'
own boycott of the Conference, represented peripheral forces in the liberation struggle.4
. Nonetheless, the All-In Africa Conference proved to be the last mass movement
gathering organised by a collection of prominent liberation struggle leaders for many
decades. Tom Lodge appropriately entitled his chapter on this period, "The Making of a
Messiah". With a surprise entrance, an inspiring physical presence, an impassioned main
address and a stealthy departure, Mandela sensationalised the event. Those gathered
perceived Mandela as the new dynamic and more militant leader of the liberation
struggle. Jordan Ngubane complained that the leaders ofthe Conference deliberately
sidelined Luthuli to Mandela's advantage. 5 Though participants sang at least one song
about the General-President, "Spread the Gospel ofLuthuli", one media representative,
Benjamin Pogrund, reported in Contact that Mandela was the "star of the show".6 Elaine
Reinertsen rightly discerned that "ChiefLuthuli remained President-General until his
death, but real leadership had passed to Mandela by 1961 ".7 The Conference resolved to
issue an ultimatum to the government, through a National Action Council led by
Mandela, calling for a national convention of multi-racial representatives to determine a
4 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 357-8.
5 Lodge, Mandela, 84, see endnote 10,237. Lodge cited:
Jordan Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New Yark: Frederick Praeger, 1963), 172.
6 Sampson, Mandela, 142.
Lodge, Mandela, 84, see endnote 8, 237. Lodge cited:
Contact (Cape Town), 06 April 1961.
7 Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 23.
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new democratic constitution. The Conference required the government's response by 31
May, the day South Africa became a republic. Not expecting the demand to be met, the
Conference also resolved "to stage country wide demonstrations on the eve of the
proclamation of the Republic".8
Following the Conference, Mandela left Pietermaritzburg to report to Luthuli in
Groutville before travelling back to Pretoria to hear the Treason Trial ruling.9 On
29 March, Judge Franz Rumpff, representing a panel of three judges, announced a
unanimous ruling: 'not guilty'. After more than four years in court, the authorities
discharged the defendants. The ANC's consistent and passionate teaching and
implementation of non-violent strategies determined the essential basis of the defence's
innocence. Luthuli responded to the verdict as "a timely upholding of the rule oflaw in
our country". Luthuli further quipped:
[The ruling] has given a lie (sic) to insistent and malicious propaganda that
has presented us as Communists, insurgents and what not, intent on
overthrowing the Government by violence when all we wanted was our
inherent right to participate fully in governing the country. 10
In his foreword to Helen Joseph's book on the Treason Trial entitled IfThis Be
Treason, Luthuli highlighted several themes that are examined in more depth in chapters
four and six.
The Trial has been an inestimable blessing because it forged together
diverse men of goodwill of all races who rallied to the support of the
Treason Trial Fund and to keep up the morale ofthe accused. What would
have been the plight of the accused without our Bishop Reeves,
Alan Paton, Dr. Hellman, Canon Collins, Alex Hepple, Christian Action,
Archbishop de Blank and Archbishop Hurley and all the other loyal men
and women [without] whose help and co-operation, chaos would have
prevailed in our ranks? We shudder to think even of the prospect of how
we would have fared if they had not come forward. In all humility I can
say that if there is one thing which helped push our movement along non-
racial lines, away from narrow, separative (sic) racialism, it is the Treason
8 "Resolutions of the All-In African Conference in Pietermaritzburg", 25-26 March 1961. Found in:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 632.
9 Benson, Nelson Mandela, 81.
10 Publication unknown, "Treason Trial Verdict- 'Law Upheld"', 30 March 1961.
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Trial, which showed the depth of the sincerity and devotion to a noble
cause on the white side of the colour line.... 11
Since Sharpeville and the State of Emergency, Mandela and Luthuli looked in
divergent directions in response to the noose placed around domestic politics.
Sympathetic to pan-Africanist sentiments, Mandela discerned that liberation would more
likely spring from black nationalist forces represented by organisations such as the anti-
White Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) that
PAC the greatly intluenced. 12 Sympathetic to liberal sentiments, Luthuli adhered more to
an exceptionalist doctrine that viewed like-minded Christian Whites to be essential in
bringing about liberation.
These above views can be seen in Mandela and Luthuli' s differing concepts of a
'[South Africa] United Front' (UF) organisation. Mandela declared at the All-In
Conference that future "'militant campaigns' would be aided by external pressures that
would be generated by the South African (sic) United Front abroad". 13 In exile, Tambo
formed the UF in 1960 as a coalition of liberation movements that would cooperate
internationally to politically and economically fight the Apartheid regime. The UF
eventually included the PAC, the ANC, the South West African People's Organisation
(SWAPO), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the South West African
National Union (SWANU), a then up-and-coming movement in South West Africa. 14
The UF collapsed due to the PAC's antagonistic presence soon after the 1961 All-In
Africa Conference. In 1962, Luthuli re-conceptualised the UF as a multi-racial coalition
11 Joseph, JfThis Be Treason, 8-9.
12 SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 433.
This is not to say that Mandela agreed with those sentiments and thus was also was anti-White.
13 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 358.
As a matter ofpolicy at this time, Mandela's reference to "militant campaigns" did not include violence.
"The South Africa United Front which [Tambo] established ... was based of course on non-violence".
Interview with Joe Matthews. Found in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy, I: 90, see footnote 138.
One ANC document confusingly refers to the "United Front" as the Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker Pact ofthe
1940s and the Joint Congresses of the 1950s.
ANC-Norway, ANC 1912-1993 (Oslo: African National Congress, 1993), 12.
Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 266.
14 The South African Indian Congress represented by YusufDadoo was the only non-Black organisation.
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of individual leaders, many of whom were Christian, white and liberal - and most
importantly - opposed to violence. ls
In addition to viewing the support of the rest of the African continent as a
significant component in the liberation struggle as did the PAC, Mandela became more
critical of domestic, liberal and Christian calls for moderation and thus non-violence.
Liberals and white newspaper editors often criticised the upcoming Stay-at-Home
campaign that was to coincide with Republic Day and the expected failure of the
government to initiate a national convention. In a March 1961 article entitled "The
Struggle for a National Convention", Mandela wrote:
In the past we have been astonished by the reaction of certain political
parties and "philanthropic" associations which proclaimed themselves to
be anti-apartheid but which, nevertheless, consistently opposed positive
action taken by the oppressed people to defeat this same policy.
Objectively, such an attitude can only serve to defend white domination
and to strengthen the National Party. It also serves to weaken the impact
of liberal views amongst European democrats and lays them open to the
charge of being hypocritical. I
An increasingly exasperated tone continued in a correspondence by Mandela to the leader
of the United Party on 23 May urging the party to declare its stance on a national
convention. Mandela bluntly conveyed the choice: "Talk it out, or shoot it out".!7
IS Luthuli indicated who he would like to include in the United Front: Ex-Chief Justices, Hon. Mr. Albert
van der Sandt Centlivres and the Hon. Mr. Henry Fagan, Sir David Pieter de VilIiers Graaff(the same to
whom Mandela wrote, "Talk it out, or shoot it out".), Dr. Jan Steytler, Dr. Alan Paton ofthe Liberal Party,
Rev. Z. R. Mahabane of the Interdenominational African Ministers' Federation (IDAMF), Dr. G. M.
Naicker, President ofthe South African Indian Congress (SAIC), Mr. P. R. Pather, President of the South
African Indian Organisation (SAIO), Paramount Chief of Abatembu, Sabata Dalindyebo (the same who
Luthuli criticised in September 1959), Or. R. E. van der Ross of the Coloured Convention Movement,
Archbishop Dennis Hurley, Archbishop Joost de Blank, Mr. Basson, Mr. Leon Levy, President ofthe South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), Mr. L. C. Scheepers, President of the Trade Union Congress
(TUC), Canon Alpheus Zulu, J. N. Singh, banned Vice-President of the SAle.
New Age, '''Form United Front Now': Interview, Cape Town, 24 May 1962. Found at:
ANC, "Albert Luthuli - Various Items", found at: www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/lutuli/lutuli8.html.16-7.
see footnote 13 on page 19, accessed on 04 April 2008.
16 Mandela, "The Struggle for a National Convention", March 1961.
Excerpt from an unidentified article. Found in:
Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr., eds. Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: The
Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990, A Documentary Survey (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991),96.
17 Correspondence to Sir de Villiers Graafffrom Nelson Mandela, calling on the United Party to support a
national convention, 23 May 1961. Found in:
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Christopher Gell Memorial Award
Even before Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize was announced, he received
humanitarian awards for his prophetic non-violent stance against injustice. In May 1961,
the committee of the inaugural 1961 Christopher Gell Memorial Award for the
Outstanding Contribution to Social Justice in South Africa in 1960 announced that
Luthuli earned the honour. Gell was a disabled British journalist who advocated for
democracy, irrespective of race colour or creed. 18 The Gell announcement prior to, as
well as the Nobel announcement shortly after, the fateful July Joint Congresses meeting
at which the decision to form MK took place weighed on Luthuli' s conscious when being
lobbied to contradict all he for so long preached and what so many others praised him for
preaching: non-violence.
The composition of the Gell Memorial Award committee affirms chapter four's
thesis that Luthuli endeared himselfto domestic and international liberal Whites
sympathetic with the liberation movement's goals. Members of the committee
unsurprisingly consisted of sympathetic white liberals: Gell's widow, Bishop Trevor
Huddleston, the Archbishop of Cape Town Joost de Blank, Anthony Sampson,
Rabbi Andre Ungar, Patrick Duncan and Prof. Leo Kuper. 19 Luthuli applied to the
Commissioner of Police for permission to attend. By 16 May, the Minister of Justice,
F. C. Erasmus, denied the request,20 Due to Luthuli's inability to travel to Port Elizabeth,
the Gell committee postponed the scheduled 31 May ceremony. On 22 October, a day
before the Nobel committee announced his Peace Prize, Luthuli received in absentia the
Christopher Gell award during a belated ceremony. Forum printed a copy ofLuthuli's
acceptance speech, delivered by Yengwa on his behalf. In his acceptance of the award,
Luthuli reminded his audience:
Johns and Davis, Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress, 100.
Benson, Nelson Mandela, 84-8.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 635.
18 For years Gell struggled on an iron-lung and died on 31 May 1958.
19 Publication unknown, "Luthuli Wants to Go to P. E.: Ex-Chiefs Republic Day Appeal to Police",
07 May 1961.
20 Publication unknown, "Luthuli Cannot Go to P. E.", 16 May 1961.
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The government has shown in recent years and months - during the State
of Emergency last year and the Twilight Emergency during May this year,
and through ministerial pronouncements - that it is arming itself to the
teeth against an unarmed people who throughout their struggle have
indicated by word and action their desire for a peaceful accommodation of
their aspirations by those presently in power. 21
Surprisingly, Luthuli stated that neither Sharpeville nor the May Strike engendered cause
for disillusionment. Rather Luthuli identified such a demonstration of physical strength
through the threat of violence as reason to "be encouraged, for it is a product of fear and
not courage".22
May Strike
Similar to the All-In Convention, a determination of whether the 28-31 May strike
(euphemistically referred to as a 'Stay-at-Home') succeeded depends on one's
perspective. Also like the All-In Convention, given the degree of internal division
(between the PAC and the ANC), the profound lengths the state took to counter any form
of non-violent protest and the greatly inhibited capacity of the ANC to mobilise, organise
and advertise the Stay-at-Home, it is a wonder any success could be claimed. What is
clear is that Mandela was in charge of the protest action from Johannesburg. This study
need not analyse the events of the Stay-at-Home as other sources do so more
adequately.23 Suffice to say, the government implemented unprecedented measures,
collectively amounting to a preparation for war, to stifle the Stay-at-Home. The
government prepared itself to use the threat of overwhelming force to quell the protest.
What the government and the liberation forces failed to consider at the time was
that another Sharpeville might very well have been the beginning of the end for the
21 LM, Yengwa, MYP, "Speech ofa Nobel Prize-Winner: The Gell Memorial Address by
A. J. Luthuli", Forum, November 1961, 7.
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA, 78/46-47 (CAMP MF 2914), Reel # 1, "Address on the Occasion of
ChristopherGell Memorial Award to A. J. Luthuli", 21 October 1961,1-3.
Daily News, "Presentation of Award to Mr. Luthuli", 08 May 1961.
22 LM, Yengwa, MYP, "Speech ofa Nobel Prize-Winner", Forum, November 1961,7.
23 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 77-80.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 319-20.
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 361-4.
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government. Another Sharpeville would cause the world to clearly understand that the
forces of democracy possessed the moral high ground - or, the only moral ground.
International solidarity with the oppressed majority would have moved quickly from
denunciatory declarations to concrete measurers to ostracise South Africa. An additional
dramatic public relations disaster involving violence against unarmed demonstrators
would have in the short to medium-term likely pushed the South African government to
the brink of collapse in the wake of economic disinvestment, negative public relations
with international bodies, trade boycotts, sanctions, and sports, academic and cultural
exclusions. After Sharpeville, the United States, the Commonwealth, the United Nations
(95 to 1) and numerous other countries in Asia and Africa clearly denounced the white
supremacist government - all before the Nobel committee announced Luthuli's Nobel
Peace Prize. As long as the ANC remained non-violent, South Africa would rapidly
become an international pariah. Another demonstration ofthe government's use of brutal
force in the face of non-violent protest had the capability to tip the balance ofpower
towards the democratic movement as it did just briefly after Sharpeville when the
government suspended the pass laws.
On the second day of the Stay-at-Home, Mandela, "demoralised" and "angry" by
SABC reports that all was normal, inexplicably and incredibly called off the campaign.24
Mandela then told a Rand Daily Mail's reporter, Benjamin Pogrund, that the days of non-
violent struggle were over.25 Mandela's rationale for impetuously calling off the strike is
perplexing.26 In his autobiography, Mandela remembered characterising to the press the
people's adherence to the Stay-At-Home as "magnificent" and lauded them for "defying
unprecedented intimidation by the state".27 Even months after the event, Mandela
appraised the Stay-at-Home to be a success. In an article entitled "Out of the Strike"
excerpted from Africa South-in-Exile, Mandela reported proudly:
24 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 319.
25 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 319.
26 Karis and Carter note that "Mandela wrote a detailed analysis of the stay-at-home that was issued in
June 1961".
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 378. See footnote 230.
Ruth First, ed., No Easy Walk to Freedom: Articles, Speeches and Trial Addresses o/Nelson Mandela
(Heinemann: London, 1965), 94-106.
Johns and Davis, Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress, 103-106.
27 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 319.
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Without a doubt, this campaign remained an impressive demonstration of
the strength of our organisation, of the high level of political
consciousness attained by our people, and of their readiness to struggle
against the most intimidating odds...There were those who cried: "The
strike has failed. It was against the Saracen Republic. It did not bring it
down" ... Only the most naIve and impatient can believe that a single
campaign will create a wholly different South Africa...The May strike
was one fighting episode. From it, the people emerged more confident,
unshaken by prognosis that they failed, that strikes could "no longer
work".28
If Mandela assessed the Stay-at-Home in this manner long after the event, his
calling-off of the campaign can be considered a tactical blunder. If Mandela determined
that the people we~e "more confident" that strikes could work, then the justification to
resort to violence based on an abandoned failed strike is questionable. The Associated
Press reported that ninety percent of buses in Johannesburg were empty at 09:00,
Monday, 29 May.29 The Post reported:
Many thousands of workers registered their protest against the Republic
and the government's refusal to cooperate with non-Whites. THEY DID
NOT GO TO WORK. They disrupted much of South African commerce
and industry. Some factories worked with skeleton staffs, others closed,
and many other businesses were shut down for three days" (emphasis
original).30
The New York Times reported that half the city's labour force had stayed away from
work?l The police later admitted to sixty percent absenteeism in the Johannesburg
area.32 New Age claimed in a leading article that it was the biggest national strike on a
political issue ever staged in South African history".33 The Stay-at-Home successfully
28 Africa South-in-Exile, "Out of the Strike", by Nelson Mandela, October-December 1961. Found in:
Johns and Davis, Mandela. Tambo and the African National Congress, 104.
29 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 363.
30 Post, 03 June 1961. Cited in:
Africa South-in-Exile, "Out of the Strike", by Nelson Mandela, October-December 1961.
31 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 362-3.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 319.
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 79.
32 Benson, Mandela, 86.
33 New Age, 08 June 1961. Cited by:
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eclipsed the recognition and celebration of Republic Day. Yet, with no reported public
violence and with some limited success, Mandela, disappointed and angry, halted the
protest based on pessimistic media reports.34 According to Govan Mbeki, those adhering
to the protest in Sophiatown were incensed by the reversal and "descend[ed] on the
Executive".35
Mandela prematurely called off the strike. Stay-at-homes and strikes required
momentum to be built. ANC protest tradition from the 1949 Programme of Action to the
1952 Defiance Campaign to the 1960 Anti-Pass Campaign required carefully timed and
incremental action, climaxing at a pre-planned crescendo. Only when public violence
had erupted and/or when substantive momentum halted after a prolonged period, such as
in the waning months of the Defiance Campaign, did ANC leaders extinguish earlier
campaigns.
Events in the Eastern Cape lend credence to the notion that the May strike was
growing momentum. The protest only began to take effect by the time Mandela called
off the strike as Port Elizabeth experienced a seventy-five percent absentee rate. Mbeki
recalled being dumbfounded, taking it for granted, not 'seriously' as did Mandela, that
the press would issue reports to intentionally dampen the spirit of protest. In his post-
strike analysis, Mandela coyly confessed his naIvete by relating, "Only after those first
tense strike days had passed were more balanced assessments made of the extent of the
strike" and "the people themselves learnt that they could not trust any verdict on their
struggle but their own".36 The movement in the Eastern Cape defied the NEC and, for
the first time, used petrol bombs to force buses to return to their depots preventing the
transport of workers to their places of employment. Many months later, Mandela
claimed in his post-strike analysis that:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 364. See footnote 226, 378.
34 Although, Mandela rightfully asserted that "During the strike in May last year the police went from
house to house, beating-up Africans and driving them to work".
Mandela, "Address to Conference ofthe Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa",
excepted from an address in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 1962. Found in:
Johns and Davis, Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress, 109.
35 Interview with Govan Mbeki. Found in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 79-80.
36 Africa South-in-Exile, "Out ofthe Strike", by Nelson Mandela, October-December 1961.
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Support for the strike grew stronger and stronger every day, and the
demand for a national convention roared and crashed across the country.37
Notwithstanding Mandela's anger and disillusionment at the time of the strike, there was
a substantive (if not "magnificent") response to the protest; the protest gained momentum
and the government committed no horrific incidents of violence. If the non-violent
method that was the Stay-at-Home did not succeed, it was not sufficiently utilised or
organised to enable its success. On the day Mandela called off the Stay-at-Home, he
twice during press interviews issued a grave statement for which he would later be
reprimanded by the NEC:
That morning in a safe flat in a white suburb, I met various members of
the local and foreign press, and I once again called the stay at home 'a
tremendous success'. But I did not mask the fact that I believed a new day
was dawning. I said, "If the government reaction is to crush by naked
force our non-violent struggle, we will have to reconsider our tactics. In
my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of non-violent
policy".38
Mandela and ANC nationalist history narratives ubiquitously point to the failure
ofthe May Strike to prove non-violent mass action's ineffectiveness and therefore justify
the turn to violence.39 However, the strike was prematurely called off despite its partial
success and lack (not absence) of state sponsored violence. The strike's success or
failure did not constitute the inefficacy of non-violent protest as Mandela and the ANC
assert. 40 Luthuli made this point himself at the time. In her book, ChiefAlbert Luthuli of
37 Africa South-in-Exile, "Out of the Strike", by Nelson Mandela, October-December 1961.
38 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 320.
Kathrada, Memoirs, 141.
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 80.
SADET reported that Karis and Carter quote Mande1a as follows: "As long as grievances remain, there will
be protest actions ofthis kind or another. Ifpeaceful protests like these are to be put down by the
mobilisation of the army and the police, then people might be forced to use other methods of struggle".
See footnote 92 citing:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Freedom, 3: 364. See footnote 230 citing: New Age, 01 June 1961.
Footage of this interview is shown to the public at the Nelson Mandela Museum in Umtata.
39 It was this "use of police and army troops in May 1961 to defeat the planned national stay-away" that
justified the turn to violence by the ANC in its statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
ANC, "Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (Marshalltown: Department ofInformation
and Publicity, August 1996),46.
40 Lodge, Mandela, 91.
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Groutville, Benson wrote extensively on Luthuli's thoughts pertaining to non-violence.
Written after Luthuli's reception of the Peace Prize and published in 1963, Benson's text
conveyed Luthuli's sentiments on violence after the May 1961 Strike:
... there is no softness in the policy of non-violence; as he has said, it is
militant, and he feels, despite government's crushing of non-violent
demonstrations such as the three-day stay-at-home in May 1961 that "the
non-violent method, even if unclothing it of any moral consideration - is
the most effective and practical in our situation". He has pointed out that
it has never been sufficiently well-organised to prove its efficacy.41
The calling off of the May Strike concluded an era of non-violent mass action and
ushered in the beginning of a new violent one. In her study on the turn to violence,
Elaine Reinertsen commented:
It is interesting to speculate how the decision to adopt violence
circumvented Luthuli's liberalism; in all his public utterances after 1961,
Luthuli seems to have remained ambivalent toward the existence of
Urnkhonto.42
Even if 'circumvented' and 'ambivalent' are not the most accurate terms, the remainder
of this chapter explores that which Reinertsen found interesting to speculate.
Umkhonto we Sizwe's Formation
Chapter three identifies Mandela as the source for the majority of post-1995
biographies and autobiographies that testify to the formation ofMK and Luthuli's role in
it.43 Because most pre-1995 commentators (Benson, Karis and Carter, Bunting,
41 Benson, ChiefAlbert Lutuli ofSouth Africa, 65.
Benson is an informed source as she served as Luthuli's secretary for much of time between the
announcement and reception of the Nobel Peace Prize. In fact, Benson's un-cited quotations of Luthuli
likely derived from her time as his secretary.
42 Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 13.
43 Mandela stated in his 1964 Rivonia Trial statement that MK formed in November 1961. Throughout this
study, I refer to the July Joint Congresses' decision to allow for MK's formation as the event during which
MKformed.
Barry Feinberg and Andre Odendaal, eds., Nelson Mandela: The Struggle Is My Life (His
Speeches & Writings 1944-1990), rev. ed. (Cape Town: David Philip, 1994), 167.
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Buthelezi and Slovo) conveyed that Luthuli was uninvolved and unaware of the decision
to form a new organisation that would utilise violence, Mandela's testimony in Long
Walk to Freedom and all subsequent copies of his account require closer examination.
Other evidence confirms the accuracy ofMandela's autobiography insofar as it
stated Luthuli's presence and involvement in the decision to form MK. In draft
manuscripts ofMasabalala "Bonnie" Yengwa's unpublished autobiography, Yengwa
affirmed that Luthuli presided over the momentous meetings in July 1961. Yengwa's
testimony is important not simply because of his intimacy with Luthuli, but more so, for
the purposes of this investigation, because his draft memoirs were written before his 1987
death and thus before the publication ofMandela's Long Walk to Freedom. Yengwa
related:
Chief Luthuli was still under a banning order and as a result a full
[National Executive] Committee was called at Chief Luthuli's magisterial
district in secret so that he could attend. This was after everyone in the
[Treason Trial] had been discharged. There was a very long heart
searching debate, because the ANC's policy of non-violence had been
tried since 1952 and after years of action through strikes and other
methods they had only met with violence. Some of us were still sceptical
about the use of violence, including Chief Luthuli, on the grounds that the
people had still to be consulted and we would not be seen to be democratic
in changing without consultation from one policy to another. But we had
h 1 . 44to accept t e OgIC.
Luthuli was aware of and did participate in the decision to form MK as Mandela attested
in his autobiography.
Yet, rather than support the decision, Luthuli yielded, albeit very reluctantly and
after two exhausting all-night meetings, to form MK. Herein contested is Mandela's
assertion that Luthuli's anger at being unifonned resulted from a mentally feeble mind
that could remember the July NEC and the Congresses' Joint Executive (CJE) meetings
and his involvement in them.45 Instead, Mandela inaccurately recalled precisely what
44 LM, MYP, unpublished draft autobiographical manuscript, 106.
45 The Joint Congresses included the ANC, Indian Congress, South African Congress of Trade Unions,
Coloured People's Congress and Congress of Democrats.
Meer, A Fortunate Man, 224.
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upset Luthuli during their "disconcerting conversation" following the December 1961
bombings.
In his autobiography, Mandela disclosed that he discussed the armed struggle with
Sisulu as far back as 1952, unknown to Luthuli (according to his Treason Trial
testimony). By June 1961, Mandela became convinced of the need to use violence. On
26 June, "Freedom Day", Mandela issued from underground a statement that cagily
predicted violence through the use of 'alternative' struggle methods.46 Following the
'failure' of the May Strike, Sisulu and Mandela again discussed the armed struggle and
resolved to raise the issue at a June 1961 NWC meeting.47 At the meeting, Kotane
argued vociferously against the proposal brought by Mandela. Kotane accused Mandela
of not having carefully thought out the proposal. Kotane argued:
There is still room for the old methods if we are imaginative and
determined enough. If we embark on a course Mandela is suggesting, we
will be exposing innocent people to massacres by the enemy.48
Possibly referring to the May Strike, Kotane stingingly stated Mandela "had been
outmanoeuvred and paralysed by the government's actions, and now in desperation ...was
resorting to revolutionary language".49 Mandela's autobiography reflected his sense of
humour and humility when he told how he chided Sisulu for not coming to his rescue.
Sisulu realised Kotane was too formidable and decided to silently retreat, believing that a
personal meeting with Mandela and Kotane would be far more effective.50 It was. Later,
in a private all day meeting, Mandela told Kotane bluntly:
46 "Issued... on 26 June 1961 from inside South Africa, explaining his decision, in accordance with advice
from the National Action Council, to carry on his political work underground". The ANC in London
published the statement.
Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 119-21.
47 Mande1a, Long Walk to Freedom, 320.
Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146.
Sampson, Mandela, 150.
48 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 320.
Sarnpson, Mandela, 150.
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, I: 88. SADET cited Mandela.
Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146.
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49 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 320.
50 Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146. Mandela cited.
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[Your] mind is stuck in the old mould of the ANC's being a legal
organisation. People were already forming military units on their own,
and the only organisation that had the muscle to lead them was the ANC.
We have always maintained that the people were ahead of us, and now
they were. 51
Mandela persuaded Kotane. Kotane subtly hinted to Mandela that he would not contest
the proposal if made again at the next NWC meeting to be held in a week's time.52 On
the second attempt, Mandela persuaded the NWC to agree that the proposal be brought to
the NEC that would meet in Durban in July 1961.53
While contemplating the adoption ofviolence, Mandela worried that the ANC had
just emerged from a four year trial wherein its consistent and clear non-violent policy
thwarted the prosecution's efforts to have the Trialists found guilty of High Treason.
Contrary to ANC history that espouses that its non-violence policy was merely
'strategic', Mandela confessed that the ANC contended in the Treason Trial that it was an
"inviolate principle".54 Mandela, not the ANC, believed "that non-violence was a tactic
that should be abandoned when it no longer worked".55 He had good reason to be
concerned about the upcoming NEC meeting. Mandela was apprehensive about his
proposal because he expected Luthuli's "moral commitment to non-violence" would
cause difficulties.56 When Lionel 'Rusty' Bernstein presented a report advocating armed
51 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 321.
Meer, A Fortunate Man, 224.
52 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 88. SADET cited Mandela.
53 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 321.
Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146. Sisulu cited Mandela.
SADET, The Road to Democracy, 1: 88.
Lodge, Mandela, 90.
Ismail Meer incorrectly guessed that the NEC met secretly on a Groutville farm in "August/September".
Meer, A Fortunate Man, 223.
Some sources indicate "Stanger" (Sampson) and others "Durban" (Mandela and Sisulu). I understand the
localities to be synonymous. Lodge (90) and SADET (1: 88) are accurate when they stated the meetings
occurred in Stanger at the house of an Indian sugar plantation owner.
Callinicos incorrectly dated the meeting in October.
Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 283.
54 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
55 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
56 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 321.
262
force at a 1961 Communist Party conference, Turok recalled Mandela shared "that it
would be difficult to sell this to the ANC, particularly Luthuli".57
Luthuli consistently and unqualifiedly opposed any move towards violence,
before, during and after the decision to form MK. Recorded in 2002 in a Sacramento,
California hospital, Narainsamy Naicker remembered his associations with Luthuli.58
Naicker highlighted a discussion he had with Luthuli regarding his suspicions of a turn to
violence.
He entertained us for a while and then he told us, "Why don't we get into
the car and go away from here". He drove around into the bamboos
behind his residence. He said, "Since it was getting a little dark and late,
there's no likelihood of the Security Branch (the Apartheid Political
Police) getting in here - at least we would know before hand, if they do".
When we got there he had a flashlight that he turned on and we were able
to converse. All he wanted to know was, whether we had any knowledge
that there were any steps being taken to move from one aspect of the
movement into violence. I said as far as we are concerned we are non-
violent and there's no way we will become violent and if the ANC
(African National Congress) is with us it should be happy. Chief was
happy with that it and it seems to cut some measure with his association
with organisations that are non-violent. So he was non-violent to the
utmost.59
The date of this poignant meeting Naicker had with Luthuli is not indicated. The context
reveals that it took place shortly before the July 1961 NEC meeting.
Mandela's comments to NEe meeting revealed his adamant stance for the turn to
violence. Seeking the moral high ground, Mandela couched its argument in ethical terms.
57 UWC, RIMA, MCH 07, 8.4.5, tape 2, interview with Ben Turok, August - October 1973,5.
Mandela, who was not a Communist, must have been at the Communist Party conference as an observer or
as an ANC representative. However, Simpson's dissertation on the turn to violence suggested that Mandela
held membership in the Communist Party. Simpson acknowledged that the matter is one of contestation.
Simpson, '''Total Onslaught' Reconsidered", 48. See endnote 11,82. Simpson cited, among other sources:
Sampson,A1andela, 147
58 Otherwise known as "Narainsamy T. Naicker". Naicker co-founded and served as President of the
Committee for South African Solidarity (COSAS). Naicker died on 19 January 2003.
59 "Naicker Remembers ChiefLuthuli", South African Beacon 10, no. 2, Summer 2003,20.
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... the state had given us no alternative to violence .. .It was wrong and
immoral to subject our people to armed attacks by the state without
offering them some kind of alternative.60
Mandela's arguments were persuasive because many in the movement "felt rudderless".61
Mande1a argued that sporadic violence had already begun, or was at least imminent, by
the African Resistance Movement (ARM), the PAC's Poqo and in rural uprisings such as
those in Mpondoland and Thembuland. Mandela debated that the moral and strategic
decision would be to control and direct the violence that had become inevitable.62
Cleverly, Mandela argued that violent methods could be implemented according to
'principles', just as non-violent methods had been. For example, the violence waged
could be against symbols of the state, of oppression, rather than against human beings.63
Mandela conceded in his autobiography that Luthuli "resisted" his arguments.64
For Luthuli, the use of non-violence was not only premised on strategic grounds.
Ethical, theological and relational considerations also heavily predisposed Luthuli to
oppose the use of violence. Also, Luthuli argued that the ANC received its mandate from
the grassroots; the ANC could not make such a massive policy alteration (strict non-
violence to an armed movement) without the consultation and re-training, ideologically
speaking, ofthe membership. After "working on him all night", the physical vigour and
the rhetorical tenacity of the young lions fatigued the older Luthuli.
Mandela perceived that Luthuli acceded to the arguments that a military campaign
was inevitable. However, Luthuli only agreed that the matter move to a more
representative body where he would have more allies. Though the NEC formally
endorsed the NWC's decision to form an armed movement, Luthuli suggested that the
meeting resolve to have never discussed the matter.65 This would allow those in the ANC
60 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
Kotane's biography cited Mandela's same expressed sentiments.
Bunting, Moses Kotane, 264, footnote 346.
61 LM, MYP, unpublished draft autobiographical manuscript, 106.
62 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 88. SADET cited Mandela.
63 Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146.
64 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
65 Meer conveyed that the ANC National Executive agreed to: "allow the formation ofan organisation that
would engage in violent forms of struggle". The ANC National Executive did not agree to the 'initiation'
of violence or the 'launch' of an armed movement.
Meer, A Fortunate Man, 224.
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with non-violent inclinations to argue in solidarity (and thus strength) with like-minded
leaders at the Congresses' Joint Executives (CJE) meeting to be held the following night.
Luthuli clearly did not agree with the decision but his Congregational ethos predisposed
him against imposing his will as the Chair. Curnick Ndlovu testified:
Luthuli believed unquestionably in non-violent struggle. [But] when these
discussions took place he was not a leader who believed in dictating.66
Mandela's autobiography asserted that Luthuli proposed an ambiguous
compromise in the NEC meeting. After what must have been for Luthuli a thoroughly
exhausting night, he recommended:
... a military movement should be a separate and independent organ,
linked to the ANC and under the overall control of the ANC, but
fundamentally autonomous.67
'Independent', yet 'linked'; 'autonomous' yet 'under the overall control'. These
contradictory characteristics of what would become MK made little collective sense.68
The above contradiction carried into the CJE's meeting held the following evening.
A further indication of Luthuli's objection to the decision to form a military
movement was his warning not to neglect "the essential tasks of organisation and the
Mandela stated that Luthuli requested that the meeting "treat the new resolution as if the ANC had not
discussed it" so that the legality of the other Congresses were not jeopardised. Yet, at a secret meeting the
banned ANC resolved to prepare for illegal violence. A decision taken by the ANC would not jeopardise
the other Congresses. In addition, not documenting or not announcing the resolution would protect other
groups should they have needed protection. To consider the matter 'not discussed' is much different than
not having the matter documented or announced. Therefore, as Meer suggested (224), I assert Luthuli
requested that the matter to be considered not to have been discussed so that he could (re-)open the debate
as if it had never happened and invite those in the ANC who were opposed to violence to ally with other
members of the Congresses who also opposed violence. Luthuli proved to be a very clever Chair.
Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
66 Interview with Curnick Ndlovu. Found in:
SADET, The Road to Democracy, 1: 89, see footnote 130.
67 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
Sisulu cited the same illogical "compromise".
Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 146.
68 Today, the same dynamic exists between the ANC and its youth and women's leagues. Recently, the
boundaries of the ANC's authority, or lack thereof, have been tested by the Youth League's President,
Julius Malema.
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traditional methods of struggle", as they were primary.69 There is little, if any, evidence
that Mandela heeded this warning. Mandela spent the rest of 1961 forming an army and
testing its munitions. Little time could be spent on political organisation, for Mandela
had only six months to prepare his army before launching it at the close of the year.
To open the CJE meeting, Luthuli displayed his penchant for requesting a 'careful
reconsideration' of an item when he had objections or concerns. As Luthuli did with the
ANC ratification of the Freedom Charter, so he did with the NEC's resolution to form a
military organisation. Luthuli indicated the previous night that the NEC's approval of the
formation of an armed movement would be treated as if it had not been discussed.
Therefore, Mandela, who interpreted the meeting's opening as "inauspicious", should not
have been surprised when Luthuli as Chair presiding over the meeting asked that the
matter be discussed "afresh".70
Mandela argued against Kotane in the first NWC meeting and against Luthuli in
the NEC meeting. The Indians ofNatal, political disciples of Gandhi's 'Satyagraha'
(non-violent 'Truth Force'), proved most difficult to convince at the CJE's meeting held
at the Bodasinghs' beach house near Stanger.71 From 20:00, the contestation raged all
night. YusufCachalia, J. N. Singh (Vice-President of the SAIC), and 'Monty' Naicker
(President of the SAIC) proved to be the worthy adversaries Mandela expected.72 Singh
countered Mandela charging that, "Non-violence has not failed us. We have failed non-
violence".73 In light of the disunity evident in the democratic movement prior to the All-
In African Conference and Mandela's inexplicable and rash calling-off of the May strike,
Singh argued a valid point. Mandela retorted that non-violence had failed, for it had
"done nothing to change the heart of the oppressors".74 Luthuli again voiced his
69 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 322.
70 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 323.
Sisulu, WaIter & Albertina Sisulu, 146. Mandela cited.
"Despite [NEC's] decision, [Luthuli] requested the members ofthe NEC feel free to participate and
express their own individual views in the debate".
Meer, A Fortunate Man, 224.
71 Meer, A Fortunate Man, 224.
72 Sampson, Mandela, 151. Sampson cited Mandela.
73 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 323.
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74 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 323.
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misgivings. 75 Luthuli optimistically dreamed that if the hearts of the international
community, white liberal democrats and faithful Christians could be changed to struggle
non-violently together with the unified mass action sponsored by black, coloured and
Indian political movements, then the oppressors would be forced to capitulate. Luthuli
reasoned that non-violent methods would foment far more political and economic
pressure on a heavily armed, sophisticated and brutal regime than would an untrained,
unequipped and isolated army.
As with the previous night's discussions, complete exhaustion rather than careful
reasoned consensus allowed a resolution to be accepted at dawn. The members of CJE
agreed that Mandela and others would not be disciplined for forming a new military
organisation separate from the ANC that would remain non-violent. Mandela stated in
his autobiography that the military organisation "would not be subject to the direct
control of the mother organisation".76 The contradictions apparent in the NEC resolution
were not clarified in the resolution taken by the CJE. No one made clear the distinction
between 'direct' and 'indirect' control. Mandela inferred that the distinction between
'direct' and 'indirect' were 'operational' and 'political', respectively or 'tactical' (short-
term) and 'strategic' (long-term), respectively. In his 1964 Rivonia Trial statement,
Mandela testified that he would ...
.. .at all times subject [MK] to the political guidance of the ANC and
would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated
without the consent of the ANC.77
These ambiguities caused Mandela's confusion during his January 1962 "disconcerting"
meeting with Luthuli following MK's launch as it can be considered both political and
operational, both tactical and strategic.
MK's ambiguous status also lead to what Slovo referred to as the "necessary
fiction": that initially MK was not the armed wing of the ANC. Robert Resha would soon
publicly dispel the myth that the ANC and MK were not synonymous. The ANC at
Lobaste in October 1962 dispensed with Luthuli's "compromise". The NWC, NEC and
75 Sisulu, Waiter & Albertina Sisulu, 280. Sisulu cited Mandela.
76 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 324.
77 Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 167.
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CJE meeting allowed Mandela to get his proverbial 'foot in the door". To placate
Luthuli, the CJE resolved to keep the organisations separate. Mandela orchestrated the
change he intended for the ANC. Despite acknowledging in his autobiography that the
meeting agreed the ANC would remain non-violent, Mandela stated only four sentences
later:
Henceforth, the ANC would be a different kind of organisation ...
embarking on a new and more dangerous path, a path of organised
violence, the results of which we did not know and could not knoW.78
Nobel Peace Prize Announced
The Norwegian Nobel Committee considered Luthuli for the Peace Prize at least
from November 1960 when the public became aware of his candidacy.79
Andrew McCracken of BronxvilIe, New York, editor ofAdvance magazine, a
Congregational publication, nominated Luthuli for the Nobel Peace Prize.80 The two men
had met in 1948 when Luthuli had lectured in the United States. Credit for Luthuli's
nomination for and awarding of the Peace Prize must ultimately be given to a Swedish
Lutheran. Gunnar Helander, a former South African missioner and then vicar of the
Karlskoga parish in Sweden, spoke on the radio, wrote speeches, submitted articles and
strongly proposed Luthuli's candidacy to his parliament. 81 Helander gave his reason for
supporting Luthuli:
78 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 323-4.
79 Star, "Nobel Prize: More Support for Luthuli", 02 November 1960.
Star quoted Rhona Churchill, who wrote for the Rand Daily Mail, reporting, "The award is certainly no
sudden decision. The Nobel Prize Committee took fifteen months to investigate Luthuli".
Star, "Luthuli' s Prize Brings Joy to Millions", 24 October 1961.
Ranjith KalIy's book, written by Farook Khan, indicated that as early as 1957 the Nobel Committee "met
and decided to defer their decision on giving Chief Luthuli the Prize". Furthermore, the text claimed, "In
1959, the Nobel Committee met and decided to defer their decision on giving ChiefLuthuli the Prize".
Both statements are incorrect. Kally's text proves generally unreliable and many dates are fictitious. For
example, KalIy's text cites 1956 as the year the Joint Congresses' made its compromise decision to form
MK.
Ranjith Kally, The Struggle: 60 Years in Focus (Durban: no publisher cited, 2004), 1.
80 New York Times, 11 December 1961 and 21 July 1967. Cited by:
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 25. See footnote 57.
Whitman, The Obituary Book, 124.
81 Sunday Times, "Nobel Prize for Luthuli: 'Fair Chance"', 15 October 1961.
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I admired Luthuli and his line had been 'violence under no circumstances'.
That is why he could be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. That was
h . h' 82t e mam t mg.
Helander's advocacy resulted in convincing thirty-four Swedish members of parliament
and Albert Schweitzer, himself a fonner Peace Prize winner, of Luthuli's worthiness and
they subsequently recommended him.83 In February 1961, Norwegian Socialist members
ofparliament supported the Swedish nomination.84 Ofcourse, many others also
advocated that the honour be given to Luthuli. One source cited Arthur Blaxall as a
prominent nominee.85 Ronald Segal, editor ofAfrica South in Exile, proposed Luthuli as
a candidate to the International Union of Socialist Youth (lUSY). The IUSY
unanimously passed a resolution in support of Luthuli at a 1960 conference in Vienna. 86
No one person or organisation can claim sole responsibility for Luthuli's nomination.
Rather, a well-spring of support from around the world advocated that the Nobel Peace
Prize be bestowed upon Luthuli for his staunch non-violent stance against a very violent
antagonist.
On 23 October 1961, one to two months after the fateful CJE' s meeting and
almost two months before the launch ofMK, the Nobel committee fonnally announced
the news that Luthuli received the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize.87 The following day, one
South African editorial acknowledged Luthuli's Nobel credentials:
Mr. Luthuli 's long career of struggle has been marked by a constant faith
in the common humanity of all peoples in this land. He has steadfastly
refused to compromise while eschewing all violence in the pursuit of his
Interview with Gunner Helander, Viistenls, 12 February 1996. Found in:
Sellstrom, Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices, 285.
82 Interview with Gunner Helander, Viisten'is, 12 February 1996. Found in:
Sellstrom, Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices, 286.
83 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Wins Nobel Prize: R 31,000 Grant for Opposing Violence", 24 October 1961.
Cape Argus, "Nobel Honour Proposed Nine Months Ago", 24 October 1961.
84 Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 25.
85 Kally, The Struggle, 1.
86 Whitman, The Obituary Book, 127.
87 Cape Times, "Luthuli Wins Nobel Prize: R 31,000 Grant for Opposing Violence", 24 October 1961.
Cape Times, "Luthuli Is Awarded Nobel Peace Prize: First South African to Win Peace Honour",
24 October 1961.
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ideal of non-discrimination. He has suffered for his principles but seldom
allowed words of bitterness to cross his lips or emotion to blur his vision.88
Ebrahim Mahomed, Luthuli's very close friend, told him at 17:30 that he had won the
Nobel Peace Prize.89 One of the first to congratulate Luthuli was Blaxall, his old friend
and colleague with whom he served in the Christian Council of South Africa and the
Fellowship of Reconciliation. Luthuli told Blaxall that he thought Mahomed was playing
a trick on him as the day before he had received the Gell Memorial Award. Luthuli
ribbed Mahomed for confusing the two awards.90 Those who intimately knew Luthuli
testify that after hearing that he won the Peace Prize, Luthuli sequestered himself in his
home for several hours in deep thought, prayer and meditation. In one interview, Luthuli
spoke of the added burden of responsibility the Peace Prize engendered: "God help me
live up to it".91 During this time, Luthuli determined his strategy so that the reception of
the award fostered the maximum possible coverage, and thus sympathy, for the struggle
for liberation. Luthuli said in one interview that "an approach to personal and public
problems... must be decisive, although they are constantly guided by Christian principles
and doctrines".92 The Peace Prize presented a window ofopportunity that required bold
leadership. Luthuli had to speak to, argue for and declare use of non-violence
consistently and resolutely.
Many suspected, both then and now, that the Nobel Committee awarded Luthuli
the Peace Prize with the intention to reinforce his and the liberation movement's non-
violent stance, thus pushing them farther away from the violent precipice all feared was
on the horizon. For example, Ezekiel MphaWele hypothesised that the Nobel Prize "may
have been interpreted as implying that the Scandinavians were investing in non-violence
in South Africa".93 The July decision to form MK meant that "this would be expecting
88 Daily News, "Mr. Luthuli's Honour", 24 October 1961.
89 Jean Hill attested that the editor of Ilanga, Dhlomo, accompanied by Mahomed shared the news with
Luthuli.
Interview with Jean Hill, Luthuli Museum, Groutville, Kwadukuza, 18 April 2005.
90 Star, "How Luthuli Heard News ofNobel Peace Prize Award", letter to the editor by
Rev. Arthur Blaxall, 13 November 1961.
91 Daily News, "Luthuli Wants to Go to Oslo for His Nobel Prize", 24 October 1961.
Cape Argus, "Luthuli Proud - But With a New Burden", 24 October 1961.
92 Daily News, "The Man of the Hour, But His Old-World Courtesy Remains", 26 October 1961.
93 Ezekiel Mphahlele, "Albert Luthuli: The End ofNon-Violence", Africa Today 14, August 1967, 1-3.
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too much".94 Mphahlele wrote that Luthuli felt "awkward" investing in "a prize for a
religious-political creed his organisation now found irrelevant".95 One commemorative
narrative commented that with violence being seriously considered:
Peace loving people, needed to boost ChiefAlbert Luthuli for they feared
that South Africa was on the brink of bloodshed. They were convinced
that he had been able to stave off any mass conflict.96
Another editorial opined "Let Him Go", arguing:
...he has been hailed as being a moderate devoted to peaceful methods of
political progress. It is impossible now for Mr. Lutuli to be anything other
than a moderate and a man ofpeace.97
Luthuli recognised others' suspicion that the Nobel Committee's intention in
awarding the Prize was specifically to reinforce a non-violent political tack. In one
interview, Luthuli naIvely discounted them.
The award would defeat its purpose utterly if there was any suggestion of
an ulterior motive. That would defeat its whole purpose with Albert
Luthuli and with the whole of Africa. In the mind of the committee, I am
sure - if one can speculate on these things - the award was given because
I have always worked for peace. It is not trying to buy me for peace.98
Yet, in addition to responsively lauding Luthuli's past position, the Nobel committee
determinatively cemented his future position on violence. Luthuli prolifically advocated
non-violent methods from the time of the announcement (October 1961) until his appeals
became too embarrassing to the liberation movement that had long since changed policy
(April 1962). Ultimately, the Nobel Committee failed to influence the liberation
As cited from Pillay's Voices ofLiberation, 1: 30.
94 Africa Today, "Albert Luthuli: The End ofNon-Violence", 1-3.
95 Africa Today, "Albert Luthuli: The End ofNon-Violence", 1-3.
96 Kally, The Struggle, 1.
97 Sunday Tribune, "Let Him Go", 29 October 1961.
98 Sunday Tribune, "Lutuli - The Impact of a Personality", by Michael Lloyd, 29 October 1961.
The interview was conducted at Ebrahim Mahomed's home.
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movement to remain non-violent while Luthuli's influence within the ANC weakened
and Mandela's strengthened.
Mahomed was just one of a cast of characters who were personally close,
affirming and of great assistance to Luthuli after he won the Peace Prize. While political
bans on the ANC, Luthuli and his ANC colleagues made allied cooperation difficult, the
intensity of friends and supporters of the liberal ilk can not go unnoticed. In the wake of
the Nobel announcement, as during the Treason Trial, Luthuli's closest compatriots were
not necessarily ANC members. Mahomed could arguably be considered Luthuli's closest
friend. In his deposition to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mahomed's son
Yunus remembered Luthuli in their home "daily".99 Mahomedjoined the Liberal Party,
founded a branch in Stanger and in time became its national Treasurer and Secretary. 100
Because Groutville was a rural tribal reserve and no other races could access Luthuli
there, Yunus indicated that "most of all the secretarial work was done at my dad's
office".JOJ If a meeting or work was required, Mahomed would "leave his office and his
clients to go and do it, irrespective ofthe consequences".J02 After Luthuli won the Peace
Prize, Mahomed "turned over his [Stanger] office for the use of the Chief, abandoned his
bookkeeping", and handled all the phone calls, telegrams and correspondences that
arrived. 103 In addition to often serving as Luthuli' s chauffeur, Mahomed was his
bookkeeper.
Beginning the day the Peace Prize was announced, accolades swamped Luthuli. J04
The night of the announcement, Luthuli did not rest until three in the morning. 105 Phone
calls inundated Luthuli as early as six the next morning. 106 Over one hundred telegrams
arrived. In Luthuli's diary, interviews were booked solid until the end of the week. 107
99 LM, EVMP, deposition from Yunus Mahomed, 20 May 1997,2.
lOO Jean Hill, unpublished "Autobiography ofJean Hill", 41.
UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/9/2911, correspondence from E. V. Mahomed to C. R. Swart, 25 June 1959.
101 LM, EVMP, deposition by Yunus Mohamed, 2.
102 LM, EVMP, deposition by Yunus Mohamed, 2
103 Interview with Jean Hill, Luthuli Museum, GroutviIle, Kwadukuza, 18 April 2005.
104 UW, WCL, COD, AD 2187, H 46, Press Statement from the Congress ofDemocrats by the National
Secretary, Ben Turok, 24 October 196 I.
UW, WCL, COD, AD 2187, H 45, handwritten draft of expression of congratulations to Luthuli,
24 October 1961.
105 Daily News, "Luthuli Wants to Go to Oslo for His Nobel Prize", 24 October 1961.
106 Rand Daily Mail, "1960 Man of Peace Has World on Doorstep", 25 October 1961.
107 Daily News, "The World Is on Luthuli's Doorstep", 15 October 1961.
272
With Mahomed, Mary Benson served as Luthuli's secretary after the announcement of
the Peace Prize. Benson handled the great bulk of correspondences from all over the
world that flooded into Stanger. Not long after the announcement, Benson left to travel
overseas.108 Due to Benson's departure, Mahomed requested Jean Hill to fulfil the
responsibilities as Luthuli's secretary. Jean and her husband, Charles, were members of
the Musgrave Congregational Church in Durban. Jean, as a white liberal Christian, was
quite typical ofLuthuli's non-ANC supporters. Long before Luthuli won the Prize, Jean
served on the Durban Joint Council of Europeans and Africans, a predecessor of the
South African Institute of Race Relations, and was a member of the multi-racial
International Club that sponsored an event at which Jean first met Luthuli. Jean also
served the Women's Defence ofthe Constitution, the predecessor of the Black Sash.
After unsuccessfully trying to begin a chapter of the Civil Rights League in Durban, Jean,
Charles and others founded the Liberal Party. In 1959, Charles proposed a unanimously
approved resolution from the Liberal Party objecting to Luthuli's banning. 109 Much later,
Jean's involvement with the Defence and Aid Fund provided legal defence and
subsistence income to families of political prisoners earning her the government's ire.
The government banned Jean from 1965 to 1970.
For a week to ten days before Luthuli set off for Norway, Jean travelled daily the
seventy-five kilometres to Stanger from Durban. In her unpublished autobiography, Jean
wrote:
I used to drive to Stanger everyday, type out the replies Chief dictated to
me and have lunch with E. V. and Chief at E. V.'s home. 110
Alan Paton became Jean's Chairperson as she served as the Secretary of the Defence and
Aid Fund in Durban. Later, as leader of the Liberal Party, Paton's fawning over Luthuli
made African nationalists bristle with discomfort. 11 I After hearing of Luthuli' s award,
108 Benson later wrote the second, after Callan, biographical work about Luthuli entitled ChiefA/bert Lutuli
ofSouth Africa.
109 UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/9129/l, correspondence from E. V. Mahomed to C. R. Swart, 25 June 1959.
110 Jean Hill, "Autobiography ofJean Hill", 41.
Interview with Jean Hill, Berea Congregational Church, 19 October 2008.
I I I SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 433-4.
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Paton responded in the press that it was "wonderful news".112 Paton continued, that "one
of her sons had been chosen to receive such an honour" instilled pride in South
Africans.! 13
Luthuli confinned that the awarding of the Prize stiffened his resolve to advocate
only non-violent means despite the ANC and the Joint Congresses' decision in July.
Luthuli's non-violent stance led him farther away from leadership in the ANC and
increased his links, in company and ideology, with the Liberal Party. In a 01 November
correspondence to the Liberal Party, Luthuli expressed deep appreciation for the many
congratulatory telegrams and letters that he received from the branches and highlighted
his renewed resolve for non-violent methods.
In case I am not able to answer them all individually would you express
my deep gratitude and say that I feel this award is an encouragement to us
all to redouble our struggle to achieve liberation by non-violent
methods. 114
Upon his arrival at the Johannesburg airport while connecting to London, the Liberal
Party presented Luthuli with a wrist watch that he regarded "as an expression of a deep
bond of friendship that exists between your Party and myself' despite "differences of
opinion on tactics in our common fight for freedom".115
Political accolades for Luthuli were not limited to those from the Liberal Party.
Jan Steytler, leader of the Progressive Party, reacted after hearing the news saying:
I am very happy to hear that my fellow South African has been awarded
this coveted prize. That an African should have been considered worthy
112 Ga=ette, "Nobel Peace Prize for Luthuli: A Lift for South Africa's Prestige", 24 October 1961.
113 Ga=ette, "Nobel Peace Prize for Luthuli: A Lift for South Africa's Prestige", 24 October 1961.
114 UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/317/l, correspondence to Peter Brown from Luthuli, 01 November 1961. Also
found at LM.
UKZN, APC&SA, no reference provided, correspondence from the Chairman of the Transvaal Division,
Liberal Party to Luthuli, 25 October 1961. Also found at LM.
115 UKZN, APC&SA, PC2/3/4/2, correspondence from Luthuli to the Chairman of the National Executive
of the Liberal Party, 23 March 1962. Also found at LM.
The differences related to opinions on qualified franchise. The Liberal Party publicly advocated for a
qualified while Luthuli and the ANC advocated for universal franchise.
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of it is an achievement of which all South Africa should be proud. He
deserves it. 116
The Most Reverend Joost de Blank, Archbishop of Cape Town and Metropolitan of the
Church of the Province of South Africa, on behalf of the Episcopal Synod sent a telegram
to Luthuli congratulating him:
We, the Bishops of the Church of the Province of South Africa,
congratulate you on the distinction you have earned in winning the Nobel
Peace Prize for 1960. We recall with satisfaction that you are a past Vice-
President of the Christian Council of South Africa. 117
A close association existed between Christianity practiced by white South African
liberals in the early 1960s and an espousal for non-violence. A prominent black member
in the Liberal Party, 'Bill' Bhengu, emphasised Luthuli's non-violent stance as a reason
for the Liberal Party's support of him:
Luthuli was born and bred in a missionary's home. His whole background
is steeped in Christianity, and in the supreme teaching "Do unto others as
you would unto you". He merely preached this. ll8
Charles Hill expressed much the same sentiments as Bhengu, contrasting Luthuli's
Christianity with Swart's presumption that Luthuli advocated violence.
[I] had heard Luthuli on many occasions, but [I] do not remember a single
occasion where Luthuli ever deviated from the basic preachings of
Christianity. However, Mr. Swart revealed to Parliament a tremendous
discovery that Luthuli had spoken to the Overseas BBC network that the
non-Europeans will not seek their goals always by meek submission. Was
not this proof enough that Luthuli preached violence, asked Mr. Swart? 119
116 Ga=etfe, "Nobel Peace Prize for Luthuli: A Lift for South Africa's Prestige", 24 October 1961.
The Progressive Party broke away from the United Party in 1959. In many ways, it was similar to the
Liberal Party especially as regards its qualified franchise policy.
117 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Sees World Press: Too Busy to Apply for Passport", 26 October 1961.
118 UKZN, APC&SA, P2/9/29/1, "Report on Protest Meeting", 1.
119 UKZN, APC&SA, P2/9/29/1, "Report on Protest Meeting", 2.
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The Liberal Party, like the Black Sash mentioned earlier in this study, and white middle
class progressive Christians found in Luthuli a kindred soul in large part due to his
staunch non-violent stance. As chapter two mentions, in 1959 the ANC and the Liberal
Party jointly called for a boycott of European goods as a non-violent strategy to achieve
liberation. The shared belief in non-violence superseded differences over qualified
franchise. If the Liberal Party, the Black Sash and white progressive Christians did not
explicitly state non-violence was a central tenet of their creed, it was because non-
violence was assumed and, for all intents and purposes, non-debatable.
Forestall through the Press
Events occurring during the latter half of 1961 comprise the fulcrum upon which
this study focuses: the decision to form MK, the announcement of the Peace Prize and the
publication of Luthuli 's columns advocating non-violent methods. The plethora of
statements from Luthuli advocating 'strategic pacifism' began in October 1961 after he
received the news that he had won the Peace Prize. The announcement of the Peace Prize
entrenched and bolstered Luthuli's non-violent stance, if it did not lead him to question
his earlier yielding to democratic decisions arrived at by beleaguered and exhausted
majorities within the July NEC and CJE meetings. Luthuli did not likely comprehend
that after Sharpeville, the exile of Tambo, the State of Emergency and the May strike, he
functioned as only the symbolic leader of the ANC. 120 Luthuli thought that he could, by
privilege of his leadership position, forestall through the press any plans for MK's
activation in light of the ANC's winning the Peace Prize.
Luthuli made many references in his gracious acceptance statements that the
Peace Prize had not been awarded to him alone. Rather, in his view the Nobel committee
had also awarded the Peace Prize to the ANC and even the continent of Africa. Luthuli
viewed himself as a representative saying, "This is an honour for the whole of Africa. If
I falter, the whole people will suffer a setback".]2! By articulating the rationale that as the
leader of the ANC he accepted its reward on its behalf and as the oppressed majority in
120 Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 27. PiIlay cited:
P. Ritner, The Death ofAfrica (New York: MacMiIlan, 1960).
121 Daily News, "Luthuli Wants to Go to Oslo for His Nobel Prize", 24 October 1961.
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South Africa asked him to serve as President-General, Luthuli hoped to send a message
to ANC members not make the turn to violence. 122 In response to a query related to the
rationale for his winning the Nobel Peace Prize, Luthuli replied:
I think I won the [Nobel Peace Prize] because I was leader of the African
National Congress and generally of our liberation movement here. The
ANC and its allies had decided to carry out its struggle along non-violent
lines. It was my happy task to help implement that decision, and I think,
because I was leader of the movement, I became a symbol of the people
and their peaceful actions. I must say that I would not pigeon-hole myself
as a pacifist. I would not hesitate to give my hand if my country went to
war. But on practical consideration it would be suicidal in the circles
today to abandon our policy of non-violence.123
The ANC has published many times that "When that [non-violent] policy was
officially and constitutionally changed, [Luthuli] did not falter". 124 Yet, what can be
debated is when the ANC's policy "officially and constitutionally changed". Does the
ANC's claim refer to the July 1961 agreement not to discipline those who were given
permission to form a new violent organisation? Or, does it refer to the Lobatse
Conference, when the ANC acknowledged MK as its own?125 Because the government
122 Mohammed Meghaoui claimed that the ANC mandated that "he accept it on behalf ofthe ANC and not
in his personal capacity". This claim is spurious. On 23 October, the Nobel Committee announced Luthuli
would receive the award. The ANC could not have met, decided and communicated this mandate before
Luthuli made his humble remarks the foHowing day. Luthuli's remarks emanated, first, from his self-
effacing nature, second, from his and the ANC's coHective culture rather than from a specific mandate and,
third, as a rationale to convince the ANC not to initiate violence.
UFH, HPAL, ANCA, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, draft article by Mohammed Meghraoui, 31 August 1967.
123 Cape Argus, "Luthuli Proud - But With a New Burden", 24 October 1961.
Star, "Added Burden upon People of Liberation Movement", 24 October 1961.
Benson told in her biography ofLuthuli's response to the question, "When had you first begun to believe in
non-violence?" Luthuli responded, "I wouldn't say that there was ever a time when I consciously decided
and said - now look, 1am here deciding for non-violence. For one thing, when I came into Congress, the
campaigns it was planning were in fact on non-violent lines and one was happy to fit in with that".
Benson, ChiefAlbert Lututi ofSouth Africa, 64.
124 ANC, "The Lutuli Page", www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/lutuli/. accessed 25 June 2008, 4.
UCT, LC, MAD, BC 1081, P 28, "In Memory", Spotlight on South Africa 5, no. 30, 05 August 1967, 3.
Albert Lutuli, Lututi Speaks: Portrait ofChiefLututi (Solidarity Committee ofthe German... in
cooperation with the United Nations Centre Against... , 1982),6.
Luthuli, The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross, 3: 5.
125 Bunting related that no formal resolutions were taken on the use of violence at Lobatse. Rather, the
'turn to violence' was accepted and approved in private "talks held outside the conference hall".
Bunting, Moses Kotane, 273.
Yengwa stated the "subject of sabotage was not very controversial and the conference unanimously agreed
to embark on the armed struggle".
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declared the ANC illegal in 1960, the ANC could not "officially and constitutionally"
change its policy; that is, it could not consult and receive a domestic mandate from the
grassroots through its democratic structures. Whether one considers, for the sake of
argument, the July NEC and CJE meetings or the November 1962 Lobatse Conference,
the answer remains the same: Luthuli did not agree with, nor did he consider that the
ANC supported, an armed movement from October 1961 when the Nobel committee
announced his award to at least 1964 when in his Rivonia statement he indicated that the
ANC had "never abandoned its method ofa militant, non-violent struggle".
After October 1961, Luthuli suspected and feared MK's possible launch and he
utilised the press to attempt to forestall it. The decisions taken by the NEC and the CJE
to form MK did not at all restrain Luthuli's advocacy for strict non-violence for two
reasons. First, the meetings decided to form but not launch MK. Second, Luthuli
continued to make the important qualification that the ANC and MK were separate
(though linked) organisations. With these qualifications, Luthuli continued to assert his
and the ANC's non-violent stand. In the ensuing months, these qualifications would
prove for Luthuli to be integrity saving loopholes.
By indicating that Luthuli "did not falter", the ANC can only imply that he did not
condemn the use of violence. If the ANC intended to imply that Luthuli himself made
the switch to violence, the implication is false as Luthuli did nothing but advocate for the
use of peaceful methods. Three days after the announcement that Luthuli won the Peace
Prize, Michael Lloyd mused that he was the "umpteenth newsman" to interview him in
Groutville. In this interview, Luthuli disputed that he was a "moderate" and emphasised
his militant credentials.
I am a militant, but in my militancy I pursue the struggle along peaceful
lines. We feel that it is better to get our freedom with as few scars as
LM, MYP, unpublished draft autobiographical manuscript, 108.
Bunting's appraisal is likely. The NEC in a statement emanating from the ANC's first conference as a
banned organisation implied, but did not state explicitly, that it considered MK and the ANC to be linked.
The statement described MK as "the military wing of our struggle...". Karis and Carter's appraisal serves
as an appropriate compromise.
"The People Accept the Challenge of the Nationalists", statement "issued by the National Executive of the
ANC", 06 April 1963, Document 69,749. Found in:
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 3: 650.
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possible ...We will pursue our struggle for equal rights, and we will pursue
. b ~ I h I· . 126It Ypeacelu means up to t e Imlt.
In an interview with Benson on 28 October, Luthuli stated:
I think they gave me the Nobel Peace Prize because they quite correctly
believe I was the leader of a liberation movement that pursued non-
violence... 12?
Days after the announcement, Theo Greyling of the South African Broadcasting
Corporation prepared a ten minute radio documentary that condescendingly questioned
Luthuli's credentials and worthiness to win the Peace Prize. In response, Paton of the
Liberal Party, Steytler ofthe Progressive Party and much of the liberal South African
public hurled abuse at the SABC. 128 In response to this highly publicly criticised radio
broadcast, Luthuli fired off an angry letter to the Rand Daily Mail saying, "All I can say
is that I will continue to stand for the prosecution of our freedom struggle along peaceful
lines". 129
With the July meetings in mind, Luthuli was well aware that many of the
oppressed were becoming impatient and more militant. During the week of the
announcement, LuthuIi made desperate pleas to South African Whites to change heart.
Haunted by the July meetings that decided to form MK, LuthuIi made similar pleas for
reconciliation. In two August columns in the Post, Luthuli warned that "time is running
out on us in the Republic of South Africa". 130 As others involved in the struggle
expressed a greater sense of anxiety and impatience; Luthuli increasingly lost the ability
to 'hold the centre'. Countries throughout the African continent, beginning with Ghana
in 1957, were being added to the list of free and independent countries on a monthly
126 Sunday Tribune, "Lutuli - The Impact ofa Personality", by Michael Lloyd, 29 October 1961.
127 Observer, "'You There, Luthuli ... "', by Mary Benson, 29 October 1961.
128 Daily News, "No SABC Comment Available on Lutuli Talk", 27 October 1961.
Cape Times, "Protests after Attack on Lutuli: SABC Talk Described as 'Vicious"', 27 October 1961.
129 Rand Daily Mail, "Insult to Nobel Prize Committee - Luthuli", 27 October 1961.
In defense of integrity, the SABC later only lamely asserted that the broadcast was "factual".
Natal Mercury, "Luthuli Not Allowed to Go to 'Honour' Meeting", 28 October 1961.
130 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "A Fateful Choice in the Election", 13 August 1961.
" .. .if the idea of separateness and 'keeping the other man down' persists, the consequences will be
as alarming as they are obvious".
BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "It's People Who Make Nations", 27 August 1961.
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basis.131 A continental spirit of 'Independence Now!' was in the air. Despite this
revolutionary climate, Luthuli proved consistent with his primary strategic method of
non-violence.
In addition to prevailing upon the white electorate to have a change of heart,
Luthuli pined to his black colleagues to remain fast to non-violent methods.
TO MY FELLOW AFRICANS I say: "Let us continue to exercise
patience and forbearance, even in a situation that provokes a spirit of
enmity. We must stand for the realisation of friendship among all people
of South Africa" (Luthuli's emphasis).132
In November, Guy Butler and Z. K. Matthews spoke at a public meeting in honour of
Luthuli at the Girl Guides Hall in Grahamstown. Much disingenuous contestation
surrounded the planning of the meeting as permission for a venue for a multi-racial
gathering proved very difficult to obtain. 133 Of course, Luthuli could not attend this
event. His statement of appreciation to the gathering is significant, for it documents
again Luthuli's disapproval of the Joint Congresses' July decision to turn towards
violence. Luthuli concludes his statement:
This award brings with it an added responsibility and a challenge to carry
on the struggle by non-violent means through the grim times that lie ahead
OfUS.
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Luthuli spoke with many well-known and credible journalists in November and
December 1961; in many he harped on the continued use of non-violent methods. In
mid-November 1961, one journalist, Benjamin Pogrund, held an in depth interview with
Luthuli. 135 During the interview Luthuli stressed:
131 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "It's Great to be Alive in Africa Today!", 26 November 1961.
In this article, Luthuli is conflicted. Luthuli blithely comments upon the problems of Ghana, Congo and
Portuguese West Africa.
132 Sunday Times, "Luthuli: Not Much Time Left to Save S. Africa", 29 October 1961.
133 EPH, "Public Meeting in Honour of Lutuli", 30 November 1961.
EPH, "Trouble at Lutuli Meeting Feared", 01 December 1961.
EPH, "Professor Makes Plea for Unity", 04 December 1961.
134 UKZN, APC&SA, PC62/1/1/3, Albert Luthuli, "Message to Grahamstown Meeting", 16 November
1961. Also found at LM.
135 Benjamin Pogrund was a close friend ofRobert Sobukwe and his biographer.
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Africans dare not forsake the path of non-violence. To do so would lead
to disaster both for themselves and for South Africa. It is true that we
have not had great success in the past in the achievement of our aims by
following non-violent methods. But this does not mean that the methods
have failed us - only that we have failed the methods .. .It is my hope that
the successful application by Africans of non-violent methods will exert
sufficient pressure on white South Africa to cause Whites to say, "We
can't go on like this. Let us sit down and discuss our mutual problems".
It is the task of the Africans to organise and discipline themselves so as to
make the fullest use of non-violent methods to bring this about.136
In the above Rand Daily Mail interview, Luthuli summarised the debates held in the
NWC, NEC and CJE meetings. Luthuli even quoted J. N. Singh's comment regarding
the efficacy of non-violent tactics. 137 Pogrund continued to explain that the methods
Luthuli had in mind included Stay-at-Homes, demonstrations and "non-collaboration"
generally - all of which were accepted throughout the civilised world as democratic and
peaceful ways of registering protest against government policy. Pogrund revealed
Luthuli's position that 'up to now, Africans had not made the fullest possible use of these
methods - and it was wrong for them to think that they had exhausted non-violent
tactics'. Pogrund quoted Luthuli:
Even the highest form - the Stay-at-Home has not been employed to the
fullest extent. No stay at home by Africans has yet been fully supported ...
I wish the government would assist us in continuing along a non-violent
path. It is not easy to guide our people when the government and its
leaders constantly talk and act in terms of force. Despite this, we shall
continue to exert pressure through non-violent means. We will continue to
be (sic) the legitimate kind of pressure used all over the world. l38
Judging from newspaper clippings, it appears that at every opportunity Luthuli declared
that non-violence is not just a method, but The Method. In a conversation on
136 Rand Daily Mail, "Non-Violence Is Path to Freedom - Luthuli", by Benjamin Pogrund, 14 November
1961.
137 Luthuli's quotation ofSingh substantiates Mandela and Yengwa's assertions that he was in fact present
at the July 1961 CJE meeting.
138 Rand Daily Mail, "Non-Violence Is Path to Freedom - Luthuli", I4 November 1961.
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23 November 1961 with J. J. Hurley, ambassador to Canada in Pretoria, Luthuli affirmed
"that it would in his opinion be 'suicidal folly' to try to overthrow the government by
force". 139
More interviews in November record Luthuli's sentiments regarding violence
after the collective decision to form MK and before his acceptance of the Nobel Peace
Prize in Oslo in December of 1961. Daniel McGeachie wrote for the British paper Daily
Express, a publication generally sympathetic to the South African government.
McGeachie's seven hundred word report sent by cable through the South African postal
service was stopped and held, thus producing a storm of outraged 'letters to the editor'
from white, black, liberal and nationalist journalists as an attack on freedom of the
press.140 In McGeachie's article, Luthuli vented exactly what he feared:
Non-violent agitation will win and I still think that the majority of black
South Africa is behind me. Stories that there are plans of violence may be
government propaganda. The government wants a show-down. They
want us to fight so that they have an excuse to mow us down. 141
If one incorrectly understands that the NEC and CJE decisions authorised MK's
formation and launch, then Luthuli's hypothesis printed in the Cape Times that "stories"
of impending violence derived from "government propaganda" suggest that he did not
participate nor was informed about decisions made by the July 1961 meetings.
What then explains Luthuli's November 1961 statement to Pogrund that "talk of
violence is government propaganda" designed to incite Blacks and thus violently defeat
them with cause? What then explains pre-Long Walk to Freedom narratives of Luthuli's
anger at being marginalised from the decision to form MK, Mandela's "disconcerting
conversation with Luthuli" and Mandela's confirmation that Luthuli was present and
chaired the meetings that approved the resolution to form an armed movement?
Evidence confirms Luthuli chaired and yielded to the July decision to form MK. In
October, the Nobel committee announced Luthuli's winning of the Peace Prize.
Hereafter, Luthuli desired that the ANC take full advantage of the extensive opportunities
139 Sampson, Mandela, 159. See footnote 103, 599.
140 Times, "Luthuli Cable Banned", 15 November 1961.
141 Cape Times, "Afrikaans Press Told Why Luthuli Cable Was Held", 20 November 1961.
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the Peace Prize offered by forestalling an activation ofviolent strategies and continue to
only employ non-violent methods. Luthuli's anger at Mandela soon after MK's launch
stemmed not from his not "being consulted about the formation ofMIC but rather from
the failure to consult or inform Luthuli about MK's launch. No one informed Luthuli of
the impending launch he suspected and feared. Luthuli's stated public hypothesis that
'talk of violence' was a government ploy to goad Blacks into violence was a means to
express fear of and to publicly forestall the imminent move from one decision
(formation) to another (activation). Given the ANC's illegal status and the great
difficulty in gathering the leadership, the media would be the best way to issue
imperatives to not proceed further from the earlier decision to form MK in light of new
developments (Nobel Peace Prize). The October announcement of Luthuli's Nobel Peace
Prize and the non-violent struggle for liberation rapidly and dramatically extended the
road previously thought in July to be a cul-de-sac. Luthuli re-assessed the now
promisingly effective non-violent tactics in light of the international publicity and
sympathy and, as the President-General, re-doubled his advocacy for an exclusively non-
violent struggle. Luthuli from October to December repeatedly emphasised through the
press, a desperate need to cancel, revisit and/or postpone any implementation of plans by
the newly formed organisation.
Between October 1961 and December 1961, Luthuli spoke most clearly about the
need for non-violence. During this time, Luthuli thoroughly articulated why some might
resort to violence because he had recently in July listened to them. From October
international attention made the imperative for and benefits of non-violence even
stronger. During this time, Luthuli made a profound distinction between "young people"
and "the leadership" that he much later echoed in 1964 as the "young people" were
sentenced to life-imprisonment.
"You would expect people to start questioning and asking, 'How long
would these white men take advantage of our seeming docility?' It would
not be surprising to find some, particularly young people, beginning to
question the efficacy of non-violence when they face so aggressive a
government. If the oppressed people here ever came to indulge in violent
ways that would be a reaction against the policy of government in
suppressing them. However much you may disagree with them, you
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cannot blame them. But the leadership", he added, "stand by the non-
violent method" (emphasis Benson's and hence Luthuli's).142
Before departing for Norway, Luthuli had little time to contemplate how he would
utilise the prize money. In keeping with his faith-based convictions, Luthuli would
discern a manner in which the funds would be put to good use to forward the liberation
struggle non-violently. When questioned about what he would do with the R 31,112.00
prize money, Luthuli responded:
It is not in my mind at the present moment. I have only been thinking of
the spiritual importance ofthe hour, and what it means in terms of the
spiritual encouragement and the added responsibility that it brings. 143
Luthuli eventually used the prize money to purchase two farms in Swaziland. Some
historians proposed that Luthuli's purchase of two farms counter Buthelezi's evocation of
"Luthuli's name when advocating non-violent change in South Africa" and provided
evidence that Luthuli supported the ANC's pursuit ofthe armed struggle. 144 Luthuli
purchased the farms to offer humanitarian relief to refugees, whether they were violent
refugees or non-violent refugees would have been immaterial. The purchase of farms for
refugee relief can more accurately be characterised as a unique non-violent endeavour to
support the struggle. No literature suggests that the farms served as military bases,
training centres or launch sites for armed incursions. 145 Furthermore, Nokukhanya
remarked, "Unfortunately, there were never many refugees staying at the farms". 146 Only
Yengwa and Conco visited a few times. Many clues reveal that the venture failed.
Nokukhanya purchased the farms and supervised all the work. She "spent long periods
away from home" (six months a year) and "experienced the hardships oflife as a woman
142 Benson, ChiefAlbert Luthuli ofSouth Africa, 65.
143 Rand Daily Mail, "Ex-Chief Will Apply for Passport", 24 October 1961.
144 Sithole, "Chief Albert Luthuli" in Zulu Identities, Carton, Laband and Sithole, 337.
145 The media reported that "no political significance is attached to the purchase" of 100 hundred acre farm.
Publication unknown, "Luthuli Buys a Farm in Swaziland", by Brian Rudden, date unknown.
146 Rule, Nokukhanya, 136.
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on her own in a strange country".147 She joined the workers in the field and ran a farm
store to "earn a bit more money".148 Nokukhanya explained:
I had to tolerate a lot from some men who were very troublesome. They
could not understand why I, a woman, was there on the farm. For them it
was a man's job. This is the kind of attitude I had to put up with. Because
I was alone and vulnerable they tried to intimidate me...At night I was all
alone because the workers did not want to stay in the farm compound and
they all went away to their farms. 149
The farms served primarily as commercial ventures whereby the proceeds of produce
grown would contribute to the liberation movement. If the farms' purpose was to support
the armed movement or refugees of the armed movement, then the ANC would have
supported and utilised the farms. The ANC would have also felt obligated to assist its
i
ailing and banned President-General's wife, not tolerating her sacrificial and solitary
toiling. Rule's book indicates that any profit made on the farms went toward helping the
ANC in London. In accordance with Luthuli's will, the money from the sale of the farms
after his death contributed to the LuthuIi Educational Trust to fund scholarships and to
assist schools with libraries and books. All things considered, it is reasonable to conclude
that Luthuli intended that the farms purchased with the Nobel Peace Prize money
contribute to non-violent methods of resistance.
Nobel Peace Prize Received
Many newspaper editors and political commentators debated the pros and cons of
Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize as one drama after another unfolded. What would be the
reaction of the South African government? Would the government grant Luthuli a
passport?150 Would he be allowed to travel outside of Oslo? Pro-National Party or not,
147 Rule, Nokukhanya, 132.
148 Rule, Nokukhanya, 133.
149 Rule, Nokukhanya, 133.
]50 Ifthe government refused, Luthuli indicated he would apply for a Rhodesian passport on the basis of his
Rhodesian birth.
Sunday Times, "He Could Get Rhodesian Passport: Luthuli Had Plan If Govt. Said No", 11 November
1961.
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universal opinion was that it would do the government far more harm than good to
prohibit Luthuli's travels and deny him a passport as a consequence of his political ban.
For the government, the decision whether to allow Luthuli's attendance was a lose/lose
proposition. If allowed to attend, Luthuli would effectively denounce the South African
government's policy of Apartheid. If they denied Luthuli permission to travel, the
government would have the rather ironic privilege of accepting it on his behalf through a
. . h d· I· I 151representattve WIt lp omatIc or consu ar status.
The government bitterly disputed Luthuli's worthiness to receive the Peace Prize
and in doing so incriminated itself. Instead of remaining silent, the government issued
petty and condescending vitriol through the Minister of the Interior, Senator Jan de
Klerk. 152 On 27 October, Luthuli applied to the Ministry of the Interior for the lifting of
his travel ban and a passport. I 53 The application itself was short-sighted in that it
requested only a "few days" and included a trip to Tanganyika (Tanzania) to celebrate
that country's independence. 154 Rather than Tanganyika, Luthuli should have applied to
visit Sweden, England or even the United States after receiving news of winning the
Peace Prize as invitations would likely be received to visit these countries. I 55 Later, and
well into his sojourn on 11 December, Luthuli and the Swedish government applied for
him to travel to and speak in Sweden "as Nobel Peace Prize winners normally dO".156
151 Daily News, "Diplomats Intrigued at Poser", 25 October 1961.
Star, "Diplomat Could Collect Prize", 25 October 1961.
Daily News, "Let Lutuli Go to Oslo", 27 October 1961.
Daily News, "How Not to Do It", 06 November 1961.
Only once before had a Nobel Peace Prize recipient been denied the opportunity to travel and accept the
award. Carl von Ossietzky who won the award was unable to claim it as he was in a German concentration
camp. Ossietzky won the 1935 Prize and, similar to Luthuli, reserved to the following year.
152 Publication unknown, "Lutuli Goes to Oslo - But Not Tanganyika", 08 November 1961.
153 Natal Mercury, "Luthuli Not Allowed to Go to 'Honour' Meeting", 28 October 1961.
The application was received on 31 October 1961.
Publication unknown, "No Decision Yet on Lutuli', 01 November 1961.
154 Star, '''No' to Request for Tanganyika Visit", 03 November 1961.
In fact, the oversight not to include Sweden in the passport application's itinerary can be considered a
grievous mistake by the Nobel Committee and Luthuli. Only the Nobel Peace Prize is received in Oslo.
All other Nobel prizes are awarded in Stockholm, Sweden. Customarily, the Nobellaureate for Peace
would join the all other laureates for a conference in Stockholm.
Interview with Tor Sellstrom, Senior Advisor ofthe African Centre of the Constructive Resolution of
Disputes, Luthuli Museum, Groutville, Kwadukuza, 27 June 2008.
155 Star, "Luthuli Invited to Tour America", 25 October 1961.
156 Publication unknown, "Longer Stay Asked For", 11 December 1961.
Luthuli was invited by the Christian Brotherhood Movement. Luthuli sent his application to the South
African legation in Stockholm. The South African government replied negatively on 12 December 1961.
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The application was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the Minister of Justice, John Vorster,
refused Luthuli's application to attend a gathering on 28 October in Stanger at which "an
enthusiastic crowd of over nine hundred" gathered to celebrate the Nobel honour. 15? At
the gathering, Paton read a song ofpraise.
You there, Luthuli. They thought your world was small.
They thought you lived in Groutville.
Now they discover it's the world you live in.
You there, Luthuli. They thought your name was small. Luthuli of
Groutville, now they discover your name is everywhere.
You there, Luthuli. They thought you were chained like a backyard dog.
Now they discovered they are in prison but you are free.
You there, Luthuli. They took your name ofchief. You were not worthy.
Now they discover you are more chief than ever.
Go well, Luthuli. May your days be long. Your country cannot spare you.
Win for us also, Luthuli, the prize of peace. 158
Many accounts ofthis time erroneously state that the government delayed and/or
initially refused to grant Luthuli a passport until the last minute. 159 This characterisation
of the government's response to Luthuli's application is inaccurate. In fact, the
government having received the application late on 31 October, could at the earliest have
reviewed the application on 01 November. On 06 November de Klerk made a statement
granting the passports for the couple. 160 The Luthulis received the passports on
23 November. 161 Furthermore, the government granted Luthuli more days abroad than he
requested in his application, realising that due to "practical reasons" he would need more
time. 162 The government felt that Luthuli's request did not take into consideration travel
delays, connecting travel and "time to relax after a long journey before such an important
Daily News, "No Extension for Lutuli: He Must Return This Week", 12 December 1961.
157 Daily News, "The Special Branch Go to 'Lutuli' Meeting", 28 October 1961.
Another newspaper report recorded "more than 1,200".
Sunday Tribune, "1,200 Gather to Hounor Lutuli", 29 October 1961.
158 Observer, '''You There, Luthuli ... "', by Mary Benson, 29 October 1961.
159 Kally, The Struggle, 1.
Worse, Kally's text stated that the government "took away his passport". The historical narrative continued
in err by indicating, "It was a year later that the government relented and gave him a very restricted
passport for a few days to be outside the country" (l).
160 Star, "Luthuli on Rand on December 5", 24 November 1961.
161 Publication unknown, "Passports for Lutulis", 24 November 1961.
162 Publication unknown, "Lutuli Goes to Oslo - But Not Tanganyika", 08 November 1961.
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event".163 Though efficient in its approval, the government's granting of a passport was
nonetheless begrudging, ungracious and included many loosely defined restrictions, for
example that he not make any political statements nor tarnish South Africa's image. In
addition, a meeting that was planned in London between Christian Action, the Anti-
Apartheid Movement and Luthuli was cancelled due to restrictions placed in his passport.
Luthuli was inconsistent in his willingness to be obedient to the government's
conditions for travel. For example, Luthuli indicated he would abide by government
decisions that would limit his speaking "at functions other than at the official Peace Prize
ceremony" but clearly did not abide by its directive to refrain from making political
statements that might tarnish South Africa's image. 164 Luthuli wrote to de Klerk on two
occasions: once to ask ifhe could attend social gatherings and once to ask ifhe could
travel to places in Norway outside Oslo. The minister responded to the former in the
affirmative while the latter query was left answered. 165 Luthuli felt obliged to turn down
an invitation to address a religious meeting in Norway's oldest cathedral, Stavanger,
because his passport conditions confined him to Oslo.
On 10 November, over ten thousand attended a rally at Curries Fountain Sports
Stadium in Durban. Of course, Vorster denied Luthuli the opportunity to attend. Luthuli
again tried to re-address the decisions made in July through his statement that affirmed
that the award was an "encouragement to continue by non-violent means the struggle for
freedom and justice for all".166 Also in November, Luthuli assembled his staff that would
accompany him while in Norway at their own expense. On 09 November, Luthuli wrote
to Mary-Louise Hooper in San Francisco requesting her service. 167 On 10 November, he
wrote to Tambo who was in New York formally asking him to be a part of his staff in
Oslo with Robert Resha. 168 There would indeed be much work to be done, receiving and
responding to correspondences and telegrams.169
163 Publication unknown, "Lutuli Goes to Oslo - But Not Tanganyika", 08 November 1961.
164 Evening Post, "Lutuli Composes His World Speech in Solitude", 02 December 1961.
Times, "Mr. Luthuli Bound by Conditions: No Political Speeches in Norway", 04 December 1961, 9b.
165 Daily News, "Mr. Lutuli Met by Songs and Freezing Cold", 07 December 1961.
166 Daily News, "More Than 10,000 Attend Rally to Honour Lutuli", 10 November 1961.
167 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.9, correspondence from Luthuli to Mary-Lousie
Hooper, 09 November 1961.
168 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.9, correspondence from Luthuli to Oliver Tambo,
10 November 1961.
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Approximately two weeks before his departure for Norway, Luthuli devoted most
ofhis time in Groutville to composing his acceptance speech and Nobellecture. Few, if
any, interviews were granted. After a prayer service on the morning of 05 December,
Mahomed drove Luthuli and his wife in a convertible coupe from Groutville to Durban,
arriving at 10:30 for lunch at the Himalaya Hotel in Durban's 'Indian quarter', and in
convoy to Louis Botha Airport for a 15 :00 flight to Johannesburg. l70 Upon his arrival in
Durban, thousands swarmed in the streets to greet Luthuli. At the airport, the authorities
requested Luthuli to instruct the crowd to depart the "Whites Only" airport hall. Luthuli
graciously invited the crowd outside where he joined them in song. l71 The flight from
Durban to Johannesburg was delayed for forty-five minutes due to a "technical hitch".172
The Luthulis were scheduled to depart Johannesburg for London at 17: 15 and arrive at
09:00. However, a second delay occurred when after take-off, the aircraft had to return to
the Johannesburg airport due to technical problems related to its pressurisation system.m
This second delay must have caused Luthuli great distress. Surprisingly, no press reports
conveyed suspicion that the government may have orchestrated both delays to examine
Luthuli's luggage contents or to frustrate itineraries that included meetings with anti-
Apartheid organisations. One press article reported oddly that as the aircraft returned to
lan Smuts airport, "the engineer of the Comet fell ill. .. and has been taken to a nursing
home".174 The flight to London was delayed until the morning of the 6th • The Luthulis
ate their supper in the upstairs airport lounge while the white passengers ate at the ground
Billy Modise also attended the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony. Modisejoined the ANC in 1955, led students
at Fort Hare University and served on the Executive ofNUSAS (National Union of South African
Students). In 1960, Modise illegally left South Africa to accept a scholarship at Lund University in
Sweden. While studying medicine, Modise involved himself heavily in anti-Apartheid politics, so much so
that he ultimately chose to study sociology.
169 UFH, HPAL, ANCA, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.0, correspondence to Luthuli from the Vice-President
ofInternational Affairs, Finn Fostervoll of the National Union ofNorwegian Students (Norsk
Studentsamband), 13 December 1961 and dictated correspondence from Luthuli to Kurt Kristianson of the
National Council ofSwedish Youth, 14 December 1961.
170 Evening Post, "Lutuli Composes His World Speech in Solitude", 02 December 1961.
Daily News, "Send-Dff of the Lutulis", 04 December 1961.
Publication Unknown, "Luthuli's Oslo Trip Is Under No Restrictions, but... ", 02 December 1961.
171 Daily News, "Lutuli Greeted by Cheering Crowd", 05 December 1961.
172 Times, "Mr. Luthuli in London Today: Delayed Flight from S. Africa", 07 December 1961, 12g.
173 Times, "Mr. Luthuli's Departure Delayed: Night Spent at Airport", 06 December 1961.
174 Times, "Mr. Luthuli in London Today: Delayed Flight from S. Africa", 07 December 1961, 12g.
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floor restaurant. The Luthulis rested in the multi-racial terminal transit sleeping quarters
while the other white passengers lodged at a local Johannesburg hotel. 175
Though expected in London at 09:00 on 06 December, the Luthulis did not arrive
until 03: 15 on the i\ eighteen hours later. 176 Luthuli planned to enjoy a sightseeing tour
of London and stay overnight at the Collins' home during his layover before travelling to
Oslo. The delay prohibited both. l77 Despite their 03: 15 arrival, over two hundred people
waited patiently to greet them. Since the July meetings, very little contact between the
ANC and Luthuli is recorded in the archives. Nonetheless, among those waiting at the
airport were Tambo and Resha. Tambo served as Luthuli's 'manager' and secretary
during Luthuli's visit to Europe. From London, the itinerary remained as originally
planned. In London, Luthuli only slept for an hour and a half. The Luthulis departed
London for Copenhagen, Denmark at 12:55 and arrived the same day at 18:50 in Oslo
after a brief stop in Gothenburg, Sweden meeting dignitaries all along the way. In
Gothenburg, Luthuli's old friend Helander boarded the plane to Oslo. On this flight,
Helander asked Luthuli ifhe did not wish to seek political asylum in Norway or Sweden.
Luthuli responded firmly in the negative saying "that his place was in South Africa,
among his own people". 178 Luthuli' s response proved consistent with his stance
discouraging those in the struggle from fleeing the country into exile. Luthuli approved
ofonly Tambo's 1960 departure from South Africa to diplomatically represent the ANC
and later desired that Mandela return to South Africa from his 1962 African tour.
Immediately, during his arrival in snow-laden Oslo, Luthuli emphasised his non-
violent principles in a broadcast interview saying "even today it would be possible for
white and coloured people to live peacefully together in South Africa".179 By 23 :00 on
the night of 07 December in Oslo, Luthuli captured his first good night's rest, in part
175 Daily News, "Lutuli Is Off at Last", 06 December 1961.
176 Rule or Nokukhanya herself confused the narrative. By Nokukhanya's account, after a seventeen hour
delay at Jan Smuts, they experienced a second eighteen hour delay in Heathrow airport. The second delay
did not occur. This is another example of inaccurate oral history being documented.
Rule, Nokukhanya, 124.
177 Publication unknown, "Gathering in London for Lutuli Is Off", 01 December 1961.
178 GOteborgs Handels - och Sjofartstidning, 24 July 1967. Found in:
Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 177. See footnote 7.
179 Times, "Mr. Luthuli in Oslo", 08 December 1961.
Daily News, "Audience with King ofNorway: Very Tired Luthuli Faces Busy Three Days", 08 December
1961.
Star, "Luthuli Suffering from Strain", 08 December 1961.
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because Tambo, who was always worried about Luthuli's heath, told many disappointed
newsmen that Luthuli was going straight to bed after dinner. Tambo was so concerned
about Luthuli's health that he sought out medical advice while in Oslo.
At 11:15 on 09 December, King Olav ofNorway received Luthuli at the Royal
Palace. Luthuli commented that his conversation with the King was very pleasant, "but
of course we did not mention anything controversial about South African conditions".180
That evening Luthuli held a press conference wherein he proclaimed his position on
violence yet subtly warned of a possible impending launch of an organisation he knew
the NEC and the CJE had already decided to form.
There was no animosity on the part of non-Whites in South Africa. The
longer the suppression lasts, however, the greater the danger of violence.
We might be pressed so far that efforts to those who try to lead the
struggle along peaceful lines may be jeopardised. 181
Implied within this statement is that the National Party regime jeopardised Luthuli's
influence within the ANC due to his non-violent position. Because Luthuli continued to
desperately plead to Mandela and the others through the press to hold off on any possible
implementation, he made no mention to the press that Mandela and others had already
converted to the violent option. More appeals 'to hold the line' would be made to his
political colleagues in South Africa in the days ahead.
Luthuli received the Peace Prize on Sunday afternoon, 10 December and gave his
Nobel address on Monday, 11 December. Perhaps the best account of Luthuli's
acceptance of the Peace Prize came from Reuling, Luthuli's mentor and friend since their
days at Adams, who dictated a seven page correspondence to the American Board in the
Rome airport after departing Norway for Salisbury, Rhodesia. Reuling provided a
personal account of his trials and tribulations in his attempts to proudly witness Luthuli
receive one of world's most notable awards. Reuling was a wonderful story teller,
making even his rental of a tuxedo and purchase of inexpensive cuff links for the award
ceremony intriguing. Reulingjustified his efforts to attend the Nobel gathering because:
180 Sunday Tribune, "Now Lutuli Makes Bid to Stay On", 10 December 1961.
181 Daily News, "Big Crowd Will See Lutuli Receive His Nobel Prize", 09 December 1961.
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Luthuli is a product of the American Board Missions, has been associated
with our church for all his life, and also because of my nearly thirty-five
year personal contact and friendship with him as a colleague at Adams
College and during all those years since ... 182
Upon his arrival in Oslo, Reuling disappointingly discovered that despite having his
name, the Nobel Institute could only provide him a pass for one event that was already
public. Even more disheartening, organisers told Reuling that:
Luthuli was besieged by committee members, television people, reB0rters
and that hundreds who wanted to see him were being turned away. 83
Organisers shared with Reuling that he would have some difficulty in getting even a brief
word with Luthuli. Officials declined all of Reuling's appeals for passes. As Reuling
sulked after his last attempt to obtain a pass, a door suddenly opened and Luthuli
accompanied by Nokukhanya appeared in the passage. The Luthulis instantly recognised
Reuling. Luthuli ...
.. .came rushing across and in the Zulu language began chattering away
asking me about family, old missionary friends, etc., etc. We talked as
hard as we could in Zulu without a word of English for six or eight
minutes. 184
Reuling did not mention his predicament to Luthuli, not wishing to embarrass him.
Following their verbose conversation, organisers provided Reuling special cards with his
name inscribed upon them. Reuling thereafter encountered few difficulties. 185
In his 12 December correspondence, Reuling described in detail the events at the
small and filled to capacity university auditorium on Sunday afternoon, 10 December
182 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961. The Luthuli
Museum acquired this correspondence from:
VU, DLSC, Record Group 120, John Reuling and Eleanor Reuling Personal Papers, Box 1, folder 1.
Also found at Michigan State University, MS 257.
183 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961.
184 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961.
185 Reuling suspected that in order for him to be given a dinner pass, someone most likely was asked to
"stand down".
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when Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Prize. Though the Nobel Committee's
Chairperson, Gunnar Jahn, spoke entirely in Norwegian without translation, Reuling
identified within the speech biographical references to Luthuli that included the
American Board Mission, Adams College, his Christian training and quotations from
some ofLuthuli's speeches and writings. 186 Jahn emphatically commented upon
Luthuli's stance on violence.
Never has Luthuli succumbed to the temptation to use violent means in the
struggle for his people. Nothing has shaken him from this firm resolve, so
firmly rooted in his conviction that violence and terror must not be
employed ... Well might we ask: will the non-Whites of South Africa, by
their suffering, their humiliation and their patience, show the other nations
of the world that human rights can be won without violence, by following
a road to which we Europeans have committed both intellectually and
emotionally, but which we have all too often abandoned? If the non-
White people of South Africa ever lift themselves from their humiliation
without resorting to violence and terror, then it will be above all because
of the work of Luthuli, their fearless and incorruptible leader who, thanks
to his own high ethical standards, has rallied his people in support of this
policy, and who throughout his adult life has staked everything and
suffered everything without bitterness and without allowing hatred and
aggression to replace his abiding love of his fellow men. But if the day
should come when the struggle of the non-Whites in South Africa to win
their freedom denigrates into bloody slaughter, then Luthuli's voice will
be heard no more. But let us remember him and never forget that his way
was unwavering and clear. He would have not have had it SO.187
What was Luthuli thinking as he heard these words, prior to his being called forward to
accept the Nobel Peace Prize? Popular South African history would have one believe
that Luthuli, as President of the ANC since 1952, five months prior to receiving the Peace
Prize supported the formation ofMK and immediately after receiving it sanctioned the
initiation of violence. In his autobiography, Mandela admitted this contradiction:
186 Particularly, "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross".
187 "Mr. [Gunnar] Jahn delivered this speech on 10 December 1961, in the auditorium of the University of
Oslo. At its conclusion he presented the Peace Prize for 1960 (reserved that year) to Mr. Luthuli, who
accepted [the Prize] in a brief speech. The English translation ofMr. Jahn's speech is, with certain editorial
changes and emendations made after collation with the Norwegian text, that which is carried in Les Prix
Nobel en 1960, which also includes the original Norwegian text".
Asmal, Chidester and James, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 20-1 and 274.
293
The honour came at an awkward time for it was juxtaposed against an
announcement that seemed to call the award itself into question. The day
after Luthuli returned from Oslo [16 December 1961], MK dramatically
d · 188announce Its emergence.
If the assumption that Luthuli sanctioned violence is true, what raced through Luthuli's
mind as Jahn declared that Luthuli was "unwavering and clear" on his objection to
violence? IfLuthuli's position was not resolutely against violence, surely he would have
experienced a sense of panic and anxiety as he listened to Jahn declare that 'if the
liberation movement is to resist the temptation to use violence, it will be due to Luthuli's
influence,.189 IfLuthuli's position was not resolutely against violence, undoubtedly he
would have bristled as Jahn concluded that 'if the liberation movement ever resorted to
violence, it will be due to an abandonment ofLuthuli's voice'. Did Luthuli support the
massive ethical and strategic change in the liberation movement's policy? If we assume
the answer is 'Yes, Luthuli sanctioned the violence', did Jahn's introduction engender an
existential dilemma within Luthuli? If this study exposes contemporary nationalist
understandings as false and concludes, 'No, Luthuli did not waver in his belief that
violence should not be employed as a means to achieve liberation', what can account for
the prevailing politico-historical assumption that he provided consent for the armed
struggle? John AlIen, author of Tutu's authorised biography, provided a glimpse of the
confusion that this study clarifies.
The Norwegians appear to have learned after the Prize was announced but
before it was conferred that violence had become likely: Luthuli told at
least one Norwegian in Oslo that notwithstanding his own feelings on the
issue, he had felt bound at a meeting with the ANC's leaders some months
earlier to accept a decision to embark on sabotage. The Norwegians did
not know when sabotage would begin and, given the operational
autonomy ofMK, it is unlikely that even Luthuli knew. 190
188 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 338.
189 That Mandela, the one who contested Luthuli's "influence" and "voice" concerning non-violence by
forming and launching MK, later won the Nobel Peace Prize is a very interesting historical irony.
190 Alien, Rabble-Rouser for Peace, 209.
In an 11 June 2007 e-mail correspondencetome.Allen provided the source of this information. "The
source for the piece you quote was Anne Ragnhild Breiby, a Norwegian researcher who did a Master's
degree on the award of the Peace Prize to South AfTicans... [In an interview,] I questioned her in some
detail on this point, and it is quite clear that while in Oslo, Luthuli told at least one of his hosts about the
decision to turn to violence. The one further detail of interest was that friends in Oslo at the time ofthe
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At the conclusion ofJahn's speech, Luthuli walked to the podium, received a
scroll, bowed to the King and gave it to Nokukhanya. Luthuli accepted the Prize in, for
him, uncharacteristic attire. 191 Luthuli borrowed from Buthelezi the partial regalia ofa
Zulu warrior king, complete with leopard skin and claw necklace. By wearing the
regalia, Luthuli risked disapproval by some within the ANC and his Congregationalist
church. 192 Luthuli was not a traditional hereditary chief, he was an Amakholwa chief.
Some who disapproved mistakenly interpreted the wearing traditional attire as nostalgia
for 'heathenism' or as a display of Zulu nationalism. For others, such as Tambo and
other ANC leaders, the Amakhosi were government minions, stooges and vestiges of the
past manipulated by the government to stunt the development of Blacks. Luthuli's choice
ofapparel is perplexing given that he also ascribed to the pejorative judgements of
traditional leadership held by the modern Africanists, nationalists and Christians. 193
Luthuli did not wear the adornments of an African king so as to represent Zulu
nationalism or traditional leadership. Rather, he wore the regalia of an African leader so
as to represent the continent ofAfrica in front of the world press. Luthuli recognised that
as the leader of the longest existing and largest liberation movement in Africa, he
represented the aspirations of the emerging African continent.
Luthuli delivered a short fifteen minute acceptance speech. 194 Being such an
august figure, many do not realise Luthuli's humble and delightful sense of humour. At
one point, Luthuli reminded the audience that the South African government did not feel
that he was worthy of such an esteemed honour. He then mentioned the award "has even
managed [for the first time in history] to produce an issue on which I agree with the
government".195 The primarily Norwegian audience, despite knowing English only as a
award found Luthuli very depressed - presumably because ofthe tensions he felt over the decision and his
receipt of the prize".
191 Only once before, at one ofhis daughter's (Hilda) wedding, had Luthuli been photographed carrying
'traditional' accoutrements, but in a suit.
192 Informal discussions with the family suggest that Nokukhanya attempted to dissuade Luthuli from the
perplexing decision to wear the regalia. '
193 Chapter two mentions Luthuli's perspectives on Christianity and traditional chieftainship.
194 A distinction exists between the short acceptance speech (l0 December) and the longer and more
prominent Nobellecture delivered the following day.
195 Daily News, "Severe Criticism ofS. A. Race Policy: Lutuli, in Warrior's Robes, Acclaimed in Oslo",
11 December 1961.
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second or third language, burst out in laughter. Reuling narrated that press reports may
have captured Luthuli's words, but they could not adequately report...
... the impression he created, the feeling ofwarmth that he gave out, the
feeling of sympathy that he engendered in his audience and the prolonged
and enthusiastic applause at the end. 196
That same evening Reuling attended a very private and formal dinner at which Luthuli
was also present. Luthuli's remarks during a brief speech focused upon the importance
ofAfrica to the world today, the need of arriving at peaceful solutions, his own ideals and
his determination to avoid violence. 197
Reuling described how the next day it was others' observation of his private
conversation with Luthuli, and thus of his fluency in Isizulu, that allowed him the
privilege of being the only guest to observe a British Broadcasting Corporation interview
with Luthuli for the programme Panorama. In this prominent current affairs programme,
the television host asked Luthuli, "How long the people would respond to Mr. Luthuli's
'bible-punching' appeal or whether they would fall prey to the 'rabble-rousers'''. Luthuli
responded that despite the fact that the National Party government exhibited no intention
to ease its Apartheid policies thus far ...
.. .militant non-violence in South Africa was still a valid weapon that
could be most effective and that it was better than resorting to violence to
. 'fr d 198gam one s ee om.
In the course of that interview Luthuli again reiterated his refrain:
We feel that to engage in any other method might brin?, bloodshed. To
gain freedom without bloodshed is a much better way. 99
196 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961,4.
197 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961,5.
198 Daily News, "Lutuli featured in BBC TV Programme", 12 December 1961.
199 BBC's current affairs program, Panorama. Cited in:
Publication unknown, "Help from the World Welcomed", 12 December 1961.
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Though Luthuli's statements were moderate, Reuling admired the frank and courageous
manner in which he firmly critiqued the South African government. Reuling surmised
that Luthuli ...
...went far beyond the bounds of what they had permitted him to do, and
there is every possibility that he may suffer for it upon return.200
On Monday, 11 December 1961 Luthuli, despite all the harassment and
complications arising from the government's cantankerous response to his award,
delivered a seventy minute Nobellecture and continued to emphasise the movement's
non-violent methods. Dressed this time in a western European suit, Luthuli stated:
Through all this cruel treatment in the name of law and order, our people,
with few exceptions, have remained non-violent. If today this (Nobel)
peace award is given to South Africa through a black man, it is not
because we in South Africa have won our fight for peace and human
brotherhood. Far from it. Perhaps we stand farther away from victory
than any other people in Africa. But nothing we have suffered at the
hands of the government has turned us from our chosen path of disciplined
resistance. It is for this, I believe, that this award is given.201
Luthuli devoted the first twenty minutes "to a picture of the African continent in a state of
[relative] peaceful revolution".202 The remaining fifty minutes Luthuli criticised
Apartheid for being "a museum piece, a relic of an age which everywhere else is dead or
dying".203
In Norway, Luthuli played the role of a pacifist, though he was not one. Contrary
to Sechaba 's claim that once the ANC decided to opt for military methods, "Luthuli did
not waver", he pleaded that there be no decision to launch the new organisation. Luthuli
stated on the occasion of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize:
200 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961, 6.
201 Publication unknown, "Way of Violence Still Rejected", 12 December 1961. Quoted from Luthuli's
Nobel Peace Prize speech found in:
Asmal, Chidester and James, South Africa's Nobel Laureates, 28-9.
Publication unknown, "S. A. is 'Museum-Piece of Our Time': Lutuli Surveys Africa Changes",
11 December 196 I.
202 When compared with Europe's bloody revolutions.
Daily News, "Lutuli Sings, Brings Crowd to Its Feet", 12 December 1961.
203 Daily News, "Lutuli Sings, Brings Crowd to Its Feet", 12 December 1961.
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I firmly believe in non-violence. It is the only correct form which our
work and our struggle can take in South Africa. Both from the moral and
the practical point of view the situation of the country demands it.
Violence disrupts human life and is destructive to perpetrator and victim
alike ...To refrain from violence is the sign of the civilised man..."204
At this time, Luthuli was not just preaching non-violence to western audiences in
Norway. Luthuli also issued a statement for domestic consumption that reiterated the
same. For example, on 11 December the Durban branch of the United Nations
Association met to commemorate Human Right Day. In his message to the Association,
Luthuli reiterated:
I am a firm believer in non-violent action, and I hope to see the liberation
of my people and all oppressed people of Africa accomplished by non-
violent means,z°5
It is hard to fathom that those in MK's newly fonned leadership structures did not
pay close attention to the audio and print news which at the time was saturated with press
releases and editorials on Luthuli. Despite the ambiguities, the NEC and CJE agreed in
July that the armed movement would fall under the political guidance of the ANC. One
would imagine, given the very limited means of communication and coordination, every
word uttered from Luthuli would be gleaned and parsed to discern its message. Luthuli
still officially led the liberation movement as the President-General of the ANC. For
example, it is inconceivable that Mandela would not have known about Luthuli's blunt
statement regarding the way forward reported by the domestic paper Rand Daily Mail. In
his statement, Luthuli implied a stem directive: to be responsible and desist from
initiating violence. Luthuli further accused that anyone who does advocate violence is
irresponsible.
Even for purely practical reasons non-violence is the only course we can
follow. Direct attack by an unarmed public against the fully armed forces
204 Colin and Margaret Legum, The Bitter Choice: Eight South Africans' Resistance to Tyranny (New Yark:
World Publishing Co., 1968),62.
205 Daily News, "Message from Lutuli", 13 December 1961.
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of the government would mean suicide. There are no responsible persons
among us in the African National Conwess who advocate violence as a
means offurthering our cause (my emphasis).206
The announcement that Luthuli won the Peace Prize caused some within in the
NEC and CJE some embarrassment as they had already made the decision to form MK
and were instituting plans that prepared for armed conflict. A November 1961
Congress[es] Bulletin issued by the National Consultative Committee defensively
qualified the meaning of Luthuli's award:
We care not a rap for those [Africanists] who throw mud by sneering at
this award because it is a "Peace" award. Ofcourse we stand for
peace! But let it not be misunderstood. Peace for us, is not peace in
bondage Let the world, and our government, therefore know: our
oppressors are turning to the most savage repression in order to safeguard
their miserable privileges and to prevent the people stretching out their
hands for the fruits of our modem age. This we can no longer tolerate,
and we will summon all our brain and brawn... 207
If not embarrassed by the award, then many in the ANC were ignorant of its significance.
Whereas Luthuli viewed the award as a public relations weapon against the National
Party regime, others undervalued it. In a 1995 interview, Sisulu confided:
Now, on the question of Chief Luthuli: We had not, I must confess, by that
time attached such an importance to the Nobel Prize itself. But from that
time on we began to analyse it and realise its significance.208
Mandela and others such as Sisulu did not wait to analyse the Prize's impact. MK's
launch immediately following Luthuli's return from Oslo significantly diminished its
significance.
Luthuli's last public event in Oslo was a religious and personal farewell gathering
at the Oslo cathedral hosted by the Bishop of Stavanger, S. Birkeli.209 Luthuli did not shy
206 Rand Daily Mail, "100 Brave Cold to Greet Luthuli", 12 December 1961.
207 UWC, RIMA, Congress of Democrats (MCH 229), "Congress Bulletin" issued by the National
Consultative Committee of the SA Indian Congress, SA Coloured Peoples Congress, SA Congress of
Democrats and the SA Congress of Trade Unions, November 1961, 6.
208 Interview with WaIter Sisulu, 15 September 1995. Found in:
SeIlstrom, Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices, 190.
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from confronting his ecclesiastical soul-mates with constructive criticism. While Luthuli
was a product of Christian evangelisation and hence deeply respected and participated in
the Christian mission, the cultural imperialism that accompanied it did not escape his
reproach. Though Luthuli admired and emulated many aspects of western civilisation, he
opposed western philosophical efforts to denigrate African culture. In the Oslo cathedral,
he attacked Rousseau's concept of the 'Nobel Savage' as insulting, derogatory and
abhorrent. Having first hand knowledge ofNorwegian missions in Natal as close as
thirty kilometres from Groutville in Maphumulo, Luthuli commented specifically on their
mission's record. The Norwegian Lutherans had good reason to be proud. Nonetheless,
Luthuli soberly criticised the mission for having not aggressively enough established
schools and universities and did not ordain indigenous clergy into the ministry in
sufficient time. Luthuli then comforted his audience by commending them for recent
corrective measures.
During Luthuli's visit, Reuling learned that only a Norwegian could appreciate
the impact an African Christian from the southern hemisphere had on an increasingly
secularised Nordic country. A bishop of the Church of Norway commented to Reuling
particularly on the words that a Norwegian Socialist leader who spoke to Luthuli, asking
that God go with him and his wife as they travel to South Africa to fight the struggle.
It was stressed to me that I simply couldn't understand this, not knowing
that the Socialists were of a somewhat different cast than those we think of
in Britain, that this particular man had to the knowledge of the bishop not
mentioned the name of God for years and years and that what he said was
not an accident or just a way of speaking because this man had discussed
the matter in these terms with the bishop previously. There was a general
feeling that his had done much to help a real spiritual revival in a large
section of Norwegian people.2lO
On 14 December, Luthuli issued a press statement that affirmed his non-violent
stance saying:
209 Daily News, '''World ofPrayer Follows You', Lutuli Is Told", 14 December 1961.
210 LM, correspondence from John Reuling to "Family and Friends", 12 December 1961, 6.
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In carrying with me back to South Africa the heavy responsibility inherent
in the acceptance of the award, 1am strengthened by the knowledge that
our belief in the peaceful solution of human problems is shared by
millions throughout the world. 211
This statement and dozens of others clearly brought to view the unsustainable position
Luthuli had on 14 December and the deeply embarrassing predicament the launch of MK
only two days later imposed upon him.
The Luthulis departed Oslo on 14 December for Johannesburg via Hamburg,
Zurich, Athens and Khartoum on Scandinavian Airlines. The plane was expected to
arrive at 14: 15 on 15 December, but a two hour delay in Khartoum caused their late
arrival in Johannesburg.212 From Johannesburg, the Luthulis took another flight at 18:00
that same day to Durban arriving at 19:15. Mahomed was there at the airport waiting to
fetch them for their return to Groutville.
Umkhonto we Sizwe's Launch
On 16 December 1961, a series of explosions around the country dramatically
announced the new violent phase of the liberation movement. MK's published manifesto
accompanied the explosions wherein, in retort to Luthuli, presumably Mandela declared:
The government has interpreted the peacefulness of the movement as
weakness; the people's non-violent policies have been taken as a green
light for government violence. Refusal to resort to violence has been
interpreted by the government as an invitation to use armed force against
the people without any fear ofreprisals.213
The first day's violence initiated by MK resulted in the death of one of its own, two
aborted arsons and a blown-up manhole containing telephone cables.214 Petrus Molefe
was killed in the vicinity of his target by a premature explosion. His partner in the failed
211 UFH, HPAL, ANC, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.9, press statement issued by Albert J. Luthuli,
14 December 1961, 1.
212 Evening Post, "Lutuli Composes His World Speech in Solitude", 02 December 1961.
213 Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 123.
214 Due to an 'operational' anomaly, the first act of sabotage was committed in Durban a day early on
15 December 1961.
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act, Benjamin Ramotse, sustained bums on his hands and face. Ramotse's hospitalisation
later led to his arrest as experts linked residue on his clothes to the explosion.215 Slovo
narrated his aborted attempt to bum down the Johannesburg Drill Hall because the chairs
and wooden floor meant to catch on fire from a homemade incendiary device were being
cleaned by workers.216 His next target of administrative offices was spared because an
official unknowingly caught him in the act of attempting to bum them down.217 Turok
unsuccessfully tried to set alight the Native Divorce Court located in a Durban post
office. Disappointingly, Turok placed the incendiary device in a drawer that he then
closed, asphyxiating the fuse. The police found the device intact, with fingerprints
linking it to Turok thus leading to his arrest and imprisonment.218 Jack Hodgson and
Rusty Bemstein succeeded in the destruction of some telecommunication cables.
Eric Mtshali related how he and Bruno Mtolo (later to be state witness "Mr. X"
who incriminated many in the Rivonia Trial), Billy Nair, Cumick Ndlovu and
Ronnie Kasrils, all members ofMKNatal Regional Command, suffered the same
anticlimactic operations that characterised most of the inaugural sabotage efforts.219 On
Ordinance Road, Mtshali and others planted a bomb at a door at the Durban pass office.
Due to either sabotage within their ranks or to inexperience, "the bomb did not explode
properly and caused very little damage".22o Though on their second operation they
succeeded in felling a pylon, the team concluded that both operations were "then not
what we wanted them to be".221
Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, a founding member of MK in the Natal Regional
Command narrated how his small unit had stolen a great deal of dynamite. In doing so,
215 UWC, RIMA, MCH ISO, Dawn (Journal ofUmkhonto we Sizwe), "The Happiest Moment in My Life",
by loe Modise, 11-2.
216 To avoid any concerns that this study unfairly reflects pejoratively upon the ANC or its decision to
adopt the armed struggle, only narratives sanctioned and published by the ANC are quoted.
217 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dawn, "The Longest Three Minutes in My Life: An Episode by Comrade loe
Slovo, Chief of Staff ofUmkhonto we Sizwe", by loe Slovo, 7.
218 Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography, 155.
219 The members ofthe Natal branch ofMK consisted of: Curnick Ndlovu (Captain), Billy Nair (Deputy
Captain), Ronnie Kasrils (Lieutenant), Eric Mtshali (Sergeant), Brain Chaitow (Head of Technicians),
Bruno Mtolo (Assistant Head of Technicians). Harold Strachan instructed the group in methods of
sabotage. The government also arrested and imprisoned Strachan for three years soon after the launCh of
MK. Reinertsen neglected to mention Ebrahim.
Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 24.
220 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, DmlJn, "December Sixteen, '61 in Durban", Eric Mtshali, 13.
221 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, DmlJn, "December Sixteen, '61 in Durban", Eric Mtshali, 13.
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they threw away the blasting caps, not knowing what they were. Ebrahim later carried
out relatively successful operations that knocked out power in much of Durban and
delayed trains after impairing lines with explosives. Yet, Ebrahim also told of an
unsuccessful pipe-bomb attack that caused no damage at all to the targeted telephone
cables. In other unsuccessful operations, thick canvas covering goods trains proved
impervious to petrol bombs hurled from above.222
In a narrative entitled "How MK Grew", Bobby Pillay explained how he,
David Perulam (later turned state witness), Ebrahim and a fourth unnamed 'comrade'
planned to assassinate an informant named A. S. Kadjee. The first attempt using a fire-
bomb was aborted due to their being spotted by a guard. Their fast footwork in retreat
was all that allowed them to escape. Following this failure, they intended to bum down
the municipal bus depot. They aborted this mission due to the presence of guards. Next
they decided to bomb a train. Somehow, they placed a bomb underneath an old black
man. "Thanks (sic) God it did not go off", Pillay wrote relieved. Apparently, one of the
saboteurs improperly constructed the timing device. Pillay acknowledged in his narrative
that his team acted against instructions not to cause loss of life. A second operation to
blow-up the Kadjee business proved more successful when the premises suffered severe
damage. Another operation destroyed three tracks and a signal box below the Victoria
Bridge. Pillay's last operation failed to destroy an electric pole with a pipe-bomb.
The charge did not go off and the following morning when I passed the
place I could still see the charge attached to the pole.223
As reviewed in chapter three, the media immediately published reports of the
sabotage efforts and Luthuli sensed MK's involvement. Upon learning of the attacks
Luthuli "demanded an explanation of what was going on".224 The news of the loss oflife
and the amateurishness of the acts made Luthuli fume. When Luthuli met with Kotane,
he "made it clear that he was not able to tell any member of the ANC to resort to
222 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dawn, "Though We Had No AK47s Nor Revolvers", Ebrahim Ismail, 14-5.
223 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dmvn, "How MK Grew", by Bobby Pillay, 20.
224 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 268.
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violence, but neither was he prepared to condemn it".225 The violence saddened Luthuli.
Yet, he was helpless to do anything about it. Luthuli said to Kotane:
When my son decides to sleep with a girl, he does not ask for my
permission, but just does it. It is only afterwards, when the girl is pregnant
and the parents make a case, that he brings his troubles home?26
Umkhonto we Sizwe's Post-Mortem
The purpose of reviewing the initial failures ofMK is not to denigrate or
dishonour those who sacrificed their lives for South Africa's liberation. Yet, even MK
veterans acknowledged that turn to violence was disastrous for the movement. The
ANC's own published narratives demonstrate that the initiation of violence was ill-
conceived, inept, haphazard and ultimately a fast-track strategy to derailing the liberation
movement in the short and medium-term.227 The first MK operatives were untrained, ill-
equipped and naIve as to the implications of their actions and the aggressive manner in
which the National Party government would respond with repressive legislation (90 Day
Detention law) and extra-legal means (torture) to extract information from operatives.228
Steve Tshwete recollected how the regime tortured one operative and how it understood
the significance of the ANC's leadership change from Luthuli to Mandela.
The police knew it too. I remember an instance when one cadre was told
by one of the most famous torturers: "Look here! I used to understand the
old Congress of Luthuli, not this thing of Mandela. This is not an
organisation but a bloody f[ucking] army. You are therefore a soldier and
I am going to bliksem you like is done to a captured soldier,,?29
The regime correspondingly changed its tactics. The liberation movement's inability to
carry out effective sabotage and the degree that such violence would antagonise the state
225 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 268-9.
226 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 269.
227 It is true that, for the long-term, MK kept the militant embers ofliberation alive psychologically.
However, it can also be argued that the turn to violence and the solidarity with Communist countries
postponed western governments' belated and eventual anti-Apartheid stance.
228 Albie Sachs, The Jail Diary ofAlbie Sachs, rev. ed. (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1990),282-5.
229 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dawn, "MK Is Born", by Steve Tshwete, 26.
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caused Luthuli and Kotane to predict that it would not be an effective means by which to
prosecute the struggle for liberation and argue against it before MK's formation and
initiation. Kotane gauged the initiation of violence to have "ruined the movement".
After the initiation of violence, Kotane chastised Turok:
What the hell's wrong with you, why did you do stupid things like this? ..
If you throw stones at peoples' windows they're going to come out and
break your neck, so don't do it unless you know what you are doing.230
In his autobiography, Slovo confided that the plans for violence were "utterly
unreal", calling the initiation ofviolence "at best, an heroic failure" that left the liberation
movement "abysmally weak in the years that followed".231 Slovo confided similar
sentiments in MK's 25th Anniversary publication:
There were a number of factors which influenced the rather inexperienced
approaches to aspects of what we had to do. First of all an important
factor was our misasssesment of the situation (sic) ... We did not
sufficiently realise that the beginnings of armed struggle would lead to the
very steps which the enemy took.232
Luthuli's plan using militant non-violent strategies (economic sanctions,
international diplomacy and mass civil disobedience) would preserve the leadership of
the liberation movement and advance the cause of liberation more effectively than
sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The inexperience and ineffectiveness of MK's assaults
very quickly led to the incarceration of most of the ANC's leadership, including
Mandela, thus decapitating the movement. Slovo himself soberly confessed:
It is also a matter of historic record that Rivonia occurred and in the few
years following Rivonia all the heroic efforts made by the movement to
reconstitute in the underground failed. And for all practical purposes the
internal movement as an organised structure had been destroyed.233
230 UWC, RIMA, MCH 07,8.4.5, tape 2, interview with Ben Turok, August - October 1973, 7-8.
231 Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography, 146.
232 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dmvn, "The Sabotage Campaign", by Joe Slovo, 25.
233 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dmvn, "The Sabotage Campaign", by Joe Slovo, 24.
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The narratives of those who initiated armed conflict on 16 December 1961 bear
testimony to the short and medium term failure of the armed struggle, the bravery of
those who initiated it and the moral legitimacy of the cause (Luthuli's "brave just men")
notwithstanding. Narratives by Albie Sachs and Ronnie Kasrils highlighted the arrests,
detentions, executions and betrayals of many MK cadres in the opening months and years
of armed conflict: (Denis Goldberg, Nelson Mandela, Cumick Ndlovu, Billy Nair,
George Naicker, Eleanor Anderson and Bruno Mtolo).234 MK cadres also recalled the
arrests ofVuyisile Mini, Wilson Khayingo and Zinakile Mkhaba.235 With most ifnot all
of the ANC leadership injail or in exile, there was no one left to whom Luthuli could
advocate militant non-violent strategies, and no one to carry out its laborious
administration.
LuthuIi's ban is often blamed for limiting his leadership. The MK cadres'
narratives reflect that it was not primarily Luthuli's banning that limited his leadership
(he still assisted in the organisation of the Pietermaritzburg Conference and still met
clandestinely with many ANC officials and Kotane). Two other circumstances primarily
amputated Luthuli's leadership. First, the sudden imprisonment and exile of most of the
other leaders of the movement limited Luthuli's pool of human resources and thus his
capacity to lead. Second, the ANC's ideological and thus strategic policy changes
required a different 'command and control' mould ofleadership and thus Luthuli's
marginalisation. Though Luthuli's influence waned since SharpevilIe, the initiation of
violence made certain that the levers of leadership fell from his hands. The non-violent
movement had ended. More important than revealing the non-efficacy of the initial
strikes is the absence of any documentation of Luthuli's leadership at the time: the
silence.
Narratives recounted by those involved in the launch of violence within MK
commemorative publications reveal a silence through their failure to state whether
Luthuli participated in or assented to the initiation ofviolence.236 The silences in the
234 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dmvn, "The Least Dramatic Contribution", by Albie Sachs, and "Dynamite
Thieves", by Ronnie Kasrils, 16 and 17, respectively.
235 UWC, RIMA, MCH 150, Dmvn, "Vuyisile Mini", by R. M. T. Ngqungwana, 19.
236 Scot! Couper, '" An Embarrassment to the Congresses?': The Silencing of Chief Albert Luthuli and the
Production of ANC History", in Journal ofSouthern African Studies 35, no. 2, June 2009, 331-48.
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narratives, especially from operatives in Kwazulu-Natal, reveal that Luthuli was not
involved, directly or indirectly, in the strategic implementation ofviolence.237 Within the
above cited narratives, none of the MK cadres ever mentioned receiving instructions,
advice, counsel, affirmation or support from Luthuli, privately or publicly. No one
mentioned Luthuli. Not even those cadres based in what is now Kwazulu-Natal
expressed a single sentiment about or reveal a single instruction from Luthuli. The
reason for this is clear: all of the Natal MK members belonged to the Communist Party
and only one, Ndlovu, was also a member of the ANC. Mtolo's book, Umkhonto we
Sizwe: The Road to the Left revealed a great deal of contestation between the ANC and
the Communist Party in Natal. Mtolo concluded that "after the sabotage attempts it
became clear that the local officials of the ANC in our province were not consulted",
though MK designated Ndlovu to serve as its liaison with ANC.238 As "Mr. X" and as an
author, Mtolo is a problematic source. By providing testimony and writing a book, Mtolo
intended to reflect negatively on the ANC to the state's benefit.239 Nonetheless, there is
little reason to suspect that sharp disagreement did not exist between many within the
ANC and the Communist Party over the use of violence as this does not necessarily
reflect poorly on the ANC from the state's perspective.24o Mtolo's book asserted that MK
did not involve the ANC in its formation or plans for launch, and purposefully so.
In her study, Reinertsen also identified this silence saying "History is more richly textured if its pages can
bring to life some of the silent moments surrounding high points of activity. These silences are very often
full ofcontlicts, dissension and procrastination of real human beings..."
Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 2.
237 Reinertsen correctly indicated that "After the intensive activity of the first few years, the pages of
history are remarkably barren. This is partly because ofthe scarcity and/or unavailability [of]
documentation on the activities ofthe banned African National Congress". Reinertsen characterised the
documentation of the months between July and December 1961 as "shrouded in obscurity".
Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 1 and 24, respectively.
Though the ANC is no longer banned, there are few archival records documenting the ANC's turn to
violence. Incredibly, no archival source can provide the exact dates of two all night meetings, held by the
ANC NEC and the Joint Congresses. Only a vague "July" from SADET and Lodge can be cited as the date
for these meetings.
238 Bruno Mtolo, Umkhonto we Si::we: The Road to the Left (Durban: Drakensberg, 1966),23.
239 Mtolo's concluding chapter (XXV) entitled, "Lalela, ChiefLuthuli!" is absurd. The chapter is a
personal appeal to Luthuli to accept the bantustan framework. I suspect that Mtolo did not even write it; or,
ifhe did, the state compelled him to do so. For example, Mtolo contradicted the contents of his book when
he states, "Remember, Chief, that the police could have acted against you at the time ofUmkhonto we
Sizwe. Those things were done in your name. We were the 'military wing' of the ANC, and the Head
Committee members were careful to obtain your approval for their actions" (191).
240 Mtolo also disclosed that this division existed within the Communist Party.
The South African Communist Party expelled Rowley Arenstein for his anti-violent stance.
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We were all convinced Communists who would have nothing to do with
the ANC unless it was prepared to toe the Communist line ... We even
managed to get recruits for military training overseas without approaching
the ANC ... [SACTU members] were also told that it was time that they
should know their true leaders who were prepared to fight to the bitter end,
and had to realise that leaders who were against Umkhonto we Sizwe were
leading them nowhere ... We could not trust some ofthe people who made
up the ANC leadership. We could not let the dangerous underground
movement be controlled by the leaders of a mass organisation which
included people who had different views from us as far as sabotage was
concerned... Curnick told us that WaIter [Sisulu] had given him strict
instructions that we were not to give in to the ANC under whatever
pressure.241
Some of those within the ANC, some Communists such as Rowley Arenstein and
some from the Indian Congress applied three points of pressure on MK. First, as seen in
the July NEC and CJE meetings, most members of the Natal ANC opposed the use of
violence and like Luthuli still actively opposed it. Second, the ANC wished to know who
in the ANC also served MK. Third, the ANC wished to authorise approval for any
violent action. MK would not compromise on any of these three pressures. MK believed
it possessed operational autonomy from the ANC. The ANC believed it had political
suzerainty over MK. MK considered its tactics, membership and launch to be operational
considerations whereas the ANC considered them to be political. A clash proved
inevitable as ANC leaders voiced their suspicions ofMKbeing "an organisation which
was led by irresponsible people".242
MK's newly formed hierarchy, composed ofa High Command led by Mandela
and regional commands, ignored Luthuli's leadership in the months following the
announcement of the Peace Prize; the 16 December bombings were, at best, reckless,
and, at worst, insubordinate. The December bombings (and more specifically their
timing) exceeded the High Command's mandate to only constitute an organisation (not
Kwamuhle Museum, File number 5 456 1 7, Accession number 99/3697 - 3699 - 4200 - 4204, interview
with Rowley Arenstein, recording track (11 10 25 12) through (13 12 16 15), date unknown, 12 and 22.
241 Mtolo, Umkhonto we Si::Ive, 23, 24, 25 and 26, respectively.
242 Mtolo, Umkhonto we Si::Ive, 26.
308
activate it), rendered moot the mandate to remain under the political supervision of the
ANC and displayed immaturity.
IfLuthuli did not agree with the initiation of violence, why did he not specifically
denounce MK and its tactics? Three reasons stand out. One, Luthuli could not "blame
brave just men" for choosing a violent course. That is not to say that he agreed with
them. Luthuli sympathised with his lieutenants and blamed the National Party regime.
Second, a democratic process within three meetings agreed to form MK. In a public
denunciation, Luthuli would be unable to differentiate his reluctant yielding to a
democratic decision to form MK before the Nobel Prize announcement and his opposition
to MK's launch and tactics after the Nobel Prize announcement. A denunciation ofMK
and its tactics would only appear hypocritical despite the fact Luthuli did not support the
decision to form or know ofMK's launch. Third, once Mandela launched MK, there was
no turning back for the liberation movement. What was done was done. Luthuli believed
that refutation of the intractable course chosen could only harm and never contribute to
the liberation struggle. Though he never denounced MK, Luthuli still advocated non-
violent strategies until April 1962.
Disconcerting Conversation
Mandela testified in his autobiography that he visited Luthuli in Groutville before
departing for North Africa in January 1962. Mandela mistakenly interpreted Luthuli's
displeasure at this meeting to be caused by Luthuli's inability to recall two momentous
all-night meetings he chaired just five months previous. Again, one must recall the
quotation by Kathrada cited at the beginning of this chapter: " ... it should be borne in
mind that even people involved in the same event remember the details differently, and
amnesia is no friend of accuracy". Yes, Luthuli was angry with Mandela. However,
Luthuli's anger did not arise because he felt he was not involved in or informed about
MK's formation. Luthuli presided, and more importantly, remembered being present.
Instead, MK's launch without his knowledge, on the heels of the receipt of the Nobel
Peace Prize, angered Luthuli.
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Following the failed May 1961 strike, Mandela held a press conference with
western journalists. In that interview Mandela stated that "In my mind we are closing a
chapter on this question of a non-violent policy". Mandela recalled that he was
reprimanded by the NEC for making such a statement public without first consulting with
the movement. Luthuli felt that Mandela had again acted unilaterally by issuing the
manifesto announcing MK on 16 December 1961. Although the manifesto qualified that
MK utilised violence as a "complement to previous actions" and although it stated that
"repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only", the
overall tone declared, "We are striking out on a new road for the liberation of the people
of this country". Statements like "closing a chapter" and "striking out along a new road"
implied the abandonment of non-violent methods, violating the NEC and CJE meetings'
agreements to continue traditional methods of resistance. By authorising the formation of
an armed movement, the NEC and CJE intended to prepare for, at most, a parallel
strategy, and more realistically, a secondary strategy. Luthuli warned that the formation
ofMK must not be at the expense of the continuance ofpolitical methods. When
reflecting from prison in the 1970s on MK's launch, Mandela honestly and transparently
disclosed:
We had made exactly that mistake, drained the political organisations of
their enthusiastic and experienced men, concentrated our attention on the
. • 243new organISatIOn.
By forming and launching MK, the ANC abandoned political work. Having not
educated, informed or trained the grassroots for a new form of struggle, the sabotage
operations rendered most ANC members spectators.244 The MK manifesto contradicted
the Joint Congresses' covenant with MK when it stated, "The time comes in the life of
any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight". Mandela made a
political statement that equated Luthuli's militant non-violent methods with 'submission'
and violence with 'fighting' and declared boldly, "We shall not submit... ,,245
243 Nelson Mandela, unpublished autobiographical manuscripts, Department of Correctional Services Files,
Nelson Mandela A5, National Archives of South Africa, 1976. Cited by Lodge in citation below.
244 Lodge, Mandela, 91 and 238, see endnote 38.
245 Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 122.
310
Evidence suggests that rather than a complement to the ANC's non-violent
strategies, the launch of MK intentionally sought to undermine them. Meghraoui of the
ANLF suggested the timing ofMK's launch aimed to specifically diminish the
anesthetising effect the Nobel Prize would have on the South African majority. If one
removes Meghraoui's outrageous suggestion that Luthuli intentionally returned to South
Africa to launch MK, the proffered explanation of Mande1a's motivation to launch MK so
quickly on the heels ofLuthuli's honour is accurate.246
At the same time the ANC leadership with Luthuli at its head, was not
unmindful of the fact that the idea of the Nobel Prize could be used to
pacify the African people in South Africa. To them it became important to
show the world that no respectable amount of respectable titles could stop
the struggle of the African people. Thus Luthuli returned to South Africa
on the 15th [of] December 1961 to launch a new phase of the struggle lead
by Umkonto We Sizwe the following mornin? (sic). The entire country
was shaken by a series of bomb explosions.24
Benson and the manifesto point to the central problem that is not Luthuli's
marginalisation from the decision to form MK, but rather the unilateral political
statements that accompanied the premature commencement of the new organisation's
methods. Benson astutely wrote:
Then Luthuli raised the question that had long troubled him: Umkhonto's
announcement in December 1961 that the policy of non-violence had
ended. Aware of Mandela's role, Luthuli criticised the failure to consult
with himself and the ANC 'grassroots'. He felt they had been
. d 248compromlse .
The manifesto stated that "Umkhonto we Sizwe fully supports the national liberation
movement and our members, jointly and individually, place themselves under the overall
political guidance of that movement,,?49 Though the new organisation would be separate
246 Luthuli actually tried to extend his stay so that he could travel to Sweden. The South African
government refused the request, forcing Luthuli to return on the designated day.
247 UFH, HPAL, ANC, ANCLL, Box 23, Folder 4, draft article by Meghraoui, 31 August 1967,3.
248 Benson, Nelson Mandela, 116.
249 "Umkhonto we Sizwe Manifesto", 1961. Found in:
Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 122.
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from the ANC, "it would nevertheless be linked to it and come under its formal
control".25o Yengwa stated the same?51 While it is true that due to the political climate
the precise relationship between the ANC and the armed movement was nebulous and
often characterised oxymoronically, Luthuli felt that the 16 December implementation of
the new methods and the rationale for justifying it were intrinsically political rather than
operational. Because no one consulted Luthuli about the planning, impending occurrence
and the timing of the December bombings, Mandela violated the spirit, if not the' letter' ,
of the CJE meeting's compromise. Sisulu related, "At a meeting to review the launch of
MK, Chief Luthuli was clearly embarrassed about the timing and unhappy about the
apparent recklessness that led to the casualties".252
The entire manifesto essentially indicted and rebuked the 'fonner' non-violent
strategies, not only viewing them as obsolete, but as fuelling continuing oppression.
Mandela stated, "The government has interpreted the peacefulness of the movement as
weakness; the people's non-violent policies as a green light for government violence".253
The bombings and the views expressed in the manifesto leaflets, and not Luthuli's failing
memory, explain his rebuke. Mandela was willing to be the 'tail that wags the dog' as he
did previously during the interview with foreign journalists following the May 1961
strike. Mandela stated in his autobiography, " ... sometimes one must go public with an
idea to push a reluctant organisation in the direction you want it to go".254 This Mandela
did, not just in word, but also in deed. Luthuli was helpless to stop it.
Conclusion
Hammarskjold's disappointing January visit, the increased balkanisation of the
liberation movement prior to the March All-In Africa Conference and Mandela's
ascendancy as the de facto leader of the ANC diminished the potency ofLuthuli's non-
violent advocacy. Since Sharpeville, Luthuli's influence as President-General continued
250 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo, 281.
251 LM, Yengwa, MYP, unpublished draft autobiographical manuscript, 106.
252 Sisulu, WaIter & Albertina Sisulu, 147.
253 Sisulu, WaIter & Albertina Sisulu, 123.
254 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 320.
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to wane while Mandela's waxed. In July, Luthuli participated in and yielded to the NEC
and CJE decisions to fonn MK. Nonetheless, the decision did not authorise MK to
embark upon violence. A decision to 'fonn' is not necessarily a decision to 'implement'.
'Fatigue' partially explains why Luthuli yielded to the decision. After Luthuli chaired
two exhausting all night meetings, the younger more energetic firebrands out-voted him,
causing his democratic capitulation. To further distance himself and the ANC from the
decision, Luthuli proposed a compromise that deemed MK a separate but linked
organisation so that though politically subservient to the ANC, MK did not officially
'dirty' the ANC and Luthuli's hands.
From October 1961 Luthuli vociferously spoke out against the use of violence
because the Nobel Committee dramatically altered the political environment by awarding
him the Peace Prize. More than modesty caused Luthuli to repeatedly emphasise that the
award was not an award for him personally, but an award for the ANC that he led and for
the liberation struggle in general. To ANC members, Luthuli emphasised in all his press
interviews that the award recognised the non-violent struggle. For Luthuli, the Peace
Prize suddenly rendered Mandela's claims articulated at the NWC, NEC and the CJE
meetings and the future claim in his February 1962 speech in Addis Ababa to the Pan
African Freedom Conference that "all opportunities for peaceful agitation and struggle
have been closed to us" no longer accurate in describing the struggle's political context.
The international community provided the non-violent movement a whirlwind of
publicity and sympathy. The tactics that enabled Gandhi to conquer the British Empire
by appealing to conscience and to universal standards of human rights and the profiting
from the international community's ability to 'shame' an oppressor to refonn began to
come to fruition in the South African struggle.
Luthuli feared a possible impending decision to launch MK and argued against the
use of violence, attempting to forestall the move from one decision to the other until the
full benefits of the awarding of the Prize could be learned and utilised. The ANC and
Joint Congresses based its decision to allow MK's fonnation on Mandela's enthusiastic
and Luthuli 's reluctant realisation that non-violent tactics had reached a cul-de-sac. But,
the Peace Prize unveiled new hope, new opportunities and an extension of the road.
Surely, the other members of the ANC, despite their inability to meet and collectively
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reassess tactics in response to the dramatically changed situation, would come to the
same conclusion and, at a bare minimum, place any discussion of MK's launch ofviolent
action in abeyance. In his many press statements, Luthuli emphasised non-violent tactics,
warned of the suicidal nature of violent resistance and repeated his steadfast avowal that
the ANC remain non-violent.
These statements did not constitute treacherous betrayals of a decision
collectively made in July to allow for the formation ofMK. Nor were his statements
indications ofLuthuli's ill-health, senility or poor memory as Mandela asserted in his
autobiography. Luthuli's numerous October, November and December press statements
and speeches highlight the fact that he, as a prerogative of leadership, advised against
MK's possible launch in light of the October Nobel announcement and the December
reception of the Peace Prize so as to tactically maximise this non-violent form of.
opposition and hence gain the sympathy of the world. It was logistically infeasible and
risky to convene NWC, NEC and CJE meetings to re-visit the issue in a democratic
forum, let alone consult the grassroots. Instead, Luthuli utilised the press to the greatest
extent possible to place in abeyance that which he feared: MK's launch. Arguably,
Luthuli implied that he questioned the decision to form MK in the press. Unarguably,
Luthuli unequivocally pleaded with his lieutenants through the press: 'Do not do anything
stupid now!'
Mandela not only was reckless in his failure to understand the strategic
implications of the Nobel Peace Prize, but he prematurely implemented new tactics rather
than only forming a separate entity that would be prepared to carry out those new tactics
when and if appropriate and necessary. More than semantics distinguished the collective
decisions to agree to form an entity and the unilateral decision carried out by that entity.
More than an implementation ofa nuanced interpretation, Mandela's launch ofMK
constituted a significant breach of covenant. This breach angered Luthuli. The NEC and
CJE meetings explicitly stated that though separate from the ANC, MK was to be subject
to its mature, wise and prudent political leadership. The bombings on 16 December not
only violated this agreement, but violated it in the most harmful and strategically unwise
manner possible - on the heels of the Nobel Peace Prize. In launching MK, Mandela did
not re-evaluate the changed context and acted autonomously (that is, not under the
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political supervision of the ANC) and possibly negated much of the practical benefit that
the movement might have derived from the Nobel award. Premature and unnecessary.255
Reckless. Irresponsible. Hot-headed. Insubordinate. These were Mandela's actions in
Luthuli's estimation. But, he kept silent. He could do nothing. The damage was done.
Though Luthuli was not a pacifist, he persistently and consistently advocated that
only non-violent methods be used in the struggle for liberation after the initiation of
violence until at least April 1962.256 Luthuli calculated that resisting the Apartheid
regime with violence was tantamount to "national suicide", for in warfare the National
Party regime had its strongest advantage.257 Luthuli believed that the initiation of
violence with superficial preparation and impatience would prove to be a catastrophic
strategic mistake. Luthuli believed, especially after his reception of the Peace Prize, that
non-violent means were more effective against the regime despite their seeming
ineffectiveness thus far, because in this area the ANC held the moral, political and
economic high ground.
Luthuli refused to sanction violence because he hoped for a peaceful non-racial
society following liberation. Because, in his mind, liberation was eventually assured,
Luthuli concerned himselfwith the nature of society after the attainment of liberation.
Luthuli believed that liberation was hardly worth fighting for if a bloody apocalypse was
the means and a divided, resentful, wounded and fractured society was the result. Not
until the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) twenty-three years later under
the influence of, among many others, two churchmen, Boesak and Tutu (who also
advocated only non-violent means but like Luthuli sympathised with and did not
condemn those whose desperation led them to believe there to be no other way than
violence), did the movement for liberation turn the tide and gain the upper hand against
the National Party regime.258
255 Lodge, Mandela, 91.
256 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, Albert Luthuli, "Our Way Is Right- We Must Keep On", 25 March 1962.
BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, Albert Luthuli, "No Change in Heart among the Whites", 29 April 1962.
257 Albert Luthuli, "Excerpts from Chief Luthuli's evidence at the [T]reason [T]rial dealing with his
understanding of a non-violent liberation struggle". Found in:
Pillay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 153-4.
258 The trade union movement and international advocacy organisations must also be given substantive
credit for the revival of the liberation movement.
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Chapter Six
Luthuli, the Leader, Started Dying Years Ago!
There are many unanswered prayers. We forget that the answer to prayer
may be "No!" because God knows what we should have!
-- transcribed by Albert Luthuli from Rev. Noel Tarrant2
Introduction
This last chapter highlights events from 1962 until Luthuli's death in 1967 that
affirm several sub-themes already discussed in previous chapters concerning his
opposition to violence. First, Mandela returned to South Africa from his 1962 pan-
African tour proposing that the ANC dominate the Congress Alliance thus diverging with
Luthuli's South African exceptionalist perspective that emphasised multi- (or non-)
racialism and non-violence. Second, the importance of interpreting Luthuli through a
theological lens as well as a political lens, is emphasised with an analysis of the title of
his autobiography (Let My People Go) published in 1962. This includes a brief
examination of Moses' role in the ancient Hebrews' liberation. Luthuli's'typological
enactment' leads to a conclusion that he envisioned himself as a spiritual leader who
would not see the Promised Land rather than as a successful political or military leader.
Third, interviews with Rowley Arenstein and Ronald Harrison contest assertions from
MK cadres that Luthuli supported the turn to violence and thus refute their production of
a homogenised nationalist historical perspective. Fourth, minutes from a March 1962
CJE meeting indicated that those present perceived Luthuli's Post columns pleading for
non-violence to be embarrassing. Luthuli's subsequent silencing informed Nokwe's
1963 assurance that Luthuli would not condemn violent acts. Yet, Luthuli did not need
I Publication Unknown, "Lutuli, the Leader, Started Dying Years Ago", July 1967.
Found atLM.
"Albert Lutuli - the man many people would have loved to see as Prime Minister - was crushed to death by
a train this week. He could not have died a happy man. Few of his dreams - not for himself but for his
people who meant so much to him - were realised during his lifetime".
2 Handwritten notes by Luthuli written on Sunday, 08 January 1967 at 11 :00 as he listened to a sermon by
Rev. W. Noel H. Tarrant at the Rondebosch Congregational Church, Cape Town.
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, Notebooks (dealing with church
services and sermons", 1965-1967.
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his own movement to silence him. The government's enforcement ofthe Sabotage Act in
June 1962 more effectively smothered any further domestic emphasis on non-violent
methods. Political contact with Luthuli became very circumscribed, leading even the
ANC to resort to his ecclesiastic contacts to provide information about his wellbeing.
Luthuli became so marginalised from the ANC that his 1964 Rivonia Statement revealed
he was not aware of the 1962 Lobatse conference's outcome that removed the veil
between the ANC and MK.
Internationally, Luthuli could not be silenced. In the final years of Luthuli's life
he received a visit from Robert Kennedy who during his 1966 whirlwind trip of South
Africa touted many typical American, liberal, Christian and western views that focused
on what 'civilisation' meant for Luthuli. Luthuli continued to receive international
honours such as being elected Rector of Glasgow University in 1962 and receiving the
New York City Protestant Council's Family of Man award in 1964 for his non-violent
opposition to Apartheid. Luthuli would not have accepted these honours had he at any
time supported MK's launch. This chapter, as previous chapters did with Reuling, Mary-
Louise Hooper and Mahomed, highlights Luthuli' s cooperation with George Houser, the
American Committee on Africa, and Martin Luther King to jointly appeal for non-violent
opposition to Apartheid in December 1962. Luthuli's imbrication with pacifists, clerics,
liberals and other non-violent human rights advocates was so extensive that testimony in
one 1964 trial claimed he offered to resign from the ANC so as to not impede others'
prosecution of the armed struggle.
This investigation would not delve into the manner in which Luthuli died if
nationalist oriented cadres and historians did not so enthusiastically perpetuate a myth
that he was murdered. If Luthuli's health was rapidly failing, ifhe never advocated
violence and if militant leaders of the liberation movement and the Apartheid regime
silenced him as this study concludes, then no motive existed for his killing. Therefore,
this chapter casts doubt on the assertions documented in chapter three that foul-play
resulted in his death. While not attempting to conclusively resolve how and why Luthuli
died, this study asserts that, at a minimum, historians can not propagate a view that his
death was "mysterious" without providing a motive, reasons why the official inquest's
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finding is unreliable and any contesting evidence (not suspicions) that suggest he was
killed intentionally.
Divergent Objectives
In December 1961, the ANC received an invitation from the Pan-African
Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) to attend a
conference to be held in Addis Ababa in February 1962.3 In a 03 January 1962 NEC
meeting, the ANC underground and Luthuli insisted that Mandela lead the ANC
PAFMECSA delegation.4 Given the ANC's need to secure outside political, financial,
moral and military support for the new phase of its struggle, it would use the
PAFMECSA conference as a means to network throughout the continent and
communicate with allies in exile. A whirlwind tour by Mandela of West, North and East
Africa would connect the rather insular ANC with the wider continent.
Prior to his departure, Mandela covertly drove to Groutville on 08 January 1962
to liaise with Luthuli.5 In his biography on Mandela, Tom Lodge pointed out three
discrepancies within Mande1a's autobiographical account of this meeting and his
January 1962 diary entries. First, Mandela's 08 January diary entry mentioned that
"Luthu1i was in high spirits" when he met with him.6 In and of itself, this does not
represent a contradiction with Mandela's autobiographical recollection thirty years later
of a "disconcerting" conversation.
A second and more pertinent discrepancy is whether Luthuli approved of the
military objective ofMandela's sojourn throughout Africa. In his 1964 Rivonia Trial
statement, Mandela indicated that in addition to attending the conference, the purpose of
his visit was to ...
3 PAFMECSA eventually became the Organisation of African Unity.
4 MandeIa, Long Walk to Freedom, 342.
Lodge,A1andela,95
5 This meeting is reviewed toward the close of chapter five that details the events of 1961 because the
disconcerting nature ofMandela and LuthuIi's conversation dealt directly with A1K's December launch.
6 Lodge, A1andela, 96 and 239, endnote 53 and 54. Lodge cited:
"Mandela (1962) Diary, entry for 03 January-13 July 1962, Exhibit R 17, Rivonia Trial Records, Brenthurst
Library, Johannesburg, entry for 08 January 1962.
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... obtain facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit
scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans.?
Luthuli may have only been aware of the educational rather than the military purpose of
the trip. Arranging "political and economic support for our new military force and, more
important, military training for our men in as many places on the continent as possible"
may have been the intention of the trip for Mandela, Sisulu and other members of the
NEC, but that may not have been articulated to Luthuli on 08 January.8 In his 1964
Rivonia statement, Mandela contradicted himself regarding the intended objectives of his
trip. First, Mandela stated that prior to his departure the purpose of his trip would include
military objectives. However, later Mandela stated that a military objective went against
an original ANC decision:
I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training.
But [in North Africa] it was impossible to organise any scheme without
the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained
the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then
there was a departure from the original decision ofthe ANC, but it applied
outside South Africa only (my emphasis).9
A third discrepancy is that Mandela's 08 January diary entry neglects to comment
upon whether Luthuli agreed or disagreed with the decision to follow a violent course.
Perhaps, Mandela did not wish to record Luthuli's disagreement in his diary. Lodge
speculated that Mandela interpolated into his telling of the "disconcerting meeting" later
debates about Luthuli's views. 10 Chapters three and five clarified the cause ofLuthuli's
distress in this meeting by asserting that the launch ofMK, rather than its formation,
angered Luthuli. One must recall that Benson's pre-Long Walk to Freedom book (1986)
narrated that the same incident occurred after Mandela's return from North Africa,
7 FHU, HPAL, ANC, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 39, transcripts of the Rivonia Trial 1963-1964, Mandela's
statement regarding the formation ofMK on the opening of the defence case in the Pretoria Supreme Court,
20 April 1964, 9.
Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 170.
8 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 342.
9 FHU, HPAL, ANC, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.9, transcripts ofthe Rivonia TriaI1963-1964, 10.
Feinberg and Odendaal, Nelson Mandela, 170-1.
10 Lodge, Mandela, 96.
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immediately prior to his arrest in Howick. I think this first disconcerting conversation
occurred, as Mandela stated, in January after the launch ofMK and immediately prior to
his departure for North Africa. 11
Two problems exist with these accounts in Mandela's autobiography. First,
Mandela failed to explain how on 03 January Luthuli and the ANC insisted that he exit
the country to arrange training, finances and political support for MK and then five days
later on 08 January chastised him for not being consulted about its formation. Second,
Mandela failed to explain how Luthuli eventually arrived at his support ofMK's
formation after, according to Mandela, forgetting about his participation in its formation
and his subsequent anger about being marginalised. Such discrepancies suggest Luthuli
did not know of the military objectives for Mandela's trip and that he never supported the
turn to violence.
Mandela's autobiography chronicled well his sojourn throughout Africa. On
10 January, Mandela drove to Lobatse, Bechuanaland (Botswana), illegally exiting South
Africa. After travelling to Kasane in northern Bechuananaland, Mandela flew to Mbeya,
Tanganyika (Tanzania). Proceeding to Dar es Salaam, Mandela met the independent
country's first President, Julius Nyerere, who advised him to postpone the armed
struggle. Next, Mandela travelled via Khartoum, Sudan to Accra, Ghana, where he met
Oliver Tambo for the first time in nearly two years. In February, Mandela travelled to
Addis Ababa to attend the PAFMECSA conference. At the conference, Mandela's
speech proclaimed the opposite ofthat which Luthuli and (according to Luthuli in his
Rivonia Statement) the ANC believed: "all opportunities for peaceful struggle had been
closed to us", hence the need to launch MK12 If as Benson asserted, Luthuli chastised
Mandela after his return from North Attica, Mandela's speech gave Luthuli good reason
to be upset. Mandela declared to all of Africa:
A leadership commits a crime against its own people if it hesitates to
sharpen its political weapons where they have become less effective...On
11 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 342.
Benson, Nelson Mandela, 116.
12 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 351.
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the night of 16 December last year, the whole of South Africa vibrated
under the heavy blows ofUmkhonto we Sizwe. 13
For Luthuli, Mandela's ethical accusation and hyperbole could easily be interpreted as
insubordinate and insulting.
Mandela continued to Cairo and Tunis and on to Rabat, Morocco, where the head
of the Algerian mission advised Mandela to not neglect the political side of war saying,
"International public opinion is sometimes worth more than a fleet ofjet fighters". 14
Mandela then travelled to Bamako in Mali, to Guinea and to Sierra Leone where Mandela
was mistaken for Luthuli. Next, Mandelajourneyed to Liberia, back to Ghana and back
to Guinea where he met Sekou Toure. In Dakar, Mandela conversed with President
Leopold Senghor and then proceeded to London were he had a disconcerting
conversation with YusufDadoo. Dadoo objected to Mandela's view that the ANC must
seek to be more pan-Africanist in nature and that within the Congresses movement the
ANC (Blacks) "had to appear to be the first among equals".15 Upon Mandela's return to
South Africa, Luthuli expressed to him the same objections that Dadoo did.
Luthuli only yielded to the decision to form MK. Mandela did not inform Luthuli
ofMK's initiation and Luthuli did not support it. Evidence casts doubt upon the extent to
which Luthuli was informed about the military objectives of Mandela's North African
trip. Therefore, Mandela's comments to Colin Legum on his day ofdeparture from
London are understandable. Mandela confided: "I dread going back and telling Luthuli I
am committed to the armed struggle".16
Mandela then travelled a second time to Addis Ababa to receive six months of
military training. Training was rudimentary, but included drill marches, firing with an
automatic rifle and pistol, demolition and mortar firing. Mandela learned to make and
avoid bombs and mines. He spent much of his time being trained in military science and
tactics by an Ethiopian officer. After only eight weeks, the ANC urgently requested
Mandela return home as the "internal armed struggle was escalating and they wanted the
13 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 351.
14 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 355.
IS Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 362.
16 Sampson, Mandela, 187.
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commander ofMK on the scene".17 Mandela returned to South Africa. After only eight
weeks of training, Mandela had to lead his army in defeating the most powerful military
force on the African continent.
Upon his return to South Africa on 24 July, Mandela immediately reported to the
NWC to highlight the lessons learned during his journeys. During Mandela's trip,
contentions arose about the nature of the ANC and its leader's just published
autobiography. If the winning of the Nobel Peace Prize did not embarrass Mandela
enough by creating "the impression that he was a tool of the West", then Luthuli's
autobiography did. IS Mandela's comments about Luthuli's autobiography reflected the
embarrassment felt by some within the movement about Luthuli's newspaper editorials
that made him appear to be an Uncle Tom and a liberal. The embarrassment caused by
the February publication of Luthuli's autobiography did not escape Mandela who
observed in his diary that "some of his statements have been extremely unfortunate and
have created the impression ofa man who is a stooge of the Whites". 19 Mandela felt the
autobiography "compromised the ANC", justifying his advocacy that the ANC become,
at least in image, more of an African nationalist rather than a multi-racial movement.20
Mandela and Luthuli's second disconcerting and inconclusive discussion reaffirmed
Luthuli's unwillingness to forego the ANC's multiracial and non-violent ethos developed
over many decades.
Luthuli had good reason to be hesitant, ifnot hostile, to Mandela's suggestion that
the ANC become more race conscious. Luthuli intended his non-violent strategies to
17 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 363.
Again, the fact that the ANC, and not the MK High Command, requested Mandela's return is very curious.
The ANC remained non-violent by agreement. What had the ANC to do with an escalating internal armed
struggle? More than likely, Mandela had to return home early because his 'army' was being arrested, tried
and imprisoned very quickly as a result of the initial failings of MK's launch. Lodge speculated that Sisulu
recalled him, worried that a prolonged absence would demoralise MK rank and file as anxieties regarding
whether Mandela would return to South Africa increased.
Lodge, Mandela, 100.
18 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 433.
19 Lodge, Mandela, 101.
20 SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 433.
Sifiso Ndlovu's chapter "The ANC in Exile. 1960-1970", indicated that Luthuli's autobiography "had been
dedicated to a white woman, Mary-Louise Hooper of the United States" (433). This is false. In all the
issues of "Let My People Go", from the first (1962) to the last published (2006), Luthuli dedicated his book
to "Mother Africa", to "Mtonya" his mother and to "Nokukhanya" his wife "to whom, under God", he felt
"most deeply indebted".
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focus on the conscience of the western, liberal and Christian world, that is, Europe and
North America, whereas Mandela's military path focused upon the receiving succour
from newly emerging independent African countries. During his trip to North and West
Africa, Mandela frequently became frustrated by the PAC's propaganda against the
ANC. Recently colonised Africa identified with a militaristic outlook and sympathised
with a racial divide whereas the ANC's non-violent and multi-racial policy failed to
impress or inspire if it was understood at all. Luthuli did not necessarily desire to
impress Africa. His objective was the long-term acceptance and support of the western
world and Africa's fusion, not separation, with it as a free and equal partner. In
December 1961 during the events celebrating his reception of the Peace Prize, Luthuli
wooed the West. Beginning in January 1962, Mandela sought to woo Africa.
History suggests Luthuli had been right. By 1990, the support of the frontline
states and MK's insufficient incursions into South Africa had not succeeded in effecting a
regime change. Rather, a combination of non-violent internal pressure from the
churches, trade unions and the UDF and from external pressure from economic sanctions
fuelled by international public opinion against Apartheid precipitated regime change.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communism that atrophied the eastern bloc's
support of African liberation movements and hence the absence of the Communist
'boogieman' enabled churches in the United States and Europe in the late 1980s to
sufficiently politically influence western governments to support democracy in South
Africa. The PAC eventually became irrelevant outside and inside South Africa. The
PAC's pro-Africanist stance may have appealed to the newly emerging African states.
But, it undermined the PAC's efforts to generate support outside Africa. Countries like
Sweden and Norway, long time supporters of the ANC, did not support the PAC because
of its "expressions of racial character,,?l Tor Sellstrom, author of texts related to the
anti-Apartheid struggle in Scandinavia, reflected the degree to which the PAC failed to
obtain assistance from the world's most supportive constituency against Apartheid.
21 Interview with Gunner Helander, Vastenls, 12 February 1996. Found in:
Sellstrom, Liberation in Southern Africa - Regional and Swedish Voices, 287.
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Although recognised by the Organisation of African Unity, [the] PAC
would never receive direct assistance from the Swedish government, nor
did it enjoy any tangible support from the NGO community in Sweden.
Both at the official level and at the non-official level, Swedish support was
from the outset extended to the ANC ... Sweden almost became a closed
area for the PAC.22
Helander in Sweden and Collins in England, each of whom led efforts to raise
funds for the International Defence and Aid Fund that Luthuli praised so heavily and to
which he felt so indebted, represented the constituency to which Luthuli appealed.
Luthuli's allegiance to the liberal West that admired the ANC's multi-racial character
bound him to the time-honoured ANC position. Luthuli's philosophical/theological and
strategic allegiance to multi-racialism motivated his resistance to Mandela's desire to
change the ANC so that it could be more attractive to African states as was the PAC.
"Let My People Go"
On 18 January 1962, William Collins publishers released Luthuli's autobiography
entitled, Let My People Go.23 Luthuli's autobiography embarrassed Mandela and other
militant leaders across the continent. When many read in Luthuli's autobiography "We
do not struggle with guns and violence, and the supremacist's array of weapons is
powerless against the spirit", Mandela claimed at the PAFMECSA conference in Ethiopia
that it was a "crime" for the leadership to hesitate to change tactics when those tactics
proved futile?4 Collins released Luthuli's autobiography just prior to Mandela's speech
in Addis Ababa. In the book, Luthuli preached non-violence; in Addis Ababa Mandela
argued that such a gospel is a crime. Because Mandela and Luthuli's contestation
22 Sellstr6m, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, I: 171.
23 Daily News, "Autobiography ofLuthuli Out Next Year", 25 October 1961.
Daily News, "Fanfare for Book by Luthuli", 13 November 1961.
Guardian (Manchester), "South Africa's Black Stallion", by Alan Paton, 18 January 1962.
Daily News, "African Leader's Autobiography: 'Let My People Go': Lutuli Tells His Side of Story ofNon-
White 'Resistance''', 18 January 1962.
24 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 227.
Luthuli also stated in his book, "We mean to continue to use such [non-violent and passive resistance]
methods" and "As long as our patience can be made to hold out, we shall not jeopardise the South Africa of
tomorrow by precipitating violence today" (postscript, 218).
Cape Times, "A Different Perspective: Albert Luthuli's Autobiography", by A. R. Delius, 22 February
1962.
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reached its height during this period, a closer examination of Luthuli's autobiography is
thus required.
Cited thus far in this study are just some of Luthuli's ubiquitous references to
non-violent methods in his autobiography. Chapters four and five identified the Hoopers'
role in its drafting. Not yet examined is the significance of the title Let My People Go
and how it reveals Luthuli's conceptualised role. "Let My People Go" is the prophet
Moses' divinely inspired biblical refrain to the Egyptian Pharaoh who oppressed the
Hebrew nation.25 "Let My People Go" and "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross",
connotes that Luthuli perceived himself to be a spiritual leader as much as ifnot more
than a political leader.
The title ofLuthuli's autobiography is partial evidence that Luthuli likened
himself to be involved in what may be described as a 'typological re-enactment,.26
Typological re-enactment is a method or lens of biblical hermeneutics whereby one
discerns one's context, calling or life direction, by identifying with personalities in the
biblical narrative. Typological enactment encourages one to emulate faithful biblical
personalities or conversely learn from them if they failed in some way. Interpreting
Luthuli to have re-enacted the role of Moses illuminates how he fathomed the past and
his compliance with fostering God's intentions or will for the future. Luthuli's emulation
of Moses became a simple method of making relevant the biblical text to his life.27
Though Luthuli did not receive formal theological training that would prepare
him specifically for the vocation of ministry, his strong faith, adequate education, innate
intelligence and Christian upbringing made him a formidable lay minister. If Luthuli had
opted for the ordained ministry, he would have succeeded admirably.28 While he had
25 Exodus 3:7 (NIV): "The Lord said, 'I have indeed seen the misery of my people in Egypt. I have heard
them crying out because of the slave drivers, and I am concerned about their suffering"'.
26 The term 'typological re-enactment' was utilised by:
Alton Templin, Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundation ofAfrikaner Nationalism, 1652-1910
(Westport: Greenwood, 1984), 117.
27 Other evidence Luthuli visualised himselfto be a participant in a typological reenactment is a sermon he
preached entitled "Christian Life: A Constant Adventure" at Adams Mission one week prior to publicising
"The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" in reaction to his being relieved of the chieftaincy. The below
article affirmed that the faith-based sermon inspired the politically-applied statement.
Scott Couper, "When Chief Albert Luthuli Launched 'Into the Deep': A Theological Reflection on a
Homiletic Resource ofPolitical Significance", Journal ofTheology for Southern Africa 130, March 2008,
76-89 and 108-11.
28 Interestingly, the earlier cited 2004 SABC3 survey identified Luthuli as a 'cleric' before a 'politician'.
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sufficient formal and self-education to effectively articulate the fundamentals of
Christianity, and arguably do so more proficiently than his peers who did enter the
ministry, Luthuli did not formally study theology and could not develop for himself a
'systematic' theology, a theology that, to the extent that is possible, is comprehensively
logical, doctrinal and integrated. As a lay person, Luthuli's theology would have been
'parochial' rather than systematic. Rather than doctrine, philosophy or direct revelation,
typological re-enactment relies on narratives to convey various descriptive and
proscriptive themes. The narratives may be in the form of myth, parable or actual
historic personalities and occurrences.
The title of Luthuli's autobiography propounds that he envisaged himself to be a
Moses figure. Moses waged a political struggle utilising non-violent methods. Yes, the
divine interventions that convinced Pharaoh to allow the Hebrews to leave Egypt were
undeniably forceful, even deadly.29 Nevertheless, they were neither the direct result of
Moses' hand nor the result of a Hebrew army.3D For Moses, the means to liberation were
fidelity and obedience to God.3! Pharaoh's heart would be hardened and his kingdom
would suffer catastrophe due its own leader's intransigent position.32
Luthuli did not envision himself as a Joshua, Saul, David or Solomon who
through military might would build a great nation. Rather, he looked to Moses who
humbly led in obedience despite all of his inadequacies.33 Time after time, Moses'
obedience resulted in failure as the Pharaoh repeatedly rescinded his mercy. Yet, Moses
continued to confront Pharaoh and repeated the refrain, "Let my people gO!,,34
Even following the Hebrews' liberation, Moses' role as a moral leader coincided
with his role as a political leader for he provided the Hebrew people with the Ten
Answers.com, "SABC3s Great South Africans". Found at:
http://www.answers.com/topic/sabc3-s-great-south-africans, accessed 16 October 2008.
29 The Ten Plagues of blood, frogs, gnats, flies, livestock, boils, hail, locusts, darkness and firstborn males
are violent in the extreme (Exodus 7-11).
30 In fact, in his youth, Moses incurred the wrath ofthe state by killing an Egyptian who beat a Hebrew
(Exodus 2: 12). This killing resulted in Moses' self-imposed exile and prolonged refugee status
(Exodus 2: 15).
31 Exodus 4:2Ia, 7:2 and 12:24.
32 Exodus 4:2Ib, 7:2, 8:15, 8:19, 8:32,9:7,9:12,9:34-35,10:20, 10:27 and 11:10.
33 Exodus 4: 10: "Moses said to the Lord, '0 Lord, I have never been eloquent, neither in the past nor since
you have spoken to your servant. I am slow of speech and tongue"'.
34 The actual refrain was: "Let my people go, so that they may worship me" found in Exodus 8:1, 8:20, 9:1,
9: 13. In Exodus 5: I it reads: "Let my people go, that they may hold a feast to me in the wilderness".
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Commandments and the Torah (The Law).35 Luthuli perhaps even foreshadowed his
inability to see the Promised Land of his own people's liberation when he predicted in his
1952 "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross" statement:
What the future has in store for me I do not know. It might be ridicule,
imprisonment, concentration camp, flogging, banishment and even death.
I only pray to the Almighty to strengthen my resolve so that none of these
grim possibilities may deter me from striving, for the sake of the good
name of our beloved country, the Union of South Africa, to make it a true
democracl and a true union in form and spirit of all the communities of
the land.3
And like Moses, Luthuli would not reach the Promised Land.37 Like Moses who led the
Chosen People that were to be a light to all nations, Luthuli saw himself leading South
Africa as "a new example to the world".38
I personally believe that here in South Africa, with all our diversities of colour
and race, we will show the world a new pattern for democracy. I think there is a
challenge to us in South Africa to set a new example for the world. Let us not
side-step that task.39
On the first Sunday morning of 1967, months before his death, Luthuli listened on
the radio to a sermon preached at a Congregationalist church in Cape Town where the
minister suggested that God's response to one's prayers is often "NO".40 This sermon
35 Exodus 20.
36 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 235.
This portion ofLuthuli's statement is strikingly parallel with Martin Luther King's speech "I Have a
Dream". One can only wonder to what degree, ifany, did Luthuli's statement inspire King. Did both
consciously see themselves in a re-enactment of Moses' life? Did both have a premonition that 'the dream'
would not achieved in their lifetimes?
37 Deuteronomy 32:48-52 and Deuteronomy 34.
38 The book of Deuteronomy concludes: "Since then, no prophet has risen in Israel like Moses, whom the
Lord knew face to face, who did all those miraculous signs and wonders the Lord sent him to do in Egypt -
to Pharaoh and to all his officials and to his whole land. For no one has ever shown the mighty power or
performed the awesome deeds that Moses did in the sight of the Lord" (Deuteronomy 34:10-12).
39 UCT, MAD, LC, BC 930, A 5, "Freedom Is the Apex" also known as "Our Vision Is a Democratic
Society", by Albert Luthuli, speech delivered to a meeting organised by the South African COD in
Johannesburg, 1958.
40 Handwritten notes by Luthuli written on Sunday, 08 January 1967 at 11:00 as he listened to a sermon by
Rev. W. M. H. Terrant at the Rondebosch Congregational Church, Cape Town.
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would have resonated with Luthuli's re-enactment of Moses. Moses desired to enter the
Promised Land. God told Moses that he would not; he would only see it from a
distance.41 Luthuli also wished to see that for which he strove so obediently. In his
autobiography's epilogue, Luthuli wrote:
I speak humbly and without levity when I say that, God giving me strength
and courage enough, I shall die, if need be, for [the struggle]. But I do not
want to die until I have seen the building begun.42
Luthuli's request was not granted. Even with the companionship ofNokukhanya, the
final years ofLuthuli's life were lonely. Government restrictions, his own adherence to
non-violence and his aging body marginalised him from the ANC and the world. Luthuli
fought for a South Africa that would belong to Blacks, Indians, Coloureds and Whites.
As Luthuli's life waned, white South Africans who were resistant to change retreated
farther into their laager, 'armed to the teeth'. MK's launch unleashed the state's wrath,
resulting in the imprisoning and/or exiling of other leaders of the liberation movement.
By resorting to violence, Luthuli's ANC followers turned away from him as the leader of
the ANC despite his retention of the title 'President-General'. Luthuli's people had let
him go.
For six months after its initial publication, copies of "Let My People Go" were
sold in South Africa. The Minister of Justice, Vorster, allowed the sale of unsold books
in stock already imported from England into South Africa. In August 1962 Vorster
indicated that no more copies would be allowed to be imported as the General Law
Amendment (Sabotage) Act banned it.43
VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, notebooks (dealing with church
services and sermons".
41 Exodus 32:52.
42 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 230.
43 Daily News, "Minister Consents to Book's Sale", 06 August 1962.
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Embarrassment to the Congresses
In chapter five, this study maintains that those who initiated the violence in Natal
in December 1961 did not communicate with nor did they receive instructions from
Luthuli. Because Luthuli had a close friendship with Rowley Arenstein and both
operated from Natal, Arenstein's perspective on Luthuli's stance on violence is
enlightening.44 Arenstein, a local attorney in Durban, frequently represented those who
became entangled with the law for political reasons, for example, women involved in the
beer hall riots. In 1958, Arenstein strategised with Luthuli on how to increase the
movement and expand the active membership of ANC by focusing on grassroots issues
thus increasing its membership from 1,000 in 1958 to 20,000 in 1959. According to
Arenstein, he ran the Durban branch of the ANC during the 1960 State of Emergency.
After the government banned the ANC, Arenstein suggested they re-name the
organisation the "African National Council" and they could, according to a then-recent
Supreme Court ruling, continue to work to achieve the ANC's objectives as the
government banned the ANC and not its objectives. The ANC refused, and according to
Arenstein, resigned itself to the fact that the government closed all avenues of non-violent
methods and hence concluded only the option of violence remained. Soon after Mandela
launched MK in December 1961, the Joint Congresses met in January 1962 during which
Arenstein argued vociferously against its creation and questioned under whose control
the military wing would fall. Arenstein adamantly affirmed that Luthuli objected to
MK's launch. Arenstein told his interviewer quite emphatically:
44 Kwamuhle Museum, File number 545617, Accession number 99/3697 - 3699 - 4200 - 4204, Interview
with Rowley Arenstein, recording track (11 10 25 12) through (13 12 16 15).
It must be noted that Arenstein articulated a prejudice against the armed struggle. Arenstein declared the
"so-called armed struggle" to be "totally uncalled for. It had to fail which it did. Whatever people say
about it, it failed" (11 1032 18). Arenstein left the Communist Party over its decision to initiate an armed
struggle prior to the ANC and Joint Congresses' decision to do the same (11202410). Arenstein felt
betrayed by the Communist Party because he felt that it intentionally excluded him when making the
decision to opt for violence. Due to Arenstein's objections to the decision to initiate violence, the
Communist Party expelled him (12 08 50 16).
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[Luthuli] very strongly believed in non-violence. At no stage, did Luthuli
ever agree to a change of violence. Never! 45
At least with the wider and international public, Luthuli was not a spent political
force as 1962 began. He published a number of articles increasing his public appeal. In
February, African-Americans' Chicago based Ebony magazine published an article by
Luthuli entitled, "What I Would Do If! Were Prime Minister" wherein he laid out his
political manifesto.46 Another American magazine, Atlantic Monthly, reprinted the
article the next month.47 In this article, Luthuli provided broad perspectives on land
reform, trade union rights, democratic polity, housing, education and foreign policy. The
01 February issue ofNew Age published a statement entitled, "We Don't Want
Crumbs".48 In this article, his autobiography and his many columns on the subject in the
Post, Luthuli expressed his perspectives on democracy, society and civilisation as he
intoned against the government's proposed homeland policy.
These topics would not have at all disturbed Luthuli more militant colleagues.
However, Luthuli's incessant harping on non-violence deeply disturbed many of them
following MK's launch. Luthuli publicised views that directly contradicted Mandela's
views found in MK's manifesto. For example, on 25 March 1962, Luthuli's regular
column published in the Post read:
When we strive for the same goal through non-violent methods, the
government visits us with more and harsher laws to suppress - if not
completely destroy - our liberation efforts. IS THIS NOT INVITING
THE OPPRESSED TO DESPERAnON? NONETHELESS, I WOULD
URGE OUR PEOPLE NOT TO DESPAIR OVER OUR METHODS OF
STRUGGLE, THE MILITANT, NONVIOLENT TECHNIQUES. SO
FAR WE HAVE FAILED THE METHODS - NOT THE METHOD US
(Luthuli's emphasis).49
45 Kwamuhle Museum, File number 545617, Accession number 99/3697 - 3699 - 4200 - 4204, Interview
with Rowley Arenstein, recording track (11 1025 12) through (13 12 16 15).
46 Ebony, "What I Would Do If! Were Prime Minister", by Albert Luthuli, February 1962. Found in:
Lutuli, Lututi Speaks, 74.
Albert Luthuli, The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross, 73-83.
47 Atlantic Monthly, "If! Were Prime Minister", by Albert Luthuli, March 1962,61-4.
Readers' comments to Luthuli's article were printed in the July 1962 issue on page 33.
48 PiI1ay, Voices ofLiberation, 1: 146-9.
49 Golden City Post, "Our Way Is Right - We Must Keep On", by Albert Luthuli, 25 March 1962.
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The same month the Post published the above column excerpt, a report of a Congresses'
Joint Executive (CJE) meeting recorded:
A speaker stated that the articles which Chief Luthuli wrote for "Golden
City Post" were frequently so mutilated that the policies expressed there
were on occasion distorted, thus being of some embarrassment to the
Congresses. A delegate agreed that the matter would be taken up.50
The above report suggests that Luthuli was reprimanded by his own movement.
Apparently, it was felt that Luthuli's overreached in his advocacy for non-violent
methods by coming dangerously close to condemning the turn to violence. This breach
could not be tolerated. Luthuli needed to be counselled to not embarrass the movement.
Following the matter's resolution, much of the leade.rship felt assured that such
sentiments from Luthuli would no longer be heard or read.
Before Luthuli's death, the ANC refrained from making any assertion that he
supported the armed movement. Not only did Luthuli consistently oppose the use of
violence, he continued to advocate strict non-violence until he was possibly advised to do
so no longer. The index of seventy-six articles itemised by the Bailey's African Photo
Archives indicated that Luthuli's last article for the Post was published on 27 May 1962.
Luthuli's columns stopped two months after the above criticism recorded in the minutes
of the CJE. After reviewing all the articles in the Post collection, only the 25 March
1962 column conflicts with the July 1961 resolution to form an armed movement. Aside
from his opposition to violence, Luthuli does not "distort" any of the ANC's stated
policies. After writing some seventy articles for the Post, it is incomprehensible that
Luthuli would continue to contribute submissions if his columns were being adulterated.
The length and style of the columns are uniform and characteristic of Luthuli's pen.51
Therefore, it seems clear that the Post did little or no editing to Luthuli's original drafts.
50 UWC, RIMA, MCH 229, Report ofa meeting of the Congresses' Joint Executives held in March 1962,
7.
51 For example, within the Luthuli Papers at UCT and UN1SA is a draft column entitled "The Meaning and
Significance of Christmas". Except for the small title change, Luthuli's draft is identical to the column
published in the Post.
BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "The Meaning of Christmas", by A1bert Luthuli, 25 December 1960.
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, "The Meaning and Significance of
Christmas", 1959 (sic). Actually, 1960.
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After Luthuli's above cited March publication in the Post, virtually nothing is heard from
him regarding non-violence save for an April column statement that mildly read:
The mood of white South Africa forces on us the use of militant efforts -
on non-violent lines - in the prosecution of our struggle.52
How and when the ANC through the CJE advised Luthuli to curb his statements
advocating non-violence is unknown. The archives are silent on this issue. Luthuli and
the ANC likely established a covenant that committed him to not criticise or question the
turn to violence. In March 1963, soon after his escape from South Africa, the ANC's
Secretary General, Duma Nokwe, travelled to Stockholm, Sweden where he delivered a
very militant speech at the launch of a national consumer boycott campaign held in
Stockholm. Also at this launch, Nokwe read a message telephonically transmitted by
Tambo in London encouraging a boycott of South African goods. The message was said
to be authorised by Luthuli. During his visit, Nokwe spoke in regard to the methods of
struggle, indicating that the ANC had no choice but "to abandon its policy of non-
violence", that "'there no longer [were] any peaceful ways left' and that the South
African people would 'not get its (sic) freedom without a (sic) bloody chaos"'.53
Notably, Nokwe emphasised, "And I assure you that our leader, Albert Luthuli, will not
condemn that".54
Sabotage Act
Luthuli could have continued to contribute to the Post until at least 24 June 1962,
the date of his last domestic publication in New Age. If those within the liberation
movement did not pressure Luthuli to refrain from making "embarrassing" statements,
then the government did. When the General Law Amendment Bill became the Sabotage
Act of 27 June 1962, it "prohibited the reproduction of any statement made anywhere at
any time (including any time in the past) by a person who was banned from attending
52 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "No Change in Heart among the Whites", by Albeit Luthuli, 29 April
1962.
53 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 193.
54 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 193.
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gatherings".55 The Act also prescribed the death penalty for a wide range of offences and
allowed the government to commit people to house arrest. Some viewed the legislation
to spell "civil death" for those on whom it fell. With this piece of legislation, the
government silenced Luthuli within South Africa's borders until his death. Luthuli, fully
aware of the impact this piece of legislation would have, wrote against it three days
before it became law.56 The illegality of quoting Luthuli may have been a relief to many
who thought that his continued advocacy of non-violent methods was tantamount to, in
Mandela's words, "committing a crime" against his own people.
Regarding historical memory, Luthuli's prolonged silence within South Africa,
neither for nor against the violent movement, transcends the relatively short period of
time from 16 December 1961 when MK launched until 29 April 1962 when for the last
time Luthuli advocated strict non-violence in his Post column. The non-recognition of
this brief and forgotten slice of time allows the ANC to disingenuously claim that once
the ANC made the decision to initiate the armed movement, "Luthuli did not falter".
Internationally, Luthuli could not be silenced. Before the Act became law,
Luthuli wrote a statement for publication in England's The Guardian opposing it. On
08 July 1962, the Guardian published Luthuli's article soon after its reception. In his
statement, Luthuli communicated his characteristically buoyant and optimistic outlook
despite contemplating the draconian legislation. Luthuli portrayed himself as the eternal
optimist, never doubting the fall of tyranny. Doubt only existed regarding liberation's
timing and cost. His statement in the Guardian related that, unlike Mandela, Luthuli
never concluded that the non-violent path led to a cul-de-sac. Luthuli perceived the
Sabotage Act as a sign of the National Party's desperation and indicative of the
foundational weakness of the Apartheid system. Luthuli declared that the oppressive
legislation stood as a governmental admission of the "effectiveness ofour freedom and of
its latent potentialities".57 As is soon shown, Luthuli's advocacy efforts with the
American Committee on Africa highlight that he considered non-violent international
political and economic pressure on the Apartheid regime to be the key to liberation.
55 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Liberation, 3: 664.
56 New Age, "Our Struggle for Progress", by Albert Luthuli, 24 June 1962.
57 Albert Luthuli, "Statement on the 'Sabotage Act', June 1962". Found in:
ANC, "The Lutuli Page". Found at: www.anc.org.zaJancdocs/history/lutuli/, accessed 25 June 2008.
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In July 1962, the Cape Times made an initial attempt to breach the Sabotage Act
by asking permission from the Minister of Justice to publish quotations by Luthuli. The
effort failed. The Cape Times wished to ask LuthuIi if the government had granted him a
passport to an upcoming "Cultural Conference" in Copenhagen, Denmark to which he
received an invitation. The Minister of Justice denied the request and indicated that he
need never be asked again to lift Luthuli's restriction.58
Luthuli as the "The Black Christ"
At the young age of twenty-two, Roland Harrison, the artist who painted The
Black Christ, had the fortune to meet Luthuli in 1962 under clandestine circumstances.
Harrison painted the figure of Christ, crucified on a cross, with Luthuli's features. 59 With
the permission of Archbishop de Blank, St. Luke's Anglican Church in Salt River
unveiled the painting. The painting drew a storm of controversy. Not only did Christ
appear as a Black, but the two Roman soldiers resembled the Prime Minister, Hendrik
Verwoerd, and the Minister of Justice, John Vorster. Jan de Klerk (F. W. Klerk's father),
then Minister ofthe Interior, instructed that the painting be taken down and the young
artist appear before the Censorship Board.60 The Board subsequently banned the
painting, ruling that it offended religious sensibilities. Following a documentary on the
painting aired on the American television network CBS, the government ordered the
painting to be destroyed. Danish and Swedish allies of the anti-Apartheid movement
smuggled the painting to Great Britain where, under CoIlins' care its display raised a
substantial sum of money for the Defence and Aid Fund. 61 Harrison suffered arrest and
torture at the hands of the Special Branch who through their interrogations aimed to
58 Natal Mercury, "Lutuli Now Silenced: Vorster Declares Ban", 04 July 1962.
59 Reader's Digest, "The Incredible Journey of South Africa's 'Black Christ"', by Dougie Oakes,
Christmas 2003, 30-1.
60 Once source incorrectly claims that F. W. de Klerk ordered the painting to be taken down.
"Defiance, Incarceration, Torture, House Arrest, Hope", brochure for Ronald Harrison's The Black Christ
Foundation, not dated.
61 Ultimately, Julius Baker, a South African exile, stored the painting in the basement of his London home
until the late 1990s when he returned it to South Africa.
Natal Mercury, "Give Back 'The Black Christ''', by Ismail Meer, 04 August 1996.
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discover with whom Harrison collaborated to paint and display The Black Christ.62
Harrison served eight years of house arrest on account of charges stemming from his
painting.
Knowing about the painting and its significance, Luthuli expressed a desire to
meet Harrison. The Norwegian Embassy arranged a clandestine visit to Luthuli for
Harrison. At great risk, the Norwegians smuggled Harrison from Cape Town to Durban,
driving slowly through the night taking advantage of the cover of darkness. Harrison met
Luthuli in Groutville within a corrugated iron shack designated to be the rendezvous site.
In his book, Harrison recounted his memorable meeting with Luthuli:
A deep strong voice said "Hello, my son". I stammered some greeting in
return, and as he grasped my hands with his, a distinct energy seemed to
course through my body...Then, suddenly, like a newborn baby entering
the world for the first time, I burst into tears. I cannot explain whether it
was the magic of that moment, or sheer magnetism of the occasion, but the
next thing I knew two strong arms had wrapped themselves around me and
once again a strong comforting voice said, "It's alright to cry, my
son.. .It's okay.. .I can see that you have already endured so much ... It's
okay... " 1 felt the stre~rh of his compassion flow into my trembling
body and fill my soul".
These touching recollections relate Luthuli's pastoral attributes. Though, more pertinent
to this study is an interview with Harrison wherein he shared specific details ofLuthuli's
stance on violence in 1962.
Harrison: J, ah, may J just add something which I, I don't know how J
forgot to mention it.. .I met this noble man and when J met him during the
course of the conversation, 1 remember the words very very clearly: "My
son, violence is not the answer. It will never be the answer". And those
were, and they...
Couper: He said those words to you? He said that to you?
Harrison: Yes. He says to me, "Violence is not the answer; it will never
be the answer to our problems". And this is, this is what he says to me,
"The road that lies ahead, is very, its going to be very very .. .it's a stonny
62 Roland Harrison, The Black Christ: A Journey to Freedom (Claremont: David Philip, 2006), 47-60.
63 Harrison, The Black Christ, 66-7.
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road ... you have to travel soberly". He says to me, "You've done
something that's very dangerous". He says, "But, you were very very
brave. You should feel very proud", he says. "What you have done is
something that was non-violent. You have spoken in a non-violent
manner". And, he was so sweet to me, "You know", he says, "You caused
such a fervour", he says to me that, "what you have actually done", he
says ..."You have highlighted the plight of the Blacks now with this, this is
what you have done".64
The private meeting with Harrison conveyed that Luthuli sought out creative non-violent
methods of resistance and that advertising the struggle against Apartheid to the
international world would in time secure freedom.
Rector of Glasgow University
In October 1962, students in South Africa and the United Kingdom honoured
Luthuli. On 07 October, Luthuli accepted the National Union of South African Students'
(NUSAS) offer to become their honorary President.65 On 22 October 1962, students at
the University of Glasgow elected Luthuli as Lord Rector in recognition of his "dignity
and restraint" in a "potentially inflammatory situation", i.e., for his non-violence
resistance to Apartheid.66 The rectorship of the university was "purely honorary".67 As
Rector, Luthuli's role would have been to be the Chair of the University Court, the chief
executive body of the University that met monthly. Students elected Luthuli for the
position knowing that he would serve in absentia. Technically, this obstacle did not
prevent Luthuli's candidacy as it was customary that very important rectors were not
expected to attend any meetings; nonetheless, his unavailability became a contentious
campaign issue among students. Due to Luthuli's unavailability to chair, an assessor
needed to be chosen with his consent to represent him.68
64 Interview with Roland Harrison, Cape Town, 14 January 2006.
65 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Accepts Honour", 08 October 1962.
NUSAS re-elected Luthuli President the following year.
Daily News, "Student's Salute Luthuli", 24 August 1963.
66 "The Legacy ofInkosi Albert Luthuli", commemorative brochure, 21 August 2004,15.
67 Star, "Luthuli in Poll Today", 22 October 1962.
68 Star, "Delay in Selecting University Stand-In for Luthuli", 23 November 1962.
The University approved Dr. T. Honeyman, former Director of the Glasgow art galleries, as Luthuli's
representative.
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Luthuli's election can not be described as insignificant as he was the first
foreigner and 'non-White' to be nominated for Rector. Though Luthuli accepted the
nomination and thus agreed to stand for election, he did not campaign against the other
candidates.69 Students campaigned in his favour, easily obtaining Luthuli's electoral win.
The students themselves inappropriately marred the election, with rival factions
contesting each other, a melee erupted and some thirty-four students were arrested for
breach of the peace and forming part of a disorderly crowd.7o
Aside from one phone call from a student representative soon after his election,
Luthuli never acted as the Rector,7] Print media reports at the time indicate that after an
initial correspondence informing Luthuli of his election, no other correspondences from
the University reached him; the government presumably intercepted and confiscated all
mail from the university to Luthuli.72 In parliament, in response to questions by
Helen Suzman, the government denied the allegation. 73 Mahomed, who received
Luthuli's post on his behalf, indicated that Luthuli did not even receive the invitation to
Scotland to be installed or the request to nominate an assessor,74 In mid-1963, Luthuli
applied for a passport to attend the long-postponed installation. After a long delay, the
government finally rejected the application in January 1964.75 A very disappointed
David Holmes, President of the Students Representative Council, indicated that Luthuli's
Publication unknown, "To Represent Lutuli at University", 03 May 1963.
69 Other candidates included a race car driver (Stirling Moss), race horse owner (the Earl Rosebery), British
Lord and Member of Parliament (Edward Heath) and the Chairman of the Scottish National Party
(Dr. R. McIntyre). Moss subsequently withdrew, recommending Luthuli.
Star, "Luthuli for Rector", 16 August 1962.
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Better Man for Task - Moss: Glasgow Honour", 02 October 1962.
Star, "Moss Stands Down for Luthuli", 02 October 1962.
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli in Lead for Rector of Glasgow University", 05 October 1962.
70 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Is Honoured - Then Scots 'Rag' Police", 23 October 1962.
Star, "Students in Brawl after Election ofLuthuli as Rector", 23 October 1962.
71 Rand Daily Mail, "Rector of Glasgow on Phone", 26 October 1962.
72 Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli Letters Missing - Scots Student", 02 February 1963.
Sunday Times, "Hertzog to be Asked about Luthuli's Missing Mail", 03 February 1963.
Daily News, Lutuli's Missing Mail", 06 February 1963.
73 Rand Daily Mail, No title, 13 February 1963.
London Times, "Luthuli's Letters 'Went Missing"', 13 February 1963, 8d.
74 Rand Daily Mail, "Only Glasgow Mail Missing, He Says", 02 February 1963.
Rand Daily Mail, "Luthuli's Missing Mail: New Facts", 15 February 1963.
Natal Mercury, "Luthuli Post: Probe to be Called For", 04 February 1963.
75 Star, "Luthuli Has Asked for Passport", 10 July] 963.
Daily News, "Government's 'No' to Lutuli Installation", 24 January 1964.
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complete absence from the rectorship would render him the first not to attend an
installation.76 The University never held the ceremony.77
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Both Luthuli and Martin Luther King, Jr. won the Nobel Peace Prize. Luthuli
won the 1960 Prize and King won the 1964 Prize.78 For both Luthuli and King, the
Prizes recognised their non-violent stance in the struggle against white supremacy in
South Africa and the United States, respectively. Both Luthuli and King possessed
similar views on the efficacy ofnon-violent tactics as a means by which to oppose
oppression and injustice. Specifically, Luthuli and King agreed on the strategic and
ethical rationale for non-violent methods of resistance. Perhaps most importantly, both
Luthuli and King relied upon an ecclesiastical and theological foundation that provided
their inspiration to maintain non-violent tactics against the constant seduction of more
militant resisters of white supremacy.
One commonality between King and Luthuli is far less known and may shed
much light on Luthuli's thinking: both denied being pacifists. ANC veterans use the fact
that Luthuli was not a pacifist to convey that he came to support the ANC's turn to
violence. Despite their similar stances, King's legacy of non-violent advocacy never
received the reversal that Luthul i 's does.
How does one specifically explain the "seeming" contradiction between Luthuli's
strategic support of pacifist methods and his repeated denial that he subscribed to
pacifism?79 This study must resolve Luthuli's deceptively contradictory stance on
76 Star, "Luthuli Has Asked for Passport", 10 July 1963.
Daily News, "University Is Upset Over Mr. Lutuli", 02 August 1963.
77 London Times, "No Ceremony without Luthuli", 17 October 1963, 7a.
78 Luthuli 's 1960 Nobel Prize was only announced in October 1961 and thus accepted in December 1961.
Luthuli was the first African Prize winner and King was the youngest.
79 I understand that all humans have contradictory views, either simultaneously or at different contexts in
their lives. Humans are not necessarily purely rational and thus logical. Therefore, contradictions need not
always be logically resolved and thus rationally explained. So, why can't this study grant Luthuli a human
trait that all humans' share, particularly politicians? The answer is twofold. First, seminal tenets of
Luthuli's thought that he frequently publicly articulated revolved around non-violence. Hence, a
contradiction concerning the use of violence would have been egregious. Luthuli made pains to explain
himself clearly and forcefully. Second, and with great risk of criticism from those that rightly warn against
the writing of hagiographies, this study finds Luthuli profoundly consistent in all facets ofhis life and in all
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violence as those who claim LuthuIi supported the armed movement depend almost
entirely on his statements denying a subscription to pacifism. Because King and Luthuli
were contemporaries and they both shared a common theological foundation that
determined their political views, King's theological perspective is useful in explaining the
paradox found in Luthuli. King's thought proves illuminating when explaining Luthuli,
for King was more articulate and nuanced than Luthuli when conveying his faith-based
convictions. This was not necessarily due to a cerebral prowess possessed by King and
lacked by Luthuli. Rather, a variance existed because King as ordained minister who
formally studied theology and received a Ph.D. in Systematic Theology from Boston
University could best articulate an ethical rationale.80 On the other hand, economic
circumstances constrained Luthuli to work as a teacher so that he could financially
support his mother, thus turning down a scholarship to Fort Hare where he would have at
least received a Bachelor's degree. Nevertheless, the Christian faith no less influenced
Luthuli than King; Luthuli represented the quintessential Kholwa: born, raised and
educated in the bosom of American Congregationalism transplanted to Natal by the
American Board. King's theological thought illuminates Luthuli's existential angst
regarding the moral dilemma of violence. A theological understanding of Luthuli allows
historians to better understand him and his politics; and a clearer understanding of him
results in a more accurate articulation of South African history and Luthuli's fundamental
role in its formation.
Only two months before the Congresses Alliance agreed to form MK, a column in
the 28 May 1961 issue of the Post entitled "Why I Believe in Non-Violence" appeared.
This column served as a veritable treatise on Luthuli's rationale ofpacifism. The column
began:
I firmly believe in non-violence. It is the only correct form which our
struggle can take in South Africa. Both from the moral and the practical
point of view the situation in our country demands it ....To refrain from
modes of communication (verbal, written, private action and public action). Rare 'apparent' contradictions
found in Luthuli on the issue ofviolence beg for further inquiry.
80 King received his doctorate on 05 June 1955.
Long Island University, "Important Dates in the Life ofDr. Martin Luther King, Jr.", 4. Found at:
http:///www.liu.edu/cwis/cwp/library/mlking.htm. accessed 11 August 2008.
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violence is the sign of the civilised man...Non-violence gives us a moral
superiority...we pledge ourselves to non-violent activity because our
better natures and our consciences demand this of us ... My hope and
prayer is that any activity on our part now or in the future time will be on
peaceful lines. 81
The column does not hint at a context or provocation that might warrant or justify
violence. Pacifist assertions riddled the column.
Ifwe are to be sincere when we advocate non-violence, we must see to it
that we do not create situations where others, rightly or wrongly, for
whatever reason, will declare it necessary to use violent methods against
us .. .let it be remembered that to create situations where violence becomes
inevitable makes one a sponsor - intentional or not - of violence.82
Then, bluntly and out of the blue, Luthuli ended the column by declaring: "I am no
pacifist but a realist". Luthuli possessed solid pacifist credentials, both in word and deed.
Yet, Luthuli denied his identification to that which he seemingly advocated: pacifism.
Luthuli's public and private rejections ofpacifism are consistent. In a letter to the
editor printed in the Rand Daily Mail and reprinted by Sechaba in October 1967, Charles
Hooper wrote quite clearly about Luthuli's stance on violence. Hooper is a credible
source as he and his wife Sheila spent many hours in discussion with Luthuli in the
dictating and drafting ofLet My People Go. The opportunity to discuss the nuances of
theology and ethics regarding the issue of violence could have only been irresistible for
Hooper. Luthuli dictated much of his autobiography during the months preceding the
July 1961 decision to form MK and hence the issue of violence was foremost in his mind
when working with Hooper. Hooper shared:
Publicly, [Luthuli] advocated only non-violence and dialogue because
they were what he passionately wanted South Africans to believe in; but
privately he maintained that Stauffenberg was right in trying to destroy
Hitler... [Luthuli's] condemnation of violence was conditional and
qualified. 83
81 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Why I Believe in Non-Violence", by Albert Luthuli, 28 May 1961.
82 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Why I Believe in Non-Violence", by Albert Luthuli, 28 May 1961.
83 Sechaba, "Letter in the S. A. Press", by Charles Hooper, October 1967, 7.
Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg was the conspirator who attempted to assassinate AdolfHitler on
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Hooper specifically mentioned that "Luthuli privately maintained" his thoughts on
Stauffenberg. Therefore, Hooper did not deductively assume knowledge of Luthuli's
stance on violence, but rather shared the specifics of a private conversation he had with
him on the subject.
The rationale behind Luthuli's claim to be a realist centres on his belief that
domestic and international benevolent, white, liberal and Christian advocates would be
the key to South Africa's liberation. Luthuli explained in the same May 1961 column
cited above:
If we were ever to forget our high call to peaceful duty and action and turn
instead to bloodshed, how can we demand and expect the sympathy of the
outside world? It is important for us to win supporters for our just cause -
both from inside and outside South Africa. We must widen our area of co-
operation and friendship and not drive away millions of potential friends
and supporters by taking the wrong, evil road.84
The above justification for the use of non-violence is 'smoking gun' evidence that proves
Luthuli could not and did not support the formation and launch ofMK. Luthuli's
sentiments also explain why: Luthuli's domestic and international constituency bound
him to never countenance the loss of the moral high ground.
The most prominent rejection of pacifism occurred during Luthuli's testimony at
the Treason Trial. In response to the judge's direct question, "Are you a pacifist?"
Luthuli responded equally directly, "No, I'm not". The debate continued, "Then perhaps
you might explain the position, the difference between the non-violence campaign and
your not being a pacifist?" Luthuli retorted, "My lords, I merely talk as one feels - I'm
20 July 1944. The assassination attempt failed. Only one of two bombs were armed inside the suitcase
Stauffenberg left in the conference room where Hitler examined a map. A large thick conference table and
a member of Hitler's staff (who was killed) by chance shielded Hitler from the bomb blast. Hitler
subsequently launched a brutal and bloody purge, killing thousands of those even remotely associated with
the resistance and the conspirators, Bonhoeffer and Erwin Rommel included. Rommel though not involved
in the plot, knew of it and thus Hitler gave him the option of suicide by poison or having his entire family
killed before his execution. Stauffenberg was shot with other conspirators. Eight others were executed by
being hung on meat hooks. Their agonising deaths were filmed and watched by Hitler. Found at:
World War II Multimedia Database, "The Plot to Assassinate Hitler, July 20, 1944",
http://www.worldwar2database.comlhtml/julyplot.htm. accessed 18 August 2008.
84 BAPA, LF, Golden City Post, "Why I Believe in Non-Violence", by Albert Luthuli, 28 May 1961.
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not conversant with [the] theory of pacifism, but J am not a pacifist".85 In an interview
following the announcement of his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Luthuli stated,
"I must say that 1would not pigeon-hole myself as a pacifist".86 Luthuli then confessed,
in a rather convoluted manner, that his faith background was primary to his thinking:
My own beliefs as I have already said are to a certain extent motivated by
Christian leanings. Because of my Christian leanings I would hesitate to
be a party to violence, my lords. But, of course, I must say in that
connection that I am not suggesting that the Christian religion says this
and that I am not a theologian, but my own leanings would be in that
direction.87
Perhaps, Luthuli lacked the tools acquired in higher education to further qualify his
beliefs. Luthuli apologised for not being conversant with the theory of pacifism or a
theologian that would be able to discern an authoritative Christian position (should one
have ever existed).88 A perspective on Luthuli's apparent clouded articulation of his
beliefs can be illuminated by examining the same existential dynamic in King.
No archival evidence uncovers that King and Luthuli ever communicated directly
with one another. When Luthuli travelled to the United States in 1948, King was only
nineteen and studying theology at Crozer Seminary. Though any direct collaboration
between the two on the statement was unlikely, Luthuli and King jointly issued an
"Appeal for Action against Apartheid" in December 1962.89 In King's powerfully brief
85 Pillay, Voices o/Liberation, 1: 157.
Excerpts from Luthuli's evidence at the Treason Trial (August 1958 - March 1961) dealing with his
understanding of a non-violent liberation struggle.
Initially this statement is surprising, coming from a man who had pacifists as some of his closest allies
(e.g., Hooper and Houser). The statement becomes less surprising when Luthuli stated he was not
knowledgeable about Communism, nor had ever read Marx, when Kotane could be considered his closest
political confidant.
86 Cape Argus, "Luthuli Proud - But With a New Burden", 24 October 1961.
87 Pillay, Voices 0/Liberation, 1: 152.
88 Pillay stated in his comments on the Rivonia Trail that Luthuli "often refers to 'militant non-violent
struggle' where 'militant' is used to mean what Martin Luther King, Jr. meant by [']direct non-violent
action[']. This is quite consistent with [Luthuli's] claim not to be a pacifist yet choosing non-violence as
the best option for political struggle".
Pillay, Voices a/Liberation, 1: 150.
89 ANC, Albert Luthuli and M. L. King, Jr., "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", published by the
United Nations at the request ofthe Special Committee against Apartheid in a pamphlet tribute to Dr. King,
10 December 1962. Found at:
http://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/solidarity/mlking03.html. accessed 18 August 2008.
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two page acceptance speech, Luthuli is the only person mentioned by name. In accepting
the Peace Prize, King stated that the Nobel Committee "honours, again, Chief Luthuli of
South Africa, whose struggles with and for his people, are still met with the most brutal
expression of man's inhumanity to man".90
King never joined a pacifist organisation. Yet he thought, spoke and acted as a
pacifist. King's advocacy of strict non-violence stance is well documented. King's
rationale for pacifist strategies echoed Luthuli's. King believed:
Violence as a way of achieving racial justice is both impractical and
immoral. It is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in
destruction for all. The old law of an eye for an eye leaves everybody
blind. It is immoral because it seeks to humiliate the opponent rather than
win his understanding; it seeks to annihilate rather than convert. Violence
is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys
communities and makes brotherhood impossible. It leaves society in
monologue rather than dialogue. Violence ends by defeating itself. It
creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers. 91
Though King advocated pacifist strategies, King was not a pacifist. And neither
was Luthuli. Crediting the thought of the American public theologian Reinhold Niebuhr,
King once explained his perspective on pacifism that this study argues also illuminates
Luthuli's:
...Niebuhr's great contribution to theology is that he has refuted the false
optimism characteristic of a great segment of Protestant liberalism.
Moreover, Niebuhr has extraordinary insight into human nature, especially
the behaviour of nations and social groups. He is keenly aware of the
complexity of human motives and of the relations between morality and
power. His theology is a persistent reminder of the reality of sin on every
level of man's existence. These elements in Niebuhr's thinking helped me
to recognise the illusions of a superficial optimism concerning human
nature, the dangers of false idealism. While I still believe in man's
Amistad Research Centre (ARC), American Committee on Africa (ACA), Box 100, folder 20,
correspondence from Luthuli to international public, September 1962, 1.
90 Nobel Prizes.com, Martin Luther King, Jr., "Martin Luther King's Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech",
10 December 1964, Oslo, Norway.
http://www.nobelprizes.com/nobellpeace/MLK-nobel.html. accessed 18 August 2008.
91 University ofKwaZulu-Natal, Gandhi-Luthuli Documentation Centre, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or
"King" pages. Found at: http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/docITEXTS/dc/dcking.htm, accessed 18 August 2008.
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potential for good, Niebuhr made me realise his potential for evil as well.
Moreover, Niebuhr helped me to recognise the complexity of man's social
involvement and the glaring reality of collective evil. Many pacifists, I
felt, failed to see this. All too many had an unwarranted optimism
concerning man and leaned unconsciously toward self-righteousness. It
was my revolt against these attitudes under the influence of Niebuhr that
accounts for the fact that in spite of my strong leaning toward pacifism, I
never joined a pacifist organisation. After reading Niebuhr, I tried to
arrive at a realistic pacifism. In other words, I came to see the pacifist
position not as sinless but as the lesser evil in the circumstances. I felt
then, as I feel now, that the pacifist would have greater appeal ifhe did not
claim to be free from the moral dilemmas that the Christian non-pacifist
does.92
King's explanation allows one to, first, understand Luthuli's jarring conclusion, "I am not
a pacifist, I am a realist", found in his 28 May 1961 Post article and, second, understand
why Luthuli denied the pacifist label yet advocated and lived-out its tenets.
King's sympathetic disavowal ofpacifism conveys why Luthuli can best be
described as a 'strategic pacifist' rather than an 'ideological pacifist' .93 The distinction is
important. The latter is bound by pacifism and thereby the methods of pacifism are
proscribed whereas the former is informed by pacifism and thereby the methods pacifism
implements are freely adopted. According to King, if Luthuli identified himself as an
'ideological pacifist', he would be uninformed, naIve and even oblivious to reality as
pacifist strategies are blinded, not contextually implemented and serve as a panacea. By
proclaiming himself a 'realist', Luthuli denied being a pacifist. As a 'strategic pacifist',
Luthuli comprehended the full-dimensions of the struggle he led and chose freely the
strategy to adopt. Luthuli chose pacifist methods, being fully cognisant of the forces
arrayed against him and the ramifications of any actions taken. Luthuli, like King, denied
being a pacifist, yet chose to implement its tenets. King discerned that pacifists failed to
possess a realistic understanding of human nature. When Luthuli declared that he was a
92 Martin Luther King, Jr. The Autobiography ofMartin Luther King, Jr., Chapter three, "Crozer
Seminary". Found at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/autobiography/chp3.htm.
accessed 18 August 2008.
Also found in:
"We Shall Overcome," author and publication unknown, 205-6.
93 An "ideological pacifist' is a 'pacifist' as defined earlier in the introduction. A 'strategic pacifist' is not a
pacifist, but who believes that in a given situation, pacifist methods are the most efficacious.
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realist, not a pacifist, he proclaimed the South African context warranted pacifist methods
and that the extent ofNational Party's intransigence did not elude him.
George Houser and the American Committee on Africa
Secondary sources make much of Luthuli's cooperation with Martin Luther King,
Jr. Primary resources reveal that the relationship and communication between the two
was less substantive than what is often conveyed. In fact, there is no archival evidence
that suggests that Luthuli and King ever directly communicated. Still, both were co-
sponsors ofthe "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", issued by the American
Committee on Africa (ACOA) on 10 December 1962.94
The content of the "Appeal for Action against Apartheid" and the convictions of
those with whom Luthuli cooperated testify to the heavy investment he placed in non-
violent tactics. The "Appeal for Action" statement was the result of many years of
cooperation and partnership between Mary-Louise Hooper (a Quaker who served as
Luthuli's secretary and staff member of ACOA), George Houser, (a pacifist and founder
and Executive Secretary of ACOA), South African clerics such as de Blank, Reeves (who
served ACOA as international sponsors) and Martin Luther King, Jr. These unique
associations affirmed Luthuli's reluctance to ever separate himself from non-violent
strategies.
The ties that bound Luthuli to other kindred spirits, spiritually motivated, were not
easily broken. Luthuli and Houser first met in 1954 and since at least 1956 the two
maintained regular correspondence.95 Born to Methodist missioner parents, Houser was
imprisoned for a year in 1940 for protesting mandatory registration for the United States
military draft. After receiving ministerial training at the Chicago Theological Seminary,
Houser founded in 1942 an organisation that pursued non-violent direct action against
racial segregation. In 1953, Houser founded ACOA to support anti-colonial struggles
94 King Encyclopedia, "American Committee on Africa (ACOA)",
www.stanford.edu/group/King/aboutking/encyclopedia/americancomitteeonafrica.html. accessed
13 June 2008.
95 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel # 2, correspondence from Luthuli to
George Houser, 08 June 1956.
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throughout Africa and to assist in the abolishment of Apartheid in South Africa. By
1957, Houser had been declared a "prohibited immigrant" in the British territories of
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Tanganyika (Tanzania), Uganda and Kenya.96
Primarily working through Mahomed as an intermediary, Houser and Luthuli
corresponded in 1956, discussing means by which ACOA would assist the ANC to print
its own publication by utilising a press in Phoenix administered by M. K. Gandhi's
grandson.97 In 1958 and 1959, LuthuIi and Houser's correspondences focused upon
efforts being made by ACOA to raise funds to defend those charged in the Treason Trial
through the Africa Defence Fund for which Houser requested Luthuli to serve as
Advisor.98 In 1960, Luthuli and Houser (with Paton and the Bishop of Johannesburg)
cooperated in the establishment of the South African Committee for Higher Education
that assisted disadvantaged students with domestic and international scholarships.99
Cooperation continued into 196I as ACOA sponsored events to celebrate Africa Freedom
Day on an annual basis. loo In October and November 1961, Luthuli received
correspondence from Houser inviting Luthuli to speak in the United States as part of his
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance tour. Luthuli reluctantly informed Houser that his banning
restrictions and the inability to receive a passport would not permit him to accept. IOI
In February 1962, Houser introduced Luthuli to ACOA's "Appeal for Action"
campaign that was intended to be a follow-up to the 1957 "Declaration of Conscience". 102
Houser envisioned that King, Luthuli and Eleanor Roosevelt would be the three sponsors.
Apparently, nothing more was required from the sponsors than their appellation on the
96 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 9, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 14 August 1957.
97 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP 2914, Reel # 2, correspondence from Luthuli to
George Houser, 08 June 1956.
Luthuli mentioned Rev. Or. Arthur Blaxall who served as an intermediary between Luthuli and Tambo.
98 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 12, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 03 December 1958.
ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 14, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 12 November 1959.
99 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folders 14 and 15, correspondence from the President of the National Union of
South African Students (NUSAS), John Shingler and George Houser and enclosure, 19 April 1960.
100 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 18, correspondence to Luthuli from George Houser, 22 March 1961.
ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 13, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 20 March 1959.
101 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 19, correspondence from Luthuli to George Houser, 22 November 1961.
102 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 10, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 14 October 1957.
More than one hundred leaders from every continent issued the 1957 Declaration of Conscience. The
Declaration sought to appeal to South Africa to bring its policies into line with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
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invitation requesting international figures to sign the Appeal. 103 What is significant to
note and what underscores the importance ofLuthuli's relationship with Houser is the
substance of a correspondence to Americans from Luthuli through the cooperation of
ACOA. In the wake of the Sabotage Act that stifled domestic advocacy efforts, Luthuli
deduced that strict adherence to non-violent methods was the key to international
solidarity and thus liberation. Luthuli wrote:
And now - under the new "Sabotage" Act - to challenge segregation is to
risk the death penalty. Under such conditions, it is not too much to say
that twelve million of my people look to you. For we cannot win equality
without the help of the outside world (Luthuli' s emphasis).104
I-I~rein, Luthuli stated clearly (contrary to pan-Africanist thinking that Mandela desired to
lean towards, if only in perception) that Blacks cannot win liberation without the support
of global public opinion that is primarily generated by white, Christian and liberal
advocates of human rights. Furthermore, such a constituency inextricably bound Luthuli
to non-violent methods. Luthuli's correspondence with Americans further stresses
Luthuli's opposition to the ANC policy pennitling the use of violence. In this
correspondence, Luthuli specifically identified a feared "cataclysm" that justified his
stance. Luthuli pleaded in December 1962:
APPEAL FOR ACTION AGAINST APARTHIED is projected to bring
pressure on South Africa on an international scale - pressure for change
before it is too late ...before we are caught in a bloody revolt which would
necessarily polarise along racial lines and blot out all hope ofjustice in
South Africa. Such a cataclysm would destroy our movement here; it
would endanger hard-won progress everywhere, including America. That
is why Martin Luther King joins me as an initiating sponsor for this
Appeal for Action ...As you write your check, 1 am sure you will make a
sacrifice - not for the recognition accorded by the Nobel Prize, but for the
103 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 07 February 1962.
ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 17 July 1962.
ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from George Houser to Luthuli, 09 October 1962.
ARC, ACA, Box lOO, Folder 20, correspondence from George Houser to Ebrahim Mahomed for Luthuli,
15 November 1962.
104 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from Luthuli to various intemationalleaders,
September 1962.
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cause we share: that interracial amity shall not perish (Luthuli's
emphases). 105
The actual Appeal issued jointly by Luthuli and King is even more explicit in its
advocacy of non-violent methods. Luthuli and King presented two possibilities for the
future in their Appeal. The first possibility was that government intransigence would
lead to a possible liberation brought about by violence and armed rebellion. The second
possibility was that a transition to a society based upon equality for all without regard to
colour would be brought about by a global quarantine of the Apartheid South Africa.
What is most significant about the first choice is that the authors stated that violence and
armed rebellion would result "once it is clear that peaceful adjustments are no longer
possible".106 Luthuli and King considered non-violent options to still be viable at the
time of writing, although to a decreasing degree. Luthuli and King articulated their fear
that "large scale violence would take the form of a racial war". 107 Such a supposed
liberation may be successful. But, at what cost? "Mass racial extennination will destroy
the potential for interracial unity in South Africa and elsewhere".108 Mandela reluctantly
risked such a scenario. Luthuli could not. The government also would not risk such a
scenario and quickly extinguished Mandela's 'army'.
Luthuli perceived that effective international sanctions supporting the non-violent
method were still viable. These would provide the ANC the public support and moral
high ground in their appeal to Christians and the international human rights advocates.
Mandela's launch ofMK and succour from Communist countries during the Cold War
quickly evaporated much of the ANC's international solidarity with western governments
that represented predominately Christian and democratic nations. As long as western
governments perceived, rightly or wrongly, the ANC to be a proxy of the Soviet Union
that sought to overthrow an anti-Communist regime, the liberation movement's efforts to
institute effective sanctions were always doomed to fail until the collapse of Communism
in the late 1980s. As early as 1956, western allies such as Mary-Louise Hooper
105 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from Luthuli to various intemationalleaders,
September 1962.
106 ANC, "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", Luthuli and King, 10 December 1962.
107 ANC, "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", Luthuli and King, 10 December 1962.
108 ANC, "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", Luthuli and King, 10 December 1962.
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expressed disquiet to Luthuli about the ANC's cooperation with Communists and
Houser's communication with Paton also suggests his anxiety over ANC Communist
influences. 109 The eruption of violence would surely wound efforts to mobilise
international support for the liberation movement by pacifists such as Hooper and
Houser. Luthuli's strategy with ACOA would not work with Mandela implementing
violence.
In September 1963, Luthuli received a request from Houser to offer a few words
in support of ACOA on the occasion of its 10th Anniversary. 110 Luthuli's greeting to
ACOA affirmed his deep respect and admiration for the organisation.
We are partners with you in your mission, and I could assure you in the
name of my people that when our day of deliverance comes, you will most
assuredly not find us wanting in the responsibility which the forging of a
suitable government acceptable to all ranks of our multi-racial population
will entail. Long live the American Committee on Africa! And may
Africa always live up to the trust that you have reposed on her!! (Luthuli' s
I . )111exc amatlOn
King's support, though not direct with Luthuli, of the anti-Apartheid movement
continued through the auspices of ACOA. Like Luthuli, King was also not a pacifist,
also declaring so categorically. Nevertheless, King continued to advocate for non-violent
tactics to further the cause of human rights in the United States and South Africa. In
December 1962, in consultation with Houser, King and other African-American leaders
met with President John Kennedy to discuss United States foreign policy concerning
Africa. On 10 December 1965 at a Human Rights Day rally organised by Houser, King
pronounced that continued United States' economic support of South Africa amounted to
109 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 12, correspondence from Alan Paton to George Houser, 21 December
1956.
After discussing to what degree Communists within the ANC exerted too much influence, Paton
conveyed to Houser, "We in the Liberal Party have taken a leading part in the setting up of the Defence
Fund. Ifyou felt, after all the above caveats, that you could help - and while 1 loathe communism 1 do
feel that help is needed and is justified - send anything you can...".
UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, correspondence from Luthuli to Mary-
Louise Hooper, 02 July 1956.
110 ARC, ACA, Box 100, Folder 22, correspondence to Luthuli from George Houser, 06 September 1963.
III ARC, ACA, Box unknown, Folder unknown, "lOth Anniversary of the American Committee on
Africa", by Albert Luthuli, n.d.
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a "shame" for the nation and called for an economic boycott of South African goods as a
demonstration of the "international potential of non-violence". 112
Rivonia and Ngakane Trials
On 26 July 1962, Mandela travelled to Natal to meet with Luthuli and members of
the Natal MKRegional Command. In this meeting with Luthuli, Mandela advised that
the ANC should be seen as dominant within the Congress Alliance to appease potential
Africanist allies throughout the continent. Luthuli disagreed and said, as he
characteristically did, he would deliberate on the matter further by consulting others. On
05 August, while leaving Natal, police arrested Mandela outside Howick, near
Pietermaritzburg. The following day, the police charged Mandela with incitement
(May 1961 strike) and leaving South Africa illegally (January 1962 North, East and West
Africa trip). After first being held during trial at the'Johannesburg Fort', and later
incarcerated in Pretoria Central Prison following the imposition of a three year sentence,
the authorities transferred Mandela to Robben Island in May 1963. By mid-July Mandela
joined his other MK co-conspirators in Pretoria to stand trial for High Treason in what is
known as the Rivonia Trial. 113 In July, the police raided the alleged MK headquarters in
Rivonia and discovered Mandela's diary written during his Africa tour and a document
entitled "Operation Mayibuye", a plan for the launch of a guerrilla war. 114 The latter
document contained sufficient evidence to convict those tried for treason that carried with
it a possible death sentence.
112 King Encyclopedia, "Houser, George Mills", found at:
www.stanford.edu/group/King/aboutkinglencyclopedia/housergeorge.html. accessed 13 June 2008.
King Encyclopedia, "American Committee on Africa (ACOA)".
113 The other defendants were Waiter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Bob
Hepple, Denis Goldberg and Lionel Bernstein. Later police arrested Elias Motsoaledi and Andrew
Mlangeni. Four escaped, one agreed to testifY for the prosecution (Hepple) and the court found one not
guilty (Bernstein).
114 The South African Communist Party owned the "Lilliesleaf' farm at which the state alleged MK to be
headquartered.
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The drama of the Rivonia Trial need not be recounted in this study. Many other
scholars in countless publications adequately described the Trial's events and their
historical significance and provide the accused's testimony from court transcripts. I IS
In brief, as R. Johnson wrote, the Trial "exposed the bitter truth: the opposition [to
Apartheid] was slipshod, amateur and ineffectual". I 16 This study instead focuses on
Luthuli's public statements in reaction to the Rivonia Trial and the sentencing of those
convicted.
The ''No one can blame ... " statement is perhaps most frequently cited by those
who wish to remember Luthuli as a supporter of the use of violence. Chapter three of this
study reviews in detail Luthuli's statement in reaction to the Rivonia Trial convictions to
resolve that while he expressed solidarity with the accused, he did not support their
methods. Further evidence for this thesis exists within a correspondence Luthuli wroteto
the General Secretary of the United Nations, 'Pantanaw U' Thant, in June 1964 during
the Rivonia Trial prior to sentencing. In this correspondence, Luthuli made it clear that
he still held that there was hope for a non-violent solution for South Africa and that he
relied on the support of the international community to place substantive external
pressure on the Apartheid regime. Luthuli begged:
I write to you most urgently today to stress that whatever hope there still
remains for a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the South African
crisis, will be lost, possibly for all time, if the United Nations does not act
promptly and with firmness on the vital matter which has moved me to
make this urgent appeal ... [The imposition of the death penalty on the
Rivonia accused] would have disastrous results for any prospects of a
peaceful settlement of the South African situation and could set in motion
a chain of actions and counter-actions which would be tragic for everyone
in South Africa as they would be difficult to contain. I 17
115 Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life: His Speeches and Writings 1944-1990 (Bellville, Mayibuye
Books, 1994), 161-83.
Clingman, Bram Fischer, 299-322.
Meer, Higher Than Hope, 161-97.
116 Johnson, South Africa, 157.
117 ANC, correspondence from Luthuli to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant,
09 March 1964. Found at: www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/lutuli/let640309.html. accessed 25 June
2008.
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In the statement, Luthuli could not lie and claim he did not understand or
sympathise with the convicted nor could he in an act of solidarity and plea for mercy tell
the complete truth and state that he disagreed with the path they chose. Hence, Luthuli's
affirmation that he and the ANC never abandoned non-violent methods, though in July
1961 he chaired and yielded to its and its partners' decision to form a 'separate
organisation' that would be prepared to use violence should no option be left available.
In the statement, Luthuli maintained support, but not agreement, with those convicted.
Luthuli did not as an individual or as the ANC President-General ever advocate or justify
violence prior to or after the 1961 decision and did not agree with the path chosen by the
convicted despite sympathising with them and understanding their frustration with the
National Party regime's perpetually intractable behaviour. The statement is the epitome
of balanced and reasoned diplomacy. However, confusing, and therefore a mystery, is
Luthuli's May 1961 declarations in the Post that the path of violence is the "evil road"
and his view that the avoidance of violence is a sign of "civilisation" and "moral
superiority" coupled with his Rivonia statement wherein he held that those convicted
"represent the highest in morality and ethics in the South African political struggle". 118
Some sources indicated that the state had sufficient evidence to arrest and
presumably convict Luthuli. 119 This claim is unfounded. If the state had evidence to
indict and convict Luthuli on charges of treason, it would have done so. While it tried,
the prosecution failed in its attempt to draw Luthuli into the Rivonia Tria1. 12o
Reminiscent of the Treason Trial, sufficient evidence could not be presented by the state
that indicated Luthuli had ever supported the use of violence. Evidence from one of the
prosecution's own witnesses must have dissuaded the prosecution from proceeding,
convinced that there existed no sound case against Luthuli. Also, the state dared not try
Luthuli, thus putting him on the stand or having the defence present countless evidences
of his non-violent position. Mande1a's diaries, PAFMECSA speech and testimony
118 The explanation may lie within the fact that one comment was made in May 1961 (when acts of
violence were less prominent) and the other much later in 1964 (when other organisations had for some
time conducted attacks that could be more closely associated, correctly or incorrectly, with 'terrorism').
Another explanation may simply be Luthuli self-confessed disposition that 'affords a charitable
interpretation' to people's characters until they prove irredeemably otherwise.
119 Mtolo, Umkhonto we Si;;we, 191.
120 Johnson, South Africa, 157.
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allowed the state to claim the moral high ground to a credulous white South African
public whereas Luthuli's moderate and persuasive position would place the ANC on the
moral high ground.
During the Rivonia Trial, the most damaging testimony of the accused's guilt
came from the state's star witness, Bruno Mtolo, known during the trial as "Mr. X". Tom
Lodge's biography, Mandela: A Critical Lift, quoted the accused's attorney, Joel Joffe,
describing Mtolo as a "recidivist criminal" and an '''old hand' in the witness box whose
testimony was a "skilfully 'interwoven mixture of fact and fiction"'.121 Nevertheless,
Mtolo's testimony about Luthuli's waning influence is truthful.
"There was a slight but definite swing from the leadership of
ChiefLuthuli towards Mandela". The shift "was brought about with great
care by members of Communist cells", Mtolo maintained. Tt was
observable in the replacement of the songs sung at meetings about Luthuli
by new songs, composed about Mandela. 122
In February 1964, the South African government detained Pascal Ngakane,
Albertinah Luthuli's husband and thus Luthuli's son-in-law, under the Transkei
Emergency Regulations. These Regulations allowed him to be held indefinitely without
being charged and without access to legal advice. Ngakane was last seen on 19 February.
Fifteen days later, it became known that the police had arrested him. 123 In July 1964, the
state charged and tried Ngakane of four counts of violating the Sabotage Act and
Suppression of Communism Act (for belonging to and furthering the aims of the ANC),
departing from the Republic and defeating the ends ofjustice. During Ngakane's trial,
another state witness, also known as "Mr. X", presented evidence that Luthuli opposed
MK's operations and even offered to resign from the ANC. Mr. X's testimony, to some
degree, is questionable as he allowed himself to be used as a witness for the state against
those with whom he formerly served. The veracity of Mr. X's testimony is especially
questionable if it agreed with the state's desired portrayal of Luthuli as a leader of an
121 Lodge, Mandela, 110. See endnote 21, chapter 5, 241. Lodge cited:
Joel Joffe, The Rivonia Story (Bellville: Mayibuye Books and the University ofthe Western Cape, 1995),
92.
122 Lodge, Mandela, Ill. See endnote 22, chapter 5, 241. Lodge cited:
Mtolo, Umkhonto we Sbve, 39-40.
123 London Times, "Luthuli Son-In-Law Detained", 14 March 1963, 7a.
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anned revolutionary movement. Evidence from a questionable witness is usually
probative ifit in some way contradicts the state's case as Mr. X's did.
In his testimony against Ngakane, Mr. X testified that he first heard of MK in
1962. In his evidence...
[Mr. X] referred to a report made at an ANC meeting by M. B. Yengwa in
March that year [1962]. Yengwa had told the meeting that Lutuli had
been complaining about reports concerning the ANC and Mkhonto we
Sizwe. He felt that if the ANC was to resort to violence then it was time
for him to resign.124
In the March ANC meeting at which both Yengwa and Ngakane were present, Mr. X
testified that it was unanimously decided not to associate with MK. Mr. X then testified
that after the meeting, Yengwa told him:
Lutuli wanted to resign from the ANC as "he did not want to be a
stumbling block to those who wanted to use violence". 125
Though Mr. X's testimony may be seen as suspect given the fact that he gave evidence
for the state, nothing in the archival record contradicts the assertion that Luthuli offered
to resign from the ANC. Mr. X's testimony in Ngakane's trial and other archival
evidence leads to a conclusion that as a result ofLuthuli's objections to violence, he
reluctantly yielded to others' convictions for its required use while continuing to advocate
for non-violent methods.
Family of Man Award
Late in his life, Luthuli continued to receive accolades and successfully maintain
the close ties with sympathetic Whites allied to the ANC's struggle in large part because
he did not renounce the non-violent path and was never heard to support the initiation of
124 Publication unknown, "Lutuli Was Stumbling Block to Violence, Witness Says", 22 July 1964.
125 Publication unknown, "Lutuli Was Stumbling Block to Violence, Witness Says", 22 July 1964.
Newscheck reported "[Luthuli's] role in the subsequent violence of 1962/1964 was never fixed. He never
condemned that violence outright, though he was reported to have considered disassociating himself
from the ANC".
Newscheck, "An Unfulfilled Life", 28 July 1967, 10.
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violence. The acceptance of the Gell, Nobel and Family of Man awards displays the
degree to which Luthuli embedded himself with the liberal cause that assumed only non-
violent tactics to be permissible and thus failed to ever distance himself from the ANC's
similar historic stance.
In 1964 Luthuli received at his home in the Umvoti mission a telegram from an
event organiser, the Honourable John Whitney, who congratulated him for being awarded
the New York City Protestant Council's Family of Man Award and inviting him to
receive it on 28 October 1964 at the Astor Hotel in Manhattan. 126 The Protestant Council
led by its President, Arthur Kinsolving, and the Society for the Family of Man led by its
Chairman, Whellock Bingham,jointly sponsored the occasion and award. l27 Luthuli's
honour was not insignificant. The Guest of Honour at the 1963 award ceremony was
United States President John Kennedy. The scheduled Guest of Honour at the 1964
ceremony was former President Dwight Eisenhower.128 The Council and Society
bestowed four awards: Human Relations, World Peace, Education and Communications.
Luthuli received the award for Human Relations that included a US$ 5,000.00 grant. 129
The Society honoured Luthuli specifically for his advocacy of non-violent methods
declaring that he was ...
. . .leading the fight against the Apartheid policy of the South African
government always advocating firm and continued opposition by non-
violent means. 130
126 UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, telegram to Luthuli from the
Chairman of the Protestant Council Family ofMan Award Dinner, the Honourable John Whitney, n.d.
Wheelock Bingham sent another telegram.
UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47 CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, telegram to Luthuli from Wheelock
Bingham, n.d.
Another telegram was also sent to Howard Trumball through the auspices of the American Board to
Beatrice Street.
UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47 CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, telegram to Luthuli from Wheelock
Bingham, 17 October 1964.
127 The Protestant Council represented 1,700 Protestant churches in the New York metropolitan area.
128 President Eisenhower's son, Colonel John Eisenhower, served as the Guest ofHonour due to his father's
absence.
129 This is a substantial sum ofmoney for the time and for Luthuli. How or if Luthuli spent this money I do
not know.
Publication unknown, "Lutuli Gets Grant", 29 October 1964.
130 Publication unknown, "Big Cash Award for Lutuli", 18 October 1964.
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As with the Nobel award, it is highly improbable that Luthuli would have
considered receiving the Family of Man award ifhe had at any time advocated or
countenanced violence. On 17 October, Luthuli posted two letters, one to the local
magistrate in Stanger and one to the Minister of Justice in Pretoria, requesting permission
to attend.]3] For Luthuli to receive the award in person, he would have to depart by
260ctober. l32 Luthuli's attendance seemed remote. He would be required to obtain
travel bookings, income tax clearance, passport photos and a passport from Pretoria, all
while being confined to Groutville and thus banned from Stanger and Durban. Luthuli
would first need to obtain blanket permission to break his banning restrictions.
In documents stamped "Secret", the South African embassy in Washington, D.e.
advised the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria on 14 October 1964 that:
While Society is ostensibly non-political[, the] decision to honour Luthuli
may reflect a desire in certain chiefly Methodist and Presbyterian quarters
in New York to make political mischief for South Africa. You will no
doubt bear in mind that UN and other hostile groups will seize on Luthuli
should he come to New York. We assume passports if applied for will not
be granted. 133
Needless to say, Luthuli could not and did not attend.
John Reuling wrote to Luthuli in early November informing him that the
organisers of the award received at the ceremony his expression of appreciation. Reuling
also wrote that an Adams alumnus, Mphiwa Mbatha, received the award and spoke
briefly on Luthuli's behalf. 134 The same correspondence discussed means by which the
American Board could facilitate the transfer of the grant money from New York to
Durban on Luthuli's behalf.
l3J VCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to the
Stanger Magistrate, 17 October 1964.
VCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to the
Secretary of Justice, 17 October 1964.
132 VCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, correspondence from Luthuli to the
Secretary of Justice, 17 October 1964.
133 National Archives Repository, Pretoria, File 100/61704, S. A. Embassy, Washington, Telegram,
No. 140, to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, "Secret: 1964 Society of Man Award", 15 October
1964,2.
l34 VCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel #1, correspondence to Luthuli from
the John Reuling, 02 September 1964.
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American Board links with Luthuli continued in late 1964 and confirm the central
theses of this study that he possessed a diminished influence within the ANC and
continued to neither support nor condemn the turn to violence. One American Board
missioner, Edward Hawley, met Oliver Tambo in Dar es Salaam in November of 1964
and for him carried a typed, unaddressed and unsigned correspondence to Luthuli in
Groutvi11e. Hawley's visit was facilitated by American Board missioner Howard
Trumbull and the local Congregational minister in Groutville. In an interview, Hawley
confided the following discussion with Luthuli.
Luthuli talked freely about his experiences under the banning orders and
explained that this current one had banned him from going to church...
One of the most moving parts of that conversation came when I asked him
about how he dealt with the increasing pressure to use force in combating
Apartheid. His response was, and Tcan remember this almost verbatim, 'I
have never been a violent man. And I could never be one ...The young
men still come out to see me. When they tell me that non-violence has
always been met by violence, I have no words left'. It was clear to me that
he still wished that justice might be obtained non-violently. But, he no
longer could find arguments to convince them that this was possible. l35
Swedish Links
The South African government prohibited Luthuli from accepting an invitation to
Sweden as well as to the United States. Concerned about reports of Luthuli's
deteriorating health, Sweden's Minister ofForeign Affairs to South Africa, Hugo Tamm,
visited Luthuli at his home in Groutville in early 1965.136 Alarmed by a report that the
South Africa's security police questioned Luthu1i about this visit, the Stockholm branch
of the ruling Social Democratic Party invited him to Sweden to speak at May Day
demonstrations in Stockholm, making the invitation through the South African
135 Interview with Edward Hawley, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 29 June 2009.
136 These reports likely emanated from Mary-Louise Hooper ofthe ACOA who told the United Nation's
General Assembly Special Committee against Apartheid that Luthuli's health was deteriorating and the
government prohibited him to be seen by a doctor. The South African government rightly denied this
claim, indicating that "any doctor, except one who is a 'named Communist' or one who is himself subject
to an order restricting his movements, could be summoned by Mr. Lutuli".
ANC, "ChiefLutuli and the United Nations: "Statement by Mrs. Mary-Louise Hooper at the Forty-Fifth
Meeting of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid", Annex IJI, 29 October 1964.
Publication unknown, '''No Medical Care' Allegation Denied", 31 October 1964.
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government. As the South African envoy to Sweden, Anthony Hamilton denied Luthuli
the opportunity to travel to Sweden in an abrasive reply. Hamilton retorted that despite
restrictions placed upon him, Luthuli. ..
.. .continued meeting with Communists and well-known agitators, both
openly and in secret. He abused the privileges accorded to him and defied
and provoked the authorities and the government at every turn.
Mr. Luthuli has therefore only himself to blame for the restrictions and
prohibitions still imposed upon him. These are unavoidable if all the
peoples of South Africa are to be protected against the violence which
would accompany a Communist-inspired coup d'etat. The restrictions on
Mr. Luthuli have been imposed only as a last resort.. .In the past, when
passport facilities were granted to Mr. Luthuli, the promises he gave were
not fulfilled. Since his last visit abroad [to accept the Nobel Peace Prize]
there has been no change in his attitude. In the circumstances, the South
African government cannot, then~fore, allow Mr. Luthuli to undertake the
proposed visit. 137
Despite the banning of the ANC, the legislation of the Sabotage Act, the
imprisonment of many of the liberation struggle leaders after the Rivonia Trial and the
exile of other ANC leaders, the outside world's contact with Luthuli continued on a
limited basis. Though such contact continued, the South African government struggled
hard to affect Luthuli's 'civil death'. Contrary to the ANC nationalists' inference that
Luthuli continued to lead the liberation movement by having secret meetings in cane
fields, Sellstrom emphasised that banning restrictions made communication with Luthuli
almost impossible.1 38 Often ecclesiastic, rather than political, links facilitated what
limited contact Luthuli had with the outside world. 139 Sellstr6m related in an interview
that Ronnie Kasrils often contacted the Swedish legation in Pretoria. They then
established contact with Luthuli through the Church of Sweden Mission in order to hear
137 Correspondence from the South African Minister A. M. Hamilton to the Secretary, Stockholms
Arbetarekommun, Stockholm, 03 June 1965. Cited by Sellstr6m:
Sellstr6m, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 239.
138 I do not imply that Luthuli and members of the ANC did not hold meetings in the cane fields as
nationalist histories so often claim. Rather, I contend that the ANC aggrandises the purpose and
significance of the meetings as they relate to the degree to which the ANC consulted Luthuli on all
(including military) matters and the degree to which he still led the movement.
139 Sellstr6m, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Afi'ica, 1: 239.
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news about him and publish that infonnation on behalf of the ANC. 140 Even at the
October 1962 Lobatse conference, where this study asserts the ANC 'officially' decided
that MK be affiliated with the ANC, the ANC received no infonnation about Luthuli, let
alone leadership. In addition,judging by Luthuli's Rivonia Statement, Luthuli was not
even infonned that the ANC officially changed its policy in Lobatse. 141 Such tenuous
links with the ANC divulge that though Luthuli held the position of President-General,
the position held only titular status with the ANC in exile. Elaine Reinertsen also
discerned a larger thesis of this study "that by 1960 the authority of the President-General
had diminished to a figurehead"; Reinertsen's statement that Luthuli "did not, and indeed
would not, as a recipient of the Peace Prize, echo the sentiments of Umkhonto we Sizwe"
provides "the strongest evidence of the declining role of the President-General". 142
Robert Kennedy's Visit
Only Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize surpassed the degree to which the four day visit
to South Africa of Senator Robert Kennedy, brother of the recently slain United States
President, embarrassed the Apartheid regime. Commenting on Kennedy's June 1966
visit, the Rand Daily Mail judged:
Senator Robert Kennedy's visit is the best thing that has happened to
South Africa for years. It is as if a window has been flung open and a gust
of fresh air has swept into a room in which the atmosphere had become
stale and foetid. Suddenly it is possible to breathe again without feeling
choked. 143
140 Interview with Tor Sellstrom, Luthuli Museum, Kwadukuza, 27 June 2008.
Spotlight, No. 29,1965. As cited by Sellstrom:
Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 243.
141 The ANC issued its first printed statement connecting MK to the ANC in April 1963. The statement
arose from the Lobatse Conference. In the statement, the ANC claimed the military wing and violence as
a tactic (beyond sabotage) and emphasised the importance and primacy of political mass action.
Nonetheless, I still assert that the statement contradicts Luthuli's claim in the June 1964 Rivonia
Statement that "The ANC never abandoned its method ofa militant, non-violent struggle..." The ANC
and/or Luthuli can not claim to prosecute a non-violent struggle and prosecute an armed struggle
simultaneously. By pursuing the latter, the former claim is negated.
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1: 135.
142 Reinertsen, "Umkhonto we Sizwe", 13 and 12, respectively.
143 Rand Daily Mail, "Kennedy, Come Back", by the Editor-In-Chief, 09 June 1966.
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During a whirlwind trip from 04 June to 09 June, Kennedy electrified the South African
press, youth and public. The frazzled press corps that tried to keep pace with Kennedy
nicknamed him the "Human Dynamo". In all of his speeches, Kennedy brilliantly
critiqued white South Africa's racism, materialism, increasing totalitarian leanings and
paranoia of Communism by speaking about the successes and mistakes of the American
project to realise a 'more perfect union'. Tn speaking indirectly to South Africa by
speaking directly about the United States, Kennedy gave a stinging evaluation of
Apartheid as an abandonment of all that western civilisation holds sacred without the
diplomatic fallout that would result in a broadside attack. Advocating "peaceful and non-
violent change", Kennedy's speeches beautifully captured Luthuli's philosophical,
theological and political understandings. 144
At dawn on the oih, Kennedy flew via helicopter to Groutville to visit Luthuli.
The two met privately for about an hour. During the visit, Luthuli and Kennedy took a
stroll down his rural street, listened to speeches ofRobert's brother and former President,
John Kennedy, on a record player Kennedy presented Luthuli as a gift and had tea.
Rule's book reported that Luthuli told Kennedy "that he was not a Communist and that
he feared despair would drive the black majority in South Africa to violence".145 Flying
back to Johannesburg, Kennedy gave a press conference over the Valley of a Thousand
Hills wherein he described Luthuli as "one of the most impressive men I have ever
met".146 The Rand Daily Mail appropriately summarised the significance of the visit to
Luthuli:
Think, also, what this visit has meant to the non-Whites of South Africa-
his acceptance of them as people who count as much as anyone else, as
people to be greeted and sought out and talked to as friends. In this sense
his meeting with ex-Chief Albert Luthuli was not merely a valuable
personal contact but a symbol of recognition of the African people as part
f . 147o our communrty.
144 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KC? 4144, 323.168 ROB, "Robert Kennedy in South Africa", a souvenir booklet
of Senator Kennedy's 1966 tour of South Africa compiled by the Rand Corporation, 1966, "Day of
Affirmation Speech", 06 June 1966, University of Cape Town, 7.
145 Rule, Nokukhanya, 137.
146 UKZN, KCAL, CC, KC? 4144,323.168 ROB, "Robert Kennedy in South Africa", "And He's Off
Again", 4.
147 Rand Daily Mail, "Kennedy, Come Back", by the Editor-In-Chief, 09 June 1966.
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Kennedy's tour provides evidence that liberalism was alive and well in South
Africa, the black majority had a strong ally in Washington, D.e. and that Luthuli feared
the eruption ofa violent conflict. Also worthy of note in this study is Kennedy's
comment that he noticed "the Chief seemed thin". 148
Luthuli's Health
Prior to the 24 May 1964 expiration of Luthuli' s five year banning order, a close
confidant of his told Dennis Royle, a Natal Witness reporter:
Luthuli's way of life has recently undergone a complete change. The 66-
year-old former Zulu Chief (he gave up his chieftainship when he went
into politics) is no longer a bustling politician but a quiet retiring
farmer ... Luthuli who can not talk for publication, is still dedicated to the
concept of a multi-racial society gained by non-violent means. But his
bannin~ from public life offers him little chance of furthering these
aims.!4
Effective 31 May 1964, the Minister of Justice, B. J. Vorster, imposed on Luthuli an even
more severe banning than the one he received in 1959. Unlike his 1959 banning, the new
one would have prevented Luthuli from even travelling to the next closest town, Stanger,
until 31 May 1969 had he not died before. The Minister of Justice felt confident that
Luthuli's activities furthered the cause of Communism and warned him not to publish
any statements, address any meetings or make contact with any banned people. 150 The
Liberal Party, NUSAS and the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions all
publicly protested Luthuli's banning.!5!
Evidence suggests that Luthuli's political and physical life were winding down
considerably. From October 1964 until his death in July 1967, thirty-three months, the
148 Rule, Nokukhanya, 137.
149 Natal Witness, "Albert Luthuli: 'Africa's Forgotten Man... "', by Dennis Royle, 01 May 1964.
150 Publication unknown, "Stricter Ban on Lutuli: May Not Enter Stanger", 23 May 1964.
151 Daily News, "Comment on Re-Imposed Lutuli Ban", 26 May 1964.
Daily News, "Restrictions on Lutuli Condemned", 06 July 1964.
Daily News, "Lutuli Order Expires in May, 1969",20 June 1964.
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only known archival materials produced by Luthuli's hand are sermon notes and some
medical reminders on scraps of paper. The Luthuli Papers include the last known
archival documents that Luthuli produced during his final year of life. Unfortunately,
other than one correspondence and one declaration of congratulations, the 'documents'
are actually scraps of paper on which Luthuli scratched notes. 152 The notes reveal that
the last six months of Luthuli's life were perhaps insular and almost exclusively focused
on religious matters. Dates of services, scripture readings and notes on sermons that
Luthuli listened to over the radio comprised the bulk of his written attention. Notes not
related to religious matters were reminders of dates and times for medical appointments.
The scribblings on various scraps of paper, magazine articles and even product
advertisements or labels are dated 08 January, 22 January, 05 February, 16 February,
26 February, 03 March and 05 March 1967.153 For example, scripture readings are found
inscribed upon a Forward Africa newsletter that affirmed in its official motto that "the
peaceful elimination of colonialism - in all its forms and wherever it may be found - is
essential to a free world".154 By no means can a conclusion be based solely on these
jottings; nonetheless, it appears that Luthuli's mental state deteriorated. The latter
writings can scarcely be deciphered.
Luthuli's deteriorating penmanship and the lack of any archival records during his
last two years of life bring into serious doubt that Luthuli was active as the President-
General of the ANC or posed a political threat to the government. Other than the 1967
scraps of paper and sermon notes just mentioned, the Papers contain Luthuli's last written
152 UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, typed "circular" correspondence from
Luthuli to "Whom It May Concern" regarding the introduction of and recommendation for Miss Muriel
Horrell of the South African Institute of Race Relations, 12 February 1964.
UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, handwritten draft of congratulations to the
newly independent nation of Zambia entitled "The Government and the People of Zambia, 23 October
1964.
UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, "notebooks (dealing with church services
and sermons)", 1965-1967. Quotation from Dorothy Woodson's 1981 indexed inventory.
153 UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, "envelopes with scribbled notes; scraps of
paper, scattered thoughts, reminders, etc ...", 1966. Quotation from Dorothy Woodson's 1981 indexed
inventory.
154 Ronald Cohen, "Nigerian Nationhood Is Endangered", Toward Freedom IS, no. 10, November 1966,
1. Found in:
UCT, LC, MAD, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Reel # 1.
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document, a note of congratulations to the government and people of Zambia for their
newly attained independence written on 23 October 1964.
In her own biography, Nokukhanya confessed that in 1966, Luthuli's health
deteriorated.
He was already weak when I returned to Groutville [from the farms in
Swaziland] in 1966. And he was very touchy. He got depressed when
something went wrong in the house. His feelings had run high because of
the treatment he received from the police. They often used to come and
take him away from the house, even at that stage. I decided not to go back
in 1966 because things had deteriorated so much at home that I needed
time to work up the fields and crops.155
Despite Luthuli's failing health and banning restrictions, he maintained a peaceful spirit
that encouraged reconciliation and harmony. In January 1966, McCord Zulu Hospital in
Durban admitted Luthuli for hypertension. This hospitalisation likely caused
Nokukhanya to decide no longer to work in Swaziland. The American Board
Superintendent of the hospital at the time, Howard Christofersen, specifically recalled
visiting Luthuli's room to bid him farewell prior to returning to the United States.
Christofersen reminisced:
It was there that [Luthuli] quoted Professor Aggery who had visited
African educational institutions in the early 1920s. "Like the black and
white keys on the piano, the Whites need the Blacks and the Blacks need
the Whites". That was the first time that I had heard that expression and it
stuck by me because it was so impressive that he would say that after the
way in which he had been persecuted. 156
On 15 March 1967, only ten days after the last inscribed piece of paper mentioned
above, Luthuli signed his Last Will and Testament bequeathing all his immovable
property to his wife and all of his children save his first born son, Hugh, who was
omitted. l57 The Last Will and Testament appointed Edward Mzoneli, Mordecai Gumede
and Eben Ntuli as the executors ofLuthuli's will. On 16 March, Luthuli signed a codicil
155 Rule, Nokukhanya, 137.
156 E-mailed correspondence from Dr. Howard Christofersen to me dated 01 August 2008.
157 KZNA, PAR, Albert John Luthuli File (AJLF), Last Will and Testament, 15 March 1967, 1.
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bequeathing a piece of land to his nephew, Norman Luthuli.158 One can only speculate
that those close to Luthuli and/or Luthuli himself began to be aware ofa physical decline
and hence ensured that the family's attorney prepared a Last Will and Testament at the
same time Luthuli scribbled his last preserved documents found in the Luthuli Papers.
Yet, in oral testimonies, the family has always maintained that Luthuli possessed good
health until the time of his death.
The scraps of paper found in the Papers confirm accounts in newspaper articles
published in mid-l 967 that Luthuli was not able to do much reading or writing and spent
most of his time listening to the radio. For example, in April 1967 the Sunday Times
reported that Luthuli had recently undergone delicate surgery to his left eye at the
McCord Zulu HospitaI.1 59 The eye had troubled him for many years and had been
"virtually useless" since Luthuli's stroke "several years ago" in 1955. 160 The eye caused
Luthuli considerable constant pain, to such an extent that it was discussed if it should be
removed. T. Gcabashe, Luthuli's son-in-law, mentioned that there was a fear that the
other eye "may also be affected".161 The medical spokesman at McCord indicated that
Luthuli "had not been cured yet and that he would not be 'for a very long time... He has a
very nasty eye and that is all I can say"'. 162
Newspaper articles suggest that more than an eye may have troubled Luthuli.
McCord Zulu Hospital admitted Luthuli in early March and he did not return home until
the week of 15 ApriI. 163 Luthuli spent as many as four weeks admitted in hospital for eye
surgery; this is a very long time for what would normally be a relatively simple
procedure. One must suspect that high blood pressure or other complicating health
factors prolonged his hospitalisation. The drafting and signing of Luthuli's Last Will and
Testament immediately preceding his four week hospitalisation casts doubt on the long
held conviction that Luthuli benefited from good health at the time of his death. One of
158 KZNA, PAR, AJLF, Last Will and Testament, 15 March 1967,5, codicil.
159 To receive treatment, Luthuli had to request permission, which was granted for this purpose, to
suspend his banning orders.
160 Sunday Times, "Chief Luthuli-ln Hospital-May Be Going Blind", 02 April 1967,2.
161 Sunday Times, "Chief Luthuli-ln Hospital-May Be Going Blind", 02 April 1967,2.
162 Sunday Times, "ChiefLuthuli-ln Hospital-May Be Going Blind", 02 April 1967,2.
163 Publications unknown:
"Lutuli Has an Eye Operation", 28 March 1967; "The Patient: All Lutuli's Visitors Are Screened",
02 April 1967; "Lutuli to Leave Hospital Soon", 03 April 1967; "Mr. Albert Lutuli Is Improving",
06 April 1967; "Lutuli Is Out ofHospital", 15 April 1967; "Lutuli Out ofHospital", 23 April 1967.
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the last publicised visits to Luthuli came in July 1967 shortly after a Swedish newspaper
interviewed him. 164 Based on this interview, Sellstrom described Luthuli as "an old and
tired man". 165
'Mysterious' Death?
On Wednesday, 19 July 1967, two days before Luthuli's death, Nokukhanya and
her husband walked together from their home in Groutville to the land he rented to
cultivate sugar cane. From the fields, Luthuli proceeded to his shop at Gledhow, just a
few minutes walk away, while Nokukhanya remained behind. Between the field and
shop were two bridges. The members of the community walked across one well-known
bridge daily for many decades. The other bridge, slightly to the west (inland), was under
construction. During this walk and visit to the field, Nokukhanya told her husband to use
the new bridge to cross over the Umvoti River to his shop to the north. Luthuli followed
his wife's suggestion and used the new bridge that day. 166 Approximately one week after
her husband's death, Nokukhanya lamented, "For what reason my late husband crossed
over [the old] rail bridge on this occasion when he was struck by a train I do not
know". 167
On Thursday, 20 July, a day before her husband was killed, Nokukhanya had a
disagreement with her husband. Many years later in an interview Nokukhanya recalled:
164 Aftonbladet, "De vita gor allt for att knack honom, men Iyckas aldrig!" ("The Whites Do Everything
to Break Him, But They Never Succeed!"), by Marie-Anne Jansson, 03 July 1967. As cited in:
Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 241.
165 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, 1: 241.
166 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Nokukhanya Luthuli, Inquest Report,
Exh. R, sworn testimony, 01 August 1967.
There are discrepancies between Nokukhanya's recollection of events recorded in Rule's biography and her
sworn statement soon after Luthuli's death. In Rule's book, Nokukhanya remembers, "What was amazing
about this whole incident was that there was a short cut through the cane fields which he had used on that
previous Wednesday. But on the day of his death he decided to use the bridge. He had even remarked that
the short cut was better than the long route. I don't know why he used the bridge". Here, Nokukhanya
made no mention ofthe new bridge under construction as she does in her 1967 sworn statement.
Rule, Nokukhanya, 145.
In her 1967 statement and in her interview with Rule, Nokukhanya remembers she advised Luthuli to take a
route that was shorter. At the funeral, Nokukhanya sorrowfully disclosed in her address to the
congregation, "I had urged him to not use the bridge but to take a longer, safe route" (my emphasis).
Sunday Tribune, "He Will Be Buried in a Multi-Racial Cemetery", 30 July 1967.
167 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Nokukhanya Luthuli, Inquest Report,
Exh. R, sworn statement, 01 August 1967.
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He said that [tomorrow] he wanted to go and see how the cane workers
were progressing.. .! protested: "But you were there yesterday. You get so
exhausted and you look so tired. I will go myself, either tomorrow or on
Monday, when I come back from Durban. There is no hurry". But he
insisted saying, "No, I'll go".168
Also on the same day, Luthuli, as was his custom, provided a devotion as he conducted a
short worship service at his home. After concluding, Luthuli said that tomorrow he
would not lead the prayer meeting. Rather, he appointed Nokukhanya for this task. None
of the family members took any notice of the comment, despite its break with family
tradition.169
On Friday, 21 July 1967, after a hurried breakfast with his wife, Luthuli left his
home at about 08:30 infonning her that he would be walking to his general dealer's store
near the Gledhow train station. l7O That day, Nokukhanya also left home for Durban to
purchase seed potatoes. Luthuli stood, as he usually did, at the bus stop on the corner of
the 'Main Road', waiting alone for a benevolent lift from a passing vehicle to his general
dealer's store about a mile and half away. Roughly an hour later, at 09:30, Luthuli
arrived at his shop where he delivered a package to Eness Mfeka, an employee at the
store. Drum magazine described Luthuli's store in April 1964 as follows:
Luthuli's shop is a tumble-down old building with crude sign-writings in
front. To lend some brightness to the otherwise drab surroundings are
coloured trade advertisements adorning paint-starved walls. 17 !
Luthuli walked to his store every day from his home. From his home or his store,
he travelled to and from the 'trust land' he rented, to supervise his few workers. Luthuli
grew sugar cane about a half a mile away from the Umvoti River railway bridge, or three
hundred yards by Nokukhanya's estimation, on the south side of the river, slightly west
(inland) of the bridge that he crossed to reach his fields. Since 06:30 that morning, two
168 Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
169 Post, "Luthuli's Last Hours - By His Son", 30 July 1967.
170 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Nokukhanya Luthuli, Inquest Report,
Exh. R., sworn statement, 01 August 1967.
171 Drum, "The Old Campaigner Starts a New Life", by G. R. Naidoo, Apri11964.
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men (Mbuyeseni and Mpanza) and a woman (Ziphi Gumede) were busy cutting cane in
Luthuli's field at a place where the bridge was visible. l72
At approximately 10:00, Luthuli left the store, declined a cup of tea and informed
Mfeka that he was going to his fields but that he would be returning. 173 Detective
Charles Lewis ofthe South African Railways Police in Durban reported that he
interviewed the people working on Luthuli's land and that none had seen or met with
Luthuli that morning. I74 In her testimony, Gumede also mentioned that Luthuli did not
meet her and the two men as expected. 175 Almost forty minutes later, Luthuli decided to
re-cross the river to return to his store without having fulfilled his objective. Luthuli
could have verified their progress visually from afar. But, having walked across the
bridge to the fields, one would assume that Luthuli would converse with those whom he
supervised. Each day, for five consecutive days preceding his death, Luthuli had visited
his workers. 176 In 1964, one reporter who accompanied Luthuli on his daily routine
wrote about his time with Luthuli.
At all of his farms, [Luthuli] not only supervises the work of the day, but
listens to the problems of his small band of labourers who always have
treated him as their father, apart from giving him the respect a chief
normally deserves. l77
No one is known to have seen him during the thirty-eight minutes following his departure
from the store. On his way back to the store, tragedy struck.
At 10:29, goods train No. 332 pulled by locomotive No. 2045 left Stanger (now
Kwadukuza), southbound for Durban. The day was bright and clear. Aboard the train
rode the Driver (Stephanus Lategan), the Conductor or 'Guard' (Pieter van Wyk) and the
172 Gumede knew Mbuyeseni only by his first name and Mpanza only by his surname. Apparently, the
police took no statements from the two men. Presumably, the police assumed their testimonies would be
identical to Gumede's, as she alluded in her testimony.
173 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Eness Mfeka, Inquest Report, Exh. S,
sworn statement, 25 July 1967.
174 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Charles Lewis, Inquest Report, Exh. D.,
sworn testimony, 03 August 1967.
175 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Ziphi Gumede, Inquest Report, Exh. T.,
sworn testimony, 01 July (sic) 1967. This date must actually be "01 August 1967".
176 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Ziphi Gumede, Inquest Report, Exh. T.,
sworn testimony, 01 July 1967 (sic).
177 Drum, "The Old Campaigner Starts a New Life", by G. R. Naidoo, April 1964.
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Boiler or 'Fireman' (Daniel Greyling). The train, running engine first, consisted of 60
axles (that is, fifteen carriages) with a tonnage of 767 tons loaded with syrup and sugar.
At 10:36 the train passed Gledhow station, where Andries Pretorius was the Station
Master, without stopping. At 10:38, two minutes after passing the Gledhow station, the
train began to cross the Umvoti River railway bridge that was situated about a thousand
yards away. Anyone entering the bridge from the south would have passed a sign that
read, "Umvoti River / Persons / Cross This Bridge at Their Own Risk" in English and
Afrikaans. The Driver consistently indicated in his testimony and his cross-examination
that he blew the whistle from the time he observed a pedestrian walking towards the train
from the south end of the bridge until the train reached him. The Driver elaborated:
This Bantu however did not appear to me to take any notice whatsoever of
my train but just continued walking along the side of the bridge in the
direction of the approaching locomotive. He had walked about the
distance of about fifteen or sixteen paces along this bridge when my
engine commenced to overtake him ...he made no attempt to step towards
the side or turn his body sideways to the moving train but continued to
walk in the same manner... 178
The Driver then exclaimed to the Boiler that the train "knocked someone". The Driver
testified:
In my estimation the front right hand side of the buffer beam missed this
Bantu by a fraction that I would have estimated at about two inches and
the engine moved past him up to the place where the front end of the cab
of the locomotive is situated and I saw the corner of the cab strike him on
the right shoulder and this caused him to be spun around and I saw him
lose his balance and fall between the right hand side of the bridge and the
• • 179movmgtram.
The Driver then immediately applied the brakes at the southern end of the bridge,
bringing it to a standstill. Upon looking to the rear, the Conductor noticed a man lying on
178 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Stephanus Lategan, Inquest Report,
Exh. V., sworn statement, 24 July 1967.
179 VCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Stephanus Lategan, Inquest Report,
Exh. V., sworn statement, 24 July 1967.
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the side of the bridge by the footplate. The Conductor disembarked. While walking
back. ..
...1noticed that it was an elderly Bantu man with a white goatee dressed
in a khaki shirt, pants, and a coat with a similar colour and he wore a pair
of brown shoes. To me it seemed as if this Bantu was either dead or
unconscious and I saw blood oozing out of his mouth. I did not know this
Bantu man. 180
The Boiler and the Driver disembarked from the train and found the man lying with his
head just alongside the western (right) leg of the line with his head hanging through
between the side of the rail and the sleepers. Though the injured man was alive and
breathing, the Boiler presumed he had received head injuries as he could see blood
flowing from his mouth and he appeared to be unconscious. Also noticed by the Driver
was the severe laceration on the top/middle portion of the head. The man's face was
covered in blood that streamed across it. The Boiler and the Driver placed him,
particularly his head, in a more comfortable position. The Driver testified that the
Conductor requested the Station Foreman (Steyn) and Master to summon an ambulance.
After phoning Stanger for an ambulance to come, the Station Master and Foreman
immediately departed on foot for the bridge. They found the Conductor and the Driver
standing at the south end of the bridge next to Luthuli who was lying on the track and on
the steel plate that is used to walk across the bridge. The Station Master testified:
This Bantu was lying on his back and I saw that he had sustained severe
head injuries which were bleeding profusely and he was unconscious at
the same time. Immediately I saw this elderly Bantu[.] I recognised him
as being ex-Chief Albert Luthuli from Groutville. 181
According to Gwendoline Gregersen, the Senior Medical Superintendent of
Stanger Hospital, Luthuli was found in the following condition when she first saw him in
180 DCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Stephanus Lategan, Inquest Report,
Exh. D., sworn statement, 24 July 1967.
181 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Andries Pretorius, Inquest Report,
Exh. M., sworn statement, 25 July 1967.
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the Casualty Department five minutes after his arrival at the hospital (approximately
I 1:50):
He was shocked (sic). His pulse was 120, his blood pressure was 130/80,
he had a fracture (?) base of the skull and he was bleeding freely from
injuries to this head; he was semi-conscious. The patient had a jagged
laceration at the base of the skull on the left hand side; this injury was
about four to five inches in length from the outer ends. There was a three
inch laceration on the centre of the occiput, on the right perital region he
had an abrasion and a laceration an inch long. He was bleeding freely
from the right ear; and he had fractured ribs on both sides; he had a
fractured left elbow; he had a bruising (?) Fracture of the left hand; he had
a laceration to the right lower leg. 182
From I I :50 to 14:20, two and one half hours, the doctors treated Luthuli for his
wounds. The staff first gave him a blood transfusion and his lacerations were sutured.
Next, Luthuli was X-rayed and given oxygen. At some time, Luthuli was administered
the heart stimulant Coramine. At 12:15, Luthuli's second son, Christian arrived at the
Luthuli home and was informed by the Station Master that his father had been struck by a
train. At 13:05, while visiting her son-in-law, Thulani Gcabashe, and daughter, Hilda
Thandeka, at St. Aidens Hospital in Durban, Nokukhanya was told her husband had been
involved in an accident. 183 Christian arrived with two 'sisters-in-law' at the hospital
shortly before 13 :00 and saw his father. 184 Luthuli was conscious.
My father looked so peaceful. His head was heavily bandaged. He tried
to smile at me. I asked him how he was feeling, and he replied that he
could feel nothing. These were his only words he spoke. I was too
overcome with emotion and I walked out of the room. 185
182 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, Gwendoline Gregersen, Inquest Report,
Exh. A., sworn statement, 24 July 1967.
183 Hilda was a nurse at S1. Aiden's. Nokukhanya also received a message from a second daughter,
Eleanor Smangele (who was a nurse at McCord Zulu Hospital in Overport) that her husband had met
with an accident.
184 On 04 November 2005, I interviewed Christian Luthuli at length. I recorded over one and half hours
of discussion while walking to Luthuli's old shop, crossing the river and viewing the site where he was
killed. Part of the interview concentrates on the day ofLuthuli's death. I have chosen to use excerpts
from his interview with The Post with the understanding that accuracy would be greater one week after
the accident rather than almost thirty years. None of his testimony in 2005 contradicted his recollections
in 1967.
185 Post, "Luthuli's Last Hours - By His Son", 30 July 1967.
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Nokukhanya received news through Christian of Luthuli's possible transfer for
brain surgery and proceeded to King Edward VIII Hospital in Durban. Luthuli's wife
and daughter searched in vain for him at King Edward. In Stanger, Luthuli's condition
deteriorated despite resuscitative measures. It was decided to not transfer Luthuli to King
Edward because he was not stable. Instead, a decision was made to send for a
neurosurgeon from Durban to come to Stanger. Upon hearing this news at King Edward,
Nokukhanya proceeded north to Stanger.
At about 13:30, Christian joined two of his family relations and Gideon Sivetye, a
Congregational minister, brother-in-law and close friend of Luthuli, at the hospital.
There they saw Luthuli, who had trouble breathing. At about 14:15, Sivetye led a prayer
around Luthuli's bedside with his family and members ofthe hospital staff in attendance.
Christian feared speaking to his father, lest he strain him and cause him to die. Christian
remembered:
When I saw him, I knew then that the sun was setting for my father. I
knew then that the thin threads of life were breaking. The Rev. Sivetye
led a prayer at my father's bedside in which my cousin, sister-in-law, and
the sister in charge and I joined. It was a simple prayer, said by a friend
who was choking with emotion. My father appeared to be peaceful when
the prayer was said. His breathing was hardly noticeable but perhaps he
was conscious that we were praying for him and his last moments must
have been happy ones. 186
186 Post, "Luthuli's Last Hours - By His Son", 30 July 1967.
Nokukhanya's memory of the event documented by Rule is exactly opposite of Christian's testimony
days after the accident documented in the Post. In her biography, Nokukhanya imagined that Luthuli had
been "alert right up to the time that he passed away...Because he was lucid right up to the end,
[Christian] did not realise that he was dying".
Rule, Nokukhanya, 140.
Also in Rule's book, Nokukhanya revealed that Luthuli did not wish to have a "noise" over his death due
to foul play. Nokukhanya added that Luthuli chose not reveal who killed him. She visualised: "When
Christian, who was at home at the time, got the message and went to the hospital, he found him in great
pain. 'How are you father'? he asked. Albert said, 'The pain is terrible'. Christian never asked him how
it happened. Albert could have talked and said, 'Such and such a thing happened to me', but there was
silence, and it's all the better".
Rule, Nokukhanya, 145.
It seems that in writing about Luthuli's death and relating the family's suspicions, Rule also did not cross
check oral testimony with written documentary evidence, i.e., articles and testimony dating back to the
time of death. Why Rule included these particular recollections ofNokukhanya in his book when they
contradicted the sworn medical evidence ofLuthuli's condition (i.e., semi-consciousness) that he had
referenced is unknown.
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Immediately following the prayer, a neurological surgeon from St. Augustine's
Medical Centre in Durban, Mauritius Joubert, arrived at Stanger Hospital at 14:20.
Joubert reported in his sworn statement that upon his arrival he found Luthuli to be in a
deep coma and not responding to any stimulation. Joubert confirms that X-rays
determined that extensive skull fractures were present as well as a fracture of the left
elbow and right ninth rib. 187 The Senior Medical Superintendent of Stanger Hospital was
present for the entirety of Joubert's examination. Five minutes later, at 14:25, Luthuli
died. By Christian's account, exactly five minutes later, at 14:30 Nokukhanya arrived at
the hospital. Joubert and/or a nurse confided the news of her husband's death to
Nokukhanya, who missed by only moments saying goodbye to her husband. The first
words Nokukhanya uttered after being told the news was, "I want to see my husband".
For fifteen minutes, she cried alone, quietly, over her husband. That evening, in keeping
with her husband's last wishes for her to lead the family service this day, Nokukhanya
prayed a simple prayer.
Perhaps the most pertinent question is: What was Luthuli doing for almost forty
minutes from the time he left his store to the time of the accident, if not visiting those
whom he intended on supervising in his field? Did he not feel well? Was he suffering a
mild stroke and thus not thinking clearly? This is possible given Luthuli's four week
admittance to McCord Zulu Hospital just three months prior to his accident. Why did he
not take the short (or long) way either through the cane fields or over the new bridge as
his wife suggested earlier in the week? While suffering a stroke, did he then revert to his
daily habitual pattern and path toward the store? Did he become uncoordinated as he did
during his 1955 stroke, as described by Albertinah Luthuli in this study? In 1955, his
stroke was perceptible only over time; his cognitive and physical abilities were only
gradually, but substantively, impaired. A stroke, disorienting him sufficiently to be hit by
a passing train with a cab that overlaps the bridge's very narrow ten and one half inch
footplate, is the most obvious explanation for the accident. Luthuli had a long history of
hypertension, hospitalising him in 1955, 1961, 1966 and 1967. The overall state of his
187 UCT, MAD, LC, AJLP, BCZA 78/46-47, CAMP MF 2914, M. J. Joubert, Inquest Report, Exh. B.,
affidavit, 05 August 1967.
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heath, chronic high blood pressure condition and history of strokes are factors that point
to the cause ofLuthuli's death.
Conclusion
Mandela's autobiography revealed a glimpse of the contestation that existed
within the liberation movement concerning Luthuli's leadership strategies even in the
wake of his death in 1967. While in prison on Robben Island, one reaction to Luthuli's
death distressed Mandela:
...we also learned ofChiefLuthuli's death at home in July 1967...
Luthuli's death left a great vacuum in the organisation; the Chief was a
Nobel Prize winner, a distinguished, internationally known figure, a man
who commanded respect from both Black[s] and White[s]. For these
reasons, he was irreplaceable ... We organised a small memorial service for
the Chief in Section B and permitted everyone who wanted to say
something to do so. It was a quiet, respectful service with only one sour
note. When Neville Alexander of the Non-European Movement rose to
speak, it was apparent that he had come not to praise the Chief but to bury
him. Without even perfunctory regrets at the man's passing, he accused
Luthuli of being a stooge of the White man, mainly on the ground that the
Chief had accepted the Nobel Peace Prize. 188
Chapter six continues the work of previous chapters that reviewed the
contestation between the more militant leadership's intention to move to a violent
revolutionary phase of the struggle and Luthuli's adherence to perceived long-expired
political strategies and his close associations with Whites. This chapter reveals that
Luthuli's 1962 autobiography written to a specific constituency that he felt was the key to
liberation and his domestic appeals for strict non-violence in the Post were found to be
188 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 522-3.
Mandela always respected Luthuli. In time, Mandela would also earn the Nobel Peace Prize. Mandela
befriended his warders, led a Government ofNational Unity in partnership with a party that imprisoned him
for over two decades, wore the Springbok jersey, had tea with the widow of Apartheid's architect and
orchestrated a miracle by leading a political and social revolution without civil war. Luthuli would have
been proud, very proud, of his lieutenant in 1994. Despite their political differences in July 1961, Mandela
never forgot the lessons Luthuli taught. Yet, Mandela and Luthuli were not the same. By articulating their
differences, the purveyors of history can best accurately remember them and honour the reasons for which
they fought.
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embarrassing by some of his lieutenants. These and other divergent perspectives
concerning the direction of the liberation movement have in large part been silenced by a
nationalist historical narrative that seeks to distance the ANC from Luthuli's steadfast
convictions yet still respect him for the international prestige he brought the movement.
This sanitised and homogenised ANC history inaccurately conflates Luthuli's ideals and
strategies with Mandela's and incorrectly teaches that all leaders in the movement came
to believe there was 'no option' but to turn to violence.
Chapter six concludes that which chapters four and five began: a story of
Luthuli's waning influence and desperate attempts to keep non-violent methods alive.
This chapter argues that Luthuli looked to the West while Mandela looked to Africa;
Luthuli preached that non-violent methods needed to be more faithfully implemented
while Mandela said at the PAFMECSA conference that leadership that gives such advice
"commits a crime against its own people"; LuthuIi remained with a strategy dependent
upon a non-racial alliance while Mandela was enamoured with and wished to capture the
attention the PAC received from black Africans; Luthuli viewed himself as an obedient
prophet, priest and ethical leader while Mandela trained to be a Commander-in-Chief and
a general. This study asserts that in time, despite working internationally with the same
liberal, white, often-pacifist and Christian allies such as George Houser, Luthuli was
rendered irrelevant domestically by the liberation movement itself and by the government
through the Sabotage Act. Contrary to what contemporary political commemorative
histories claim, Luthuli did not wage or support the armed struggle in secret meetings
under the cover of cane. He tilled the fields with his workers during the last years of his
life. If the above is true, the question must be asked, "Why would the government have
him killed?" A review of Luthuli's chronic health problems, then recent hospitalisations
and the precariousness of traversing that particular bridge adjacent to a passing train,




Tormented by the Ideal l
As a devoted Christian [Luthuli] has always taken an active part in church
affairs both in his own church of the American Board Missions and in
missionary circles generally. He has been Vice-President of the Christian
Council of South Africa. He is a firm believer in the idea that the
Christian principle of the value, dignity, of every individual ought to
pervade all our social, economic and political policies. -- Zachariah
Matthews2
Synopsis of Findings
This study brings 'church' history into political history by weaving together
biography and ecclesiology to more accurately understand Chief Albert Luthuli's life and
to argue that his political convictions were primarily theologically motivated. While this
study investigates many political issues, the question of violence as a strategy to liberate
South Africa from Apartheid most comprehensively, but not exclusively, illustrates the
confluence of Luthuli's political thoughts and ecclesiastic heritage. Luthuli's reception
of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize and the 2008 contestation surrounding the renaming a
primary school in Amanzimtoti after Andrew Zondo and hosting an exhibition about him
speak to the fact that the question of violence was then, and still is today, the pre-eminent
contentious issue concerning the liberation struggle.3
Contrary to current public historical mythology and in concurrence with more
scholarly contributions, this study concludes that Luthuli never subscribed to or
supported the use of violence because his ecclesiastic roots, associations and loyalties ran
1 "We must continue to be tonnented by the ideal [in human and structural relations]. Its possibility must
be there for peoples to attempt to put it in practice, to begin over and over again, wherever in the world it
has ever been tried, or has failed ...Without the will to tramp towards that possibility, no relations of
Whites, of the West, with the West's formerly subject people can ever be free from the past... "
Gordimer, The Essential Gesture, 237.
2 Zachariah Matthews, "Albert John Luthuli: A Personal Tribute", South African Outlook 92, no. 1089,
01 January 1962.
3 A. Young, "Glorifying a Murderer Will Only Stir Up More Hatred", Natal Mercury, 19 November 2008,
9.
Thembinkosi Ngcobo, "Zondo Display Is about Creating Dialogue", Natal Mercury, 20 November 2008,
13.
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far deeper than his political ones. This study asserts that the ANC first claimed Luthuli
subscribed to or supported violence after his death, and since then has propagated a myth
that he did. Luthuli's faith-based character and political perspectives encouraged the
spectrum of South African society open to a multiracial democracy to recognise him as a
national leader. However, the intransigence of and resort to violence by the National
Party regime led more militant leaders of the ANC to conclude that those same
unrelinquished Christian values and associations rendered Luthuli's leadership by May
1961 nai've, irrelevant and thus obsolete in the new political climate.
This investigation set out to explain the dynamic that existed between Luthuli and
Congregationalism whereby the values or ideals of Christocentric western culture were
accepted by Luthuli and implemented. The introduction to this study briefly expounded
upon the nature of Congregationalism, emphasising that its uniqueness as a faith tradition
most obviously manifests itself through its polity more so than through its theological
conceptions. The various names ofLuthuli's faith tradition such as Congregationalism,
Non-conformism and Separatism all emphasise a form of church governance that cherish
dissent, freedom of thought and democracy. Congregationalism's unique polity and the
various attributes that inspire it were never limited to the church and naturally carried
over into society and civil governance (whether in England, North America or South
Africa). Congregationalism's primary strengths, such as a biblically motivated concern
for justice and a yearning for education, were reflected throughout Luthuli's life and most
notably in his political speeches. Congregationalism's ideals were never far from
Luthuli's mind and were shown in the manner in which he chaired meetings, encouraged
diversity and yielded to a majority decision. Luthuli was a democrat, an egalitarian and a
strong advocate for freedom. The Congregationalist polity in which Luthuli was
saturated convinced him of the rightness and efficacy of free speech, debate and
constitutional methods. Luthuli was a gradualist who reasoned that incremental steps
were the surest and soundest means to achieve liberation.
In his Nobel acceptance speech, Luthuli specifically remembered his ecclesiastic
forefathers, Philip and Livingstone, as examples of those who lived out the Christian
Congregational ideal. Examples are too few and far between of missioners who strove
for the ideal their faith and polity proclaimed and hence some historians have judged
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them collectively as a pre-emptive force used to 'soften-up' indigenous societies for the
full colonial onslaught. Yet, as the introduction explains there existed those missiological
characters who, unlike the majority of their colleagues, practiced that which their faith
and polity espoused. American and LMS missioners were not homogenous. The
Comaroffs mention some evangelists "found common cause and cooperated openly" as
an ally with the forces of colonialism (e.g., Mackenzie) while others "ended locked up in
battle with secular forces for - what they took to be - the destiny of the continent" (e.g.,
van der Kemp). In this investigation, terse ecclesiastical biographies demonstrate how
the Congregational ideal was at times embodied. From those examples Luthuli
engendered his politics; those rare few who, to state in layman's terms, 'practised what
they preached' and provided brief glimpses of Congregationalism incarnated.
The American Board brought Congregationalism to what is now Kwazulu-Natal and
helped produce ka Seme and Dube, the ANC's founder and first President, respectively.
Congregationalism founded the Umvoti Mission Station (Groutville) where its values
imbedded themselves in the home, church and community that nurtured Luthuli. The
theology Luthuli heard from the pulpit provided him with confidence that, though slowly,
equality between the races would be realised when all were ripe for its benefits. Luthuli
viewed all humans as fundamentally good, created in the "Image of God" and children of
God. Non-violence, conciliation and compromise were not just strategically wise, but
essential to expressing the dignity and worth of every person.
By 1967, the year of Luthuli's death and during the height of Apartheid,
Congregationalism demonstrated it ecumenical spirit by uniting different churches to
form the multi-racial United Congregational Church of Southern Africa and in the 1970s
and 1980s placed itself in the forefront of the anti-Apartheid struggle. Though 'liberal',
the grassroots of the Congregational faith remained conservative as it regarded the ethics
of using violence as a means to achieve liberation. Congregationalists' collective
response to the World Council of Churches' Programme to Combat Violence expressed
grave concern about condoning violence by even indirectly supporting armed
movements. The chapters following the introduction highlight many of the above facets
of Congregationalism that Luthuli embodied throughout his life and leadership of the
ANC.
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Chapter one conveys that Luthuli's ecclesiastic roots were deep and extended,
more so than his political roots in the ANC that were sown relatively late in his life.
Luthuli began the story of his genealogy with his grandfather, Ntaba, a follower of the
American missioner Grout. The American Board that reared, educated, mentored,
employed and preached to Luthuli throughout his formative years instilled in him a
reverence for the values espoused by the western world. In the lives ofLuthuIi's
biological and ecclesiastic forebears, what the Comaroffs tenned "complex historical
dynamics" and "the dialectics of culture and consciousness" were identified so as to
provide a balanced view of the relationship between missioners and indigenous people.4
Luthuli's ecclesiastic ancestors and mentors were not simply 'products' of
Congregationalism; other ingredients, some inherent, formed them. In the same manner,
this study explains that Luthuli was independently intelligent, possessed 'agency' and
thus was "motivated".5
Luthuli recognised that his experience at the American Board's Adams College
was the most formative experience of his life. Luthuli evaluated charitably the
personalities he encountered during his time at Adams, from those that betrayed the ideal
such as Loram and de Villiers, to those who represented the ideal such as Brueckner,
Brookes and Atkins. Luthuli respected them for their beneficence toward him and
instilled a lifelong commitment to interracial cooperation. The Congregationalist and one
time leader of the American Board, Reuling, had the longest association with Luthuli
spanning over forty years and likely had the most substantive impact on Luthuli's life.
Despite the profound impact Congregationalism had on Luthuli, he was not a
blank slate upon which Congregational ism (or any other kind of-ism) could just write.
Nonetheless, Congregationalism and Luthuli intersected and their intersection should be
seen as the primary lens through which his political thought is analysed. In reasoning
that this intersection was seminal throughout Luthuli's life, this study investigated the
dynamics and product of that interface, particularly on his politics, in order to more
accurately understand the man. Luthuli can not simply be interpreted to be a loyal cadre
and leader of the ANC. As the Comaroffs rightly commented:
4 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 6.
Denis, "From Church History to Religious History", 88-9.
5 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 10.
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Once the motives, intentions and imaginings of persons living or dead are
allowed to speak from the historical record, it becomes impossible to see
them as mere reflections of monolithic cultural structures or social forces. 6
The most biographical section ofthis study, chapter two, traces Luthuli's
ascendancy as a political leader. Luthuli's early leadership experiences disillusioned him
to working exclusively along ethnic or racial lines. The Natal African Teachers'
Association experienced few successes advocating to the Department of Education. The
Zulu Language and Cultural Society diverted its focus from encouraging mass education
and the grafting positive aspects of Zulu culture onto western ways to ethnic insularity.
Though Luthuli achieved some successes with the cane growing associations, Luthuli
wrote in his autobiography that Africans were difficult to unite and were often "apathetic
and uncooperative". The divide and rule tactics always seemed to hold sway. Luthuli
confided in his autobiography that he felt a sense of disappointment in his own Groutville
community after they rather meekly and mildly resigned themselves to the government's
removing him as Chief.
In large part because of these disappointments and the government's dismissive
attitude toward the Native Representative Council, Luthuli placed his faith in multiracial
and international collaborative efforts. Benevolent white, liberal and Christian allies
possessed organisational and writing skills, political influence, finances and a sense of
unity that Luthuli felt was necessary to mobilise public opposition to assert pressure
against the National Party. From the 1930s, many ecclesiastic organisations,
Congregationalist included, afforded Luthuli opportunities and leadership roles that were
not necessarily afforded to the same degree to his more militant lieutenants. Luthuli's
travels to the International Missionary Conference in India and to the United States on a
speaking tour were sponsored by the church. The Natal Missionary Conference elected
him their first black Chair. Luthuli participated in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the
South African Institute of Race Relations, the Christian Council of South Africa
(Executive member and Vice-President), the advisory boards ofInanda Seminary, Adams
College and McCord Zulu Hospital, Bantu Congregational Church (Chair), the Mission
6 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 10.
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Reserve Association, the International Club and the Durban Joint Council of Europeans
and Africans. These numerous and rich involvements in multiracial organisations
engrained in Luthuli a confidence that dialogue, negotiation and cooperation were
possible with Whites and that violence as a method must be avoided to prevent a
subsequent race war. These substantive engagements and platforms equipped Luthuli to
endear himself almost messianically to Whites in Cape Town during his 1959 tour and
led to his resistance of Mandela's 1962 proposal for the ANC (Blacks) to be seen to be in
control of the Congress Alliance.
Chapter two also captures events that lead to the apex of Luthuli's political
influence. Luthuli's election as President of the Natal ANC elevated him as a prominent
leader during the Defiance Campaign. The Campaign earned Luthuli the ire of the
government who subsequently dismissed him from his chieftaincy. Concerning the
primary thesis of this study, this chapter proved with archival documentation that
Luthuli's most famous political statement, "The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross", was
theologically motivated and homiletically generated. The statement launched Luthuli
into the national spotlight and he was shortly thereafter elected President-General ofthe
ANC. Luthuli's lack of involvement with the drafting of the Freedom Charter due to a
serious stroke and his absence from the Congress of the People due to his ban
foreshadowed an enthusiastic movement's willingness to bypass its leader. Luthuli
would yield to the ANC's ratification of the Charter for the sake of unity, despite his
discomfort with many of the specifics contained within it.
The 1956-1961 Treason Trial brought the entire liberation movement together for
the first time. Despite the seriousness of the charges and disruption the Trial caused to
families and finances, the movement's mood was buoyant and all involved proudly
viewed Luthuli to be their capable leader. The movement was unified, gathered, held the
moral high ground, attracted international sympathy and received the moral support and
financial succour from many sectors of society. Luthuli held together all types under one
broad political church: Communists and anti-Communists, men and women, Indians,
Coloureds, Blacks, Whites, Christians, Muslims, rich and poor, educated and
undereducated, militant and moderate. At this time, Luthuli reached the zenith of his
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political life. Soon, the state dropped the charges against Luthuli. Yet, Mandela and
others continued to face the threat of capital punishment until the Trial's conclusion.
Chapter two also focuses upon the breakaway of the Africanist camp within the
ANC. While the Africanists went their own way, they were influential within the ANC
as Mandela and others sought to compete with their popularity throughout the
increasingly independent African continent. Competition with the PAC led younger
leaders of the ANC to be less patient, more militant and less willing to cooperate with
white western liberal Christians in the fight against Apartheid. Because this was
Luthuli's base of solidarity, his influence began to wane in 1960 and 1961. Also in 1959
Luthuli adamantly protested the creation of the bantustan framework. His position on
Bantustans, like his positions on the issues of violence and multi-racial cooperation, is an
example of a political philosophy motivated by theological considerations. The bantustan
framework violated Luthuli's conception of all societies' progression to 'civilisation'
through cooperation and was thus a violation of God's will (divine Providence). In short,
the bantustan framework and the theology that underpinned it was, from Luthuli's
perspective, a heresy.
Chapter three interrupts the biographic narrative and identifies two popular myths
concerning Luthuli that are generally not supported in more serious academic works: that
he supported the turn to violence and therefore, by implication, that he died a
"mysterious" death at the hand of an assassin. First, while through 'promotional'
publications such as Sechaba and Mayibuye, internet websites and organisational
histories the ANC consistently implied Luthuli came to support the turn to violence, texts
written from 1962 to 1994 (Bunting, Slovo and Benson) incorrectly claimed that Luthuli
did not participate in and was ignorant of the formation ofMK. After Mandela's 1994
autobiography, virtually political representations of Luthuli cited Mandela and repeated
his claim that as it concerns Luthuli's supposed ignorance about the formation ofMK and
his supposed opposition the ANC's turn to violence, "nothing could be farther from the
truth". That Luthuli knew ofMK'sformation is accurate. That Luthuli supported MK's
launch is not. Recently, political elites such as Ndebele, Nair, Zuma and Asmal imply in
commemorative audiovisual documentaries a conclusion that Luthuli came to support and
even participated as a leader in the prosecution of violence. Chapter three discloses that
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numerous pronouncements, such as "The Road to Freedom" and the Rivonia Trial
statements, are anachronistically interpreted to support the armed movement when in fact
a careful analysis of both concludes that they expressed opposition to the armed struggle.
As pointed out in the preface, nationalist interpretations ofLuthuli's stand on violence
almost exclusively emphasise political viewpoints at the expense of more illuminating
theological ones. Second and finally, suspicions that Luthuli was assassinated were
published by the ANC and other African liberation movements immediately following
his death. None of the suspicions are backed by any evidence. Conspiracy theorists
discount the findings of the inquest despite the fact that the Luthuli family had legal
representation who did not dispute its finding and in the face of a sworn statement from
Nokukhanya stating she was confident that her husband's death was the result of an
accident. This study concludes that perceptions related to suspicions from whence the
conspiracy theories germinate are contradictory while the contemporaneous archival
evidence generated by the inquest, medical history, personal documents (or lack thereof)
and Luthuli's last will and testament is consistent and plausible.
Chapter four resumes the chronological narrative to explain how Sharpeville and
the State of Emergency led many within the ANC to believe that non-violent methods
were futile against an increasingly violent National Party regime. On the morning of
Sharpeville, Luthuli's column in the Golden City Post pleaded for Whites to change their
hearts and that Blacks "can not manage without the Whites in South Africa". During the
Emergency, Turok explained that the ANC and the SACP fused as a result of mass arrests
and organisational bans thus cutting Luthuli out of an almost non-existent chain of
command. Mandela, Sisulu and Nokwe strategised and advised their President-General
what to do. Luthuli defiantly burned his pass. However, upon sentencing, Luthuli
declined from issuing a statement that called on all South Africans to struggle "without
flinching" thus casting himself in the mould ofXuma and Moroka before him who were
passed-over for leadership by younger more militant and impatient Youth Leaguers.
Also stunting Luthuli's ability to lead and influence during the post-Sharpeville Treason
Trial was his privileged and sequestered status due to his health and his very close white,
liberal and Christian associates who often hosted him. The PAC used this against Luthuli
and the ANC, claiming that they were underlings for their white bosses and liberal press
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corps. Luthuli's autobiography narrating events of the time provided a long list of white
supporters such as Taylor, Reeves, Brink, Hooper, Coliins and many others whose moral,
economic, and political assistance Luthuli felt was invaluable and indispensable. This
study rejects a conclusion that Luthuli was subservient to his liberal and Christian
associations. Rather, similar outlooks and strategy considerations bound Luthuli to these
associations thus gradually distancing himself from his more militant lieutenants.
Chapter five finds that the first ten months of 1961 gave Luthuli little evidence
that non-violent methods were viable. Hammarskj6ld's visit disappointed, the PAC,
Liberal Party and the ANC's incessant disputes weakened the movement prior to the All-
Africa Conference and the government prepared itself to use overwhelming force to
ensure that non-violent mass action, such as the May strike, did not succeed. Mandela
and ANC history always claimed that the failure of the May strike precipitated the
necessity to turn to violence. However, Mandela's own assessments of the strike suggest
a conclusion that it was at least succeeding and thus his calling off of the strike was
premature. This assessment led one Indian Congress member and Luthuli to claim that
"non-violence has not failed us, we have failed non-violence".
In July 1961, NEC and CJE meetings in Luthuli's presence resolved after two
bitter all-night debates to allow the formation of an armed movement, MK. Many
important qualifications must be made regarding Luthuli's participation in this decision.
One, he did not support the decision; he only democratically yielded to it. Two, the
decision was made only after an exhausting all-night meeting where fatigue more than
any other factor enabled an unsettled consensus. Three, due to Luthuli's disagreement
with the decision, he requested a compromise whereby MK would be a separate
organisation from the ANC thus not dirtying his or the ANC's hands, that MK would be
politically subject or linked to ANC (but operationally autonomous) and that the ANC
would continue to emphasise traditional non-violent mass political action. Fourth and
finally, the decision agreed to the formation ofMK and not its initiation (launch).
In October 1961, the Nobel Committee announced that Luthuli would be awarded
the 1960 Nobel Prize. In Luthuli's view, this removed the cul-de-sac that Mandela and
others felt the non-violent movement had reached. Luthuli believed that the international
attention now focused on the liberation movement, driven by those white, liberal,
383
Christian supporters who nominated him, would be the key to bringing sufficient moral,
political and economic pressure on the National Party regime forcing its capitulation.
From October, Luthuli sought at every opportunity through the press to forestall any
thoughts or plans for MK's activation. Luthuli repeatedly, in no uncertain terms, warned
of the suicidal consequences of violent action and proclaimed that non-violent mass
action was the only way forward. During Luthuli's trip to Norway, Luthuli emphasised
many times in his acceptance speech, lecture and countless interviews that his position
was firmly non-violent. Luthuli's advocacy went unheeded by MK's High Command.
On the day after his return from Oslo, perhaps in an effort to neutralise Luthuli, Mandela
launched MK without Luthuli' s knowledge, declaring through its Manifesto that, for all
intents and purposes, the old strategies were not only extinct but led the government to
perceive the liberation movement as weak and thereby encouraged the government's use
ofviolence. Mandela effectively announced that armed revolution was the path forward.
Luthuli was livid. Yet, with MK's launch, Luthuli was also politically impotent.
As Mandela stated in his autobiography, 'there was no going back'. In Luthuli's
estimation, Mandela prematurely activated MK and therefore was reckless and
insubordinate. According to Sisulu, MK's High Command failed to appreciate the
significance of the Nobel Prize and short-circuited any possible benefit that may have
accrued from it. Luthuli's conversation with Kotane summarised his feelings on the
matter:
When my son decides to sleep with a girl, he does not ask for my
permission, but he just does it. It is only afterwards, when the girl is
pregnant and the parents make a case, that he brings his troubles home. 7
Chapter five continues with the "afterwards" following MK's launch, a post-
mortem analysis. Based on multiple evaluations of MK's strategic and tactical failure and
according to ANC veterans' own analysis found in commemorative publications, MK's
launch destroyed the liberation movement in the short to medium term, rendering it
dormant until the mid-1970s and still on the defensive until the late 1980s. Mandela
chose to challenge the government at its greatest strength that was the liberation
7 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 269.
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movement's greatest weakness: military prowess. Luthuli desired to continue to
challenge the government with the liberation movement's greatest strength and the
government's greatest weakness, moral authority.
The conclusion of chapter five resolves that Luthuli's disconcerting conversation
with Mandela concerned the launch ofMK on the heels of the Nobel Prize and not the
formation of MK that Mandela believed Luthuli had forgotten due to ill health. Luthuli
felt offended that all of the qualifications agreed to in July concerning MK's fonnation
were not honoured. Three covenants were broken: the primacy ofpolitical work, the
political leadership of ANC was ignored with MK's launch despite the ANC's leader
pleas to forestall any initiation and lives were lost due to a dearth of discipline, training
and competence.
Chapter six reviews the years 1962 to 1967 when Luthuli died and provided
additional evidence that further confirmed many of this study's theses. First, Mandela's
January 1962 trip abroad drove him further away from Luthuli concerning the strategic
way forward. Mandela leaned toward pan-African nationalism in his fear of the PAC's
popularity and Luthuli leaned more towards South African exceptionalism in his fear of
losing the sympathy and support of his white liberal Christian constituency who he
believed were indispensable to the struggle. Mandela categorically denounced Luthuli's
position at the PAFMECSA conference, calling it a "crime" against his own people.
Second, Luthuli's autobiography released in February 1962 caused much
embarrassment to Mandela and others, who felt that it portrayed the leader of the ANC to
be a stooge of the Whites. Uniquely, this last chapter unpacks Luthuli's understanding of
his leadership role by analysing the most obvious clue to doing so: the title of his
autobiography. One can not historically interpret Luthuli by strictly analysing him
politically, as Sechaba did. Luthuli's autobiographical title is biblical and therefore
fundamentally theological. To understand Moses' role is to understand Luthuli. Using
the hermeneutical lens of a typological re-enactment, one perceives that Luthuli saw
himself as obedient rather than successful, an ethical as much as (if not more than) a
political leader, non-violent rather than militarist and even a tragic rather than a
triumphant character in his inability to reach the Promised Land.
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In March 1962, Luthuli argued in the Post that non-violent methods must be
exercised to the exclusion of violent methods. That same month, a meeting of the Joint
Congresses expressed that Luthuli's statements were embarrassing, yet they gave him the
benefit of the doubt in accordance with his stature by reasoning that the Post adulterated
his opinions. An examination ofall Luthuli's columns finds that they were characteristic
of his style and printed verbatim from submitted drafts. With the exception of his stance
on violence, Luthuli never expressed sentiments contrary to ANC or Joint Congress'
decisions. Luthuli's Post columns and utterances strictly endorsing only non-violent
methods stopped (domestically) shortly after the minutes recommend the matter be
addressed with him. Nonetheless, it was the Sabotage Act in June 1962 that silenced
Luthuli. Nationalist apologists for the turn to violence cite the fact that Luthuli did not
condemn outright the initiation of violence. However, by his failure to condemn, one can
not conclude he therefore supported violence. Luthuli's refusal to condemn was a
demonstration ofhis sympathy and solidarity for those who had lost patience as well as
his democratic ethos that would not undermine a decision taken even if he as the leader
objected to it. Hence, Nokwe could "assure" that Luthuli would not denounce. Ronald
Harrison reiterated this perspective in a 2006 interview:
I think [Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo] were driven towards [violence], you
know? The violence that they, those militants, there was only one way
that they could see. But, Albert Luthuli always maintained, "This is not
the answer to our problems". Yeh. They became militant but under no
circumstances [did] the Chief, the great and noble Chief, ever compromise
his principles. He'd rather sit back. This 1 believe until this day. Then 1
also maintain that, that, because it was a fact that he would not denounce
any particular person or any person, you know, he was not a person who
would character assassinate. You would never, you would never hear him,
there was not once, did he speak, "No!" that he said to Mandela or the
Umkhonto we Sizwe, or to the others that what they were doing was
wrong. He just reiterated, reiterated, reiterated. At no time did he
denounce what they were doing because to him, making such a statement
would have undone all the good that he had done in some way, or that
others had done. So, he kept a low profile as that was concerned.8
8 Interview with Ronald Harrison, Cape Town, 14 January 2006.
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Chapter six continues to emphasise Luthuli's allegiance to non-violent methods
and his international advocacy for them. Luthuli's acceptance of the rectorship of
Glasgow University in 1962 and the Family of Man award from the New York Protestant
Council in 1964 (both given specifically for his non-violent stance) demonstrated that,
unless Luthuli can be characterised as a hypocrite, he never supported the turn to
violence. His continued relationship and cooperation with Houser's ACOA again
emphasised his links with liberal, Christian, white and often pacifist supporters. In
ACOA's sponsorship of their "Appeal for Action", King and Luthuli feared the
likelihood of a race war should violence be utilised in the struggle and argued that
peaceful methods of resistance such as boycotts and sanctions be implemented
immediately.
The study concludes on a macabre, sensitive and controversial note: Was Luthuli
murdered as so many suggest? After reviewing Luthuli's health, it is more than plausible
that his death was the result of an accident possibly induced by a stroke. Luthuli had a
long history of hypertension, high blood pressure and strokes. He had been hospitalised
as early as 1952 and as late as 1967. In the final months of his life, his penmanship
deteriorated, the number of archival records he produced plummeted, he became half
blind and deaf and before an unusually long hospitalisation for an eye operation he
prepared his Last Will and Testament. By Nokukhanya's evaluation, Luthuli looked tired
a day before his death and she advised him to stay home and rest. On 21 July, Luthuli
went from his shop to visit his workers in the field. They never saw him. He returned to
his shop across a rail bridge's ten-and-a-halfinch footplate. Photographic evidence
shows that any misstep or failure to balance appropriately to avoid an approaching train
with cab that extended over the footplate would prove catastrophic.
The myth that Luthuli was killed, like the myth that he supported the turn to
violence, leads to inaccurate interpretations of Luthuli. To say that Luthuli was
mysteriously killed is to understand that he still had a vital role in the struggle for
liberation at the time of his death, that he was a threat to the Apartheid regime. Sadly,
Luthuli had long since been considered obsolete by leaders of his own movement and he
had little contact with those imprisoned, banned or exiled. Since Sharpeville, through the
State of Emergency and upon the launch ofMK, Luthuli served only as the honorary,
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emeritus, titular leader of the ANC and thus no motive existed for his death. A martyr
inspires the oppressed, not the oppressor.
Luthuli and Congregationalism
The dynamic between Luthuli and his missiological forebears can not be located
on a one dimensional plane, whereby Luthuli assimilated bequeathed ideas, rejected
others and adjusted some to fit. In matters of faith and polity, interaction occurred on two
planes: one being that of the ideal (that to which is aspired and sought) and the other
being what is practised (that which is implemented and realised). In matters of faith, the
dialectic of consciousness between Congregationalism and Luthuli was multi-
dimensional. Congregationalism exposed and educated Luthuli to its ideals, such as what
the Comaroffs described as the "global democracy of material well-being and moral
merit, of equality before the law and the Lord".9 Luthuli in turn prophetically
implemented that which Congregationalism espoused and did so arguably better than its
progenitors, thus proving by his example that Whites had no monopoly on civilisation.
The Comaroffs provided an analysis that included both agency and structure to
speak about the encounter of Luthuli (agency) and Congregationalism and those mentors
who practiced it (structure). This investigation proposed a dynamic concerning Luthuli
and Congregationalism that still remains 'missing'. Perhaps the Comaroffs point to it
when they identify a "liminal space between the hegemonic and the ideological and the
conscious and the subconscious".1O It is in this space that we can locate Luthuli, the
proto-South African Liberation or Black Theology theologian, representing the
Amakholwa, who is able within this space to imagine, redefine, innovate and create.
Hegemony, more a process than a state, saturates a "condition of being" so that it
lies almost unrecognised, self-evident, assumed and "ineffable".!! Ideology is lesser in
degree than hegemony; it is not embodied, it is communicable, it is contestable and it is
therefore more easily resisted. Luthuli as a subject of colonial and evangelical influence
utilised the tools provided to him by missioners (theology, concepts of natural rights,
9 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 12.
10 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 30.
11 Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, 5 and 30, respectively.
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language, education and private property) to develop a consciousness that could identify
and accept the hegemony, critique its warped implementation by those who dominate and
re-introduce it in its 'pure' form. A perfect example of this dialectic within Luthuli is his
understanding of and acceptance of 'civilisation' (as a hegemonic concept) and his
resistance to the pervasive and enforced ideology that civilisation is synonymous with
'whiteness'. Luthuli bought, 'Jock stock and barrel', the assumption that civilisation was
beneficial, should be engendered and made available to all who chose to participate in it.
Yet, in the "liminal space between conscious and subconscious" Luthuli distinguished
and situated himself between the hegemonic understanding of what constituted
civilisation and the white supremacists' ideological assumption that it was Eurocentric.
Luthuli was thus able to refashion his consciousness as an heir to civilisation and co-
participant in its perennial evolution and hence, resist Apartheid. Raymond Williams
insisted correctly that hegemony, though insidiously invasive, is never total. 12 In his
autobiography, Luthuli explained:
I am angered by the Nationalist gibe nowadays that such schools as this
one [Edendale], or Adams College, or St. Peter's, Rosettenville, turned out
"Black Englishmen". It was no more necessary for pupils to become
black Englishmen than it was for the teachers to become white Africans.
Two cultures met, both Africans and Europeans were affected by the
meeting. Both profited and both survived enriched. At Edendale, at
Adams, and informally at other times, I have been taught by European
mentors. I am aware of a profound gratitude for what I learned. I remain
an African. I think as an African, I speak as an African, I act as an
African, and as an African I worship the God whose children we all are. I
do not see why it should be otherwise. 13
Within a broader context, Philippe Denis insightfully affinned Luthuli's sentiments:
In South Africa, as in other parts of the African continent, the
development of Christianity has been moulded by African initiatives. Far
from being "the duped and agent-less victims of processes beyond their
control", the local people tried to make use of the religion brought by the
missionaries to make sense of a world in rapid transformation. 14
12 Raymond WiIliam, Marxism and Literature (London: Oxford University, 1977), 109.
13 LuthuIi, Let My People Go, 31.
14 Denis, "From Church History to Religious History", 90. Denis cited:
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The reality that Congregationalism as a whole often failed to live up to its own
ideals within the context of southern Africa evangelism does not invalidate the potent
influence those ideals had on Luthuli. When it comes to accepting values, hypocrisy is
not an automatic disqualifier. Luthuli was highly critical of Smuts' hypocrisy, but that
did not diminish the impact Smuts' stated ideals had on Luthuli's politics. Smuts
exposed his hypocrisy when he pontificated about universal values of human civilisation
and then betrayed those values when reflecting and deciding upon the South African
context. Luthuli commented in his autobiography that abroad, Smuts was seen as a world
statesman of international repute while at home a relentless white supremacist.
There is a tendency nowadays to look back to the Smuts regime as a day
of restraint and just government. In point of fact however, the General did
not exert his undoubted influence to extend a helping hand to the masses
who groaned under disabilities, and it was he who gave Hertzog the power
to disenfranchise the few African votes. 15
Disappointingly, the western democracies ultimately failed to see in the ANC
Luthuli's embodiment of their highest aspirations and subsequently provided succour for
the opposite with their continued investment in Apartheid South Africa. Luthuli was not
blind to the chasm between the western world's ideals and its practice. He wrote a
correspondence to Peace News in 1963 that excoriated western democracies that were
complicit in South Africa's oppression of its black population.
To the nations and governments of the world, particularly those directly or
indirectly giving aid and encouragement to this contemptible Nationalist
regime, I say: Cast aside your hypocrisy and deceit. Declare yourself on
the side of oppression if that is your sincere design. Do not think we will
be deceived by your pious protestations as long as you are prepared to
condone, assist and actively support the tyranny in our land ...No
Elizabeth Elbourne, "Early Khoisan Uses of Mission Christianity", in Missions and Christianity,
Bredekamp and Ross, 65.
15 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 98.
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expression of concern, no platitudes about injustice will content us. The
test is action - against oppression. 16
Like King ("I Have a Dream"), Luthuli was an optimist. Luthuli conceived that
all human beings, though perhaps at different stages, were naturally progressing forward,
for the better, both scientifically and socially. Education, academic and spiritual, was the
key to unlocking human potential. Luthuli's optimism perhaps placed a 'brake' on any
imprudent impatience for the attainment of human rights through violent means. Luthuli
never wavered from his convictions, despite the fact that the National Party regime's
intractable racism and thirst for power ultimately undermined at every stage his
understanding that history was inevitably progressive. King utilised the Declaration of
Independence and the stated ideals of the American dream to persuade others who shared
those same ideals yet failed to implement them that equality for African-Americans must
be realised. Likewise, what enabled the dynamic between Congregational ism and
Luthuli to be reciprocal in nature is that he influenced the western world, Christianity and
even Congregationalism in his implementation of their stated ideals. Both tormented by
the ideal, Luthuli politically demonstrated Congregationalism on a practical plane and
Congregationalism theologically inspired him on an ideal plane.
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